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By Master Gunnery Sergeant Renaldo R. Keene, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)
the military won the credibility war in Desert Shield/Storm. But who really wins forever in this unneeded struggle? The •Oedia will be back, better prepared, and the military could lose its shirt next time.
In the Gulf War, the military, in almost every instance, proved that it was more in touch with the American public than were the media, who showed elitism, arrogance, and disunity. The military wisely distanced itself from media infighting. Prepared for war and the press, the military passed out information at briefings,, worked the Press pools, and, in general, went efficiently about its business of winning the war.
But this is not the time for the military to gloat. The Press, like Arnold Schwarzenegger, will be back. It never really retreated. Although the military more than met its obligation to keep American taxpayers informed, there are Several problems that must be studied now, before future eonflicts.
There were charges that the large and powerful media c°nglomerates struck deals with the military and bullied lbe smaller representatives out of the press pools. The srnaller media outlets cried foul to Congress, blaming the Pentagon and the military.
But smaller news outlets and reporters being cut out of the loop was a problem of the media’s own making. Three hays before the ground war, Senator Herbert Kohl (D-WI) and other members of the Senate heard testimony before a committee about the restrictions. Testifying were Pentagon spokesman Pete Williams, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, and reporters. Senator Kohl said 'hat despite the rules, the public was flooded with information about the war. He asked the dean of American broadcasters, Walter Cronkite, and several other Uewsbroadcasters if they were contending that the public h'dn’t know where we stood militarily.
Cronkite said he didn’t know how the war was being conducted; Malcolm Browne of the New York Times said he really knew nothing about where we stood.
Senator Kohl asked if they were questioning what had been reported at military briefings. Sydney Schanberg of Hewsday said they were not suggesting that the briefers were lying—“We don’t know if they are telling us anything approaching the full picture. That’s not their job. We can’t cross-check the information.” Cragg Hines of the Houston Chronicle said, “We don’t know what we don't know.”
When the ground war started, and ended in less than 100 hours, everyone in the United States seemed to know what the press refused to believe: the U.S. military had been on the square with the media and the taxpayers and had brought to the war what the media have now lost— credibility.
The media may not like them, but briefings and media pools are a valuable and expedient means of releasing accurate information. The military should continue to use them in the future.
The facts of war are that the military does not have the means and manpower, nor does it have a requirement, to cater to every media outlet in the United States and overseas who can afford to send a reporter to the scene of battle. Pentagon spokesman Williams testified: “I know reporters are frustrated that they can’t get out to see the troops. [But with 1,400 journalists in the Gulf] We can’t say y’all come to the battlefield . . . It's not practical.”
The only obligation military planners have is to ensure that representatives of the media have the opportunity to report on events. When tactical considerations dictate allowing only a few media representatives to the battlefield, the military tries to ensure that those who accompany them have the wherewithal to reach the broadest spectrum of American audiences (print, radio, television, and still pho-
tography). The military allocates pool spaces as the situation allows. Who the representatives are and which networks or organizations they work for is not the military’s concern. That is usually left to the media to decide among themselves.
From all indications, the media didn’t do a very good job of it this time. Frank A. Aukofer of the Milwaukee
Journal told senators: “Instead of battling for all in the name of press freedom, [the civilian media] eagerly traded their journalistic principles for a few crumbs for themselves and starvation for many of their colleagues.”
In his briefing of the senators, Walter Cronkite (a correspondent in Europe during World War II) suggested a return to a form of rear-area censorship similar to that used in World War II. At that time, because of military restrictions, lawyers quickly censored reports from the field on a first-come, first-served basis. Cronkite’s suggestion was not greeted with enthusiasm by his fellow journalists.
It was interesting that this seasoned newsman saw no need for news to be instantaneous from the battlefield. “I don’t see what this rush to print, or this rush to transmit, is all about. It doesn’t really matter in a wartime situation if we learn something this minute ... or the next day,” Cronkite said.
