This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
By Colonel John C. Scharfen, U.S. Marine Corps, (Retired)
At the outset of 1989 the MV-22 Osprey was the Marine Corps story of the year—but then the world changed. The sudden unpredictable erosion of the Soviet threat promised reductions in a defense budget already constrained by the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings legislation. The year’s events confirmed what many thought would happen: . . battles
over service roles and missions inevitably follow a constrained defense budget. . . . In 1989 there was ample evidence that the service proponents and antagonists had reached the jumpoff point for attack.”1 In 1989 they crossed the line of departure and clashed in the first skirmishes of what appears to be a minor roles-and-missions battle.
Other important events in 1989 were the budget, the naming of Richard Cheney as Secretary of Defense, the battle over the MV-22, Operation Just Cause in Panama, the Commandant’s continuing emphasis on warrior skills and professional military education (see Commandant’s interview, p. 144), the Department of Defense commitment to the drug war (see “DoD Plays in the Drug War,” p. 76), and the ongoing attempts to rationalize the role of women in the Marine Corps. But none was more noteworthy than the roles-and-missions issue.
Roles and missions: Service etiquette dictates against publicizing internecine conflicts over roles and missions.2 Defense leaders recognize that the Congress, the media, and the public find these disputes distasteful, counterproductive, and sometimes comic. But, behind closed doors, the battles can be intense, and the media revels in the intrigue. “The Army-Marine Corps tussle is a proper debate, and there will be many others like it as the services compete for slices of a shrinking pie. But unless Mr. Cheney provides a strategic roadmap for future defense needs, these disputes will be settled in the worst way possible, by log rolling among the services and parochial politicking in Congress,” said the New York Times in an editorial.3
Two services are contending for primacy as the nation’s force for fighting low intensity conflict (LIC), what then- Vice President Bush described in 1986 as “. . . the war in the shadows . . . manifested in a stream of hostage crises, terrorist attacks, local conflicts, and insurgencies.”4 As the Warsaw Pact threat for general war diminishes, so does the necessity for maintaining a large U.S. force in Europe. The predictable reductions of our forces in Europe translate to a smaller Army bereft of its principal mission, leaving LIC as the major justification for force structuring. This is an arena, however, in which the Marine Corps has traditionally justified itself to the nation. Generations of Americans have thought of Marines as “first to fight . . . expeditionary forces”—all sustained by the ships of the U.S. Navy and designed to project power ashore by forcible entry and pave the way for follow-on U.S. Army forces.
The Commandant’s agenda addresses such concerns. From the outset of his tenure, long before events in Europe altered our assessment of the Soviet threat, he began training and structuring the Marine Corps for “the most likely” combat and that which is best suited for its historic role—low-intensity conflict. In 1988 he told Congress: “While we are fully prepared for the most challenging conflict, your Marine Corps must also stand ready for the most likely conflict—that in the Third World.”5 In his 1989 report he sharpened the focus: “Over the past year we have taken a hard look at ourselves and assessed the direction of the Corps. ... we reaffirmed our roles and missions. We are not only the Nation’s most deployable force, but the most employable across the spectrum of conflict. . . . Your Corps remains prepared for the most likely conflict,”—in his view, low intensity conflict.’’ The press fell short of maintaining that General Gray invented LIC, but one article contended that “. . . the iconoclastic fireplug . . . Gen. A1 Gray has emerged at the forefront of this [LIC] strategy.”7 Marines may lay claim to having written the first LIC manual—the Small Wars Manual, published in 1940—but the contemporary emphasis on readiness for this form of war coincides with the naming of General Gray as Commandant. Marine amphibious forces were redesignated as “expeditionary forces,” a term they had been forced to drop in 1965; the Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) was organized. Wrote one Marine author, “. . . What is needed is a
National Security Decision Directive to assign a service the principal role and mission to be prepared to engage in all forms of low-intensity-conflict.”8 By the beginning of 1989, the Marine Corps had so thoroughly established its claim to being the logical service to serve as the nation’s premier LIC force that one Army officer said, “A1 Gray has positioned the Corps well to deal with Third World revolutionary wars, and I’m not sure that’s a mission the Army wants.”9 Of course, he is wrong about the Army. If the Army is to weather the force reduction storms it must seek refuge by gamering at least a share of the missions that are being funded.
