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Plan for the 21st Century Now
By John L. Petersen
It's heading our way at high-tech speed. If we're smart, we'll use the next two years to make big changes and get ready for it. If not the Navy will just limp along—wounded and behind the times.
The U.S. Navy of the 21st century is being designed and built today. Whatever we do or don’t do in the first half of the 1990s will fundamentally decide the Navy’s capabilities well into the first half of the next century. A unique confluence of historical events will make the coming years critical in the lives of all Navy people— and offer great opportunities.
A huge shift in the United States’s financial balance, the end of communism, and the beginning of the information age, all happening right now, will ensure that the Navy of the next century will be drastically different from the one we know.
Shift in the Financial Balance
The U.S. military has just walked off of a funding cliff and is beginning a free-fall that probably won’t end until 1995 or 1996. Both the causes, which are manifold, and the catalyst—the disintegration of the Soviet Union— have been well documented and analyzed. Graham- Rudman-Hollings and other budget problems guarantee that this funding downturn will be severe. Extra-budget spending for 1991, for example (which is in addition to an estimated deficit of $327 billion) includes the savings and loan bailout, all costs of Operation Desert Shield, new funding for the International Monetary Fund to compensate states in the anti-Iraq coalition, cancellation of Polish and Egyptian debts, and any increase in debt payments that attend higher interest rates. Huge, costly domestic pressures (such as the necessity to rebuild our physical infrastructure) are also growing. What the Navy, at all levels, must understand is that this train is on the track, with a full head of steam, and coming our way. It is inevitable and we must plan for it.
The funding decreases will be so large that it will be impossible to just “do less of the same thing.” Like bond brokers put on the street after the collapse of the junk bond market, the Navy will have to change the way it operates. It will have to restructure itself because there won’t be any other alternatives.
The question is whether this restructuring will be largely reactive and fragmented (and therefore inefficient and debilitating) or proactive and coherent (and positively synergetic). In the first case, a dollar’s worth of budget cut could result in multiple-dollar decreases in capability. In the latter, it would be possible to maintain—and in some cases increase—capability even in the face of serious funding erosion.
End of Communism
For the past 40 years the United States’s defense capability has been defined in terms of the Soviet threat. We have designed, built, and sold it on that basis. The Soviets have now gone away and we are left with a huge and costly apparatus for which, in traditional terms, there is no apparent need. The United States must therefore redefine the utility of its armed forces. What will national security mean in the near future, and what is the role of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines in that context? If the Navy does not lead in that redefinition, it will be done by others, and almost certainly in terms that do not fully take into consideration the unique advantages naval forces provide.
The Information Age
Scientific and technological advances are exploding at exponential rates. The projections are astounding: personal-size computers within five years with the capacity of a present Cray, desktop machines that are smarter than human beings by 2020, instantaneous telephone communications from any place on earth by the turn of the century , smart homes that respond to voice commands in five years, nanotechnological advances that may increase average lifetimes past 100 years within 20 years. This tidal wave of discoveries and inventions is now producing data and information at such great rates that it is estimated to be doubling worldwide every four or five years.
The information technology that is the engine for this revolution will fundamentally transform the Navy in the same way that steam power, nuclear power, and aircraft did only this time it will be much faster and the effect will be much more comprehensive. The inevitability of this trend is obvious; one must only observe the ubiquitous and indispensable nature of personal computers and consider that the life cycle for computer technology is now only one and a half to three years. Prices are coming down, applications are increasing geometrically—there is proliferation down to the lowest levels.
Therein lies the big problem: interconnectedness and compatibility. If every command is allowed to respond to the muses of the era independently, the Navy will wind up with thousands of different kinds of systems and databases, none of which easily transfers data to the others. Some Navy analysts believe the cost to convert data from all of these disparate formats to all others could overcome the advantage of automating, ending with a bird’s nest of complexly interwoven but incompatible systems.
