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As the “Mother of All Battles” turns into the “Mother of All Retreats,” it has exposed a number of lessons for us to learn or relearn. That said, let’s wade right in.
Amphibious Operations
Planning, as always, proved to be critical in a chain of events that addressed an assault, then a raid, and, finally, a feint. The time-line for execution proved to be exceedingly difficult to forecast, implement, and meet. Three major obstacles delayed operations: mine clearing, weather conditions, and the question of whether the anticipated operation actually contributed to the commander-in-chiefs overall campaign plan. The delays, which were also greatly affected by a significant enemy threat, brought the wisdom of conducting any amphibious operation into question. The limited area in which any operation could occur further exacerbated the problem. The Marines faced the prospect of having to land and attack into Iraqi strength. The only value of a continued effort to conduct an amphibious operation was that the Iraqis expected such a move and committed significant forces to counter the landing that never came. The deception worked, even if it did tie up a considerable amount of our assets, too.
Amphibious doctrine appears to have been disregarded. One can only surmise that all the doctrinal planning was done and subsequent documents drafted. This was not in evidence at higher staff levels, however. A lot of second-guessing followed. To confuse the situation further, a new vocabulary of expressions and phrases replaced the standard terminology. Fortunately, telephone communications held, and the various staffs worked through problems as they cropped up. Maybe that was part of the overall deception plan; if so, it also worked (on us, too).
Naval Gunfire Support
Naval Gunfire Support (NGFS) became critical to the Navy’s support of the ground campaign. The battleships’ big guns definitely have a place in naval and ground operations. Sadly, the same cannot be said for the five-inch guns, which we never brought into action.
It was a matter of great fortune that the battleships were already activated and available to contribute to the war effort.
The concept of NGFS employment was slow in evolving, and failed to consider all the potential users. There was concern that apportionment was unduly constrained as a result of politics rather than military reasons. Once the ice was broken, NGFS became a major contributor in breaking the Iraqis’ will to fight.
We need to work on applying doctrine, or changing it. We did not use the standard documents associated with naval gunfire support, which resulted in confusion. We need to familiarize the Army with the current concept of NGFS, as well as its capabilities and limitations. Supporting documentation, such as lists of targets, fire support overlays, and standard naval gunfire support plans also require review. A number of Navy and Marine Corps personnel would benefit from this study, too.
There was hesitation in the allocation of firing platforms because of the considerable mine threat. And because we did not employ the five-inch gun platforms, some questioned the Navy’s overall support of the ground campaign. We massaged NGFS until it worked.
On the brighter side, the battleship crews showed exceptional innovation in using remotely piloted vehicles to generate valid targets, and to obtain battle damage assessments (BDA) from their firing missions. That may have helped solve the greatest problem of NGFS—communication.
Battle Damage Assessment
The accuracy of BDA reports left much to be desired. If you believed everything you read, the U.S. Navy sank the entire Iraqi Navy a number of times. Loose terminology also created confusion at a time when factuality was crucial. Ambiguity must be reduced to the lowest possible level. It would be better to report “target(s) missed” than to pass “hits in target area.” Granted, pilots had their hands full with enemy tire and the effects of weather and other artificial impediments (i.e., smoke from the oil fires), but the impact of inaccurate reports must be properly weighed against submitting ambiguous reports. We still have much work to do on BDA.
General H. Norman Schwarzkopf set the date for the attack—21 February, later delayed for in-theater reasons to 23 February.
As D-Day drew near, U.S. naval forces concentrated in the northern Persian Gulf for a possible amphibious assault. Unfortunately, on 18 February Iraqi mines damaged the amphibious assault ship Tripoli (LPH-10) and the
Aegis cruiser Princeton (CG-59). The Tripoli remained combat capable, although she had a 20-foot x 20-foot hole blown in her bow. The Princeton, although still mission capable, returned to port. Clearly, the Iraqis, having had five months to mine the coastal approaches to Kuwait, had made a Marine landing problematic. U.S. amphibious and support forces nevertheless remained on station. On
• By Lieutenant Commander Michael C. Braunbeck, U.S. Navy
Mine Warfare
Another topic that came back to haunt us was the venerable, cheap, unexotic, and highly effective mine. Iraqi mines significantly affected our plans to conduct amphibious operations and employ NGFS. They also promise to occupy our attention for some time to come. They significantly damaged the USS Princeton (CG- 59) and Tripoli (LPH-10). It wasn’t that long ago that the Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58) provided us the same lesson. What did we learn?
Mines are still difficult to clear, and this war has shown that aerial mine-clearing measures are not the best way to address this problem. Six new mine countermeasures ships are not the best way, either. We need to stop waffling and get down to the business of building a force of real mine countermeasures ships. How many more ships must we sacrifice before the lightbulb comes on?
The Unconventional Threat
We witnessed massive oil slicks in the Persian Gulf that will have long-lasting effects on the environment. While that does not seem to be a military problem, the fact that we steam in the area of those slicks and make feed and fresh water from those polluted waters adds military operational significance to that act of environmental terrorism.
US NAVY (B MORRIS)
The other unconventional threat worth reviewing was the threat of the use of biological and chemical weapons against Navy and Marine Corps personnel (and everyone else, too). The lessons we learned were that simplicity in protective equipment design (i.e., masks and filters) and lightweight protective clothing are necessary to function in these threat environments. The climatology needs to be factored into future designs, too. Put on the gear we have now, and go into an operating fireroom if one has any doubt.
The battleships’ 16-inch guns (here, the Wisconsin's) were impressive during Desert Storm. In fact, there are reports that at the first signs of impending 16-inch gunfire—i.e., one of the battleships’ remotely piloted vehicles overhead to spot for the firing—Iraqi soldiers surrendered.
We need to update the training of all personnel in the latest self-protection equipment and techniques. We may not have the luxury of time in the next crisis.
There are many new experts on a host of topics as a result of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. I encourage those people to share their experiences so we get it all right the next time.
Commander Braunbeck was assigned as an augmentee to the Navy Desk of the Coalition, Coordination, Communication and Integration Center, throughout Desert Storm, in addition to his normal assignment to the Joint Section, U.S. Military Training Mission to Saudi Arabia.