This speed is perceived as a need by the media, who cloak themselves in the First Amendment. Live reports from the battlefield are not guaranteed in the Constitution and do more for audience ratings and advertising dollars than the public’s need to know. Initial intelligence and situation reports from the field are seldom accurate. War is confusion, and only a foolish commander goes by only one report from the front. It is also dangerous to think that one live report is indicative or accurate in reflecting the complete picture.
Getting the facts right takes time. For years, United Press International preferred to wait until the facts were in and checked before putting a story on the wire, even if it meant not being first to break a story.
The military has no obligation to meet media deadlines, but the U.S. forces and their public affairs personnel have learned that it is imperative to be honest, forthright, candid, and as quick as possible within the bounds of operational security when releasing information.
This has not always been the case, especially during the Vietnam War when goals and purposes were not always clear, and the government and the military became suspect to the press—sometimes with good reason. In Vietnam, the military learned that imposing secrecy and disinformation for political reasons rather than for any real need for tactical secrecy creates a “credibility gap,” not only with the American press but also with the people. In the Gulf the military did not, as the press predicted and some probably hoped, resort to lies, coverups, or attempts to mislead. They backed up their words with positive, professional action, silencing critics and impressing allies and the enemy.
But the media also did an outstanding job of covering the war, in spite of themselves. The public’s appetite for information was ravenous, and the media fed it as never before. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney said on the first day of the war during his 16 January press briefing, “The best reporting that I’ve seen on what transpired in Baghdad was on CNN.” In reality he was complimenting the whole media—it was the fastest and most complete coverage ever, requiring high technology that almost matched that of the American military.
The American taxpayer seemed to agree. Despite con
tinuing controversies about the reporting and Pentagon censorship, more than four out of 10 Americans, according to a Washington Post-ABC News Poll conducted March 1-4, said they had gained respect for the news media; just one out five had a lower opinion of the press. The media may complain about their access, but their journalists did give the American public all the news that was fit to print or air.
The war in the Gulf was an indication of things to come- Reporting such as that from Cable News Network (CNN) reporter Peter Arnett in Baghdad will be seen in future conflicts. These days, leaders can see world news for free. Peter Vesey, director of CNN International, says his network has a policy of allowing world leaders to receive it at no charge. Currently, 140 foreign broadcasters subscribe to CNN and an unknown number of overseas radio and television stations hijack or have the capability to hijack the network’s signal. Vesey estimates overseas viewers to be approximately 25 million and growing.
But that same Post-ABC poll showed that the military’s image improved dramatically; far more than the media’s. A decade ago only half of those questioned in a Post-ABC poll expressed confidence in the nation’s armed forces, and today nearly nine out of ten Americans view the military positively.
There is a very important lesson for the military here: be credible. Spokesmen such as Pete Williams; Army Lieutenant General Thomas W. Kelly, Director of Operations; Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Marine Brigadier General Richard I. Neal, Deputy Director of Operations, U.S. Central Command, among others, were not only honest, they were also believable.
Part of their credibility came from the fact that the commanders and military briefers spoke directly to the media, not through their public affairs officers. Putting the commanders and operations officers up front as briefers is a long established, although sometimes overlooked, public ; affairs policy that naturally lends itself to credibility. When Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell, said “Trust me” during his brief early in the air war, it was credible, not only because there was no reason I at the time to doubt him, but also because as Chairman of the JCS, the public reasoned he was in a position to know.
When General H. Norman Schwarzkopf gave a brief- ' mg, he spoke candidly and was thoroughly knowledgeable, because it was his operation he was talking about.
The military has for years been schooling its officers on how to deal with the media. It is a program of merit, and most flag officers by now realize that they must be willing to deal with media and that doing so with authority and candor has value in any conflict. No one has to like the media, but their rights under the Constitution are unimpeachable, and the U.S. military is a servant of that Constitution. A wise commander deals with the media with knowledge and confidence rather than with ignorance and fear.
This process begins during peacetime, at the small unit level. None of the spokesmen in Desert Storm became experts on the scene; they learned to deal with the media | long ago in their careers. As briefers, they were able to
SeParate their personal from their professional views and objectively inform their audiences.