Since the end of the Vietnam War, the Army has given first priority to its European mission. Almost 15% of U.S. Army forces—including four full-strength armored and mechanized divisions—are positioned in Europe. Of the 14 other active duty divisions, six are on a ten-day alert to reinforce Europe. When the administration and congress talk about deep cuts in our European presence as a bonus of the Gorbachev revolution, the Army listens. The need to reorient the Army’s focus on low-intensity conflict is explicit in a paper entitled “A Strategic Force for the 1990s and Beyond,” sponsored by Army Chief of Staff General Carl E. Vuono. Although it was published in an official Army magazine, the following passage reads as if it were drawn from a Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual: “For years [the Army has] been . . • rewriting its doctrine to adjust to world changes. The modernization of heavy forces, creation of elite light divisions and increases in the size of special operations forces have balanced the Army for virtually any strategic contingency, including the special capability of what’s called ‘forced entry—the any-time, anyplace, initial ‘fighting your way into' enemy territory to establish the first airhead for the rest of the force to follow. The 82nd Airborne can do it, as can the 75th Ranger Regiment. In fact, the Rangers boast the nickname ‘the President’s Kick Off Team.’”10
The Marine Corps historian, Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, U.S. Marine Corps, (Retired), summed up the Army-Marine Corps roles and missions contest as follows, “. . . the missions of
•he Army and Marine Corps seem to be converging .... the nation [does not] feed, nor could it afford, two land armies. For that matter, it also neither needs nor can afford two Marine Corps.”11
The budget: The Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Representative Les Aspin (D-WI), gave his opinion of the 1989 defense budget process when he said, “I’m convinced •here’s no strategy or rationale for what •hey’re doing. . . . It’s a disorderly process.”12 Every administration has been chastised by the press for failing to develop an adequate strategy, but one man's grand strategy can be another man’s trifle. The Department of Defense does have an elaborate, cyclic process •hat produces a strategy. However, it is So ponderous that it is irrelevant to the allocation of priorities in the budget process. In the words of a Pentagon program analyst, “. . . this neat, logical process Is constantly bypassed by the everchang- lng, bewildering events of the real w°rld. . . . Our planning process does not work in the real world because our Planners have disconnected strategy from •he real world of budget politics.”13
The fiscal year 1990 budget signed by President Bush in November 1989 allocated $9.2 billion in direct appropriations f°r the Marine Corps. This was $29.5 million less than appropriated in 1988 but $95.6 million more than the Department °f Defense had requested. After adjusting for a pay raise, budget allocations will reduce end strength by 465 Marines.
After three years of anticipating the •rauma of a deflated budget, the services, •° include the Marine Corps, still have n°t suffered badly. But prudent budget- catchers are looking at the ominous five- year forecasts. Based on November guidelines provided by the Secretary of Pefense, the military services are expecting a personnel cut of 13.8%—290,000 billets from the current 2.1 million personnel strength—by 1995. The Marine Corps share of that cut would be 7.7%— or 15,000 fewer Marines than the current strength of 194,000. This equates to one Marine Expeditionary Brigade. But the Marine Corps share of the proposed cuts would not be as drastic as those proposed for the Army and the Air Force—a whopping 17.6% and 17.3% respectively. The Navy would suffer the least with a 6.9% drop. The Marine Corps has no cause to celebrate, however; Senate Armed Services Committee chairman Sen. Sam Nunn (D-GA) intends to take a hard look at the disparity between the number of Marines in the Fleet Marine Force and the few amphibious ships available to transport them.14
While Cheney has said that he wants to cut the defense budget by $180 billion during the next five years, it is not a fait accompli. In the elaborate Kabuki theater of the defense budget process, what you see is seldom what you get. In addition to the accounting sorcery that has been integral to defense budgeting, circumstances change. The late 1989 Panama action, for example, took the edge off the Gramm- Rudman-Hollings-Gorbachev—with the acronym Gramachev—incentives for
major force reductions.15
The MV-22 Osprey: The good news in 1989 was that the test program is proceeding smoothly for the hybrid that uses tilting engines and rotors to take off and land like a helicopter yet converts to a fixed-wing conventional aircraft in flight. Two aircraft were flying development tests. The aircraft, designed to replace the aging CH-46E and early CH-53A/D assault support helicopters, had flown at 250 knots in level flight. It had sustained 2.3gs and flown at 10,000 feet. It was meeting design specifications to transport 24 troops with a crew of four with y combat radius of 220+ nautical miles at 250 nautical miles per hour. Four more developmental MV-22s were scheduled to be delivered.
The bad news first came to light earlier in the year, when Cheney on 25 April told the House Armed Services Committee that he “could not justify spending the amount of money . . . proposed . . . when we were just getting ready to move into procurement on the V-22 to perform a very narrow mission that I think can be performed ... by using [CH-53E| helicopters instead of the V-22.” Admiral William Crowe, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ol Staff, challenged the “strategic rationale for the V-22” in the amphibious mission. The Department of Defense revised fiscal year 1990 defense budget cancelled the program on grounds of affordability.16
In November the Congress, which has been generally supportive of the V-22, countered the DoD decision by providing $225 million in the 1990 budget to keep the flight tests on schedule. In addition, $260 million left over in advance procurement funds from the previous year’s authorization for production activities appeared to be available. The total funds on hand, therefore, came to about a halfbillion dollars for the program.17 Then Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Atwood, without consulting Congress, signed a 1 December memorandum that included a “deferral device” directing an immediate termination of V-22 contracts funded by the leftover $260 million. The Atwood memo indicated that it was not in the public interest to spend these funds since the administration does not intend to continue the program beyond the research and development phase. Atwood’s
The LCAC headed for a Mediterranean beach and the C-I4I dropping parachutists in Korea represent two means of inserting U.S. troops into battle. The Marine Corps and the Army airborne share an illustrious fighting heritage. Will the two eventually find themselves engaged in an open fight for the “expeditionary” role?
memorandum energized the Congress. It prompted Representative Curt Weldon (R-PA) to characterize it as “faceless, gutless” [and] very ill-timed and ill conceived.” Weldon threw down the congressional gauntlet: “If anything, this has strengthened congressional support for the program.” He then warned the Secretary of Defense, “Cheney has had tremendous credibility with the Congress, and this has actually hurt him.” In a 12 December letter to Secretary Cheney,
NAVY TIMES (D. PENSINGER)
The V-22 Osprey has strong congressional support, in part because of its commercial potential. General A.M. Gray said it would be hard to find any commandant who would send Marines into action riding the helicopters proposed to replace it.