So we are faced with three inevitable trends: precipitously decreasing funding, causing certain restructuring and possible havoc; the utility of the military being redefined in terms that reflect a new understanding of the future, and the virus of information technology, which has infected the whole system and will either be a godsend or a disaster. How the Navy responds to these trends will define the core capability that it will have to build on for decades to come.
How does a self-admitted conservative and bureaucratic organization respond effectively to these “threats”? HoW do we capitalize on the opportunities that coexist with such ominous alternatives? The solution lies with considering problems systemically and having the courage to fundamentally reassess the way the Navy presently does business in an attempt to identify less costly ways of accomplishing what we must do in the future. There will be change—painful change—either way.
Five principles must be embraced to ensure success:
► Be proactive, not reactive. Develop a vision of the Navy of the future that responds to a sophisticated under-
standing of the likely strategic environment that will be c°nfronted. Decide clearly what the Navy of the future should be and what roles it must play to fulfill its obliga- hons to the American people.
7 Start with a blank slate in determining how to carry out future responsibilities. Distill future roles down to the lowest levels that don’t presuppose specific solutions (and Platforms) and then look at people, technology, and major trends. Then determine the most cost-effective way to accomplish those jobs. Some of the present capability must continue to be used, but we should set a new goal for future planning that is not anchored to past conventions. 7 Attack the potential problems and opportunities system- 'cally. It is impossible to deal with problems of this magnitude on a piecemeal basis. The interdependence of the system guarantees that each problem is linked to other aspects of the situation; dealing with one alone sets up Multiple reactions at other locations.
Approaches must therefore interact at basic levels, mobilizing all parts of the system. When everyone is equally threatened, no one is particularly threatened.
^ Mobilize broad involvement in executing these initiatives. Industry, science, and academia are discovering that the only way to deal effectively with our increasingly complex and interdependent world is to solve problems in a parallel manner, with many people contributing to a common solution. The vantage point of an individual or a small group is usually too narrow to provide the broad sweep of understanding required for developing comprehensive solutions. The more people are actively involved, •he more robust the remedy will be. Clear goals and objectives are required so that all involved are working toward similar ends.
^ Unleash and encourage creativity. These problems will °nly be solved with creative solutions—marginal proposals will not be adequate. The Navy has great resources in its people, but their creativity can be tapped only if the system allows and encourages it. These epic predicaments demand the best thinking of all Navy people.
Effectively changing the fundamentals of the Navy in a short period is not impossible. There are pockets of nas-
I Ionic's that respond to voice commands, average life spans exceeding 100 years, and computers smarter than people (here, HAL—in the background—threatens the space-ship crew in the 1968 movie “2001: A Space Odyssey”) are all on the agenda.
cent activity and a number of good ideas that could form the basis for material, positive change.
Less Is More
- Increase the efficiency with which the Navy uses energy: Energy expert Amory Lovins has shown that 80% to 90% of the country’s lighting energy could be saved by fully using today’s most efficient lighting technology (most of which is only one or two years old). The payback would cover installation costs in under two years. Motors use at least two thirds of industrial electricity and some 53% to 60% of all electricity in the country. New high- efficiency motors, electronic speed controls, and a total of 33 kinds of further improvements to motor systems could cut motor systems’ use of electricity in half, with an average payback in only 15 months.
New “superwindows” installed in buildings would let in 60% of the visible light, thereby displacing electric light and the heat it produces while producing the insulation equivalent of a standard solid wall.
Big quick-starting and long-lasting savings could be realized across sea and shore establishments if these new technologies were implemented.
- New personnel and ship rotation schemes: A new study suggests that the Navy could maintain its present force structure and decrease its manpower costs by up to 40% by rotating ships between an active and standby status and manning them with smaller-cadre crews during the standby periods. A ship would go through a continuing cycle of a year in an active status followed by a year in standby. Most of the crew would transfer during standby periods to a similar-type vessel (then in an active status) homeported in the same location, leaving the standby ship manned to a 30% level. The standby ship would be used for reserve training and would go to sea only three or four times during the year, for one or two days. The fully trained component that switched between ships would arrive ready to go with no need for lengthy workups.
