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By Rear Admiral Jeremy D. Taylor, U.S. Navy
For those on the warrior path, the study of war fighting—including strategy, the operational art, and tactics—should be mandatory. Yet in the Navy, the officer corps rarely undergoes formal examination on the basics of the profession. There is no requirement for those in command to show that they are reading the books that constitute a vital laboratory for warriors.
Our war-fighting education comes from on-the-job experience, in a random fashion. Our emphasis is on management and engineering. Only a third of our captains and senior commanders have completed senior war college courses; few of our warrior leaders, especially those in naval aviation, have time for these courses or for other service schools with their abundant opportunities to study tactics and history and to read and think about war fighting.
We do not require completion of pertinent correspondence courses, and we do little to encourage independent study in how to fight and win.
Instead, we propel warriors returning to fleet assignments through courses that are equipment- and mission- specific, with little or no emphasis on the basics of war fighting—the lessons learned and recorded by the great captains of military history.
Doctrine for naval warfare is abundant in our allied tactical and naval warfare publications, but these are classified and few in number. They are good references, but they ignore the basics and leave much to be desired. The commanders-in-chief of the fleets and other operational commanders are currently filling the gaps in doctrine by issuing operation orders and “fighting instructions.” Tactical notes and memoranda serve well at the subordinate levels. What is missing is a doctrine on the order of the Army’s FM 100-5 Operations, which “provides Army leaders at all levels with doctrinal guidance for conducting campaigns and major operations and for fighting battles and engagements within the broader framework of military strategy.”1 This is the Army’s war-fighting manual. It provides the foundation for subordinate doctrine, the acquisition and fielding of forces and equipment, and unit training. It is the principle, too, for a soldier’s self-study in the science and art of war; it emphasizes flexibility and speed in air/land battle doctrine and on developing initiative in combat commanders, especially at the tactical level.2
Army doctrine is “the condensed expression of its approach to fighting campaigns, major operations, battles,
“Until formal Navy training in the art and science of war is available to all warriors, self-study remains the responsibility of every officer who aspires to lead sailors in combat— and win.”
and engagements. Tactics, techniques, procedures, organizations, support structure, equipment, and training must all derive from it.” It is rooted in time-tested theories and principles, yet is forward-looking and adaptable to changing technology, threats, and missions. It is definitive enough to guide operation, yet versatile enough to accommodate a wide variety of situations that might be encountered anywhere in the world. Finally, the Army notes: To be useful, doctrine must be uniformly known and understood.3
The Army effort is worthy of study and emulation. The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General A1 Gray, has promulgated his own superb 88-page manual, FMFM-1 Warfighting. General Gray has woven his own philosophy
into this doctrine on how to fight and how to prepare to fight.4
But the book is much more than Marine Corps doctrine. It is an excellent condensation of the lessons provided by Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Napoleon, Jomini, Frederick the Great, Du Picq, Foch, Mahan, Liddell-Hart, Patton, Wylie, Dupuy, and Hughes. It should be a part of every seagoing warrior’s professional library. It was written for Marines, but it provides beef for every Navy leader who is responsible for preparing for combat and who expects to lead or employ sailors in combat. Naval officers will find the book useful, because the Commandant’s doctrine shows a clear preference for maneuver warfare—which, of course, is the preferred employment of our mobile, flexible, and versatile naval forces.
Warfighting is logically organized. A section on the nature and theory of war precedes general guidance for preparing for war; the last part tells how to fight. While the specific principles of war— objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity—are not listed, they nevertheless reside at the core of the Commandant’s doctrine.
Among these principles, which are detailed in the Army’s manual and in the recently issued Joint Chiefs of Staff “Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations” (JCS Pub 3-0), the one that stands out is unity of command—under one responsible commander.
Unity of command, which Napoleon held was “the first necessity of war,” is paramount to victory. Warfighting reinforces this tenet of the Marine Corps. With his fundamental and general guidance for all Marines to digest and take to heart and mind, General Gray has invoked the “Nelson touch.” His band-of-brothers leadership style will be well served by this effort to get all Marines reading from the same script, thinking and acting as one. This is the first purpose of doctrine.