Senator John Glenn (D-OH) charged that the deferral device was “a direct contravention of Congressional guidance on the V-22 program contained in both the FY-90 Defense Authorization Act and in the FY-90 Defense Appropriations Act.” Representative Les Aspin (D-WI), was also displeased with the Atwood memorandum.18
The utility of the V-22 is a core issue. In early 1989 the Commandant, in his annual report to Congress, justified the aircraft as one that would provide “. . .a decisive advantage in over-the- horizon operations.”19 The claim is valid on its own. Those familiar with the aircraft’s potential, however, recognize that in citing “over-the-horizon operations” as a justification for continued development and procurement, the Commandant was not identifying the sole nor perhaps even the most important mission of the V-22. Senator Nunn commented, “The Committee is hopeful that the Department of Defense will have a broader justification than simply the Marine Corps justification that has so far been given.”20 When Cheney submitted the defense budget to Congress on 25 April he assigned the V-22 this narrow amphibious mission and contended that on this basis the MV-22 is not cost-effective. It is a bad rap. Retired Admiral Fred H. Michaelis, U.S. Navy, in an overview of the utility of the MV-22 argues that the Osprey may be the most versatile, multimission aircraft ever developed.21 It is the Air Force’s choice for long-range, counter-hostage, and immediate-response operations. The Air Force has testified that there is no aircraft available now or in the foreseeable future that can match the capabilities of the Osprey for these missions. The Navy would use the Osprey for combat search and rescue. For the first time, the service would have an aircraft able to loiter far enough off target to be safe yet close enough to be capable of retrieving downed aircrews before they were captured. Some Army medical personnel and logisticians believe that the aircraft is ideal for casualty evacuation and for supporting forward deployed forces. The aircraft has great utility for the Coast Guard’s anti-drug interdiction mission. Lieutenant Colonel John Creveling of the U.S. Special Operations Command has indicated that the Osprey is the top priority for the joint military command because it requires an aircraft that can take off vertically and fly at high speeds for special operations.22 The commercial applications of the aircraft are manifold and manifest.
Marine Corps support of the MV-22 went through several transitions during 1989. Early in the year, in the report to the Congress, General Gray stated that the MV-22 “. . .is the most important advance in military aviation since the helicopter. . . . It is my number one aviation priority.” However he subsequently faced the determined opposition of a Secretary of Defense who unfortunately had made a personal commitment to the demise of the tiltrotor. Early in his tenure Cheney demonstrated that he was capable of retaliating against those who opposed him. Faced with a declining budget that sharpened the significance of the Army-Marine Corps roles and missions contest, and knowing that the influence of the Secretary of Defense could be crucial in this contest, it appears that the Marine hierarchy has backed off from any identifiable campaigning on behalf of the endangered aircraft. The Marine transition from steady, strong support to witnessing events silently was most obvious when the Marine Corps delayed its response to a Sikorsky white paper downplaying tiltrotor technology. A defense- oriented publication quoted a Marine as stating “the Marine Corps would be ill- served if we got into a point-counterpoint in response to the charges made by Sikorsky.”-3 Another reporter contended that V-22 contractors discouraged Marines from being more aggressive and rocking the boat.24 There was a lack of passion in a statement from the senior Marine aviator, Lieutenant General Charles H. Pitman: “I think that we lose a lot if we lose the V-22 ... but we’re still better equipped [today].”25 At the end of the year, however, the pressures began to mount within the aviation community for more active Marine Corps support of the besieged program. The extent to which the Marine Corps condones lobbying for the MV-22 could be crucial. With the aid of Congress, the Marine Corps could win the battle, but in the process they might lose the roles and missions war by alienating the Secretary of Defense. Senior Marine Corps officers insist that they neither authorize nor condone any attempts to undermine the authority of the Secretary of Defense on this issue.
One school of thought maintains that the MV-22 is so important to the entire defense establishment and to the U.S. economy that the program will prevail even without DoD support. Accordingly, this school argues that there is no need for fhe Marine Corps to gamble on sacrific- lng the core issues of roles and missions t°r an aircraft it can survive without over the short term—and will probably get anyway. But others, equally knowledge- ahle, contend that the program cannot survive without DoD support and that the United States will lose the technology to other national competitors in Asia or Europe unless the Marine Corps fights for the MV-22. The loss of this market to other nations is possible. The Ishida Croup of Nagoya, Japan, plans to build a tilt wing (as opposed to a tilt rotor) air- eraft that has been designated the TW-68. The Japanese conglomerate plans to build an initial order of 100 aircraft to fly across a network of STOL and verti-ports ln Japan.26 Another competitor for this hybrid technology is Eurofar, a consortium of British, French, Spanish, Italian, and West German firms that has designed a similar aircraft.27
Operations and exercises: Marine torces played an important but not dominant role in Operation Just Cause, the military intervention in Panama that was the most important operational event of 1989. In the simplest of terms, it was an Army show and by all accounts from qualified observers, it was a military success, well conceived and executed by competent professionals. There were some failings. The absence of civil affairs teams and sufficient military police to control the streets that fell prey to civil disorder and widespread looting could have been avoided by better planning. The collateral damage inflicted on noncombatants may have been excessive. The lack of a media plan contributed to some valid complaints made by the press. Some have cited a poor intelligence effort as the cause for the failure to capture General Manuel Noriega quickly. The focus on this failure—if it can be called a failure—obscures the reality that the intelligence available and employed in the operation was extraordinarily rich in both quantity and quality. Would that U.S. forces could always have such an intimate knowledge of the terrain, the oppos- "ig forces, and the populace.