This scheme takes into consideration the potential use of specific members of the Selected Reserve, retirees, the individual Ready Reserve, and the shore establishment who would carry mobilization orders back to their old ship and a crew with whom they had worked. Through block personnel transfers, a net increase in unit cohesion and crew efficiency would be realized. Naval Reserve Fleet ships integrated into this process would be fully deployable 50% of the time instead of being useful only for training, as they currently are.
This approach presupposes reduced deployments, of course, but that has already been called for by congressional leaders and others. The same number of ships
would be available for a significantly reduced cost, and crew efficiency would be greater.
► New mathematical models for weapon systems: The National Academy of Sciences has confirmed the validity of a relatively new mathematical theory that could affect the structure of all major computer models used in evaluating the potential effectiveness of weapon systems. The result would encourage the development and procurement of weapons with a different balance of operational characteristics than currently favored.
Present models used to predict weapon effectiveness in wartime situations start with one-on-one encounters—one weapon against one defensive system. For multiple encounters, the situation that predominates in war, they adapt the basic one-on-one data to conform to the new situation. This process omits key considerations about the physical configuration (where weapons are located relative to each other and the targets) of both the attackers and the defenders. The new configural theory accurately factors these relationships into the process. The new approach suggests that the effectiveness of present systems has been overstated in most configurations by factors of two to ten or more.
When multiple encounters are accurately portrayed, a number of the characteristics that are particularly valued in present systems (such as higher detection probability, longer range, and higher speed) become much less significant. Typically, these characteristics are the most expensive ones to design into a system. What we spend the most on does not contribute to, and in many cases detracts from, the effectiveness of the system in combat.
If configural theory were widely adopted, the Navy could get better and probably more weapons for the same price, and in the process increase effectiveness in combat.
Find New Uses for What We’ve Got ► Carriers for Marines: If, as most analysts believe, naval forces will increasingly be required to quickly deploy to places such as Iraq and Korea, aircraft carriers that might otherwise be retired could help the Navy guarantee that the naval team could deliver a significant, heavy force to a distant location in minimum time.
A carrier could be a very effective expeditionary force ship—it can deliver a large number of troops and heavy equipment a long distance in a short time. Perhaps half of a Marine Expeditionary Force could be quickly moved by one of these ships. Hangar decks and elevators on a modified carrier could make storing and loading/unloading of tanks and other mobile equipment easy and quick. The military crew would increase dependability; the spaces and much of the equipment needed for rear-area headquarters support already exist. The flight deck could, of
Making better use of what we have left should be a vital part of the plan. Aircraft carriers scheduled for retirement could carry troops and equipment instead, with their flight decks accommodating Harriers (here, an AV-8B from Marine Attack Squadron 542 hovers above the John F. Kennedy [CV-67]).
course, be used for reconnaissance aircraft or Harriers. Such a vessel would be equally effective in showing force and the flag.
There are potential problems, but such a scheme could dramatically increase the flexibility and agility of the naval team.
► Polaris boats for conventional missions: The recent Persian Gulf War suggests that there will be times when we may need to be able to deliver a massive, precision conventional attack without exposing our troops in the process. Navy nuclear-powered ballistic submarines can deliver long-range, accurate striking power almost anywhere in the world in less than half an hour. There is no j defense against their long arm, which strikes without warning. Polaris boats, soon to be retired, may present an opportunity to increase significantly the Navy’s striking capability at almost no cost. Missiles could be retrofitted with fuel-air mixture warheads, giving a conventional punch that would approach that of small nuclear weapons. With no particular need for stealth and constant cruising, . these ships could be deployed more conventionally, perhaps with reduced crews, whenever they were needed. All of the capital costs would be sunk. With reduced operating schedules, the United States could field a very cost-effective new system.
