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Contents:
The Way Ahead—14
Blue-Green Is a Primary Color—14
Keeping the Campers Happy—14
U.S. Naval Aircraft and Weapon Development in 1990—16
Two Seats—Until Now—17
Time for a One-Eighty—18
The Indian Navy Is No Threat—19
Down by Subs—20
The End of the East German Navy—22
Early Gulf War Lessons—23
Desert Shield—The Forces—23
Our Military is Geographically Illiterate—23
The Last Great Air Battle—23
Interview: RADM V. L. Hill—29
Naval Aviation—Leaner with Marines—29
ENTER THE FORUM We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.
“The Way Ahead”
(.See H. L. Garrett. F. B. Kelso, and A. M. Gray, pp. 36-47, April 1991 Proceedings)
“Blue-Green Is a Primary
Color”
(See W. C. Gregson, pp. 54-59, April 1991
Proceedings)
Major Francis G. Hoffman. U.S. Marine Corps Reserve—I was very pleased to see that the senior leadership of the naval services the architects of American seapower for the next generation—have joined forces. For the second time in five years (See “The Maritime Strategy,” supplement to the January 1986 Proceedings), the combined authority and prestige of the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps have provided a public outline of the future of our maritime power. Such a presentation is sorely needed, for the recent past has been marked by divergent thinking and compartmented approaches to warfighting, force structure, and modernization requirements.
“The Way Ahead,” however, looked and sounded a lot like the past. Rather than presenting a carefully drawn and integrated approach, it contained the same fractured thinking—with many of the same tired and safe cliches about naval forces and sea control—that has resulted in a Navy-Marine Corps team that exists in name only.
In contrast, I found Colonel Gregson’s call for a more integrated or “blue- green” approach far more stimulating and responsive both to the challenges of the new world order and the realities of domestic fiscal pressures. I would underscore his point that “less of the same clearly won’t work.” Yet, that is the prescription of “The Way Ahead.”
We need an integrated approach to the Navy Department-wide problem of determining how the Navy and the Marine Corps can best serve the United States despite decreased defense funding. The Department’s crucial question is how to balance the continued need to deter global war against the increased emphasis on power projection assets and to respond effectively when and where needed. Such a balance is necessary to support the na
tional strategy—ironically put forward by President George Bush in Aspen, on 2 August 1990.
One of the overarching lessons from the Gulf War is that future investment decisions should result in decreased spending for strategic deterrence systems and increased funding of power-projection capabilities. Naval resources and force structure must be adapted to improve the landward extension of sea power for regional conflicts. These priorities are not reflected in the current budget forwarded to the Congress on 4 February 1991, nor are they adequately detailed in “The Way Ahead.”
The less-than-optimal performance of Navy strike forces in Operation Desert Storm and the controversy generated by inadequate sealift should give pause to our decision makers. The first conclusion for the Pentagon should be the obvious requirement for a unified warfighting doctrine that is tied to force structure, modernization, and programming decisions. The leadership of the naval services must use an integrated warfighting approach that takes synergistic advantage of the Navy-Marine Corps team and preserves the capabilities that are most relevant for projecting our influence and our power ashore at the point of attack. □
“Keeping the Campers Happy”
{See P. Oliver, pp. 76-78, February 1991
Proceedings)
Charles E. Wright—It seems that every few months another article concerning junior-officer retention—or the lack thereof—appears in Proceedings. What amazes me is that the articles are usually written from a career service person’s perspective, and their conclusions astonish me. With all due respect and admiration for Admiral Oliver, I’m afraid that he has absolutely no idea of why a junior ofticer would leave the submarine force. If he truly understood the deep, underlying thoughts and emotions that would prompt an officer to resign, I believe he would have done so himself.
I am a junior officer who quit. I graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy and
later served three years on a ballistic missile submarine. My decision to resign was not easy. Yet, the disillusionment that 1 felt about the Navy forced me to take that action.
When 1 turned in my resignation, I still had nine months left to serve on board my boat, so I did not list all of my reasons for leaving in my resignation. Those that I listed were true and valid, but they were nowhere close to being all of the reasons. As it was, I paid dearly for my decision to leave. My final patrol was Stygian, and that’s precisely why the Navy does not know all of my reasons for my decision. My commanding officer, the man whose example convinced me that I should resign, considered a junior officer’s resignation as a blemish on his record. I still had to live with him for nine months, so I subdued my remarks.
Strangely enough, though, no one cared to learn why I wanted out. The fact that I was resigning proved to my command that I was a malcontent, and that my opinions were worth their weight in whale dung. Personally, I believe the entire U.S. Navy shares this attitude. Recent articles in Proceedings speak of the reasons why people leave, but are written by those who stay. It doesn’t work.
Does the Navy really want to know why junior officers leave? Does it really care? Then why not do something innovative and radical in its approach? Ask! Yes, contact those who got out, who now have no ties to the system. We feel free to really tell why, now that there are no recriminations. I remember well why I quit, and I imagine there are others like me as well. If you want to know, you’ll ask. What you learn may amaze you. □
“U.S. Naval Aircraft and Weapon Developments in 1990”
(See F. D. Kennedy, Jr., pp. 160-166, May 1991 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Ronald J. Unter- reiner, U.S. Navy, Training Officer, Fighter Squadron 51—As a career naval aviator, I view with concern recent steps taken by the Secretary of Defense to promote the demise of naval aviation as an autonomous strike force.