Of the 24,000 troops committed to the operation, only about 700 were Marines teho were already in place prior to the operation. In addition to the eight Marines in the U.S. Embassy Security Guard, Marine units included Company U of the 2d Light Armored Infantry Bat- ialion; company K of the 3d Battalion, Gth Marines; Detachment G of Brigade Service Support Group Six; the First Tleet Anti-Terrorist Security Team; and fhe Marine Corps Security Force Company, Panama. These units were organized into Task Force Semper Fidelis (commanded by Colonel Charles Richardson, U.S. Marine Corps) that had the initial mission of securing Howard Air Force Base and the Bridge of the Americas that spanned the Panama Canal. Subsequently, Marine mobile operations covered an area of about 600 square miles southwest of the canal and included several sweeps through towns and port areas believed to harbor elements of the Panamanian Defense Force and Noriega’s Dignity Battalions (or in the GI-Marine vernacular, “dingbats”). At one point, the Marines had detained about 1,200 Noriega supporters and confiscated 550 weapons and 50,000 rounds of ammunition.28 The light armored vehicle (LAV) proved to be extremely effective at this level of combat, earning the respect and envy of Army officers; some are now on loan to the Army for evaluation.
Army advocates skillfully exploited Operation Just Cause to promote their claim for what Army Chief of Staff General Carl E. Vuono terms “contingency forces . . . with forced entry capabilities . . . anywhere on the globe.29 However, the accomplishment was less spectacular than advertised. The military challenges presented in Operation Just Cause were as manageable as they come. The United States had a substantial military presence in Panama before the operation, controlled major air terminals, had detailed intelligence, had a year to plan and train for the operation, had freedom in selecting time and place, was opposed by a third-rate military force, and enjoyed the population’s support. Notwithstanding the air drops, there was no bona fide forcible entry demonstrated, nor was there a requirement to support a sustained operation, two of the capabilities that define a competent expeditionary force. Significantly, Senator Nunn warned against over-valuing the lessons learned from the operation in reshaping our military forces.30
The military mobilized to fight the war on drugs during 1989. Despite congressional mandates to commit the military to a more active role against the infiltration of drugs into the United States, until mid- 1989 the Pentagon was reluctant to do so. “Within the uniformed services, Gen. Alfred M. Gray, the marine member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is generally credited with being the leading advocate of greater military involvement in the drug war and senior military officers say the other Chiefs have been converted to his way of thinking, a military analyst said.”31 In July, the public learned that Marine Corps OV-IOD Broncos fitted
PRESTON’S
188-J Main SL Wharf, Greenport, NY 11944
You could shop for months and never find the hundreds of decorative nautical ideas illustrated in Preston's new catalog:
112 pages teeming with ship models, marine paintings, nautical lamps and clocks, ships' wheels, figureheads and scores of other nautical ideas for the Home.
cFREE 112 Page Catalog for Lovers of
QHIPS &EA
☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆
HISTORICAL
U.S. NAVY SHIP S CAPS
These are the same baseball caps sold aboard U.S. Navy warships. They are navy blue with service gold embroidery - not a patch or silkscreen. Caps are full (not mesh back), adjustable (one size fits all) and made in USA.
BATTLESHIPS: IOWA, NEW JERSEY, MISSOURI. WISCONSIN, NEW YORK. TEXAS, ARIZONA, CALIFORNIA, WEST VIRGINIA, WASHINGTON. AIRCRAFT CARRIERS: MIDWAY, CORAL SEA. FORRESTAL, RANGER, KITTY HAWK, SARATOGA. INDEPENDENCE, ENTERPRISE, EISENHOWER, LINCOLN. KENNEDY. AMERICA, NIMITZ, CONSTELLATION. CARL VINSON. ROOSEVELT. RETIRED: U.S. NAVY. U.S. MARINES or U.S. COAST GUARD. SPECIALTY: NAVY. USMC. USCG. TOP GUN. STARK. VINCENNES. EMBLEM: Embroidered with silver and gold metallic thread and available for U.S. NAVY (officer), (officer retired), (C.R0.-E-9, E-8, E-7), (C.R0. retired-E-9 retired, E-8 retired, E-7 retired), (wings-pilot. (light officer, flight crew), (submarine dolphins), (seabees), (seals), U.S. MARINES. U.S. COASTGUARD, US. ARMY, and U.S. AIR FORCE.
CUSTOM: Any other ship not listed above or any military unit is available as a custom cap. The minimum quantity for a custom cap is two per ship or unit (both with eggs or both without eggs). Custom caps must be ordered in even numbers. The top line is twenty spaces maximum and the bottom line is twelve spaces maximum. EMBLEMS NOT AVAILABLE ON CUSTOM CAPS.
Caps are $12.00 each. Scrambled eggs on visor are an additional $2.00. Add $2.50 for shipping. CA residents add 6%. Allow eight weeks for delivery. No CODs or credit card orders.
HAMPTON COMPANY, Dept. R, P.O. Box 3643, Tustin, CA 92681.
