This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
By Lieutenant Commander J. V. P. Goldrick, Royal Australian Navy
The Royal Malaysian Navy—and its fellow ASEAN members—will march smartly into the next century as the Pacific’s Western Rim gains prominence in the world’s economy. The ASEAN navies—including (top to bottom) a Malaysian frigate, a patrol boat from Singapore, an Indonesian patrol boat, and a Thai frigate—participated in the Royal Malaysian Navy’s fleet review.
The year 2001 will mark the beginning of the Century of the Pacific. Despite the promise of prosperity in a Europe no longer divided by the East-West confrontation, every statistic of international development points to Pacific western rim domination of the world economy. Prominent among the states involved are the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Five out of six—Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia—have already achieved rates of growth and economic strength that would have been unthinkable only 25 years ago. Only the Philippines continue to be hamstrung by internal dissent and insurrection.
In no small measure, the Western world’s welfare is becoming linked with the prosperity of these states. Aside from their economic role, they have a powerful influence on the stability of a region that has great strategic significance. Although ASEAN is not a military alliance, it acts as a counterbalance to the activities of both China and the Soviet Union. By maintaining a united front on geopolitical matters, notably the future of Cambodia, ASEAN has demonstrated that Southeast Asia is a community of nations with common strategic interests.
In the military sphere, the ASEAN states have been independently pursuing well-ordered programs of development that have radically improved their capability to defend themselves by land and sea. Their navies have been notable beneficiaries, but the implications of such advances have not yet received much attention from inter-
fmnt
national commentators who have been preoccupied with issues involving East-West relations.1 Even in Southeast Asia itself, the superpower bases at Cam Ranh Bay and Subic Bay have been more in the limelight than the modern and highly capable Malaysian facility at Lumut or the Indonesian shipbuilding effort at Surabaya.
'This must change. The six ASEAN navies deserve attention from the West because they must be major contributors to regional stability; and it is in the interests of all the Western powers—not merely in the Pacific—to maintain this stability. By acting now to develop and strengthen relations, the U.S. Navy and the navies of other concerned powers will be doing much to demonstrate the interdependence of the trading nations; all depend on the area’s security and on the free passage of seaborne trade.
Developments
Table 1 shows the timing and extent of the acquisitions in each ASEAN navy for the last 20 years. Some important points become clear in examining the statistics. The first concerns the lack of progress in the Philippines. Although some new construction may be in the offing for the Republic’s navy, it is clearly a decade behind its sister services. The second point concerns the acceleration of development—the mid- and late 1980s saw much more
activity than the previous decade. While material acquisitions in the late 1990s may be less remarkable, improved training and operational standards, better maintenance facilities, and, in particular, more sophisticated logistic support will most likely mean much greater effectiveness.
Even in 1990, the larger ASEAN navies are most interested in these areas. The Malaysian submarine project has been noteworthy for the Royal Malaysian Navy’s insistence on achieving the right combination of boat, training programs, and material support. Despite some importuning by British industry to buy commercially refitted Porpoise-class diesel submarines “on the cheap,” the Malaysian Navy has been loath to follow such a path.
