Command and Control in the Coalition

This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected.  Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies.  Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue.  The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.

By Lieutenant General John H. Cushman, U.S. Army (Retired)

Command and control (C²) of a coalition military force, as for a single-nation force, takes place at four interlocking levels: political, strategic, opera­tional, and tactical. From the outset, the challenge to the Mideast coalition was to achieve superior performance at all four levels. The coalition had only one opportunity to do it right; it appears to have succeeded.

Political and Strategic Direction

Political and strategic direction is the product of a na­tion’s or coalition’s highest political and military authori­ties working in concert. A theater commander-in-chief joins the high military authorities in formulating strategic direction, while concurrently considering and carrying out his in-theater strategic direction.

The Mideast coalition resembles that of the Korean War, but only in that United Nations (U.N.) Security Council resolutions authorize its members’ actions. The differences are striking. In 1950, the Soviet Union was boycotting Security Council meetings; today it is a partner of the United States. In 1950, the Security Council pro­vided for a single U.S.-led U.N. command; today, there is no such structure. In 1950, U.S. forces went to war imme­diately and were unprepared; this time, the United States and its allies had more than five months to prepare their air and sea forces, and even longer to ready their ground forces. And in 1990, the scene is the Middle East, which vastly complicates the political and strategic equation.

Quickly after Iraq’s seizure of Kuwait, the Security Council defined the objectives of the emerging coalition: Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, restoration of Kuwait’s former regime, security of Saudi Arabia from Iraqi attack, and release of the people whom the Iraqis held against their will. All have essentially been achieved. Beyond calling immediately for an embargo enforced by U.N. members’ military action—and four months later author­izing members to use “all necessary means” to force Iraqi compliance with the U.N. objectives—the Security Coun­cil provided no political or strategic direction. Not only has the United States led the coalition and committed by far the greatest share of military might, but, in close con­tact with other key nations and with their evident consent, it has been the moving force and the de facto drafter and coordinator of political and strategic direction. Looking at the orders that may have been given to Commander-in­Chief U.S. Central Command (CinCCent) General Nor­man Schwarzkopf can provide a clearer idea of this U.S.

direction.

If the form followed that of the classic February 1944 directive by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to General Dwight D. Eisenhower for the invasion of Europe— keeping in mind the fact that Eisenhower’s command au­thority as Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces far exceeded Schwarzkopf’s coordination au­thority—the orders would have read somewhat like this:

“[Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), for the U.S. Secretary of Defense, to Schwarzkopf] In your capacity as Commander-in-Chief U.S. Central Command, and with the agreement of all other members of the U.N. coalition, you are designated as the primary coordina­tor for the military operations of the U.N. coalition forces in and near Saudi Arabia responsive to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.”

Task

“When directed by the Secretary of Defense, you will undertake and coordinate operations aimed at the destruction of Iraqi armed forces and the libera­tion of Kuwait. In executing this task, you are au­thorized to conduct and to coordinate the conduct of sea operations in and from designated waters, air operations throughout Kuwait and Iraq, and land operations in Kuwait and into Iraq as necessary to recover and defend Kuwait and to destroy such Iraqi forces as immediately threaten Kuwait’s territory.

“Pending authority to execute the above task, you will defend and coordinate the defense of Saudi Ara­bia. Should Iraqi forces attack Saudi Arabia, you are authorized to conduct and to coordinate the conduct of defensive air, land, and sea operations, to include pursuit over Iraq’s territory.”

Command

“You are responsible to the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman JCS. Under the provisions of Joint Publication 1-01, Unified Action Armed Forces, you will have combatant command of all assigned U.S. forces. The governments of the United Kingdom [and others as named] have agreed that their forces present will be under your opera­tional control. Forces of Saudi Arabia [and others as named] will cooperate according to arrangements for

coordination that you work out with each national commander. Direct communication with national representatives of nations in the U.N. coalition force is authorized to facilitate operations and to arrange necessary logistics.”

Logistics

“The responsibility for logistics support of na­tional forces will rest with the respective nations; this can include logistics agreements between na­tions. You will be responsible for coordinating the logistics requirements and activities of the forces present in the coalition and for bringing to the atten­tion of the Chairman JCS logistics deficiencies that will impede your operations.”

Coordination of Operations of Other Forces!Agencies

“In furtherance of the United Nation’s aim of lib­erating Kuwait, a coordinated program of special operations is now in action. You may recommend any variation in these activities that may seem desir­able.”

Reestablishment of Civil Governments and Liberated Allied Territories and Administration of Enemy Territories

“Instructions for the reestablishment of civil gov­ernment in Kuwait and for the administration of Iraqi territories taken by your forces will be issued at a later date.”

Details such as the following, not in the Eisenhower directive, are probably called for today:

“Use of nuclear and lethal chemical weapons is not contemplated .... Taking into account the need to be militarily effective and to avoid unnecessary military

The initial political and stra­tegic direction of either coali­tion or unilateral warfare must come from the highest level. In the case of the Gulf War, such direction from the U.N. Security Council was so limited that the United States had to become the de facto drafter and coordinator. (Left to right, the JCS Chairman, General Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney confer with General Norman Schwarzkopf, the Theater Commander.)

casualties, make every effort to limit damage to non­combatants, religious structures, and the civil infra­structure of Kuwait and Iraq.

“The aims of your air campaign will be to gain full freedom of air action; to deny Iraq any use of its air and fleet; to destroy Iraq’s capabilities to produce nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons; and to greatly re­duce its army’s ability to fight.

“Your land campaign will aim to destroy Iraqi forces in and threatening Kuwait and to liberate Kuwait. You are authorized to permit Iraq to make the first offensive move, which, if made, you will defeat decisively, thereupon taking up an offensive that destroys the op­posing Iraqi forces and achieves the liberation of Ku­wait. You will, however, prepare a land campaign that takes the offensive when directed, in the event Iraq does not attack on land.”