The cancellation of the A-12 program took many by surprise. Not being a budg- eteer, I am not in a position to evaluate the termination solely on contractual and financial reasoning. As a tactician, however, I will sorely miss the deep, covert striking power the Avenger could have provided my air wing. The A-12 was the stated highest priority of naval aircraft acquisition, and its elimination appears to
have created a sudden program vacuum that was first sensed and then quickly refilled by the same budgeteers who caused it. Aircraft program selection seems to have been based on factors having little to do with current tactical needs, naval air tasking, and the role of naval aviation in the near and long term.
As a participant in several CNO-spon- sored air wing and future aircraft studies, I am stunned by the recent termination of the F-14D program and selection of the F/A-18E/F as our next major aircraft program. Do we need a replacement for the A-6? Absolutely! Do we need a replacement for the F-14A. Absolutely! Does out year acquisition of a conceptual aircraft (F-18E/F) that will not attain performance in the year 2000 that already exists on the ramp at Miramar today make any sense? Absolutely not!
There are two certainties when looking at the near term obligations that are sure to be placed on our carrier battle groups. First, we will continue to be tasked with maintaining U.S. presence in waters near countries that will undoubtedly become less comfortable with large scale American landbased forces. Second, we will always be the ultimate rapid-response force.
Our ability to operate within striking range of huge areas of politically unstable geography is perhaps the single greatest argument for the existence of naval aviation. We currently are fully capable of meeting both tasks. As our aging A-6/F- 14A air wings continue toward their mandated evolutionary dead ends, we will no longer be able to fulfill the role that we have so proudly played for the past 50 years.
The F/A-18 is a fine aircraft. It is relatively inexpensive, and can fulfill both attack and fighter roles (within limits that are currently independently exceeded by two other aircraft). It augments those aircraft well and gives the carrier group commander needed flexibility. The Hornet, however, simply does not have the long-range/high-payload capacity available with A-6/F-14. Using F/A-18s for long missions requires extensive tanking, most often exceeding the air wing’s ability to provide fuel. We either turn A-6s into tankers, losing striking power, or we are forced to rely on Air Force tanking assets. If we are to continue our stand-alone capability to project power deep across hostile shorelines, we will need something better and (even more critical) sooner than the F/A-18E/F.
The current and potential growth capability of the F-14D is well documented. With relatively minimal (and inexpensive) upgrades, its capability as a deep
Naval aviation needs replacements for the F-14A/A-6, but the F/A-18— which lacks the long-range/high payload capability—is not the answer.
interdiction strike-fighter far exceeds current and projected aircraft. Why the Secretary of Defense would pass on a technologically low-risk solution to our clear near-term needs is a total mystery to this aviator. The follow-on capability of this i airframe is only limited by the availability of cutting edge weapons systems and engines, all of which will easily fit within its spacious confines. Perhaps, with the exception of radar cross section, we could easily be looking at an aircraft that could meet the Navy advanced tactical , fighter Tentative Operational Requirement, at a tiny fraction of the total price. | And isn’t price one of the most important factors?
Perhaps the Defense Secretary’s budget staff should use a slightly different method to determine the composition of the near-term naval air wing. I believe they should look past the simple factor of , unit dollar cost, and instead examine the total capability of the carrier air wing that they are eroding with these fiscal decisions. Perhaps they should talk to the warriors; the CAGs, the squadron commanders, and the fleet aircrews who have had to plan their combat air strikes with heavy reliance on non-organic tanking assets to fulfill their missions. And Defense staffers could then ask them how they are going to function for the next decade without an autonomous deep strike capability, as the A-6E/F-14A aircraft are forced into obsolescence.
There exists in Washington, according to the press, an animosity toward Grumman Aircraft. Words like “smugness” are used. I have also been told by senior naval officers in the Pentagon that the Secretary of Defense and his staff think of the F-14 (series) aircraft as a weapon only for the outer air battle; to be used only against waves of incoming Backfires
I
In this dramatic stained glass plate, the USS Constitution, the oldest U.S. Navy ship in commission, is shown underway in heavy seas.* Dark clouds and lightning signal the peril. But in the clouds is the face of God. Rays of brilliant light pour down on the ship, as she sails into calm
An official, issue of the United States Historical Society in tribute to all men and women who have served and are serving in the U.S. Navy
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waters. The restless wave is bound. * The words of the hymn encircle the scene. ★ Artisans of the Stained Glass Guild have created this masterpiece in stained glass and polished lead-free pewter. * They apply 16 separate colors to rich cathedral glass, then fire it in a red- hot kiln, fusing the paints and glass as one. * These are the artisans who have made the stained glass for the great
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ant| Blackjacks. It appears, to this naval 0fhcer, that personal bias and staff mis- Un<Jerstanding of aircraft capabilities will s°on leave the naval air wing incapable of Performing its primary mission—with or W|thout the gracious assistance of our sister service’s tanking assets. □
‘Two Seats—Until Now”
[See R. F. Dunn, p. 13, January 1991; W. C.