The table also shows that each of the ASEAN navies has followed a broadly similar process of force structure development in recent years. All the navies have moved from being purely “constabulary” to “inshore territorial defense” and thence to “offshore territorial defense.”' After this stage, however, the progress of the ASEAN navies does not fit wholly within the terminology that Eric Grove outlines;3 “adjacent force protection” does not quite describe forces that are not, in general, more longlegged than implied by the term “offshore” but that do have a capacity to protect commerce from threats above and below water. This means much more than a capability confined to “territorial” defense. This at least tacit admis-
Table 1 ASEAN Naval Developments 1970-1990
Type of Service Ships/Equipment Date of Achievement (post-1970)
Navy: | Philippines | Malaysia | Indonesia | Singapore | Thailand | Brunei |
Constabulary Patrol Craft | Pre-1970 | Pre-1970 | Pre-1970 | Pre-1970 | Pre-1970 | 1967 |
Landing Ships | Pre-1970 | 1974 | Pre-1970 | 1971 | Pre-1970 |
|
Coastal Fast Attack Craft |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Defense (Gun/Tor) |
| 1976 | Pre-1970 | 1971 | 1983 | 1967 |
Fast Attack Craft |
|
|
|
|
|
|
(Missile) |
| 1972 | 1979 | 1972 | 1976 | 1978 |
Offshore Corvettes/OTH Missiles |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Defense and Targetting |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Systems |
| 1984 | 1979 | 1989 | 1986 | 1994tt |
Shipborne helicopters |
| 1988 | 1980 |
| 1992(?) | 1994tt |
Sea Lane ASW Systems** |
| 1984 | 1979 | 1989 | 1983 | 1994ft |
Defense MCMV |
| 1985 | 1988 | Proj | Pre-1970 |
|
Mar. Patrol Aircraft | 1979 |
|
| 1991 (?) | 1979 | 1989 |
Submarines |
| 1993(?) | 1981 |
|
|
|
**In this context, “ASW Systems” include modern solid-state hull sonars and homing torpedoes/medium-range mortars, but not older sonars | short-range | |||||
mortars/Hedgchog, or depth charges. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
##MCMVs are taken to include vessels with a capability for modern mine hunting. |
|
|
|
| ||
‘♦♦Indonesia possessed up to a dozen Whiskey-class submarines, given by the Soviet Union circa 1960. None of these remain operational and the standards | ||||||
achieved were never comparable to the Type 209s now in service. |
|
|
|
|
| |
; ttBrunei projects a buy of at least three sophisticated corvettes, designated OPV but with an SSM and (possible) ASW capability, together with a helicopter deck. | ||||||
At the time of writing the original order with a British firm (Vosper Thorncycroft) had been cancelled and new | tenders are being sought. |
| ||||
Source: Jane's Fighting Ships. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
I
sion that a responsibility exists to protect trade is another sign of the transition of ASEAN out of the underdeveloped World. If the nations concerned did not feel that they had something to protect in seaborne commerce, the funds Would not be available.
The Common Strategic Interest_____________
Because maritime development has taken these directions, some could argue that it is not of a destabilizing nature. Such incremental increases in self-defense capabilities must reduce the possibility of maritime action by any aggressor nation and thus should reduce the ASEAN nations’ apprehensions.
It would be disingenuous to argue that the ASEAN navies’ capabilities include no capacity for power projection, but the extent of such capacity when weighed against any Possibility of sophisticated opposition is so limited that these services are and will probably remain fundamentally defensive. The demands of coastal and exclusive economic zone surveillance and security, the defense of ports and harbors, and the protection of trade are more than enough to keep each one of the navies very busy indeed. The fact that each one of the larger ASEAN navies, as Well as other regional powers, regards these requirements as force structure determinants is proof enough that common maritime strategic interests exist on the Pacific western rim.
But can the activities of the ASEAN navies be coordinated to serve common strategic goals? And will that coordination involve the navies of other countries with a legitimate interest in what former U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Carlisle Trost has described as ‘‘the regional stability necessary for the expansion ot free markets and the growth of democracies? 4 The United States, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, Brunei, and Papua New Guinea fall into this category.
For the United States, cooperation could be a substitute for the reductions in U.S. global military activity foreshadowed in the fiscal year 1990 allocations. Equally, a community of regional navies would allay some of the concerns expressed in Southeast Asia over such reductions. This could be seen simply as a logical extension of the Nixon Doctrine. Even in the days of the 600-ship Navy, the U.S. fleet was no substitute for the basic assets other nations with maritime responsibilities require for their own protection. “Forward-deployed and combat- ready,” the U.S. Navy will continue, in Admiral Charles Larson’s words, to work at “keeping it all together," but most often as an instrument of last resort.5 All of the nations involved in joint activity, however, benefit at every level, from seagoing ships to chancelleries; this would greatly increase Southeast Asia’s stability.
The Coordination of Naval Activity
The coordination of naval activity can take a number of forms, of varying degrees of value.
Cooperation through Formal Alliance: Formal alliances historically are the firmest guarantee that the military forces of a number of powers will serve the best interests of all concerned. NATO is the most notable instance in the contemporary world; the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and the Central Treaty Organization are less durable examples in Asia. More successfully, the Five-Power Defence Agreement (FPDA), involving the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore, has resulted in workable joint operating procedures and regular multilateral exercises, such as Exercise Starfish.