Marines played a limited but effective role in Panama and their light armored vehicles proved ideal for operations in the urban environment. The U.S. Army is now evaluating the vehicles.
with forward looking infrared (FLIR) systems had been used to detect and track low-flying aircraft, boats, and ground vehicles smuggling narcotics into the southeast United States. In August, General Gray told a Senate committee that the military was “fully locked and loaded “and leaning forward in their foxholes,” in anticipation of a role in the drug war.32 On 18 September, Secretary Cheney announced that the U.S. military was firmly committed to an antidrug operational strategy, and a 15 October deadline was assigned for the services to deliver proposals on how they might contribute. On 13 October an announcement was made that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the Marine Corps had signed a memorandum of understanding to conduct joint training and surveillance operations along the southwest borders of the United States. The INS announcement indicated that no more than 50 Marines would be involved in the program at any one time and that Marines would accompany the Border Patrol on their operations. In December, a Marine reconnaissance patrol exchanged fire with drug smugglers crossing the U.S. border. No casualties were inflicted on either side although the smugglers abandoned a horse and 535 pounds of marijuana in their flight from the encounter.
Marines from the 2d Marine Expeditionary Force in Camp Lejeune participated in disaster relief operations after Hurricane Hugo hit South Carolina in September. A detachment of 80 Marines assisted in the cleanup of the millions of gallons of crude oil dumped into Prince William Sound, Alaska, by the oil tanker Exxon Valdez.
Kernel Blitz 89-1 was the first major exercise of 1989. This is an annual event that gives Marines an opportunity to develop and test innovative landing plans with new equipment. The 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade with Amphibious Group 3 landed on the Camp Pendleton beaches.
In more exotic climes, United States and Royal Thai Marines joined in a combined operation conducting an amphibious assault exercise against Pattatya Beach, Thailand, in Exercise Thalay Thai ’89. The exercise is scheduled to become a semiannual affair, alternating with Exercise Cobra Gold. As the Thai Royal
Marines and the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit secured the initial objectives, the 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade was flown from California and linked up with the equipment and support of the Maritime Prepositioning Ships from MPS Squadron Two.
Marines of the 37th MEU and the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force maneuvered in northern Japan in a field training exercise called Northern Warrior. The 13th MEU conducted Valiant Usher, an amphibious readiness exercise, at Subic Bay in the Philippines. Closer to home, the 4th and 6th Marine Expeditionary Brigades from the II Marine Expeditionary Force participated in Exercise Solid Shield 89. This joint training exercise also included elements of the XVIII Airborne Corps with the 82nd Airborne and 101st Airborne Assault Divisions.
Great Lakes Cruise 89, a Navy- Marine, show-the-flag, recruiting and training event found about 180 Marines embarked on board the USS Boulder (LST-1190) to visit some 20 Canadian and U.S. cities on the Great Lakes. Marines participated in Caltrop Force 89, an exercise that included forces from four English-speaking countries—the United States, Canada, Great Britain, and Australia. U.S. forces included elements of the Army’s 7th Infantry Division (Light) and the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines with the 1st Light Armored Infantry Battalion and the 3d Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company from the Fourth Marine Division.
It was an important year for education and training. In May, a House Armed Services Committee study group reported on its survey of the quality of education
U.S. MARINE CORPS <C. JENKS)
in the higher-level service schools. On the down side, the Marine Corps Coni' mand and Staff College was faulted for being too much of a trade school for amphibious warfare with insufficient emphasis on joint operations. On the high side, the panel praised the Marines for their use of well-qualified adjunct professors who are drawn from the Marine Corps Reserve. Since the committee report, the curricula of the Staff College has been completely changed to include doubling the joint service content.
The Marine Corps University was established on 1 August. The institution directs all broad military educational—-as opposed to technical—activities within the Marine Corps, both Regular and Reserve. The Basic and Amphibious Warfare Schools, the Command and Staff College, the three staff noncommissioned academies, the 17 noncommissioned officers schools, the Marine Corps Institute, and the Professional Military Education (PME) program (among others) come under the University’s purview. The University faculty will include both military and civilian instructors. General Gray has set some lofty goals for the institution and views its development as a long-term project.
The creation of the Marine Corps University is one of many initiatives that the Commandant has undertaken to make the Corps’ professional development routine more intellectually rigorous. (See p. 144, this issue, for a detailed description of the program.)
Headquarters provided a required reading list of military subjects for each rank and grade, which provided grist for the media’s infatuation with the Marine
Will
Corps. One article was headlined, “Too Many Books Could Make The Marines Dangerous.”33
The Commandant has also put Fleet Marine Force Manual 1—Warfighting, Published in March—on the required reading list. In his foreward to the 88- Page manual Gray said, “1 expect every officer to read—and reread—this book, understand it, and take its message to heart. . . . This manual describes a philosophy of action which dictates our approach to duty.” The manual has stimulated some provocative discussion in the Marine Corps Gazette. One of the most thoughtful and constructive critiques was Provided by Lieutenant Colonel Edward T Robeson IV, who not only expressed his substantive reservations but provided line-by-line recommendations for change.34
The Marine Corps took a critical look at its marksmanship training programs during the year. For many years critics have maintained that marksmanship training programs gave too much attention to fixed-target, known-distance shooting at the expense of training under combat conditions. Some modifications were made to the markmanship training courses but generally, the existing program has been retained. Construction began on a new facility at Camp Lejeune t° train Marines for military operations in Urban terrain; it should be ready for use soon. The 20-acre, $7.8 million representation of an urban environment includes paved roads and mockups of homes and commercial buildings. One building has a reinforced roof that will Uccommodate the landing of a CH-53E.
The Marine Combat Training course— udvanced infantry training that every rnale Marine gets once he graduates from a recruit depot—got off the ground at the Schools of Infantry at Camp Pendleton, California, and Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.