Z°bel and J. Marshall, pp. 14-19, March 1991;
**• A. Padilla, pp. 14-19, April 1991
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Walter T. Molano, U.S. Navy—Three cheers for Vice Admiral Uur|n. It is time for technology to take its eourse and replace the radar intercept of- hcer (RIO): Quantum leaps in sensors, 'nformation processing, and information oianagemcnt has eliminated the need for |jlOs. Once this process is applied to the Bghter community, it should be equally applied to the entire naval flight officer community. The tasks fulfilled by other "aval flight officers (NFOs), such as A-6 bombardier-navigators, are being done Py sophisticated technology. The aviation community has subconsciously wrestled 'v'th this problem for years. Pilots in command possess the true power in the air community. Attempts to integrate ^FOs into the full aviation organizational structure have been half-accepted. The NFOs face higher obstacles and greater °dds in their career progression than pi- '°ts. These include a cap on the maximum number of NFO commanding officers in at least the fighter and medium- attack communities, a lack of commit- tttent to achieve an equal bonus for pilots and NFOs, and deep unhappiness from ttjany single-seat pilots at having to take direction from someone who never held a stick and throttle in his life.
The odds NFOs face are found in the 'nathematics of pilots departing for the airlines. The inordinate number of pilots exiting for airline jobs left a disproportionate number of NFOs in the Navy. The self imposed cap on NFO commanding officers almost guaranteed an unencumbered progression for those pilots who chose to stay, thus stiffening the statistical odds against NFOs. Although most aviation detailers would say that true talent and performance are properly regarded, it is no secret that NFOs have a tougher row to hoe. Why waste an expensive asset? Why waste a highly educated and highly paid officer? Let technology replace these NFOs where possible. If the Navy is not going to commit to unrestricted opportunities for NFOs, then replace them with enlisted men or warrant officers.
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landing on the boat, instead of developing leadership and strategic skills such as running an organization and fighting a war? The goal of an officer is and should ' be command. It is time for aviation to focus on these goals, instead of myopic- 1 ally focusing on the thrill of flying and who should hold the stick and throttle.
Now that Pandora’s box is wide open, it may be time to debate the entire naval- aviator environment. With improving aviation technology and shrinking budget dollars, does it make sense to use officers in the role of pilots? The Army successfully has used warrant officers as pilots. No one can argue that an Apache attack helicopter is easier to fly than a Navy jet. Education and rank have little to do with flying an ultra-sophisticated, multi
million dollar government asset. The naval aviation community also has complained about a lack of access to the top echelons of the Navy. The community’s recent solution was a gerrymandering of the post-command billets to create the Super CAG position. Although this created another avenue to flag rank, is it a band-aid solution to a much deeper problem? Could it be that aviators spend too much time honing tactile skills such as
“Time for a One-Eighty”
(•See F. T. Fagan, pp. 48-49, February 1991;
M. L. Bartlett, B. W. Goodrum, and R. J. Quigley, pp. 22-28. May 1991 Proceedings)
Captain Donald K. Forbes, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Although I agree in principle with the tenor and thrust of Colonel Fagan’s remarks, I do not necessarily accept all of his conclusions. Colonel Fagan's assessment that the cops-and- robbers environment has existed for only one or two decades, and that midshipmen share no blame is naive. The cops-and- robbers environment—in varying degrees—existed while I was a midshipman in the late 1940s; it existed during my tenure as Commandant of Midshipmen from 1973-76; and obviously it still existed during Colonel Fagan’s recent tour at the Academy. Upperclassmen, by both word and action, have taught plebes and junior midshipmen that “you rate what you get away with.” This supports the , robbers’ side of the equation. Overzealous brigade, faculty, and staff officers— some practicing Form-2 leadership- complete the equation on the cops’ side. When midshipmen who espouse “you rate what you get away with” disregard acceptable standards of conduct and military performance, and those reasonable rules and regulations established for the , Brigade, the classic cops-and-robbers confrontation arises. The result is abject failure in leadership, both on the part of all midshipmen and the Academy’s officer corps.
Fortunately, a great majority of the 1 Brigade makes an honest effort to practice the principles of sound leadership and to live up to the standards of conduct established for them. A small minority, however, does not. Those midshipmen continually probe and test the system at every opportunity. The perpetuation of midshipmen credos, such as “you rate what you get away with,” when focused on the system of standards and regulations established for midshipmen, keeps the cops-and-robbers game going.
For decades, administrations at the Academy have changed every two or three years, yet the cops and robbers problem continues. Are there any common threads? You bet! And one is the
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^'dshiprnen. Every administration for ttlc past two decades has attempted to solve this problem by shifting more authority and responsibility to the Brigade and its midshipmen officers, while hold- mg the latter accountable. According to t-olonel Fagan, these efforts have achieved limited success—for the problem obviously still exists today. I suspect 11 will remain a problem of some sort Ur>til tougher accountability standards are 'nvoked and the midshipmen themselves become more involved in correcting the
Problem.