But FPDA is an exception. ASEAN traditionally has been wary of formal multilateral military links, inside and outside of the ASEAN framework. In an increasingly complex and multipolar world, there seems little reason for it to change this attitude. The ASEAN militaries emphasize personal contacts, thereby sidestepping such vexed issues as territorial disputes in multilateral fora.6 In such an atmosphere ASEAN will achieve more through interaction at operational levels than through high-level agreements.
Navies as Tutors: More sophisticated navies can also act as both positive and negative role models. They can suggest the most profitable directions for future development, by assisting with the mechanics of the development, and by indicating the approaches the less-sophisticated navy should avoid.
Large navies have often provided this kind of help to smaller navies. The Royal Navy in particular assisted with the birth and early days of the Royal Malaysian Navy and the Royal Brunei Armed Forces Flotilla, not only for political reasons, but because of its duty as the former colonial power. The U.S. Navy has this kind of relationship, albeit more checkered, with the Republic of Philippines Navy. However, the developing nation often comes to resent its client status, and the larger navy frequently imposes procedures and doctrine on the smaller one without adequate thought to local conditions.
Arms Sales: More recently, in the intensely competitive arms trade arena, the navy of the selling nation often has to provide the training support for a new weapon system. Sometimes, as with Britain’s transfer to the Malaysian Navy of six Wasp helicopters at bargain prices, including flight instructors and expert ground staff, the selling nation hopes for a future sale of more sophisticated equipment (in this case, the Super Lynx). While Britain, France, and, the oft-forgotten Netherlands, continue to have residual interests in Southeast Asia, in the future they will concentrate less on strategic concerns and more on maintaining their shares of the market in arms sales. Subsidized support without an ulterior financial motive is becoming a thing of the past. Britain, for example, conducts an International Principal Warfare Officer Course for selected nations but rarely offers it free of charge. Although these countries’ ships will remain welcome in the region, on a navy-to-navy basis, future cooperation must lie in selected personnel exchanges, notably at the staff college level. Staff colleges are particularly useful vehicles because they involve extensive intellectual interaction anil conceptual study without raising issues of access to detailed—and thus highly classified—doctrine.
Support without Formalities: The third form of cooperation is a coordinated policy type of cooperation of support for strategic reasons without the ties of formal alliances; this has been less common but appears to have some merit. Since such activity is inherently managed more on a military rather than a diplomatic level, however, it runs the risk of clashing with changing political requirements. In addition, the hand that feeds has no guarantee that it will not be bitten. Finally, it is difficult to conduct such activities so that they not only serve a joint interest but avoid giving unnecessary offense to any other powers.
The military versus political argument can have two results in the context of ASEAN. Within Indonesia, in particular, the armed services play such a crucial role in the management of the nation that the distinction between military and political spheres is blurred. The goodwill created at operational levels may soon pay dividends elsewhere. Furthermore, given ASEAN’s reluctance to embark on formal multilateral undertakings, purely operational links may be more acceptable to the organization’s member governments, provided always that their operation is spread evenly throughout the community.
This latter element introduces the question of the views of the nations not directly involved. But the similarity ol strategic interests within the region is such that sclt- defensc measures for one should only be welcomed by all. Therefore, cooperation in limited antisurface warfare, mine countermeasures, and shallow-water antisubmarine warfare should not destabilize the region.
As to the risk that changes in political alignments might find the erstwhile cooperators in opposition to each other, their secrets known—this is a hazard of any international military activity. The state of ASEAN in 1990 would suggest that it is a risk well worth running.
Less quantifiable is the suggestion that there is value in encouraging cooperation and joint activities for their own sake. At its most basic, working together tends to diminish the suspicions that result from not knowing another nation’s intentions. Navies that form their unscheduled contacts at sea into impromptu passage exercises (PassExs) have that much less time to evolve self-fulfilling warplans. More important, by emphasizing areas such as mine countermeasures and ASW, joint activities highlight maritime nations’ dependence on and common interest in the free passage of trade.
Cooperation at Work—the U.S. Navy
Interaction between the Western alliance navies and ASEAN has already started. The United States has made many attempts with foreign military sales assistance, particularly with Thailand and, more recently, with Indonesia. U.S. Navy units have conducted PassExs and more formal exercises with several ASEAN nations, including
Thailand and Indonesia. Personnel attend U.S. technical schools and receive tactical training. ASEAN students attend the U.S. Naval War College and heads of ASEAN navies have been active participants in the International Sea Power Symposium sponsored by the Chief of Naval Operations in Newport, Rhode Island.
