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By Lieutenant Charley L. Diaz, U.S. Coast Guard
With budget cuts looming, DoD’s new detection and monitoring mission could prove a blessing in disguise—assisting the nation in the campaign against drugs while enhancing our war-fighting capability.
In the fall of 1988, the inevitable happened: the Congress brought the Department of Defense (DoD) into the drug war in a big way. The fiscal year 1988 Defense Authorization Act designated DoD as the single lead agency for the “detection and monitoring” of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs destined for the United States.1 DoD had resisted the move for years, believing the drug war could become another Vietnam—an unwin- nable war of attrition, fought against an elusive enemy, with unclear political objectives. But in the summer of 1988, a CBS/New York Times poll revealed that more than 60% of Americans considered the drug threat to be a greater risk than the less tangible threat of communism. The American people clearly wanted more to be done in the so-called war on drugs, and DoD, with its ready force of resources, was the logical choice.
DoD has a responsibility to make the most of its newly assigned peacetime mission. DoD (especially the Navy) can actually benefit from its new drug detection role and enhance certain war-fighting capabilities. Yet, we must put firm limits on DoD’s involvement in the drug war to ensure its continued ability to carry out its primary wartime mission.
The Threat: On 9 March 1973, the Coast Guard cutter Dauntless (WMEC-624) made the first-ever Coast Guard marijuana drug bust. The 3,000 pounds of marijuana found on board two drug-laden vessels was just the tip of the iceberg. To date, the Coast Guard has seized more than 29.1 million pounds of marijuana and more than 141,000 pounds of cocaine.2
In the mid to late 1970s, the annual marijuana harvests in Colombia produced a flood of so-called motherships to southern Florida. As a result, U.S. drug interdiction forces were concentrated in the Caribbean. Seizures quickly increased, and the drug smugglers were forced to change their modus operandi. Today’s smugglers conduct year- round operations, vary their transit routes, ship significantly smaller loads, and conceal their contraband in sophisticated hidden compartments.
In the early 1980s, cocaine became America’s drug of choice. Its high-value/low-volume nature make it conducive to air smuggling and concealment in hidden compartments on board vessels. The cocaine supply line begins in the Andean region of South America. The upper Huallaga Valley of Peru and the Chapare region of Bolivia produce more than 90% of the world’s coca leaf.3 Dried coca leaves are processed along tributaries of the Amazon. River. The refined cocaine is then flown from clandestine airstrips in Colombia’s Guajira Peninsula to remote airstrips in the Bahamas and the southeastern United States. Pilots often fly at night and without navigational lights to avoid detection. Maritime trafficking of cocaine has also increased; the largest individual cocaine seizures have been in commercial maritime shipping containers.
The Current U.S. Response: Thus far, every Cabinet- level department, nearly 40 federal agencies, and almost every state and local law enforcement agency in the United States has been involved in the drug war. However, the current federal interdiction effort ($4—$8 billion) pales in comparison with the estimated worth of the illegal drug trade, which congressional testimony cites as high as $500 billion.4 DoD is the lead agency for detection and monitoring. The Coast Guard has primary drug apprehension responsibility in the maritime environment, and the Customs Service has primary responsibility for the U.S. land borders. Coast Guard and Customs share air-interdiction responsibilities. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) conducts drug investigations and operations within the continental United States and overseas in cooperation with foreign governments. The U.S. drug enforcement effort is more like a war than many people think. U.S. interdiction agencies follow a four-step interdiction model:
► Detect: all targets in an area
^ Sort: designate targets of interest ^ Intercept/Track: ID suspects and ascertain status ^ Apprehend: seize ships/aircraft and make arrests Drug interdiction agencies have developed a coordinated three-zone strategy:
^ Departure zone: waters/airspace off source countries (e.g., Colombia)
^ Transit zone: waters/airspace en route to the United States (e.g., Caribbean)
^ Arrival zone: waters/airspace directly off the United States (Atlantic/Pacific)
Layering detection and interdiction assets in all three zones, the United States uses a defense-in-depth concept (i e., putting both surface and air smugglers continually at risk). Although this concept is sound and has resulted in a significant number of seizures, there are insufficient resources available to implement the strategy.
