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By Rear Admiral Rolf E. Pedersen, Royal Norwegian Navy
Ironically, Soviet submarine bases may hold the key to Norwegian security. The Kola bases are so important, in fact, that the Soviets cannot afford to provoke NATO retaliation by attacking Norway. Spread thinly along the coast, the Norwegian Navy is banking on that.
The Soviet Union bases most of its strategic submarines at the Kola Peninsula, and their protection is of vital importance. This concern bears upon Norway’s situation. The primary objective of most Soviet forces that serve on Kola-based vessels, submarines, and aircraft is to form a forward barrier as a link in the protection of this bastion for strategic submarines and for the entire Kola complex.
An effective barrier presumes, as a minimum, Soviet control of northern Norwegian territory and the waters and airspace east of the Lofotens-Greenland line. The former Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, indirectly advocated this position when he said that it is far simpler to seize and maintain naval control if one has control of the adjacent coasts. The adjacent coast in this case is the coast of northern Norway.
We must, therefore, assume that Soviet forces have planned to secure northern Norwegian territory under given conditions to protect their strategic submarine bastion and safeguard the base complex at Kola and Soviet operations in the Norwegian Sea.
As long as Norway is a credible member of NATO and NATO remains a reliable alliance, an isolated attack on Northern Norway would be most unlikely. We are, in fact, protected by the paradox formulated some years ago by Norwegian Defense Minister Johan J. Holst: “Perhaps the extreme importance of this base complex is our best guarantee that they [the Soviet Union] will not start anything except that which would be necessary in a global confrontation, and that they therefore will refrain from an isolated attack on North Norway.”
The paradox also implies that the Soviet Union will avoid actions that would provoke a permanent or semipermanent NATO presence in northern Norway and adjacent waters. Indications are that the Soviet Union is fully aware of this and that it tries to show restraint in waters and land areas that are sensitive to Norway and to NATO. Therefore, a regionalization resulting from confidence-building measures at sea is a subject that is very sensitive to the Norwegian Navy.
This maritime situation prevailed in the postwar period, until November 1989. The situation today is much different. Europe is in a state of turbulent change. We have seen the east European revolution of 1989 and are now seeing developments growing from the Soviet February revolution of 1990. No one can predict the final outcome of these events. The Soviet empire is in the process of being dissolved. But Soviet military power remains intact. The Brezhnev Doctrine no longer applies to Eastern Europe. It is, instead, being applied against the Soviet Union’s own republics. The intentions of the current Soviet president are stated as perestroika and glasnost, but Soviet military capability remains ready for Mikhail Gorbachev’s unknown successors to use. The Soviet Union cannot feed itself, but its Northern and Pacific fleets continue to grow in number and quality.
Another look at the strategic picture shows that the red color in the Baltic has faded somewhat, but the red has not faded in the north. If reduced Norwegian defense budgets weaken Norwegian defense, especially the Norwegian Navy, the country could easily be pressured to make unwanted concessions and to surrender freedom of action. Small, weak nations that share borders with a great power are quite vulnerable. It would be naive to think that the Norwegian land area bordering on the North Atlantic and the economic zone would not continue to be attractive to a great Russian power with nearly twice the population of a reunited Germany.
Strategically, little has changed, even if the world between the Ural Mountains and the Atlantic seems more peaceful. The Barents Sea-Kurdistan axis must not be forgotten in the euphoric state of peace we are now experiencing. Therefore, nothing calls for a change in our strategy and naval concept.
Norway’s Security Policy
Norway’s security policy is based on a balance between security and reassurance. The Norwegian objective is to maintain low tension in the northern area and, at the same
time, safeguard its sovereignty and freedom of action. The military consequences are that no foreign troops are stationed in Norway in peacetime. But in view of Norway s strategic importance to NATO and the Soviet capabilities We face, Norway must rely on timely reinforcements when We ask for them in a critical situation. The Norwegian military must be able to hold out until NATO reinforcements reach combat theaters.
The Norwegian problem is that northern Norway, which is the most exposed part of the country, only has 10% of the nation’s resources, and requires supplies from the south. Thus, northern Norway cannot be defended unless southern Norway is under Norwegian control.
Norwegian Strategy______________________________
The Norwegian strategy consists of three stages. y Maintain adequate forces in northern Norway at a high level of training and readiness. This should assure adequate holding time to . . .
V Enable reinforcements from southern Norway to mobilize and reinforce northern Norway and endure until . . . ► NATO’s reinforcements arrive.