Look at Old Problems in New Ways
We must find new ways to think about military threats— ways that allow us to accomplish military goals without a great deal of exposure to our people. In the past (including
______________________________________________________ __________ U.s. NA'A'^
the Persian Gulf War) our military has built its strategy on fielding large numbers of people and equipment to prevail against equally large numbers of opponents. An alternative approach may be a systems-based analysis. All countries are systems; collections of many interlinking nodes, fiach of these nodes—individuals, physical facilities, groups, or even symbols—affects other nodes, some more So than others. A careful and methodical analysis of the target system could clearly identify the relatively small number of high-value nodes that, if destroyed or disabled, "'ould cause the physical and psychological systems to Cease to function. In addition to military and economic c°nsiderations, the problem would have to be analyzed specifically in terms of psychology, the ultimate objective always being to convince the adversary that he has no ahernative but to capitulate.
A battle plan based on a careful systemic analysis would lend itself to the use of weapons such as ballistic missiles that could damage high-value nodes from afar, exposing few, if any, friendly forces in the process. Military planers using advanced computer-analysis programs would sPecialize in identifying those nodes that most likely 'vould cause the system to collapse.
This concept could fundamentally change the roles and rnission of the military. Large numbers of men or ships designed to overcome an enemy by mustering greater force than he could would give way to smaller, very specialized, unconventional capabilities. Individuals and groups trained to eliminate single nodes, solidify situations after a missile attack, and work, Spetsnaz-like, behind enemy lines to cut communications and foment confusion would proliferate. In the same way that a single telephone company employee can bring a large corporation to its knees in hours by terminating its phone service and eliminating its ability to communicate externally, small groups of specialty forces could produce effects far °ut of proportion to their numbers.
far the Information Age_____________________
► Implement Navy CALS: The Navy’s most significant tesponse to the explosion of information technology is the c°mputer-aided acquisition and logistics support (CALS) Initiative. CALS is a Department of Defense-wide attempt to provide coherence and standardization to the growth of computer and data-based processes in acquisition and logistics. It is a giant step toward a paperless hfavy. CALS assures that the computers of one contractor Produce data that is readable by the machines of all the °ther contractors on a job—it is a system much like the revolutionary linkup between Newport News Shipbuilding and Electric Boat on the SSN-21 project. Conceptual, detail, and construction/production engineers can all work °ff of the same database at the same time, not waiting for others to finish. One CALS project produces training manuals on demand in any quantity. Sophisticated computer- driven equipment prints, packages, and ships the order— ffom one to hundreds—directly to the ship or station. This would eliminate the $8 million per year the Navy now sPends on technical-manual overstock.
All National Football League teams could play each other in the space the Navy now maintains to store its millions of technical drawings, which could be stored in four refrigerator-size optical disk reading machines—with any drawing available in seconds. Rapid Acquisition of Manufactured Parts (RAMP), a CALS-based system, would allow the Navy to manufacture any small replacement mechanical part or electronic circuit board within a month (a process that now averages 300 days) at savings of 50% of the present costs.
All of this could recast the way the Navy does its acquisition and logistics, saving billions of dollars a year in the process. CALS is the best program the Navy has for anticipating and managing the information technology explosion; it should be one of our highest priorities.
► A Navy information technology initiative: The new information technologies that are emerging will directly affect everyone in the Navy. They will change tactics, strategies, doctrines, the Navy organization, the intelligence business, training, recruiting, administration, and, of course, logistics and acquisition. These systems are growing without a coherent doctrine for well-identified transNavy objectives.
In the Navy, command, control, and communication people do not mutually share information with information management people. Each thinks that the other is a “different” part of the business, and each has built a huge system for storing and collecting information in different and probably incompatible forms. A major initiative is critically needed to systematically consider the broad implications of the information age and develop a master
plan, with a philosophy and a strategy, for guiding information development within the service. Even a huge, bureaucratic, fragmented, organization like the Navy can quickly come to grips with these issues and change course dramatically in a short period.