The future of these types of activities with ASEAN needs careful molding. First, all but the Philippines have little need for further outright material assistance, provided they can be allowed access to modern systems. Their requirements lie more in the areas of learning doctrine and gaining operational experience. The latter presents some difficulties for the U.S. Navy. While it can transfer information on individual systems, the U.S. Navy’s emphasis on carrier aviation and highly sophisticated oceanic antiair warfare and ASW make its operations less relevant to services attempting the transition from inshore to offshore territorial defense and basic commerce protection. The major multilateral activity in the Pacific, the biennial Rim of the Pacific (RimPac) exercise, now involves not only the United States, Australia, and Canada (with irregular participation by the United Kingdom), but Japan and—from 1990—South Korea. RimPac, however, has an oceanic slant, and it would not be easy to modify it to suit the archipelagic navies without losing much of its value for the current participants. The Politics of a new U.S. Navy-sponsored major exercise within the archipelago probably would be too complex, given the likely reaction of both the Soviet Union and China to the level of U.S. combatant activity this would entail.
One of the less obvious problems ot cooperation concerns access to information. Most allied material (NATO remains the repository of much of the maritime doctrine accumulated since the end of World War II) can only be released to third parties with the consent of all the other allied powers involved in its creation. The U.S. Navy, however, while cooperating fully with NATO, has consistently maintained national publications. Therefore, it has
The U.S. Navy can continue working with the ASEAN navies in both formal and informal exchanges, such as this one with Singapore’s Navy.
the advantage of having a “copyright on much information that would be of value to smaller navies and can ic- leasc this on a bi- or multilateral basis without much of a complication.
The best part the United States could play in Southeast Asia probably would be to provide a coherent program ol hardware support, which can, in most cases, be paid tor by the receiving nations at close to the market rate, lhe United States should also continue access to intellectual capital through trade and tactical schools, and staff and higher education facilities, such as the U.S. Naval War College. Practical exercises will have a place, but they should be on a small scale, concentrating on areas such as minesweeping. The one exception could be Naval Control of Shipping (NCS), a worldwide “club” that has many nations of the region as participants in regular exercises.
Cooperation at Work—the Medium Powers_
The region’s medium maritime powers, while constrained by political requirements and limitations on their own resources, have a unique role to play, which the U.S. Navy cannot replicate. Although much more sophisticated and capable in most areas than the ASEAN navies, the medium powers’ navies are small enough and their operational interests similar enough to make interaction relevant for both sides. If the United States can transfer doctrine, these nations can transfer operational expertise.
Two nations in particular fall into this category: Japan and Australia; New Zealand falls partially into it. Japan is unlikely to be active in the region for some years, unless some extraordinary change occurs in both its political and strategic situations. Japan has yet to permit arms sales overseas, and any level of technical assistance would be too easily associated with the intent to sell arms for it to be allowed. In addition, the Southeast Asian powers remain wary of any suggestion of a “Co-prosperity Sphere.” Nevertheless, Japanese ships are beginning to move farther afield. They have taken part in a number of RimPac exercises, most recently in May 1990; that same month, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force training squadron played a prominent role in the Malaysian Navy’s Fleet Review at Penang. Bilateral PassExs after port visits should give Japan a useful foot in the door during the next decade and provide a window for Southeast Asian navies into the requirements for frigate and destroyer operations.
In the Southwest Pacific, Australia has had some success with the Pacific patrol boat project, following the transfer of refurbished Attack-class patrol craft to Indonesia between 1973 and 1986.7 Australia also has sought to extend its links with Southeast Asian navies and Japan. In 1989 and 1990, for example, Australian naval units worked repeatedly with the FPDA nations and the navies of the Philippines, Brunei, and Thailand. In recent months, Australia has made efforts to improve its defense relationship with Indonesia and increase the frequency of bilateral exercises. It was Australia that initiated the West-
ern Pacific Naval Sea Power Symposium that brings together the heads of the region’s navies.
Australia and New Zealand are increasing their involvement with the ASEAN navies. The Australian Navy shows no sign of reducing its activities, and the trend of policy development, as evidenced by the 1987 Australia White Paper on Defence and more recent ministerial statements, suggest that the government views such involvement as a major facet of Australia’s activities in the region.
