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By Norman Polmar, Author, The Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet
Unilateral or
Bilateral Nuclear Disarmament?
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“Despite the steadfast opposition by the U.S. government to any form of naval arms control, and the continuing failure of the Soviet Union to engage the West in a naval arms control process. . . . Naval nuclear weapons are being reduced and controlled.”1 This observation summarizes the unbalanced decline of tactical nuclear weapons between the U.S. Navy and the Soviet Navy.
Between 1988 and 1990, U.S. naval tactical/theater nuclear weapons declined 31.5%, from an estimated 3,645 to 2,500. During the same period, Soviet naval weapons dropped 3.5% from a calculated 2,705 to 2,608.[1] The accuracy of these numbers can be challenged, but they are a valid approximation and reflect the trends in these weapons.
Most of the U.S. reduction results from the demise of the antisubmarine Warfare rocket (ASROC) carried in surface ships, the submarine-launched ASW missile (SUBROC), and the Terrier surface-to-air missile. Retiring these weapons leaves the U.S. fleet without nuclear antiair weapons and with aircraft-released bombs as the only nuclear antiship and antisubmarine weapons. As the number of carrier air wings decrease, so will the number of strike aircraft that can carry nuclear weapons.
Other than bombs, the only tactical/ theater nuclear weapon left in the fleet is the Tomahawk land-attack missile (TLAM), which can carry either a conventional or nuclear warhead.
Thus, in the near term there will be four nuclear weapons in the fleet:
- B43-1 bomb: A tactical nuclear bomb designed for high-speed delivery against surface targets.[2] It entered service in 1961 and yields an estimated one kiloton (i.e., 1,000 tons of TNT). Today, it is Probably carried only by carrier-based A-7E Corsair aircraft (now being phased out) and A-6E Intruder aircraft; 250 hombs are estimated to be available for naval use.[3]
- B57 bomb: A lightweight, multipurpose bomb that can be used against submarines as well as surface targets. Introduced in 1963, it is reported to be in the sub-kiloton to 20-kiloton range. The A-6E, A-7E, and those Navy and Marine F/A-18 Hornet strike fighters that have been specially “wired” to carry nuclear weapons can employ these weapons against surface targets; some 475 bombs are reported to be available for naval
The only tactical nuclear weapon left in the surface fleet, the Tomahawk has a major drawback: it limits surface combatants to specific operating areas.
strike use.
About another 825 B57s are available for ASW operations, delivered by the carrier-based S-3 Viking and SH-3 Sea King, and possibly the new SH-60F Sea- hawk, and land-based P-3 Orion aircraft. ► B61 bomb: Also a lightweight bomb, introduced in 1968, this weapon can only be used against surface targets. The A-6E, A-7E, and specially wired F/A-18 aircraft can carry these; some 625 are estimated to be available for Navy use.
► Tomahawk TLAM(N) cruise missile: The BGM-109A nuclear-armed Tomahawk is a ship/submarine-launched, subsonic cruise missile that entered service in 1984. The TLAM(N) has a W80-0 warhead with a selectable yield of 5 to 150 kilotons. The Iowa (BB-61)-class battleships, several cruisers, some Spru- ance (DD-963)-class destroyers, and about 50 attack submarines (SSNs)-a current total of some 90 ships—can launch the Tomahawk. That number should increase to perhaps 150 ships by the year 2000.
According to unclassified estimates, some 325 weapons were in stock by mid- 1990 with an announced inventory objective of 758 nuclear missiles. However, it is unlikely that goal will be met in the current fiscal and policy environment.
There is only one tactical nuclear weapon under development for the U.S. Navy, the B90 nuclear depth/strike bomb. This multipurpose weapon is intended to replace the outdated B57 bomb with the procurement of some 1,000 bombs planned for the 1990s. It was scheduled to enter the inventory in fiscal year 1993, but its future is now in doubt.
A variety of other naval nuclear weapons have been proposed during the past decade—variants of the Phoenix air-to- air missile, ASW torpedoes, vertical- launch ASROC(VLA), Standard surface- to-air missiles, and, especially, the Sea Lance submarine missile (SUBROC follow-on). But all of these programs have died early because the Navy has not supported the introduction of these nuclear weapons into the fleet.
U.S. nuclear weapons policy does not call for replacing a nuclear system simply because it is obsolete; the military service must “show a need and have an analysis that shows that the replacement would be effective, and they will not buy a nuclear capability if there is a conventional capability that will do the same job.”[4] More-
1991
Proceedings / February 1991
over, the U.S. Navy is “culturally” opposed to nuclear weapons at sea. In brief, the use of nuclear weapons in a naval conflict strongly favors the Soviet Union because of the vulnerability of large surface warships.
The aviation community has opposed nuclear weapons because of the potential vulnerability of aircraft carriers to a single nuclear weapon (whereas a modem carrier is considered capable of surviving several hits by conventional cruise missiles or torpedoes). The surface warfare community basically supports this view; but more important, arming surface combatants with TLAMs could require that those ships be kept in specific operating areas—within range of certain land targets—thus depriving those surface combatants of their mobility and mission flexibility.
The submarine community also opposes tactical/theater nuclear weapons. Arming nuclear attack submarines with nuclear Tomahawks could deprive them of operational flexibility. In addition, every Tomahawk displaces one torpedo for use against enemy submarines and surface ships, the sine qua non of submarines in the eyes of the submarine community. ASW/vulnerability is also important to submariners. Despite criticism of the potential effectiveness of the U.S. Mk-48 advance capability (ADCAP) and Mk-50 lightweight torpedoes against modem, high-speed, double-hull Soviet submarines, the submarine leadership has strongly opposed all suggestions for the consideration of nuclear torpedoes. The concern seems to be that if one looks at Soviet vulnerability to conventional U.S. torpedoes (questionable), someone also might look at the issue of U.S. submarine vulnerability to Soviet conventional torpedoes (considerable).