This is not always easy. Many Marines, in particular, j*ee themselves as the guardians of their version of Corps honor. A retired Marine officer recently visited a recruit bepot and found it interesting when an officer there told birn that he knew the men were being trained the way God would want them to be. This kind of misguided thinking is n°t uncommon in the Corps and is often used to justify either releasing or not releasing information.
Disinformation is something that a commander in combat may find necessary, as witnessed by General Schwarzkopf’s strategy in the Gulf, which he revealed in bis press briefing on 28 February. As with any secret, the fewer who know the better. But this must be only for tactical reasons, never for political or personal gain.
Credibility lies in the basic tenet that as the servant of ihe American public, the military is accountable for its actions and that the information explaining those actions w'll eventually be available to anyone who asks.
But the press’s complaint that the pools didn't work is Probably not without some substance. Syndicated columnist Fred Reed quit because he was left out of covering the action. Two lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of the Department of Defense’s media-access rules claimed that pool coverage restricted descriptions of combat and required military review of combat dispatches. One suit was brought by The Nation, Harper’s, In These Times, Pacific News Service, The Guardian, The Progressive magazine, Mother Jones magazine, the L.A. Weekly and the Village Voice. The second, filed by the French news service Agence France-Presse, wanted access to news Pools.
Interesting, but one has to ask: Flow many reporters does it take to cover a war? How many can the military *egitimately be expected to support?
From a purely military logistical standpoint, the fewer reporters the better. World War II veteran correspondents Say there never were more than several dozen reporters covering the European front at any one time and that the rest had to settle for filing stories from England and far
Free rein for the media in combat zones does not make sense, but some access to the troops is good for morale.
behind the lines.
The press today claims that during the Vietnam War reporters were allowed to go anywhere on their own. This was not true in the initial years of that war, at least in Northern I Corps, where the Marines operated. Retired Master Sergeant Tom Bartlett, a Marine combat correspondent with the III Marine Amphibious Force Combat Information Bureau in Da Nang, recalled, “No members of the media went anywhere without a military escort in 1965 and 1966. That rule was somewhat relaxed later depending on the experience of the reporters and what units they wanted to be with. Some units such as reconnaissance outfits never allowed any civilian media, with or without escort, to go with them.” It took several years for the military to allow the press to roam, and then only on a limited basis. The Washington Post reporter Henry Allen said, “No more than forty reporters were where bullets were flying.” He went on to say that there were 70 to 80 during the 1968 Tet Offensive and that the siege at Khe Sanh was limited to 10 or 12 reporters.
The crisis in the Gulf lasted seven months total. Of the 1,400 journalists there, more than 190 reporters were among combat forces when they rolled into Kuwait and southern Iraq on 24 February.
The Pentagon pool was designed to get reporters to the region during the early stages of the conflict, and apparently it did work; it was not set up to be a continuing vehicle for handling the media. The war didn’t last long enough for the military to come up with a new avenue of approach that the media could agree with.
There is a case for allowing the press some freedom of movement in war zones. But it is no more practical to suggest that the military allow the press free rein than it would be to suggest that the press allow the military to censor unflattering stories. In the future we can expect conflicts, as in the Gulf, in which the press will be able to work around the military combat information bureaus.
In the Marine Corps, the public affairs community has for years wanted to place Marine combat correspondents on the Marine expeditionary units’ tables of organization. This increase would consist of at most a staff noncommissioned officer in charge and one photojournalist and/or electronic journalist. This would not require an increase of public affairs personnel assets, but rather a realignment of the occupational field.
These combat correspondents would know their units, be deployed with them at all times, and be prepared to handle civilian media representatives in their unit’s area of operation. There would be no censorship on the battlefield, for no live reporting would be permitted.