The contrasts in marching and other military performance among midshipmen companies described by Colonel Fagan have existed in the past, as well as recently. Why? Obviously, in some companies the senior midshipmen take their authority and responsibility for maintenance of good order and discipline seri- °usly. In those companies where good order and discipline are sorely lacking, fhe senior midshipmen have simply failed ln leadership and in exercising the authority and responsibility given to them. Have they been held accountable for their failures? If not, then the officer corps has failed to establish an accountability standard that the midshipmen can expect as Well as understand. As Colonel Fagan has so aptly stated, the midshipmen rise and fall with the standards set for them by the Academy officers.
Although Colonel Fagan states that the Honor Concept is flawed, his discussion and examples indicate to me that it is the Honor System that perhaps is flawed. The concept—that a midshipman shall n°t lie, cheat, or steal—is, in my estima- ft°n, not flawed. The system in place to ensure that violators of the Honor ConCept are dealt with in a manner that supports the concept is time-tested. Colonel Pagan’s statement that “the inmates are funning the asylum” is a patently unfair characterization and fails to recognize the niany years that the Brigade honor organization has successfully and responsibly carried out its mandate to deal with honor v'olators in a fair, proper, impartial, and nnemotional manner. My experience— Which consists of listening to more than 50 recordings of honor board hearings conducted by midshipmen over a three- year period—tells me that midshipmen honor boards took their responsibility seriously, consistently acted impartially, and based on the evidence presented, consistently came up with the right decision as to guilt or innocence. To my knowledge, the midshipmen given the responsibility to dispose of honor cases have always prided themselves as the Protectors of the honor concept and have not shirked their responsibilities— because they have known that such action or inaction would have a negative impact on the Brigade and the viability of the concept itself.
ln a way. Colonel Fagan may be suggesting that the administration, not the midshipmen, run the honor system. That would be a disaster because it would eliminate the full participation of the most important element of the system that, over many years, has made the system run successfully-—the midshipmen. Colonel Fagan’s examples of problems with the honor system suggest that the system needs to be fixed, but not changed. If the Brigade Honor Boards are in fact remiss in finding honor violators guilty, then the administration, with candid assistance from the Brigade, needs to determine causal factors and make corrections as appropriate. Midshipman Preisser’s article should give the administration some clues on where to start their determinations.
Having to recommend discharge to the Secretary of the Navy for a midshipman found guilty of an honor violation can be trying, in some instances. But the administration must bite the bullet and send the violator home. In my estimation, there are really no mitigating reasons or extenuating circumstances for retaining any midshipman who has been found guilty— fairly, properly, and impartially—by a Brigade Honor Board. As Colonel Fagan so succinctly stated, the midshipmen rise and fall to the standards set for them by Academy officers. □
“The Indian Navy Is No Threat”
(See S. J. Singh, pp. 75-76, March 1991
Proceedings)
Lieutenant (junior grade) G. M. Kinahan, U.S. Naval Reserve—The author is most adept at tailoring his comments to suit his audience. Where do his real views lie? Referring to Indian naval power, he assures his U.S. readership that, “It is evident that while the countries on the Indian Ocean littoral have little grounds to fear that India is pursuing a regional superpower status, the nation needs to review its military philosophy in order to at least assure itself of a credible defense.” However, in the October- December 1989 issue of the Journal of the United Service Institution of India (for which he won first prize in the USI Gold Medal Essay Competition), Lieutenant Singh said:
“The U.S. has constantly maintained a large military presence in the Indian Ocean, using the excuse of protecting its interests in the Gulf War. . .as cover for its own imperialist and interventionist policies . . . India has watched with concern and anxiety the growth of extraregional military units in the Indian Ocean, and . . . [her] efforts must be directed at revealing the blatant falsehood of super power claims that their military presence provides stability, which . . . achieved little [in the Gulf) beyond the
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destruction of a civil jet liner and killing of its innocent passengers (USS Vincennes, July 88).”
“The U.S. used the excuse of the creation of a ‘power vacuum’ in the region to justify its incursions, following the British withdrawal from East of the Suez . . . |T]he logical and rightful inheritor of this mantle is India, not the U.S. Indian power and prestige should be further enhanced in order to resume this mantle, and to aid removal of extra-regional forces, in the interest of regional stability.”
What exactly does Lieutenant Singh have in mind as a means of promoting regional stability? He continues:
“In order to meet its security commitments, the Indian Maritime Forces, must have total control over a zone extending |sic] 500 km beyond the limits of the EEZ | the Exclusive Economic Zone extends up to 200 n.m. from the coast and already covers more than 2 million sq. km.!]. By securing command of the sea in the zone, the Indian Maritime Forces would be able to engage targets before the latter could bring their weapons to bear upon Indian territory or the EEZ. The zone of total control would therefore necessarily cover the entire Bay of Bengal in the East, and portions of the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean extending up to [sic] 1000 km from the coastline in the West and South.”