As long as this strategy is credible, we believe that we will be able to prevent war. But the strategy is based on the premise that warning time will be sufficient. For now, that warning time seems to be considerable. This of course also determines the sizing of the forces we must keep in northern Norway at any time. We must, however, make sure that we do not weaken our readiness in northern Norway and that NATO does not reduce its reinforcement capability to the point at which an adversary might be tempted to launch an isolated attack or apply pressure
against parts of northern Norway. The Kola base paradox must be upheld as a defense mechanism against isolated attacks.
Another strategic point concerns southern Norway, which in many ways is the heart of NATO’s Northern Command. It is protected in the north by northern Norway, in the east by Sweden, in the west by NATO’s naval forces, and in the south by Danish and German forces. Strategically, southern Norway acts as a base area for support of operations in the Baltic and North seas and northern Norway.
The main task of the commander-in-chief of southern Norway is, however, to reinforce and support northern Norway. But to do this, he must have the necessary forces to employ the resources. This applies to protection of any mobilization, the transfer of reinforcements, and the resupply of the northern Norway forces. Military and political developments in Central Europe may, however, exacerbate the commander-in-chief’s job in the future.
The Navy’s Tasks
Norwegian naval defense consists of three branches:
- The coastal artillery, which includes the permanent combat elements with coastal batteries, torpedo batteries, and controllable minefields
- The navy, with its submarines, frigates, motor torpedo boats, minelayers, minesweepers, and various auxiliary ships
- The coast guard, which is an organ of the navy.
Our task must also be seen in the context of the allied
naval forces that operate in the Baltic and its exit, in the North Sea, and in the Norwegian Sea. No naval forces
have been earmarked for Norway, but the presence and priorities of NATO naval forces influence the resources that the Soviet Union could spare for an attack on Norway. Nevertheless, Norway must depend on NATO’s earmarked army and air force reinforcements as chief deterrents against war on the northern flank.
The main task of our navy is to protect our territory from attacks launched from the sea. The task is divided into three main portions: surveillance, anti-invasion, and protection of coastal sea lines of communication (SLOCs).
Because of our long coastline and limited available resources, we have structured the navy in such a way that we can use small and relatively inexpensive units that are more or less tailor-made for the jobs to be carried out in coastal waters. In this process, we have had to sacrifice ocean-going qualities, endurance, on-board repair facilities, and, to a great extent, the multicombat options typical of vessels in ocean-going navies. We can live without many of the multicombat options, since the lack of them can be largely compensated for by our modus operandi in a designated area.
We look at the coastal environment as a force multiplier. By pursuing such a philosophy, we can, with limited resources, maintain more units than what we otherwise could. This is essential when we have to compensate for elements of uncertainty in an adversary’s modus operandi.
To assess and implement necessary measures in response to irregularities in our coastal and ocean areas, we place great emphasis on surveillance. In addition to patrols by our submarines and maritime surveillance aircraft, the new coast guard vessels contribute significantly.
In the future, the need for surveillance along the coast will increase because of increased threats to the environment from pollution. This is true for surveillance and control of both civilian maritime activities and shipping in the ocean areas that we are responsible for. All our ships and coastal artillery units must take part in surveillance of our maritime environment and related resources and guard our national interests and international commitments. Here we also find new peacetime tasks for our coastal radar stations. In crises and in war, our many fishing boats and coastal monitoring stations will enhance our surveillance capabilities.
Our coastal population provides perhaps our best surveillance. The women and men who live along our 21,000-kilometer-long coast are very observant and sensitive to irregularities at the water’s edge. Many nations envy this capability, but they also fear the alertness and contribution by the coastal population to our outer defense line and peacetime surveillance interests.
Anti-invasion ___________________________
If we are unable to delay or avert an invasion, there will be no place to send reinforcements, and nothing to reinforce. Top priority, therefore, goes to defending against a naval invasion.
The naval anti-invasion concept is based on three principles, often referred to as the maritime triad of the antiinvasion defense: Delays and channelization; Survivability and perseverance; Mobility and concentration of forces.
The delay and channelization effect is designed to win time for Norway to concentrate its forces or channel a naval invasion to areas less vulnerable or easier to defend. The main elements in achieving this are the permanent installations of the coastal artillery.
Coastal artillery installations are strategically located to Protect the entrances to crucial areas and resource centers. They consist of some 20 seafront batteries, a number of fire-sweep batteries, torpedo batteries, and controllable minefields. The most exposed installations are manned in Peacetime; the others can be operational within 48 hours.
In addition, operational and requisitional minelayers will lay defensive minefields. The first field can be in place in less than 12 hours after initiation. Coastal artillery will cover most minefields.