All major exercises during 1989 included helicopter assault support and close air support operations. Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (HMM)- 163 was an integral player in Exercise Thalay Thai and Kernel Blitz 89-1; IIMM- 166 also participated in Kernel olitz. Marines proposed the construction °f a mid-Atlantic electronic warfare range at Piney Island, North Carolina, •hat would simulate electronic ground Slgnals to jam aircraft radar capabilities; Ihe proposal calls for multiservice use.
Personnel: Over the past half-century, Personnel management has become an e*acting science. Automation and sophisticated management techniques have Peen driven by the increased cost of personnel, competition for the better qualified people, social pressures, and greater concern for rights and equity. Some of the more critical concerns are the issues of dual career marriages, day care, teenage mothers and mothers-to-be, single parents, the role of women in combat, racial tensions, drugs, manning levels, distribution of skills, career opportunities, and recruitment of homosexuals. About 60% of military personnel are married and about 5% of Marines are women. The Marine Corps thus faces concerns for child-care facilities, child custody problems, provisions for maternity care and maternity leave, special consideration for pregnant Marines, and limitations on who can be considered truly deployable. Many of these problems fall on the shoulders of the commander, but all are equally the concern of the personnel manager. (See “Smaller and Better in the 1990s” by MajGen Walter Boomer, pp. 104-110.)
Strategies must be developed to ensure that the approach to reducing the number of active-duty Marines guarantees a balanced force, with the appropriate skills in the numbers required to assure equity for the individual Marine.
The Army’s experience in Operation Just Cause in Panama provided grist for Representative Pat Schroeder (D-CO), who promised draft legislation to authorize a four-year test of assigning women to combat units. Sergeant Rhonda Maskus, of the 82nd Airborne Division, filed a discrimination complaint against the Army alleging that a male had been selected in her stead to deploy for combat in Just Cause. The strategy to cope with these conflicts is, apparently, to avoid a major encounter. The services seem to be conducting a delaying action, withdrawing but not capitulating, marking time, and hoping, that a sane balance on the issues will prevail.
A new reenlistment system was introduced during the year. Headquarters Marine Corps career monitors now visit major commands once a year not merely to provide information as they did in the past but to do one-on-one interviews with prospective reenlistees. Qualified Marines can evaluate their options and reen-
The 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade flew to Thailand and linked up with these vehicles, which came ashore from ships of Maritime Prepositioning Squadron Two.
list on the spot.
All Marine officers selected for captain are now required to train for a secondary military occupational specialty and many can expect to serve in their secondary specialty soon after being assigned the new specialty. The decision was made to bolster the numbers of officers available to serve in fields in which there are officer shortages such as intelligence and communications.
The Marine Corps found few takers in an early retirement program offered to Marines in pay grades E-7 through E-9 who were serving in overcrowded occupational fields.35 The Marine Corps was authorized to award $6,000 bonuses to company grade aviators to stem pilot drain in critical areas. The Marines had only 50% of the AV-8B aviators required and only about 40% of the EA-6 pilots needed. The Navy has been offering $4,000 to $12,000 bonuses to its critical
skill aviators for years; but it has been six years since the Marine Corps felt compelled to do so, and Marine aviators believe that they have not been fairly compensated.36
The Navy Times reported that the Marines were having difficulty encouraging grading officers to write meaningful fitness reports.37 Following are some of the “unfit” quotes that were cited, “Easily likeable but frightens COs. . . . Did not bring discredit upon the Marine Corps. . . . Took over an unsatisfactory] unit and maintained it. . . . Conscious.”
There were problems in the recruiting service during 1989. First, the services began to feel the impact of a declining population of younger people—there will be a 30% reduction in qualified 17- to 23-year-old males by 1994. The recruiting budget also declined. A particularly distressing incident in the Pittsburgh recruiting station ended with courts-martial
An AV-8B from VMA-231 launches from the 6.5° ski-jump bow of the Italian Navy’s carrier Giuseppe Garibaldi in the Mediterranean. U.S. Marine Corps Harriers have operated from the Spanish Navy’s carrier Principe de Asturias, which has a 12° ski-jump. The Soviet carrier Tbilisi also has a ski-jump.
for a Marine major and six senior noncommissioned officers and non-judicial punishment for 19 other Marines for manufacturing high school diplomas and hiding injuries, criminal records, and drug abuse to qualify some 200 fraudulent enlistees. But there was also good news on the recruiting front. By midyear, 96% of the male and 100% of the female enlistees were high school graduates. The recruiting service will probably add another 70 career recruiters to the ranks to bring the total to about 530.
According to the General Accounting Office, only the Marine Corps is complying with a congressional mandate to provide better qualified officers to career joint-duty slots. The Marine Corps also appears to be protecting the careers of joint-duty officers as they are doing as well or better than their peers on promotion lists.
Aviation: During the year the Marines generated plans to recruit helicopter pilots to transition to fixed-wing jet aircraft to alleviate shortages of pilots; 15 helicopter pilots transitioned to the AV-8B during 1989. In June the Commandant, concerned about the loss of 45 Marines in seven aircraft mishaps at the year’s midpoint, declared a two-day operational stand-down for each Marine aviation unit. Most of the accidents were caused by aircrew error. “Our machines are not letting us down; we are letting ourselves down. It is time to pause, catch our breath and come to grips with the devastating trend established this year, Gray told his Marines.”38
The future of Marine Corps aviation is all vertical/short takeoff and landing (V/ STOL), according to Major General Mi' chael P. Sullivan. He said that the Marine Corps wanted within 20 years an entire inventory of aircraft capable of vertical and short takeoffs and landings—with the exception of the KC-130 refueler- transport and its replacement. The AV-8B replacement of this era will be supersonic. He cited the modern-day vulnerability of airfields and the seabasing advantage of V/STOL aircraft as major considerations.