One defense official observed that “to deal with these faster, quieter, and more survivable Soviet submarines, new ASW weapons are required. An improved conventional torpedo looks promising [Mk- 48 ADCAP]; but to preclude the possibility that improvements in Soviet systems could negate, at some point, the capabilities of our conventional ASW weapons, we must have nuclear ASW weapons.”[5] 2 3 4 5 [6] [7] The Soviet submarine threat could become more severe (and possibly less vulnerable) if the submarine and weapon goals forecast in the recent, official Soviet book The Navy: Its Role, Prospects for Development, and Employment come to pass.
But the planned Sea Lance stand-off submarine weapon with a nuclear depth bomb was stillborn, and the submarine community has been outspoken in its opposition to nuclear torpedoes. In response to one proposal for such a weapon discussed in Proceedings,1 senior Navy submariners mounted a campaign to counter the article which included encouraging two retired submarine captains to write a comment making the Navy’s case.[8]
Subsequent articles in Proceedings proposing even sub-kiloton nuclear torpedoes have brought down the ire of the submarine community.
While the U.S. Navy is disposing of tactical/theater nuclear weapons except for Tomahawks and bombs, the Soviet inventory of nuclear weapons shows little quantitative change. There are several questions about qualitative changes. In brief, the Soviet Navy deploys nuclear weapons in several categories:
- Antisubmarine: missiles on surface ships and submarines; submarine- and possibly ship-launched torpedoes; aerial depth bombs
- Antiship: missiles on surface ships, aircraft, and submarines; torpedoes; possibly bombs
- Antiair: missiles on surface ships
- Land-attack: missiles on surface ships, submarines, and aircraft; possibly bombs
Although the number of warships in the Soviet fleet is declining, the number of Soviet naval strike aircraft is rapidly increasing,[9] and the potential conversion of Yankee-class strategic missile submarines (SSBNs) to cruise-missile carriers (SSGNs) and to attack submarines (SSNs) could significantly increase the number of nuclear weapons at sea. Construction continues of ships and submarines carrying the SS-N-19 and SS-N-22 antiship missiles, and the SS-N-14, SS- N-15, and SS-N-16 ASW missiles, all of which are nuclear capable.
The major question in considering Soviet nuclear weapons at sea is the SA-N-6 antiair missile; it is not publicly known if this weapon, in nine cruisers of the Kirov, Slava, and Kara classes, has a nuclear warhead. Most warships with the older SA-N-1 Goa antiair missile are being retired, and only 22 cruisers and carriers have the SA-N-3 Goblet missile, which probably has a nuclear option. (A nuclear SA-N-6 could give the Soviets 30 ships with a nuclear antiair capability in the year 2000.)
The former probability of the Soviet first use of nuclear weapons in a naval or land conflict is now considered unlikely by the U.S. intelligence community. It was always believed that NATO would introduce them in the face of a massive Soviet conventional attack in Europe. But the changing Soviet defense posture, the political-economic restructuring of Eu
rope, the continued Soviet support of naval programs, and other factors could easily change this situation in the next decade.
While the probability of a near-term conflict with the Soviet Union seems unlikely, the possibilities for change are tremendous, demanding a long-term approach to considerations of potential U.S.-Soviet conflict.
At the same time, several Third World countries have or are developing nuclear weapons. While a nuclear exchange with those countries is unlikely, U.S. naval weapons—which could be used without overflight or basing permission—may provide flexibility in deterring the use of Third World nuclear as well as conventional weapons. As Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney says in his statement to Congress on the fiscal year 1992 budget: “Nonstrategic nuclear forces . . . provide the flexibility to deter attacks or respond to aggression at the tactical (or theater level) in most parts of the world.”
A world with fewer nuclear weapons is in several (but not all) respects a safer world, and certain conventional weapons, especially “smart” and “brilliant” ones, can now compensate for the effectiveness of nuclear weapons. Still, for a number of reasons nuclear weapons will be needed in the U.S. inventory for the foreseeable future. Thus, the naval nuclear weapon issues should be periodically revisited in this rapidly changing world.
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Proceedings / February 1991
[1]Ibid.
[2]AU U.S. nuclear weapons are numbered in a single series that dates back to the Fat Man and Little Boy bombs of 1945. All weapon numbers were originally given a “mark” prefix. Subsequently, most bombs were given a "B” prefix and other weapons (including specialized depth bombs) a “W" prefix.
[3]Inventory estimates from “Nuclear Notebook,’ Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, June 1990, p. 48.
[4]Dr. Richard L. Wagner, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, testimony before the Committee on Armed Services, Senate, 13 March 1985-
‘Joshua Handler and William M. Arkin, “Nuclear Warships and Naval Nuclear Weapons 1990: A Complete Inventory,” Neptune Paper No. 5, September 1990, p. 1.
[6]Ibid.
[7]Norman Polmar and Donald M. Kerr, “Nuclear Torpedoes,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1986, pp. 62-68. At the time the article was written Dr. Kerr was Director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory; both authors had recently served on a Secretary of the Navy panel examining advanced torpedo issues.
[8]Captain D. A. Paolucci, USN (Ret.), and Captain [ J. H. Patton, USN (Ret.), Comment and Discussion, pp. 91-95, November 1986 Proceedings.
“See “Soviet Navy: A Growth Industry,” U.S- Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1990, pp- 133-134.
'“Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, January 1991, p- V-l.