This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
RADM Riley D. Mixson, USN
You have every right to be extremely proud of the Navy in general and naval air in particular. During Desert Storm courageous aircrews flying with smart weapon systems and but a paucity of smart weapons literally decimated major-league targets.
In the first 72 hours alone, Navy air struck the A1 Qaim nuclear production facility, the Samara chemical warfare production and storage areas, numerous airfields, and thermal power plants.
In the first 48 hours, 60% of the enemy air defense suppression sorties were flown by Navy crews, who also fired 60% of the total high-speed antiradiation missiles [HARM],
Navy strike aircraft flew 23% of the combat missions, with 23% of the strike aircraft in theater. Overall missions, including support, placed the Navy-Marine Corps team at 25% of all missions flown.
Rules of engagement were well known, targets were well planned, and strikes skillfully executed — all in a joint campaign with the U.S.Air Force and Coalition air forces that was unprecedented in size. The air campaign was orchestrated by the Air
Force under its umbrella for coordinating air warfare—the air tasking order. The six months of Desert Shield enabled Red Sea and Persian Gulf naval forces to learn to operate within this sys- tern, and I do not know of a better way to orchestrate 2,000' 3,000 sorties per day from the four services and the numerous allied air forces participating.
It worked well and enabled execution of a brilliantly planned air campaign by the Air Force. The Navy participated in everyone of the target areas except psychological operations — pamphlet dropping.
[There were many Navy strike warfare success stories] including the tremendous contributions by Tomahawks. I would like to drive home, however, five points where we must do better.
First: The Navy is becoming hostage to Air Force land-based tanking for sustained power-projection warfare beyond 200 nautical miles from the battle force. This becomes super critical when the F-14s and A-6s commence their water fall at ends of currently projected service lives, and will remain so until either the [next attack aircraft] AX, as currently envisioned, is operational or until we purchase tankers, be they carrier-based or land- based, with the capacity required to conduct standoff warfare. Typical strike packages of 24-26 aircraft on a 650-nautical-mile strike from the Red Sea required pre-target and post-target airborne tanking to the tune of 386,000 pounds of fuel for an A-7
g
The John F. Kennedy (CV-67) and her air wing were in the thick of the action during Operation Desert Storm. Precision-guided munitions like these laser-guided bombs on the flight deck (above) proved their worth; the Navy should retrofit all its strike aircraft with automatic-tracking laser designators. High-speed antiradiation missiles (opposite, coming up on the elevator) also were a big success in the Gulf War.
wing and 514,000 pounds for an F/A-18 wing. To illustrate, if Red Sea forces had to conduct organic strikes, sorties over the beach would have been reduced by more than two-thirds. We need that AX, and a better organic tanking capability.
Second: We need to revise our thinking on ordnance requirements and their associated weapon systems. I turned down some war-winning targets because we lacked a penetrating weapon such as the Air Force’s 1-2000. Further, the Navy was short of laser-guided bomb kits. In the Red Sea, for example, we started
Proceedings / August 1991
Desert Storm
‘he war with only 112 Mk-82 500-pound-bomb kits, 124 Mk-83 ‘>000-pound kits, and 258 Mk-84 2,000-pound kits and that "'as all we were going to get. The day the war ended 1 had 7 Mk-82 kits and 30 Mk-83 kits left. The Navy needs additional laser-guided bomb capability for the foreseeable future and laser sPot automatic track designators in all strike aircraft.
In the Iraqi war, our A-6 aircrews were able to deliver laser- guided bombs effectively only because of the air sanctuary above •0,000 feet. F/A-18s and A-7s could drop laser-guided bombs only with an A-6 buddy, which is not smart in a hostile environ- nient — and is also hard to do. It’s better to carry one bomb and hit, than have 12 near-misses. War-winning weapons need to Penetrate and destroy strategic, hardened war-winning targets.
also need a night infrared capability in the Walleye II [currently television-guided] inventory.
Third: The Navy is sorely lacking in state-of-the-art mission recorders, which not only provide timely bomb-damage assess- Trent and better training, but also good press coverage of targets struck. The A-6 in-flight forward-looking infrared recorder with two-inch format is a dinosaur and not conducive for training, homb-damage assessment, or to meet public relations requirements. The F/A-18 recorder cannot be reproduced on three- quarter inch format except by recording off the aircraft’s play
back screen with a video camera. This makes it hard to obtain accurate bomb-damage assessment in most cases and extremely difficult to compete on television’s Cable News Network with the other air forces.
Fourth: The Navy should be more aggressive in attending to the J-factor — as in joint warfare. In hindsight we should have placed more people in Riyadh. The U.S. Air Force had a staff of well over 1,000 to run the air campaign; we had a staff of 100 and no officer was assigned to the Joint Force Air Component Commander until commencement of hostilities. Thanks to the fairness of General Charles Horner, U.S. Air Force, and the extraordinary efforts of our handful on the Central Command’s Naval Forces staff in Riyadh, and Captain Lyle Bien in particular, the Navy managed a proportionate share of the strike sorties. [See “From the Strike Cell,” by Captain Bien in the June 1991 Proceedings, pages 58-60.]
Fifth, the Navy did not play the press. We tend to avoid the press; the U.S. Air Force embraced the press. The results were viewed almost around the clock during the course of the war by people all over the world. The Navy’s Chief of Information should have been in place in Riyadh with a staff adequate to ensure our strike warfare part of the story was told better than it was.
The five areas above are the most pressing in my view, regardless of scenario, and require immediate efforts to correct. By far, the most pressing need is to develop a true 700-nautical-mile standoff capability. The operational requirement for the AX is right on in that regard.
Standoff means more sorties devoted to strike and less to force defense. A comparison of Red Sea forces versus Persian Gulf forces in percentage of strike effort will tell that story. Through about the midpoint of the war, 50% of Persian Gulf sorties were devoted to force defense while in the Red Sea, 50% were devoted to strike. When the threat permitted, Vice Admiral Stanley Arthur ICommander Naval Forces, U.S. Central Command| placed his carriers within 150 nautical miles to support the ground forces, and the Navy’s sortie count over the beach then increased dramatically.
Stealth was a good story in Iraq. For carrier strikes it would equate to reduced numbers of support aircraft to ensure the job is accomplished, which in turn translates to lower airborne fuel requirements. And one large bomb on target and recorded for proof of hit and public relations, is better than numerous near- misses. We need to get with it and train to future wars in truly joint campaign warfare exercises. This means more than one B-52 firing a Harpoon during fleet exercises or dissimilar air combat tactics with the Air Force.
Let me close by saying that communications, data links, overhead intelligence gathering, and translation of all of the above into our task force command centers and into meaningful decision format worked great, thanks to the considerable strides Vice Admiral Jerry Tuttle [Director, Space and Electronic Warfare, OP-94, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations] and OP-94 have made in the past two years.
I felt very comfortable in all warfare areas in knowledge of what the enemy was doing and to both defend the force and take the fight to the enemy. Of course, we have areas in the command, control, communications, and intelligence world in which we need to improve, but, from my perspective, it’s never been so good.
Admiral Mixson commanded Carrier Group Two in the Red Sea during the Gull War. He made the remarks published here at a symposium sponsored jointly by the Naval Aviation Museum Foundation and the U. S. Naval Institute at Pensacola, Florida, on 9 May 1991.
‘oceedings / August 1991