Similar attitudes are evident in New Zealand; plus it has the added spur of losing access to the U.S. Navy in the wake of the ban on nuclear-armed and -powered units. This means the New Zealand Navy must look in new directions for opportunities to involve its ships in challenging exercises.
Cooperation at Work—Intra-ASEAN
The ASEAN navies play their own part in stimulating cooperation. The Indonesian Navy conducted a successful multiship tour of Malaysia, Singapore, and Brunei under the designation Safari 90 in May and June of 1990. While this was at least partially a sales pitch for the new Indonesian-built FPB-57-class fast-attack and patrol craft, it also involved ambitious bilateral exercises with Singapore8 and, on a smaller scale, with Brunei. Malaysian and Thai naval units have worked together frequently, while courtesy visits among all five nations are common, and these visits are usually followed by a PassEx.
Future cooperative measures could include the progressive formulation of joint doctrine for operations, building upon the bilateral agreements and the common body of knowledge that already exists. Joint training programs and even joint facilities for training and exercises would have obvious political ramifications, but the benefits to the ASEAN navies would be enormous because they would allow real economies of scale. There are some possibilities here for the involvement of outside services with relevant expertise for specific areas.
Conclusion
An increasingly complex world demands flexible thinking. Much more will be gained by coordinated efforts to emphasize the coinciding national interests among the Pacific rim nations than by schemes for formal alliances.
The risk of destabilization with such cooperation are minimal. The areas in which cooperation would be most profitable relate to problems of surveillance, territorial and economic zone defense, and commerce protection. All maritime powers have these legitimate concerns.
The chances of duplication and interference in the activities of navies seeking to work with ASEAN also would be minimal, since ASEAN would always be able to refuse an offer or, more likely, suggest a modification. Untrammeled by formal alliances, the nature of cooperative activities also can be altered to meet changing requirements and skill levels.
Cooperation with ASEAN does not require an allembracing master plan to ensure coordination among the more capable navies of the region but a clear judgment as to the best way to advance the interests of each of the services concerned—on both sides of the arrangement. As the late Admiral Richard G. Colbert declared, “Domination leads to dependence, while true ‘partnership’ encourages the independence, pride and dignity of our sovereign allies.”9 'For regular surveys of the development of the ASEAN navies see J. V. P. Goldrick and P. D. Jones, Far Eastern Navies Review annually in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings March Foreign Navies edition from 1982 to date.
2Eric Grove, The Future of Sea Power (U.S. Naval Institute: Annapolis, MD, 1990) pp. 236-241. See also M. A. Morris, The Expansion of Third World Navies (Macmillan: London, 1987) and S. W. Haines “Third World Navies: Myths and Realities,” Naval Forces, April 1988.
3Eric Grove, The Future of Sea Power.
4Adm. C. A. H. Trost, USN “Maritime Strategy for the 1990s,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Naval Review Issue, May 1990, p. 97.
5Ibid, p. 98. See also Adm. C. R. Larson, USN, “National Interests and Naval Forces in the 1990s,” Naval War College Review, Winter 1990, Volume XLIII. Nol, p. 9.
6It is no coincidence (not at all laughable) that one of the most important events in the ASEAN military calendar should be the Armed Forces Golf Tournament—the 1990 competition brought with it the first visit of a Philippines Minister of Defence to Malaysia in 21 years. See Asian Defence Journal, May 1990, pp. 99-102. 7See Dora Alves, “The Pacific Patrol Boat,” Asian Pacific Defence Reporter, June 1990; see also Jane’s Fighting Ships 1989-90, p. 270. It is of interest that two of the eight units were transferred well before the Royal Australian Navy had any replacements (Fremantle-class fast patrol craft) ordered.
*The Straits Times (Singapore), Friday, 25 May 1990.
9Quoted in John B. Hattendorf, “International Naval Cooperation and Admiral Richard G. Colbert: The Intertwining of a Career with an Idea,” The RCN in Transition 1910-1985, W. A. B. Douglas[ed] (University of British Columbia Press, Vancouver, 1988) p. 251.
Commander Goldrick is currently the commanding officer of HMAS Cessnock. He has been coauthor of the Far Eastern Navies review in the International Navies issue of the Naval Institute Proceedings since 1982.