Is it therefore surprising that the countries on the Indian Ocean littoral do fear that India is in hot pursuit of regional superpower status. If Lieutenant Singh’s published views represent those of his service community, and he subscribes to such ambitious goals for India in the name of “assuring itself a credible defense,” the U.S. and French naval presence in the Indian Ocean must be perceived by other nations in the region as a welcome addition—a key to ensuring stability for many years to come. □
“Down by Subs”
(See N. Beach, pp. 89-92, April 1991
Proceedings)
Captain Roy C. Smith, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—Ned Beach has provided an excellent summary but, like most submariners, he downplays antisubmarine warfare efforts along the East Coast in 1942.
The initial German onslaught certainly caught the United States with its pants down. There were few suitable and available ships and aircraft in January 1942, and their antisubmarine warfare gear was crude at best. But by May, a coastal con
voy system had been set up to run fro111 New York to Halifax, Virginia and front Norfolk, Virginia, to Key West, Florida-" two stretches where ships couldn’t find safe anchorage after a day’s steaming-
The first convoy sailed on 14 May 1942 from Hampton Roads, Virginia, for Key West: the USS Dupont (DD-152) OTC, the Plymouth (William Vanderbilt’s 224-foot yacht Alva carrying one four-inch and four three-inch guns, depth charges, but no radar and primitive sonar), and two 165-foot Coast Guard cutters escorting some 40 merchantmen on board mostly empty tankers. I was Gunnery Officer on board the Plymouth■
Later additions to the convoy system extended from Norfolk-Key West to New York and across the Gulf of Mexico from Key West to Galveston, Texas, when U-boats appeared on that tanker supply line in mid-summer. Although we suffered heavy losses in the first four months, the coastal convoy system worked very well from then on. According to Morison, monthly sinkings dropped from 23 in April, to 5 in May, 13 in June, 3 in July, and none through the rest of 1942.
One incident remains vividly in memory. We were bringing a convoy from Guantanamo to New York in October 1942, opposite the Virginia Capes in the midwatch. The Plymouth was patrolling , ahead of the center column, when a patrol cratt was sighted close aboard on a colli' ( sion course. We just missed, but as she was scraping past alongside, it was reported that the tanker leading the center column had just run over and sunk 3 small tug. Suddenly we were surrounded by landing craft, all headed east across our course. Captain Frank Schmidt be- j lieved that collisions were a more imminent danger than submarines and ordered our group to turn on all its lights. When the others did the same it was obvious that they were a much larger convoy crossing our route. Before long everybody had worked clear and settled down on base courses with no further casualties, but it was too close for comfort.
When we arrived in New York, Captain Schmidt stormed ashore to find out what idiot had routed one convoy across the track of another. He was told that the other was all the amphibious craft for the invasion of North Africa, that its sched- ! uled departure would have had it well clear of us, but its sailing had been delayed twelve hours.
We hadn’t been informed because the Operation Torch convoy was so secret that Commander eastern sea frontier didn’t want to risk a radio message to us being intercepted! □
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Navy” |
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(See S. Gales, pp. 55-57, March 1991 | Bundesmarine | Hull |
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Proceedings) | Designation | Number | Name | Remarks |
A. D. Baker III, Editor Combat Fleets of | Klasse 610 | F224 | Rostock | Koni Class |
the World—The sidebar contained some |
| F225 | Halle | Koni Class |
exceedingly incorrect information on the | Klasse 620 | P6165 | Sassnitz | Bal-Com-10 Class |
former East German Volksmarine. In fact, at its demise on 3 October 1990, the fleet was down to 3 Koni-class frigates, 16 Parchim-class corvettes, 5 Tarantul- class guided missile patrol boats, 1 Sassnitz-class patrol boat, about 20 Kondor-II class minesweepers, and a number of auxiliaries. At no time did the Volksmarine ever operate the “23 frigates” and “52 guided missile boats” as Commander Gates states in his article.