Live reporting in the Gulf had the potential to be militarily damaging on a grand scale. In Israel, ABC immediately showed the impact of Iraqi-launched Scud missiles as they occurred. Only when military analyst Anthony Cordesman in Washington pointed out on national TV that the network was unwittingly serving Iraqi spotters did the
Principles of Information
It is the policy of DoD to make available timely and accurate information so that the public, Congress, and members representing the press, radio, and television may assess and understand the facts about national security and defense strategy. Requests for information from organizations and private citizens will be answered responsibly and as rapidly as possible. In carrying out this policy, the following Principles of Information will apply:
Information will be made fully and readily available, consistent with statutory require
ments, unless its release is precluded by current and valid security classification. The provisions of the Freedom of Information Act will be supported in both letter and spirit.
A free flow of general and military information will be made available, without censorship or propaganda, to men and women of the Armed Forces and their dependents.
Information will not be classified or otherwise withheld to protect the government from criticism or embarrassment.
Information will only be withheld when disclosure would adversely affect national security or threaten the safety or privacy of the men and women of the Armed Forces.
The Department’s obligation to provide the public with information on its major programs may require detailed public affairs planning and coordination within the Department and with other government agencies. The sole purpose of such activity is to expedite the flow of information to the public: propaganda has no place in the Department of Defense public affairs programs.
network realize its error. ABC’s Dean Reynolds in Jerusalem, with only one source, erroneously announced that the Scud missiles that hit Israel had chemical warheads. His statement caused confusion at the highest levels in various allied governments and nearly put Israel into the war.
Too many lives are at stake for the military to allow live reporting from the battlefield. As in all previous conflicts, reporters can take their material with them when they return to the rear or send it back on the first available carrier.
Censorship of civilian media material is something the media claim is best left to the civilians, but there is no guarantee that all reporters will adhere to self censorship. There were several media outlets, such as U.S. News and World Report, that were aware two weeks in advance where allied ground forces would strike and that amphibious operations were very unlikely, but withheld disclosure. CBS News defied a news blackout imposed by Secretary Cheney in the first hours of the ground war, and reported from Khafji. CBS anchorman Dan Rather shrugged it off by saying that he didn’t think anything being reported was of a classified nature. But he didn’t really know. In an effort to be first on the air with the news, Rather violated the blackout and then did it again. He could easily have killed himself and his crew who, without military escort, were rummaging through Iraqi fortifications on the beach in Kuwait City. It never dawned on any of the media team that the deserted war equipment could have been booby-trapped. Aside from members of the media being killed, the military may have lost valuable intelligence information. Thus, there is a need for military escorts and military review of material.
The military has a mandate in its release of material. Called the Principles of Information (see top of page), it was drawn up for the Department of Defense in the early 1980s. Commanders should know and understand these
principles, for they are excellent guidelines for the release of information to the press and the public.
The policy may need to be restated from time to time in the future by the Secretary of Defense. It requires the military to own up to its mistakes: in this case, death by friendly fire, ordnance that failed, and Patriot missiles that missed, to name a few. The U.S. military in the Gulf and in the Pentagon did accept responsibility for its actions.
The military is keenly aware of its responsibility to the media. Lieutenant General Thomas W. Kelly, retiring from his assignment as Pentagon briefer and from military service, said, “Having a free press has served the United States well for 215 years. It is a crucial element in our democracy, and if anybody needs a contrast, all they have to do is look at a country that doesn’t have a free press and see what happened there.”
The media will be part of the next conflict and it is safe to assume that they will be better prepared. But there is not a war between the military and the press. A skepticism between the two is not only necessary, it is healthy and in the best interest of the democracy.
It took the U.S. military more than 20 years to gain the credibility it earned in this war, and it can be lost in a matter ot hours. Like it or not, the military needs the media’s probing queries to remind it of this—and to be its messenger to the nation.
Renaldo R. Keene is an assistant editor at Leatherneck magazine. A retired Marine master gunnery sergeant with 27 years’ service, he spent 35 months as a combat correspondent in Vietnam. His last military assignment was Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, as the senior enlisted pubhe affairs chief, public affairs occupational field sponsor and public , affairs policy and plans.