Operation Sharp Edge

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Protecting civilians abroad is a job Navy and Marine amphibious forces do frequently—but never routinely. This operation showed the team at its best—but the Middle East dominated the news and few have heard of it.

From 5 August 1990 until 21 August 1990, the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) executed classic MEU (SOC) missions: ► Protection and evacuation of noncombatants ► Security operations ► Show of force

On 27 May 1990, the 22d MEU (SOC)—then serving as Landing Force Sixth Fleet—left the Mediterranean for coastal waters off Monrovia, Liberia, in response to con­tinued unrest and threats to U.S. citizens and property. Little has been written about the operation, which was overshadowed by Iraq’s seizure of Kuwait and the subse­quent U.S. and coalition buildup.

Nevertheless, Operation Sharp Edge highlighted the unique capabilities of the Navy-Marine Corps team to de­ploy rapidly a sea-based force capable of remaining on station indefinitely, prepared to conduct special operations with particular emphasis on the evacuation and protection of noncombatants.

Background: Liberia has had a long-standing relation­ship with the United States and is the location of a number of important U.S. telecommunications sites. The major cities are Monrovia, the capital; Buchanan, an important port; and Harbel, just south of the Firestone rubber planta­tion—the largest in the world (see Figure 1).

On 12 April 1980, a coup led by Army Master Sergeant Samuel K. Doe overthrew the government, suspended the constitution and imposed martial law. A new constitution was drafted and on 15 October 1985 elections were held. Elected president, Doe was inaugurated on 16 January 1986.

In December 1989, Charles Taylor, a Gio tribesman, began an insurgency against the Doe government. Taylor, a former director of the Liberian General Services Admin­istration, had been accused of corruption and had fled the country. His insurgent organization became the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), and was initially com­posed of 100-200 hard-core members. The organization grew as dissatisfaction with Doe increased; as the NPFL gained strength, elements began a slow advance toward Monrovia.

During pre-deployment training, the 22d MEU staff had focused on Liberia as a potential trouble spot, gathering intelligence continuously; indications were that the NPFL might bog down during the approaching rainy season.

Representatives from the staff of the Commander-in­Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, briefed the 22d MEU (SOC) staff on the situation when the unit arrived in the Mediterranean, and provided maps, photography, and other valuable background information. Preliminary “What if...” sessions focused on possible courses of action, should the unit be employed.

Deployment: In late May, the Marines were conducting routine training ashore in France while Amphibious Squadron Four (PhibRon Four) ships—the Saipan (LHA- 2), Ponce (LPD-15), and Sumter (LST-1181)—were un­dergoing an upkeep period in Toulon, France.

The Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 2/4, Marine Me­dium Helicopter Squadron (HMM)-261 (Reinforced), and MEU Service Support Group (MSSG)-22 were training at Camp De Canjuers, France. The squadron’s AV-8B de­tachment was shore-based at Hyeres Naval Air Station, east of Toulon.

On 25 May 1990 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed PhibRon Four to embark the Marines and proceed to the vicinity of Monrovia, prepared to evacuate noncombatants and conduct security operations at key U. S. installations. The order came as no surprise, and the ships departed Toulon on 27 May.

An initial plan was presented to the Commander, Sixth Fleet on 28 May. This quick response was a direct result of the emphasis placed on rapid-reaction planning during all MEU (SOC) training. Although use of other forces was considered, it became apparent at this point that the “mar­itime option” was the preferred course of action.

Command relationships: Under normal command rela­tionships in the Mediterranean, the Landing Force, Sixth Fleet—in this case the 22d MEU (SOC)—is designated Task Force 61 and the amphibious squadron—in this case, PhibRon Four—is Task Force 62. Traditional blue-green amphibious relationships exist for planning and execution, i.e., parallel planning prior to embarkation as Com­mander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF), and Com­mander, Landing Force (CLF), for execution.

Because Sharp Edge was a maritime operation, the U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Europe (USCinCEur), designated Commander, Sixth Fleet, as Commander, Joint Task Force (COMJTF), to facilitate adding additional forces, if required. The MEU and the PhibRon reported directly to COMJTF.

Command relationships were clear. All elements of the Sixth Fleet and CinCEur staffs worked closely with the MEU and the PhibRon.

The Commander, Sixth Fleet, attached the USS Peter­son (DD-969) to the task force to provide an improved signals intelligence and naval gunfire capability. As the situation unfolded, this decision proved fortuitous.

As the MEU transited the Strait of Gibraltar, the latest maps were flown to the ships and a forward command element (FCE), led by the MEU’s executive officer, was flown to Rota, Spain. The FCE’s mission was to fly to Monrovia, establish contact with the U.S. Embassy, and provide detailed information to the forces afloat.

Communication with the Sixth Fleet headquarters was maintained on two satellite nets, and the European com­mand net was monitored on the bridge of the Saipan. The Sharp Edge net was also the primary means of communi­cating with the FCE at the embassy. High frequency (HF) radio was used as a backup. Ultra-high-frequency (UHF) radio nets were used when the ships arrived off Monrovia.