This list is an update to the list of former Volksmarine units incorporated into the Bundesmarine; it turned out to be more than the “12” initially reported. In all, 30 ships were taken over:
These ships are to be maintained for at least one year in service, all of them operating from former East German ports. Many former Volksmarine units had already been sold for scrap before unification, and the units not incorporated in the Bundesmarine (including the entire class of 12 Frosch-class landing ships) were for disposal. Sassnitz-class patrol boats (formerly known by NATO as the Bal-Com- 10 class and no longer equipped with the Soviet SS-NX-25 missile system) continued in production, with five launched by the time of the unification; three of them, named Orkan, Piorun, and Huragan, were sold to Poland without engines or armament, and the others are being marketed to the world’s navies. □
Klasse 621 | P6166 | Hiddensee (ex-Albin Kobis) | Tarantul-I Class |
Klasse 630 | P6164 | Grevestniihlen | Parchim-Class corvette |
| P6167 | Gadebusch | Parchim-Class corvette |
| P6168 | Teterow | Parchim-Class corvette |
| P6169 | Liibz | Parchim-Class corvette |
| P6170 | Wismar | Parchim-Class corvette |
Klasse 640 | M2669 | Tangermiinde | Kondor-II-Class minesweeper |
| M2670 | Sommerda | Kondor-II-Class minesweeper |
| M2671 | Eisleben | Kondor-II-Class minesweeper |
| M2672 | Bitterfeld | Kondor-II-Class minesweeper |
| M2673 | Bernau | Kondor-II-Class minesweeper |
Klasse 650 | M2674 | Eilenburg | Kondor-II-Class minesweeper |
M890 | Vogtland | OHRE-Class Barracks ship | |
| Y89I | Alt mark | OHRE-Class Barracks ship |
| Y892 | Havelland | OHRE-Class Barracks ship |
| Y893 | Ueke rmark | OHRE-Class Barracks ship |
| Y894 | Borde | OHRE-Class Barracks ship |
| Y895 | Wische (ex-Harz) | OHRE-Class Barracks ship |
Klasse 660 | Y1650 | Ummanz | Zander-Class tug |
| Y1651 | Koos (ex-Delpliin) | Zander-Class tug |
| Y1654 | Havel | Type 270 tug |
| Y1655 | Zingst (ex-Elbe) | Zander-C lass tug |
| Y1656 | Wustrow (ex-Zander) | Zander-Class tug |
Klasse 670 | A1459 | Thale | Type 700 Salvage tug |
Y1652 | Kolpinsee | Fuel lighter | |
| Y1657 | Fleesensee | Fuel lighter |
Klasse 680 | Y1653 | Kolliker Ort | Buoy tender |
‘Early Gulf War Lessons”
R. F. Dunn, p. 25, March 1991
Proceedings)
^ P. Dalton—“The money allocated to technology has been well spent. The new gear works . . . over and over again,” Admiral Dunn stated in his article. This 1,1 ay be true—but there was at least one Weapon system that appeared to work remarkably well that definitely was not new. In fact, it is almost 60 years old. In •he air war that preceded the ground war •his old system worked with and supplemented the new high-tech systems.
• refer to the surface gunfire control systems that controlled the 16-inch guns °f the Missouri (BB-63) and the Wiscon- s,n (BB-64). It was impressive to watch fhese ships on television, lobbing shells •nto the enemy positions in Kuwait. I couldn’t help recalling my involvement w'th these systems during ship construc- •'°n and fitting-out during the early 1940s.
These fire control systems have electromechanical Mk-8 Rangekeepers, deigned and built long before the advent of s°lid-state technology. The Rangekeepers are composed of accurately machined Cams, differentials, component solvers, •md disc integrators, which compute and solve the fire-control problem and transmit these values electrically as gun orders. The evening news showed the effective operation of system equipment •hat was designed and built long before television was available. □
Marine midshipmen were lost to enemy action during World War II? The regiment of midshipmen at the Merchant Marine Academy is authorized to carry a battle ensign in their honor. Since its establishment, Kings Point has been the only federal academy that has had students placed “in harm’s way.”
Rear Admiral Paul L. Krinsky, U.S. Maritime Service, the Superintendent of the Merchant Marine Academy, recently praised those midshipmen serving in the war zone, noting that they are following a long tradition of his academy’s service to the country. □
“Our Military is Geographically Illiterate”
(iSee E. W. Carter, pp. 120-122, April 1991 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander John T. Kemper, U.S. Navy—The article brings to mind an example. It occurred while I was serving on the staff of Commander Submarine Group Seven in Okinawa, Japan, in the early 1980s. We were routing submarines to Perth, Australia, for liberty. After proposing another visit, the Commodore related that the Commander Submarine Group Pacific had expressed concern that we were stopping at Perth too often, and suggested that wc find an alternative liberty port. When asked where, the Commodore reportedly said something like, “Well, some other good liberty port on the Indian Ocean littoral.” □
“The Last Great Air Battle”
(See J. Metcalf, p. 26, March 1991
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Sam J. Tangredi, U.S. Navy—Admiral Metcalf deserves considerable credit for getting the Navy to adopt the surface-launched cruise missile as a major strike weapon in an efficient manner. But he forgets that his words can alienate as well as convince. Those alienated can stall, refute, or confuse the changes he hopes to institute. Individuals serious about change—and willing to forgo the credit—recognize that new systems are more fully adopted when developed with minimum threat to existing organizations. Those existing methods and organizations that demonstrate their ineffectiveness will wither away quicker if they are not given a direct cause to rally against as a last stand. It is easier to influence people by winning friends—not by making enemies. It would be better for surface warriors to point out that the Tomahawk is making
“Desert Shield—The Forces”
(Sec pp. 83-84, January 1991; P. A. Moloney, Pp. 19-22, April 1991; S. H. Oxendine, p. 32, May 1991 Proceedings)
James E. Knight—The services represented were not completely described in •he article. The fourth federal academy, •he U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, at Kings Point, New York, had some 130 midshipmen assigned to ships serving in •he Persian Gulf during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.
Having attended the U.S. Naval Acad- eniy, I was aware of the Merchant Marine Academy’s existence, but not until my son matriculated at Kings Point did I become fully aware of its mission and importance. Now it appears that the higher command has once again found that the Warships need these highly trained and motivated merchant mariners to bring •hem the bacon, ammo, and heavy equipment needed to properly defend U.S. interests around the world.