Receptivity to new thinking and projects, creativity and the willingness to change, all of this comes down to individuals—how they think, what their attitude is, and how free they feel to do their best. But it’s not just individuals, it’s every individual sailor, officer, and civilian. Each one can choose a new heading . . . or not. No one person can plot a new course to the future and automatically expect everyone else to follow.
A Navy-wide mind-set change is necessary—a common understanding that the world is changing very rapidly, that the future of the Navy is at stake, and that there is something each person can do about it.
This is not unmapped territory. Numerous American corporations have already very successfully confronted this change-over, and most of Japan’s industry negotiated these rapids with obvious results. In each case the principles of Dr. Edward Deming and total quality management were applied. Dr. Deming’s ideas (create a consistency of purpose for improvement of the product or service, adopt the new philosophy, institute leadership, drive out fear, break down barriers between staff areas) have been the source of revolutionary change in large organizations around the world. If given adequate support by top management, this process could change the Navy from the inside out in three years.
Total quality management is being implemented by the Navy—called total quality leadership (TQL). It is just at the beginning phase; initial target projects will be running during 1991. It would be hard to overstate the importance of TQL to the future of the Navy, and to overestimate how hard it will be to implement it. TQL is antithetical to the present mode of operations. It flies in the face of all of the past experience of everyone in the service. It will attack the bureaucratic, hierarchical Navy structure and process. But these are the same problems hundreds of other organizations have had and solved by adopting its principled
It is important to understand the trends that are forcing change, and to have in hand a set of principles for confronting the change. But we must also have good ideas that offer solutions to major problems. These are all for nought, though, if the system—the people—don’t understand what’s at stake and have a mechanism for changing- TQL is that mechanism. And the Navy of the 21st century will be what it then is—strong, agile, and capable or wounded, lumbering, and bureaucratic—because of its success or failure to implement TQL in the next two years.
Time is short and we should get about the program with enthusiasm.
Mr. Peterson is president of The Arlington Institute, which specializes in researching new methods of foresight and future-scenario development.
ARLEIGH BURKE ESSAY CONTEST
YV
The U.S. Naval Institute is proud to announce its eighth annual Arleigh Burke Essay Contest, which replaces the former annual General Prize Essay Contest.
Three essays will be selected for prizes.
Anyone is eligible to enter and win. First prize earns $2,000, a Gold Medal, and a Life Membership in the Naval Institute. First Honorable Mention wins 11,000 and a Silver Medal. Second Honorable Mention wins $750 and a Bronze Medal.
The topic of the essay must relate to the objective of the U.S. Naval Institute: “The advancement of professional, literary, and scientific knowledge in the naval and maritime services, and the advancement of the knowledge of sea power.” Essays will be judged by the Editorial Board of the US. Naval Institute.
ENTRY RULES
- Essays must be original, must not exceed 4,000 words, and must not have been previously published. An exact word count must appear on the title page.
- All entries should be directed to: Publisher, U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland 21402.
- Essays must be received on or before I December 1991 at the U.S. Naval Institute.
- The name of the author shall not appear on the essay. Each author shall assign a motto in addition to a title to the essay. This motto shall appear (a) on the title page of the essay, with the title, in lieu of the author’s name, and (b) by itself on the outside of an accompanying sealed envelope containing the name and address of the essayist, the title of the
essay, and the motto. This envelope will not be opened until the Editorial Board has made its selections.
- The awards will be presented to the winning essayists at the 118th Annual Meeting of the membership of the Naval Institute.
Letters notifying the award winners will be mailed on or about 1 February 1992, and the unsuccessful essays will be returned to their authors on that date.
- All essays must be typewritten, double-spaced, on paper approximately SVV'xll" Please include your social security number and a short biographical sketch. Submit two complete copies.
- The winning and honorable mention essays will be published in the Proceedings. Essays not awarded a prize may be selected for publication in the Proceedings. The writers of such essays will be compensated at the rate established for purchase of articles.
- An essay entered in this contest should be analytical and/or interpretive, not merely an exposition, a personal narrative, or
1,Lpm Deadline: 1 December 1991