One can surmise that this is roughly the guidance Gen­eral Schwarzkopf received; that he probably participated in its formulation; and that it was essentially in place by early November. President George Bush’s decision at that time to double the size of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia likely reflected the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s and General Schwarzkopf’s judgment as to the forces required to carry it out. And the late November U.S.-led action in the U.N. Security Council (Secretary of State James Baker in the chair), which set the 15 January deadline for Saddam Hus­sein to withdraw from Kuwait, probably reflected General Schwarzkopf’s thinking as to when the air campaign could start, with the land campaign to begin a month or so later when land reinforcements were ready to fight. Mean­while, it is likely that General Schwarzkopf and his coali­tion team were developing their in-theater plans so that when President Bush directed the plan’s execution, key allies having agreed, the coalition force could begin coor­dinated operations according to those plans. From the first, General Schwarzkopf would have been under no illu­sion that Arab contingents of the coalition force would come under his operational command; so he would have set about building a framework for operations that would work even under that circumstance.

Operational and Tactical Direction

In modern war, C² at the operational and tactical levels where the fighting takes place is very much a matter of command-and-control systems.¹ Using their respective C² systems linked with those of others, battle participants throughout the force seek to see the situation, decide what to do, and do it. C² and its systems are thus critical to a force’s collective skill. Skill gets the job done quickly; skill also saves lives. The Mideast force required the ut­most in skill, and hence in C² system quality.

As Karl von Clausewitz said, “Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The diffi­culties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war.’’² Immeasurably more fast moving and technically complex than in Clausewitz’s time, war remains the domain of fric-

Older strategic and tactical concepts of warfare—divided into functional components of land, sea and air—have given way to the realization that land-based air forces, sea-based forces, and land forces each can engage in all three forms of warfare. The challenge is to create the most effective amalgam of combat power, across the board.

tion—information is late, uncertain, or inaccurate; orders are issued on wrong information and are not understood, not carried out, or carried out at the wrong time. Each commander most wants his C² system to ameliorate fric­tion and reduce uncertainties.

The Mideast theater’s war was an intricate amalgam of sea, air, and air/land warfare. In principle, land-based air forces can engage in each form of warfare (for example, they can provide close air support in air/land warfare, and air reconnaissance in sea warfare). Sea-based forces can likewise engage in all three (they offer close air support and amphibious operations in air/land warfare, and offen­sive counterair in air warfare). Land forces can do the same (providing high-altitude air defense in air warfare, and forcible-entry airborne seizure of an advanced fleet base in sea warfare). The three kinds of forces are highly effective in a single context; the Mideast challenge was to combine them in the three forms of warfare.

Arriving in August at his Central Command (CentCom) forward headquarters and judging that Saddam Hussein had missed his chance to attack southward, General Schwarzkopf could infer, if he had not been told, his mis­sion: liberate Kuwait. He could estimate the enemy, im­pressive indeed. He could see before him the vast area of operations, with Kuwait as its focal point. He could calcu­late the time, force, and logistics factors of the troop flow into the region. His requirement was to plan a theater cam­paign and to orchestrate its subordinate air, sea, and land campaigns.³ He faced fundamental decisions on how to

organize and direct the U.S. parts, which he commanded, of the emerging coalition force and how to bring the re­mainder together.

General Schwarzkopf’s U.S. forces came to him in components:

• Army forces of Central Command (ArCent)—Third U.S. Army
• Marine forces of Central Command (MarCent)—I Ma­rine Expeditionary Force
• Navy forces of Central Command (NavCent)—Seventh Fleet
• Air Force forces of Central Command (CentAF)— Ninth Air Force

Each had a three-star commander.⁴ CinCCent evidently decided to build his U.S. war-fighting team around these four commanders and, in so doing, to place behind each one’s effort the full energy and resources of his armed service. Over these components, Schwarzkopf wielded powerful new team-building authorities, given by the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986. Among them: “authorita­tive direction over all aspects of military operations . . . prescribing the chain of command . . . organizing [subor­dinate] commands and forces as he considers necessary ■ . . employing forces as he considers necessary ... as­signing command functions to subordinate commanders” and more.⁵ General Schwarzkopf was able to pull together his U.S. forces as tightly as he wished. Owning by far the largest coalition contingent, he could then persuade other nations’ smaller contingents to join his team in the interest

U.S. AIR FORCE (C. PUTMAN) of accomplishing the common mission.

Air warfare is simple to summarize but complex to carry out well. It entails writing each day an air tasking order that spells out what each single- or multi-aircraft mission—from air refuelers, to defensive fighter cover, to air-defense suppression and ground attack—will do, at what place, and at what minute. The success of Desert Storm’s multinational air campaign, stunningly initiated and by all accounts well managed, stems directly from Goldwater-Nichols’s authorities and General Schwarzkopf’s delegating approach. Any U.S. joint force commander can now designate a single air authority, known as the joint force air component commander (JFACC), for the “planning, coordination, allocation and tasking” of all tactical air in the force, regardless of its service component—an authority heretofore not available to joint commanders in war.⁶ The commander of CentAF, with his tactical air control center partially staffed by peo­ple from other services and nations, was CinCCent’s JFACC. Other nations’ air forces conformed to the com-

Air warfare is conducted through “frag” orders that cover every single- or multi-aircraft mission—even such support missions as Air Force aerial refueling of Navy aircraft. For close coordination of air assets (bottom, two Air Force F-15s, one Saudi F-5), tactical air control cen­ters are manned by representatives of Coalition air forces (here, U.S. and Saudi), to ensure that sorties reach their targets without conflict or confusion en route.