I wonder how many in the fleet and midshipmen know that 210 Merchant
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the job of naval aviators easier—and saving their lives—rather than replacing aviation in its power projection role.
War is more than ordnance on target. As the Chinese sage Sun Tzu noted, the acme of skill is to defeat the enemy without fighting; but if one has to fight, it is better to defeat his strategy than to simply attack his defenses. This requires a balanced strike force with many complementary elements—a force that is characterized by “jointness” and flexibility. Under current conditions, such a force would entail cruise missiles and manned aircraft. □
Edward H. Feege, Jr.—Admiral Metcalf’s thoughts on the military consequences of Desert Storm were extremely interesting. Without a doubt, land-attack cruise missiles are coming into their own as power-projection weapons. However, there should be a number of caveats to his claim that we are witnessing a revolution in which the manned bomber will be supplanted by cruise missiles. Instead, what we may well be seeing is merely a new division of labor, as he implies at the end of his article.
The Tomahawk cruise missile proved its worth during strategic air and missile attacks on targets deep inside Iraq. It appears to have been used with special effectiveness against Iraq’s nuclear, biological, and chemical production facilities, as well as its national level command and control facilities. In the deep interdiction role, Tomahawks proved to be an effective means of dropping bridges and temporarily disrupting the lines of communication used for Iraqi supplies and reinforcements.
Nevertheless, the Tomahawk (or land- attack cruise missiles in general) did not seem suitable for all strategic and interdiction targets. The offensive air campaign—in particular the hardened shelter-bursting missions—appeared especially conducive to the use of manned systems. There were a large number of targets, many of which could be repaired, and not all of which were occupied. To have substituted Tomahawks for F-l 17s in disrupting this elaborate shell-game would have required an inordinate number of missiles. Targeting a $2 million Tomahawk at each aircraft shelter in Iraq would have been a waste of time and effort, yet the mission was still important enough that the theater Commander-inChief ordered it to be carried out. Such was also the case in the great “Scud hunt,” where the targets moved too quickly to ever be targeted with cruise missiles. Nor were unmanned missiles
Desert Storm brought the Tomahawk, here firing from the Wisconsin (BB-64), into its own and made it a factor in the naval power projection equation.
flexible enough to be targeted at the traffic backlogs created by the destruction of bridges along the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. In all of these cases, manned aircraft were the best weapons available.
The ability of the man-in-the-loop to take advantage of opportunities such as these will continue to be unequalled for the forseeable future. Artificial intelligence may change this equation, as Admiral Metcalf suggests, but this raises the question of how many “brilliant” cruise missiles we can afford, and also how suitable they will be for the wide variety of tasks that comprise the power projection mission.
Emphasis on strategic attacks and deep interdiction, however, begs the broader question of what the projection of naval power ashore is meant to accomplish. In the Gulf War, strategic bombing and deep interdiction were only part (albeit an important part) of a greater effort that focused on the most threatening part of Iraq’s arsenal—its ground army. For U.S. and coalition ground forces (which provided the only permanent assurance that Iraqi forces would leave Kuwait and remain in Iraq), the most useful supporting fires were those that disrupted and thinned Iraqi army units in and around Kuwait. At the operational and tactical levels, this translated into ground support missions such as battlefield preparation and interdiction, armed reconnaissance, and close air support. The target set was dug in over a wide area, interspersed with decoys, and was often mobile. Thus, Iraqi defenses in Kuwait presented mainly targets of opportunity or were pop-up threats operating against coalition ground forces. To counter these, it was still a major advantage for men, in aircraft, to be in the loop and to be aiming the weapons of war. The ability to give timely battlefield support, in coordination with the operations of ground forces, was yet another facet of allied operations which did not lend itself to the use of cruise missiles (although it did lend itself to effective naval gunfire support).
In general, it is important to guard against concepts of war that concentrate solely upon conventional attacks on stra tegic targets. The Navy has had and should continue to have the ability to strike targets deep in the enemy’s rear, and the Tomahawk has proven its ability to handle many of these. This capability, however, should not come at the expense of the Navy’s ability to support U.S forces ashore, particularly its Marine brethren, by targeting enemy ground formations throughout their depth.
This suggests that, although a manned deep-penetration aircraft will be needed to replace the A-6E, it need not be bough1 in the same numbers as its predecessor- Instead, Tomahawk (and its replacement) would take on expanded duties in the deep strike/interdiction realm, while the replacement medium-attack aircraft would be used for more specialized missions.
Carrier aviation, then, would become more oriented to the support of ground forces. While carrier air wings as currently configured and trained already have significant capability in this regard, they would have more aircraft better suited to the role. Although not quite by design, this process may already be under way; improved multi-role F/A-18 variants may comprise the lion’s share of future carrier air wings (up to 60 aircraft, according to some estimates).
Had Saddam Hussein’s army continued to roll into Saudi Arabia in August 1990, the USS Independence (CV-62) and USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN- 69) battlegroups probably would not have concentrated their efforts on strategic strikes (although it is likely that there would have been some of these missions flown). Instead, their most crucial task would have been to slow the advancing Iraqi armor and support Saudi forces until U.S. air and ground reinforcements arrived in the area. Tomahawks could have been used for the bulk of retaliatory and strategic strikes inside Iraq (the mission for which they were best suited), while carrier tactical aircraft, along with available ground and land-based air forces, would have been tasked with blunting and disrupting the Iraqi ground advance and maintaining local air superiority.