An AV-8B with a gross weight of 31,000 pounds deck-launched off the 12° ski-jump on the bow of Spain’s aircraft carrier Principe de Asturias; in the words of one veteran aviator, “I would love to convince the United States Navy that this [a ski-jump bow] is the way to go.”
During the year Japan indicated an interest in buying 20 or 30 maritime- configured Harriers for operational tests. Rolls-Royce officials estimate that the final Japanese buy would be 50 aircraft- The Japanese, and the Italians, want ;1 Harrier with a radar for sea-based fleet air defense. The Royal Navy’s Sea Harrier already has one; the key to AV-8B foreign military sales to these nations is the installation of a multimode radar.40
Marines suspended delivery of McDonnell Douglas’s AV-8B Harrier II aircraft until the company corrected the manufacturing process that was resulting in tears in the composite material used in the fabrication of the wings. The first of 99 approved night-attack aircraft were delivered to the Marine Corps for testing during the last quarter of the year.
Other weapon systems: The big weapons news of 1989 came from one of the smallest weapons. After 77 years, the M1911 and M1911A1 Colt .45 was retired and replaced by the 9-mm. Beretta. The transition did not go smoothly, however. The Army rejected a production lot of the pistols from the Italian manufacturer, citing a potential defect. There was progress this year in the development of some radically new shoulder weapons. The next generation of combat rifles could fire a duplex bullet—two rounds would leave the chamber, one tracing the other to give a wider scope to the striking pattern; a caseless bullet—which would not require a brass shell; and flechettes--' fine steel darts that also give a broader striking pattern.
lock
on amphibious shipping as General
fewi
news comes from the logic that with an aPparent lessening of the strategic threat— Uhout any diminution of the conven- ,l0nal threat at the lower orders of vio- the U.S. Navy would provide a
knee
Operation Just Cause generated substantial enthusiasm within the Army for 'he Marine’s light armored vehicle. This e'ght-wheeled, 14-ton steel vehicle can Perform a number of roles, from transportation of troops (six Marines), to serv- lng as the chassis for an assault gun or as an a'r defense variant. All would be heli- c°Pter transportable with the CH-53E.
Uring the year the Marine Corps indicted an interest in testing a British lightweight 155 -mm. howitzer to replace the J/tl98 towed 155-mm. howitzer. General ttPivan identified the following devel- °Prnent priorities for ground force weap- ?ns and support systems:
Unmanned aerial vehicles for recon- Cissance and long term endurance Uigitizeci maps that would permit the Marine in the field to call up a library of jttaps on a hand-held screen Better nuclear, biological, and chemi- Cl protective clothing Improved packaging for equipment and supplies
Improved night vision goggles—a Cchnology that has been faulted in aircraft accidents, yet received good grades or Performance in Just Cause Army helicopter operations
Improved forward combat logistics and 'mproved packaging of ammunition and Applies.41
Shipping: In the year of roles and mis- Sl°ns and of positioning to compete for constrained budgets, the players don’t always line up on the same side of the aH- The Commander-in-Chief of the Pecial Operations Command, Army eneral James Lindsay, has voiced strong support for the MV-22—“If the MV-22 is finally canceled I’ve got to ave something else,” and “I had my 1 ^ ,[1] [2]n court more than once. ... I ost.”42 On the other hand, the Special Perations Command proposes a poten- lal threat to the Marine Corps’s perennial lndsay proceeds with his plans for for- ard deploying special operation forces a°oard ships of the amphibious fleet. enior Marines downplay any conflict °Ver amphibious shipping with the Spe- |?al Operations Command and indicate ^at scheduling Special Operations b°ard amphibious ships is a cooperative rather than a competitive arrangement. &ad news for Marines came from a °ngressional Budget Office study that j|aggested the Navy could do with 17 er amphibious ships by 1998. Good higher priority to extending sea power ashore in low-intensity conflicts.
The Navy’s plans to build five amphibious assault ships (LHD)-ls, four dock landing ships (LSD)-41s, and 59 air cushion landing craft (LCACs). The bill over the next five years for such a program would be $4.5 billion.43 The USS Wasp (LHD-1), an 844-foot, 40,500-ton amphibious assault ship was commissioned at Norfolk, Virginia, in July. The keel was laid for the Essex (LHD-2) earlier in the year. Crane ship #7 (designed to offload cargo from MPS ships where port facilities are primitive) joined the Ready Reserve Force during the year.
A National Security Sealift Policy was signed by President Bush on 5 October. Two aspects of the policy are important to maritime forces. One is that, for the first time, the nation’s highest authority has validated that U.S. security depends upon ‘‘U.S. owned and allied shipping resources.” The second is that ‘‘U.S. Policies and programs shall provide for an environment which fosters the competitiveness and industrial preparedness of . . . the maritime industry.” ,4M. Moore and G. Wilson, Washington Post, 28 November 1989, p. A-l.
,5The Gramm-Rudman-Gorbachev term is credited to Mr. Lawrence Korb of the Brooking’s Institute by the Economist, Nov. 25-Dec. 1, 1989, p. 27.