The forward combat element included the battalion ex­ecutive officer, the officers-in-charge (OICs) of the SEAL and Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO)

detachments, and a radio operator. The SEAL OIC pro­vided valuable beach and hydrographic information while the ANGLICO OIC, an aviator, gave timely and accurate analysis of proposed landing zones. The BLT executive officer provided tactical assessments from the ground combat element perspective and the MEU executive offi­cer dealt with embassy officials (to include the ambassa­dor) as the direct representative of COMJTF, the 22d MEU, and PhibRon Four. The team landed at Monrovia’s Roberts International Airport on 31 May, after a flight from Rota in a Navy C-130 (see Figure 2).

As the situation deteriorated, particularly in Monrovia, the requirement to reinforce the embassy assumed higher priority. This made it imperative to get a helicopter-borne force within range of Monrovia as quickly as possible. Even steaming at more than 20 knots, the Saipan could not close this distance until 3 June. Accordingly, a CH-46 and a 75-man security force composed of a reinforced rifle platoon and a SEAL detachment were embarked on the Peterson to sprint ahead of the Saipan at 30 knots.

The Peterson arrived off Monrovia on 2 June, 24 hours ahead of the Saipan. The situation changed, however, and the Peterson's force was not immediately required. On 3 June, the security force returned to the Saipan.

During the transit to Monrovia the forward command element relied on satellite communications to maintain contact with the forces afloat. This link provided indispen­sable updates on the situation ashore and enabled all ele­ments of the Marine expeditionary unit to conduct realistic rehearsals for possible action ashore.

Execution: During June and July and into the first days of August, the NPFL and a splinter group, the Indepen­dent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) under Prince Johnson, slowly tightened the noose around Mon­rovia. U.S. forces continued to rehearse possible actions— day and night—at least once a week. The MEU issued ammunition, used role-players to simulate evacuees, and conducted mass-casualty drills. No-notice rehearsals were also held, and all evolutions received immediate critiques.

All hands became familiar with planned landing zones, debarkation, ammunition issue, treatment of casualties, handling of evacuees, and the rules of engagement.

At the end of July, fighting around the U.S. embassy intensified and the MEU was placed on a one-hour alert, as possible reinforcements. The killing of approximately 200 civilians at the Lutheran Church of Monrovia added a new sense of urgency to the situation.

On 4 August, Prince Johnson threatened to take U.S. hostages. That evening, the U. S. ambassador advised the forces afloat that he was requesting assistance from the National Command Authority. Shortly thereafter, the forces afloat were directed to:

• Secure the U.S. embassy with a reinforced rifle com­pany
• Evacuate embassy personnel, U.S. citizens, and desig­nated foreign nationals from the U.S. embassy and area telecommunications receiver and transmitter sites.
• Provide logistics support to the U.S. embassy.

At sea, the Navy and Marine Corps staffs met at 2100 (local time) 4 August on board the Saipan to refine the plan. A final brief was conducted at 0500 on 5 August.

Few changes were required; L-hour (touchdown in the LZ) was set for 0900 the same day—5 August.

All ships closed to within six nautical miles of Monro­via that morning. HMM-261 helicopters launched with visibility restricted by rain. Predeployment and shipboard training, which emphasized flight operations in reduced visibility, paid dividends; the helicopter crews found their landing zones without incident (see Figure 3).

Five CH-46s landed a rifle platoon from Echo Company in LZ Dove at the area telecommunications office (ATO) receiver site; by 0913, 18 U.S. citizens were on their way out. Within minutes, the platoon followed them.

Two CH-46s and one CH-53D another of Echo Com­pany’s platoons in LZ Condor at the ATO transmitter site; by 0929, three U.S. citizens and all the Marines were on their way to the Saipan.

Simultaneously, a mix of CFl-46s and CH-53Ds landed Hotel Company (Reinforced)—234 Marines and six fast attack vehicles—in LZ Magic at the U.S. Embassy. The company set up security and deployed heavy weapons and 60-mm. mortars to cover likely avenues of approach and planned targets. Defensive positions were established at each gate and Marines patrolled the Embassy perimeter; 40 U.S. citizens and foreign nationals were processed at the Embassy and flown to safety on the Saipan.

AH-IT attack helicopters and UH-1N command-and- control helos orbited all three LZs ready to provide close- in fire support; two AV-8Bs maintained a five-minute alert on the Saipan's flight deck. The Peterson was positioned in a predetermined fire support area three miles west of Bushrod Island to provide naval gunfire support.

Daily, from 6 August through 21 August 1990, 22d MEU (SOC) helicopters continued to evacuate U.S. citi­zens and foreign nationals from the embassy. On 16 and

Operation Sharp Edge forces in Liberia coordinated flights to multiple landing zones, evacuation by helicopter and landing craft, face-to-face negotiations with rebel forces, and flights to yet an­other country—Sierra Leone.

Most of these evolutions took place under threat of attack and more than 1,600 civilians were evacuated, most of whom were not U.S. citizens.

Reliable satellite communica­tions made the job a lot easier.

But there is an organiza­tional reason behind the prow­

ess displayed during Sharp Edge—the decision to give Marine Expeditionary Units a special operations capabil­ity. This decision drove equipment and training require­ments; it cost money and time—but the evidence to date shows it was the right thing to do. The Cold War may be over, but the flex­ibility provided by the com­bination of a U.S. Navy Amphibious Squadron and a Marine Expeditionary Unit will be needed over­seas indefinitely.

Marines provided security at the U.S. embassy in Monro­via. Navy and Marine Corps helicopters flew citizens from countries other than the United States to Freetown, Sierra Leone, where they were repatriated.