General Gray wants his Marines prepared to cope and thrive in the environment of chaos, uncertainty, constant change, and friction they are certain to encounter on the battlefield.5 He wants them to seek unity through a “harmonious initiative” that they can achieve
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by sharing the philosophy of winning and by sharing experiences in training. He wants wide-open acceptance and use of a doctrine that instills trust and confidence in subordinates and encourages imagination and initiative at all levels of command. He has put forth a doctrine that provides concepts, values, and a common language that encourages and requires judgment in execution; judgment that is sound and
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4- *f *4* -P -p -p -f *f -r *r 4* *f -F -f *f *r *f *f -f *f 4* 4- 4- 4*4- 4- timely, that leads to effective decisions that minimize friction for our forces and create it for our opponents.
Readiness to take the initiative and deal effectively with the unexpected is an essential quality for combat leaders. This is increasingly the case as technology drives us to disperse, maneuver, and expand battle space. We are also incorporating a complex network of command, control, communication, and intelligence systems that may not be available after the first salvo—or even before, as we practice stealth and deception. We can expect a need for independent action by subordinate commanders; action that supports the overall plan of attack. This requires initiative based on lessons learned and instinct. But unity of command—all efforts focused on a common goal— can be achieved only if all the decision makers in the loop are comfortable with the philosophy that has guided their preparation for combat. “Sound doctrine will establish unity amidst chaos.”6 This is the Nelson touch to General Gray’s doctrine. “Nelson always had a plan of action, a comprehensive one. He always transmitted it to his captains and practiced it so they were of one mind about what was wanted.”7
There is a link between doctrine and leadership that requires emphasis. General Gray’s officers are expected to be students of the art and science of war at all levels—tactical, operational, and strategic—“with a solid foundation in military theory and a knowledge of military history and the timeless lessons to be gained from it.”8 He has directed his Corps to read, and has provided a challenging reading list (ALMAR 127- 89).9 He has made the study of war equal in importance to physical conditioning.10
It is long past time for the Navy to expand on General Gray’s example.
We also need to follow the cue of the Army, whose doctrine holds that: “No peacetime duty is more important for leaders than studying their profession and preparing for war. The regular study of military history and biography is invaluable in this regard.”11
Our maritime strategy, currently undergoing revision, is an outstanding document for use in Washington and among strategic thinkers. But it has little application at thp operational and tactical levels. Navy doctrine at these levels of war fighting is disparate, piecemeal, and locally generated.
Our operational-level commanders have addressed this problem by putting together fighting instructions, tactical notes, and lessons learned at their respective levels of command during the past two or three decades. Operation orders from theater and fleet commanders, supplemented by other short-term orders and the allied tactical and naval warfare publications, provide explicit guidance at the operational and tactical levels. And our record of performance indicates that this may adequate. The system is not broken.
But is it good enough? Where is the doctrine that will provide implicit guidance when the explicit guidance is lost in the chaos, uncertainty, and friction of combat? Have we already had indicators of difficulty in the Grenada, Lebanon, and recent fleet exercise experiences? Are we achieving unity amidst chaos?
Naval officers would do well to follow their Marine brothers, and read and reread General Gray’s book. We should also be evaluating JCS Pub 3-0 at every level of command, with the goal of shaping this doctrine for unified and joint operations into one of our own.
In addition, a self-examination based on Sun Tzu’s Art of War is a good idea. The use of the principles of war as a checklist in all operational and tactical planning should become routine. The principles are “clear and lasting truths” that every warrior should know when and how to apply and when and how to violate.12 Until formal Navy training in the art and science of war is available to all warriors, self-study remains the responsibility of every officer who aspires to lead sailors in combat—and win.
'U.S. Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986),
p. 1.
2Ibid., p. i.
3Ibid., p. 6.
4U.S. Marine Corps, Warfighting, FMFM1, Gen. A.M. Gray, USMC (Washington, D.C.: PCN 139 000050 00, 1989), foreword letter.
!Ibid., p. 64.
6Capt. Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., USMC, Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1986), p. 24.
7Ibid.
sWarftghting, p. 44.
9“The Commandant’s Reading List,” Marine Corps Gazette, Washington, D.C., September 1989. p. 17.
'°Warflghting, p. 51.
"FM 100-5, p. 14.
‘-RAdm. J.C. Wylie, Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989), p. 19.
Admiral Taylor is Director, Aviation Plans and Requirements Division, Office of the CNO.