I6N. Friedman, “V-22 Full Scale Development Testing Continues,” Proceedings, January 1990, p. 135. ,7B.H. Cooper, Jr., “V-22 Osprey Tilt-Rotor Aircraft (Weapons Facts),” Congressional Research Service, 5 June 1989, order code IB86103. 18“Aspin Riled Over DoD Osprey Action,” Defense News, 18 December 1989, p. 2.
|yGen A.M. Gray, USMC, “The Annual Report of the Marine Corps To Congress,” as reported in Marine Corps Gazette, April 1989, p. 20.
20Sen. Sam Nunn (D-GA), Senate Radio and TV Gallery, 14 June 1989.
21Adm F.H. Michaelis, USN, (Ret) “V-22 Osprey —National Asset or Salami Victim,” unpublished manuscript written January 1990) in author’s personal files.
22G. Frank, “A New Angle in Transportation,” Los Angeles Times, 4 July 1989, p. IV-1.
23“Marine Response to Sikorsky V-22 White Paper Quashed Despite Strong Support,” Inside the Navy, 8 January 1990, p. 1.
24“Marines Preparing to Fight For V-22 During Fy-91 Budget Hearings,” Defense Daily, 10 January 1990, p. 41.
25Armed Forces Journal International, January 1990, p. 82.
26D.A. Brown, “Japan’s Ishida Group May Build Tilt-Wing Transport in U.S.,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 1 January 1990, p. 83.
27E. Weiner, “The Tilt Rotor: Wall Street to Capitol Hill in 45 Minutes?,” New York Times, 20 January 1990, p. F-8.
28J. Longo and E. Donovan, “Panamanians Welcome Marines,” Navy Times, 8 January 1990, p. 6. 29Gen Carl E. Vuono, USA, “Army Doesn’t Have to Compete With Marines,” New York Times, 1 January 1990, p. 24.
30R. Maze in “Operation Just Cause Draws Praise on Capitol Hill,” Navy Times, 15 January 1990, p. 6. 31B.E. Trainor, Military editor, New York Times, personal communication with author.
32R.A. Ryan, “Use of U.S. Troops in Drug War Questioned,” Detroit News, 18 August 1989, p. 3. 33N. Wade, “The Leatherneck Library,” New York Times.
34See the November 1989 issue of the Marine Corps Gazette, pp. 24-29 for these critiques.
35E.P. Donovan, “Early Retirement Rules Eased for Marines,” Navy Times, 13 November 1989, p. 7. 36E.P. Donovan, “Corps May Dangle Bonus Lure in Critical Pilot Slots,” Navy Times, 16 October 1989, p. 4.
37E.P. Donovan, “Flowery Phrases Fail in Evaluations,” Navy Times, September 1989, p. 4. 38Commandant of the Marine Corps message 031600Z June 89, titled: “Aviation Standdown.” 39J. Grady, “Jumping Jets off Spain’s New Carrier Leaves Pilots Enthused,” Navy Times, 27 March 1989, p. 23.
40M. Witt, “Japan will buy Harriers, Rolls-Royce Says,” Navy Times, 18 September 1989, p. 29. 4,“Marinc Corps Report to Industry,” Marine Corps Gazette, October, 1989, p. 4.
42S.M. Schafer, “Osprey Cut Leaves Military in the Lurch, General Says,” Philadelphia Inquirer, 31 January 1990, p. 12.
43C. Baker, “Cuts Suggested for Corps’ Assault Ship Fleet,” Navy Times, 27 November 1989, p. 24.
Col Scharfen is a senior scientist at TITAN Systems, Inc., in Vienna, Virginia, and is on the board of the Marine Corps Historical Foundation. He has lectured on strategy and general war planning at the U.S. Joint Staff College.
'Col J.C. Scharfen, USMC, (Ret), “The U.S. Marine Corps in 1988”, Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1989, p. 166.
2There have been some notable exceptions to this gentility however, such as those found in LtGen Carl E. Mundy’s (USMC) interview titled “Marines ready to defend against an Army takeover of its fast-attack mission” with Elizabeth P. Donovan, Navy Times, 8 January 1990, p. 25 and BrigGen Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret), article “Go Marines! Beat Army!” Washington Post 8 October 1989, p. C-l. More characteristic of the politic approach to this brawl is Army Chief of Staff Gen Carl E. Vuono’s letter to the editor of the New York Times, 1 January, 1990, p. 24 “Army Doesn’t Have to Compete with Marines”, in which he cites the Army’s ”... substantial contingency forces . . . ,” but implies that the Army is above the interservice fray in that its “. . . unique strategic roles and missions complement those of our other services. ...”
[2]New York Times, 18 December 1989, p. A-18.
4New York Times, 8 December 1989, p. 4.
5Gen A.M. Gray, USMC, “The Annual Report of the Marine Corps to Congress”, Marine Corps Gazette, April 1988, p. 24.
6Ibid., p. 15.
7U.S. News and World Report, “Does America Need an Army?” 11 December 1989, p. 22. (Note the irony of the title, which recalls the perennial challenge: ‘Does America Need a Marine Corps?’) 8LtCol T. Hayden, USMC, “Low-Intensity Conflict”, Amphibious Warfare Review, Summer 1988, p. 32.
9Insight, “Defenders Reexamine Their Maps,” 25 December 1989, p. 22.
1()LtCol Donald Maple, USA “The Army As A Strategic Force”, Soldiers, January 1990, p. 25. "Simmons, op. cit.
I2John M. Broder and Melissa Healy, “Pentagon Accused of Lacking Strategy in Budget Plans to Meet Spending Cuts,” Los Angeles Times, 8 December 1989, p. 4.
,3F.C. Spinney, “A Defense Strategy That Works,” Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1990, p. 97.