Last year we took delivery of the first of several new seafront batteries, which give an entirely new dimension to the defense of the main entrances in northern and southern Norway. These forts represent the best of Norwegian and Swedish coastal artillery experience and technology. But the price is, of course, commensurate with the capability. Our submarines and, to some degree, the fortified Permanent defensive facilities of the coastal artillery handle the aspects of survivability and perseverance.
Submarines are least vulnerable to changes in the threat, Particularly, the air threat. Therefore, they can operate in
Our 38 motor torpedo boats (MTBs) and 62 F-16 lighters provide mobility and concentration of lorccs. Most ol the missile-capable MTBs will be deployed in the North. The MTBs in the naval anti-invasion defense will operate as needed to inflict maximum losses on the invasion lorce and its amphibious and troop transport vessels, while the invasion elements are still shut up and inactive on board. Coordination with the coastal artillery is needed to avoid mutual interference and to achieve the best possible combat effect that cooperation between these two types ol units can foster. Another chief task for the M TBs will be to attack invasion forces out of range of the coastal artillery.
With maximum exploitation of the coastal environment, we believe that every element of the anti-invasion defense force’s maritime triad represents a threat not to be overlooked by the enemy. After approaching the coastline from the open sea, an adversary’s movements will be seriously restricted in the inner coastal waters. An enemy will, therefore, be forced to structure forces to cope with each of these threats. The implementation of a naval attack in a multithreat defensive environment, and with limited freedom of navigation, will, without a doubt, place a heavy burden on the enemy’s tactical leadership and
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forward, exposed areas, as well as in other places. The submarines will normally exploit the waters and their own characteristics to apply continuous pressure on enemy vessels trying to penetrate Norwegian territorial waters. Another important task for the submarines will be to attack enemy supply and reinforcement units transported by sea. The introduction of the new Ula (S-300)-class and updated Kobben (S-318)-class submarines gives us a first-class, modern, and powerful submarine weapon, tailor-made for our coastal waters and neighboring ocean areas.
The three-pronged Norwegian naval defense organization consists of, left to right: the “Kystvakt” coast guard— here, the Norkapp (W-320) patrol ship; coastal artillery— here, a Norwegian-manned Bofors gun; and the navy— here, the guided-missile frigate Narvik (F-304).
A Tribute to the Norwegian Navy
On 7 June 1990 navy war veterans gathered in Tromso to celebrate the 50th anniversary of His Majesty King Haakon’s,
The Crown Prince’s, and the Government’s departure from Norway on board HMS Devonshire. In the wake of the ship, they left an occupied Norway. Today we ask ourselves: How could this happen? The poet Nordahl Grieg had the answer: “We did not follow the times; in spite of everything, we worked for peace.”
We so much wanted peace that we were unable to read the signals of evil and violence. The result on 7 June 1940 was complete humiliation when King, Crown Prince, and Government had to leave Norway.
Three weeks earlier in Portsmouth, however, a young navy lieutenant dressed in knickerbockers and a windjacket had hoisted the Royal Norwegian Navy flag and the command flag on board MTB-5. This was the beginning of the turning-point from defeat to victory. Norway’s battle for freedom was to be carried on until our Navy flag again could fly with pride and in
freedom along our weatherbeaten coast. And it was our veterans who fought this battle. They did not accept defeat and
humiliation. They fought from the orlop and the bridge, on deck and in the engine rooms. They fought with mines, guns, and torpedoes. They manned Asdics, minesweeps, radios, and boiler rooms.
On 7 June 45 years ago, HMS
Norfolk anchored in Oslo harbor with His Majesty King Haakon on board. Our king could once more step onto a free Norway.
When our navy finally completed the job and returned home, others had received the greatest accolades. The navy’s reception, after being the only arm of the military that fought throughout the war from September 1939, was not as they had expected and deserved. Thanks to them, however, the navy flag could once more fly freely and with pride along our coast and in our harbors. Those who fought on board during the war did their job. They fulfilled the navy’s motto: “For King, Country and the Flag.”
On behalf of all those who were able to live and grow up in a free Norway and for all that the navy stands for, I, as Inspector General of the Navy, thanked the war veterans of the navy and promised that we will do all in our power to maintain the freedom they recaptured for Norway and try to live up to the same slogan for which they fought.
Rear Admiral Rolf Pedersen
weapon-employment concepts. That is precisely the intent of our operational concept, and that is what we are trained for.
Protection of Coastal Sea Lines of Communication
The main ground transportation lines between southern and northern Norway are a railroad and a highway, and they are easily wiped out. Heavy rains or snowstorms in themselves are enough to wreck these fragile transportation lines. Fortunately, we have a very effective civilian coastal merchant navy and a good ally in our inner coastal leads, often called “Coastal Highway 1.” Even if we have only a few escort vessels and other units, the special conditions along the coast will make seaborne transportation a realistic undertaking. It is a national responsibility to safeguard our own ports and our sea lanes.