As such, operational experience seems to suggest that we should be aware of naval revolutions that promise, with a single system, to solve the Navy’s (and the nation’s) power projection needs. In naval warfare, as in other areas of military endeavor, one should be skeptical of any solution that sees no need for a synergistic, combined arms approach to operations. □
Interview: Rear Admiral Virgil L- Hill”
®ee PP- 43-47, February 1991 Proceedings)
'dshipman First Class Eric N. Pfister, “!>• Navy—Admiral Hill was right on he mark when he identified the average ,Tudshipman’s attitude as one of the root Problems facing the Naval Academy. The Past year’s scrutiny of the Naval Academy seemed to focus on programs, when actually it should have focused on the midshipmen themselves.
Today’s midshipmen too often just '''ant to slide by, rather than prepare hemselves to excel in the fleet. Those who strive to excel and take advantage of "'hat the Academy has to offer are too often ridiculed by their classmates, la- eled “geeks” and “sweats.”
As Admiral Hill stated, “over a period °f years, midshipmen developed a collec- tlVe opinion that whatever you can get away with is okay. The saying ‘you rate "'hat yOU skate’ [soon became] widesPread.” This attitude bothers me. As a Plebe I was told to dedicate myself to do my best, because lives would depend on my actions in the fleet.
A poor attitude has crept into the Brigade, infecting both the Honor Concept and the conduct system, and abetting a Pattern of selective compliance with Academy regulations.
Fortunately, Admiral Hill has been striving to rectify the situation. Before mil classes began, the Superintendent called for a convocation designed to bring togethcr the entire Naval Academy team— mcluding the officers, the faculty, and fhe Brigade—in the pursuit of excellence.
In the wake of this convocation, Admiral Hill and the administration have Placed new trust in the midshipmen—of "'hich the Brigade is highly aware. This "ms never so evident as when the Brigade Honor Chairman announced that midshipmen would take the professional competency review test in their own r°oms without proctors. There also were cheers when the Brigade was informed that the Honor committee had eliminated accountability forms for menial Brigade evolutions. Looking around the King Hall dining facility during the applause, I "'as surprised to see how earnest the midshipmen were.
The Academy cannot be viewed solely as a factory that automatically manufactures competent officers. There is no magic formula or program that will guarantee success for all graduates, and no midshipman will instantly turn into a good officer by simply tossing a cap into the air at graduation.
The Academy provides an environment in which midshipmen can experience and practice leadership; the midshipmen themselves must determine whether or not they are going to take advantage of it. □
“Naval Aviation—Leaner with
Marines”
(See R. M. Nutwell, pp. 34-40, January 1991
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Peter J. Sciabarra, U.S. Navy, Air Boss, USS Vancouver (LPD-2)—Captain Nutwell presents a very concise vision of naval aviation needs following the Cold War, with one major exception. The requirement for at-sea vertical replenishment is one that will never cease to exist. The one aircraft that is perfectly suited for this mission—the CH-46 Sea Knight—has been accomplishing it for more than 20 years. Ask any carrier group commander or carrier commanding officer about giving up the helicopter combat support squadron (HC) detachment operating from logistic ships at sea. The vertical
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replenishment mission is the same in peace or war—one that can be accomplished only by the H-46 tandem-rotor design. However, a quick look at the HC community shows no pipeline or replacement airframes in sight. In addition, each of the four operational squadrons— HC-5, HC-6, HC-8, and HC-11— are down by at least one or two airframes each. And where is the replacement aircraft for the Navy H-46, many of which are approaching their service end-life? The good news is that it is currently operational. The bad news is that the replacement is the Marine Corps stock of CH- 46E’s for which their planned replacement is the V-22 Osprey.
We are very nearly approaching “in extremis.” For those who would argue for an H-60 derivative to replace the H-46 the question is: “Are you willing to accept a greatly reduced transfer rate and sacrifice the cargo and passenger capacity of the H-46?” Any possible replacement would also need to possess the convenience of a ramp and hatch with an integrated cargo roller system for quick movement of palletized cargo. For the smaller decks, consider the last time an H-46 pilot needed you to alter course to provide winds for Vertrep. The tandem- rotor design that allows for maximum flexibility in wind direction and speed are exclusively H-46 features. The H-46 also has filled in admirably as a valid search- and-rescue asset on numerous occasions, and a Doppler-equipped H-46 is an excellent SAR platform.
I appreciate and respect the need for and capabilities of the tactical, antisubmarine warfare, and early-warning communities, but the Navy H-46 community
What platform will assume the vertical replenishment role of the aging Navy CH-46? Marine Corps CH-46Es, above, are so designated— but their planned replacement is the V-22 Osprey, still in trouble.
plays a vital role in ensuring that all others receive the support necessary to accomplish their missions. The problem is real and will soon be affecting future deployments unless a plan is formulated now to replace the aging H-46. □