National stockpiling in northern Norway and prepositioning for a U.S. Marine Expeditionary Brigade in Tron- delag makes it possible to concentrate on the defense of the sea lines of communication between Trondelag and Vestfjorden. Our operational concept is to place maximum pressure on the submarines in order to intercept and prevent attacks. We intend to do this by using our frigates and corvettes as the nucleus of escort groups that consist of coast guard vessels and requisitioned fishing vessels as assisting escorts, using sonar and mines as their main weapons.
This makes it possible to increase the number of our own vessels that can apply pressure on enemy submarines and intercept their attacks. The combat escort vessels, however, can give such an escort group secure combat leadership, air defense, and the capability to apply weapons against a submarine effectively.
The Oslo (F-300) class and the two light escort vessels of the Sleipner (F-310) class are reaching the end of a modernization program. The operational results after modernization are very encouraging. The navy has, therefore, strengthened to a large degree its ability to protect the sea lines of communication along the coast. Maritime
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1 Patrol aircraft will be used in open seas and as forward defense against submarines violating our waters. Antisurface defense of the coastal SLOC will be maintained by the MTB’s and maritime attack aircraft. Antiair defense will be maintained by the Oslo class’s improved Sea Sparrow missile air defense, in addition to the air force s improved Hawk air-defense missiles, and most important, by °ur own and our allied aircraft in the role of interceptors. The coast artillery missile air defense will also be able to contribute to air defense close to the fort areas.
Generally, both area defense and close escort will be used to protect the coastal lines of communication. The commander of the forces at sea will decide what tactic to use, depending on the actual situation.
Minesweeping could be the weak link in the defense of the coastal SLOC until the arrival of the new mine countermeasures vessels. Our old minesweeping force, reduced to eight units, will face a hard test, when shipping lanes and harbors must be kept open. Their primary task is to sweep the waters for mines to ensure operational freedom for the Navy and to keep the Trondelag-Vestfjorden sea transport lane open.
Even with a planned increase in minesweepers and mine dividing troops, our ability to keep open vital harbors and lanes in southern Norway will be doubtful, at best. We hope that our allies in the south can give us a hand with niinesweeping in the Oslofjord-Skagerak area. The strict priority given to the vital SLOC between Trondelag and Vestfjorden makes it difficult to protect or keep other Norwegian SLOCs mine-free without such help. This will continue to be the case even after we receive our new minesweeping vessels, although their high speed will ease the problem to a certain extent.
Even for a coastal Navy, the question of peacetime deployment and bases is of great importance. In northern Norway, forward operational bases for submarines and MTBs have been built in the mountains near Tromso, and a supply base lies just north of the Ofotfjord. The navy’s main base, Haakonsvern, however, is situated just outside Bergen. With its maintenance and training capabilities, schools, the Commander, Sea Training organization, and the Naval Materiel Command, Haakonsvern has now reProceedings / March 1991
placed Horten as the most important naval center.
Strategic considerations demand that the navy keep as many vessels and forts as possible operational in the north of Norway. The main force of the navy must, for training purposes, be operated from its main base. It is also sound economics to train and exercise the navy farther south and operate from Haakonsvern. At the same time the forces at the standing forts in northern Norway can focus more on mobilization training rather than preparedness training. As far as the navy is concerned, it will be far more important in the future to ensure that the combat units based at Haakonsvern are prepared to sail north.
Of course, this has an unfavorable effect on the possibility of obtaining forward defense for the south of Norway. Fortunately, we have allies to the west and south. The German Navy’s effective Tornado aircraft and frigate fleet, together with allied submarines and other units, will, directly or indirectly, supply the southern part ot Norway with most resources required for an outer naval defense. Our own coast artillery installations take care of the inner defense of southern Norway. Mobilization soldiers at our own coast artillery divisions are highly trained. They live close to their forts, and the necessary equipment is available in mobilized forts. The coast artillery in southern Norway, however, has lost its mobile maneuvering element in that some MTBs had to be retired, because of age and lack of funds. We are working on obtaining an equivalent solution in a few years’ time. These will cooperate closely with the coast artillery forts and under the supervision of the chief of the local naval district.
In concert, all of these elements work well together in ensuring a secure coastal defense for Norway.
Rear Admiral Pedersen is Inspector General of the Royal Norwegian Navy. His naval service began in 1954 when he enrolled in the Naval Academy of Norway.