The antiair warfare (AAW) concept, “shoot the archer, not the arrows,” also applies to the Coast Guard’s drug interdiction strategy, which is designed to intercept drugs in transit. The theory is that large quantities of drugs are most vulnerable when they are en route to the United
States. Two basic tenets support this theory:
- Drugs are shipped in relatively large quantities in order to make a risky transit worth the effort.
- Drugs are in their most concentrated form during shipment for ease of concealment and economies of scale.
At the beginning of the drug supply line, marijuana and coca fields in source countries are often remote, well guarded, and scattered throughout a hostile countryside. Further, growing coca leaf is not illegal in some countries where the crop is endemic to the culture. Finally, eradication requires that hundreds of hectares of crop be destroyed to equal one good-size drug bust. At the other end of the supply line, where the drugs enter the United States, shipments are quickly divided up and distributed. To compound the problem, pure cocaine is usually “cut” several times with other substances, thereby doubling or tripling the total amount. However, interdiction agencies only have a two-to-three week window of opportunity to interdict drug-smuggling vessels. This window is reduced to a few hours for drug-smuggling aircraft.
Contrary to popular belief, DoD has been supporting the federal drug interdiction effort for years. The Navy has
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led the way with support of the Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment (LEDET) program. Over the last several years, the Navy provided approximately 2,000 ship days annually to the LEDET program.5 Under the LEDET concept, six- and seven-man Coast Guard boarding teams embark in selected Navy ships for deployment into areas of law enforcement interest such as the Caribbean. When time and Navy mission requirements allow, LEDETs conduct law enforcement boardings of suspect vessels.
The Navy also dedicates certain Navy LEDET ships under the tactical control of Commander Caribbean Squadron (ComCaribRon), a Coast Guard captain (See “Blocking the Caribbean Drug Traffic,” Proceedings, December 1989). These combatants conduct drug interdiction operations deep into the Caribbean and occasionally conduct combined operations with units from foreign source and transshipment countries, such as Venezuela, Honduras, and Jamaica. The strong Navy/Coast Guard presence in the Caribbean has resulted in many vessel seizures. In addition, the LEDET program is a significant drug-smuggling deterrent in the Atlantic and the Pacific. Now drug smugglers have to avoid all Navy ships as well as Coast Guard cutters for fear of being detected and/or seized.
DoD has also provided equipment to support drug interdiction operations. The Navy recently loaned four airborne early warning E-2C Hawkeye aircraft to the Coast Guard. The Customs Service also has six P-3s. DoD has committed more than 72,000 surveillance flight hours and 7,000 ship days in suppport of the antidrug effort.6
The Army has provided satellite communications gear and signal corps operators in support of ComCaribRon operations. In 1986, Army Blackhawk helicopters and pilots supported coca eradication operations in Bolivia (Operation Blast Furnace). Today, similar forces are supporting a combined (U.S./Bahamas) joint (DEA/Coast Guard/Army) operation in the Bahamas, Turks, and Caicos (OPBAT). In the beginning months of 1990, DoD provided $65 million to support President Barco’s antidrug offensive in Colombia.7
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Plan: After being assigned their new detection and monitoring role last fall, JCS developed an implementation plan through the Joint Operation Planning System. The joint plan identifies five supported Commanders-in-Chief (CinCs): CinCLant (Atlantic), CinCPac (Pacific), CinCSouth (U.S. Southern Command), CinCNorAD (North American Air Defense Command), and CinCFORCE (U.S. Forces Command).
CinCLant, CinCPac, and CinCFORCE have chosen to establish joint task forces (JTFs) to implement the plan. JTF-4, headquartered in Key West, Florida, JTF-5 in Alameda, California, and JTF-6 in El Paso, Texas, (under CinCFORCE) are the central repositories for all DoD drug detections and intelligence in their respective operating areas. CinCSouth will concentrate on developing Latin American counter-narcotics forces, and CinCNorAD will be responsible for air smugglers entering the United States.
Immediate Operational Enhancements: Drug interdiction operations could increase Navy units’ operational proficiency in several areas. Because the Caribbean operating area is only a few hundred—rather than a few thousand- miles away, normal transit times will be significantly reduced. Consequently, Navy elements will spend more time on station.
Navy personnel will be obtaining hundreds of radar CPAs (closest-points-of-approach) and intercept solutions every day in one of the highest traffic density areas in the world. Acquiring timely target intercepts is crucial to successful drug interdiction. Radar contact information and target intercepts will have to be expeditiously passed to U.S. interdiction forces via high-frequency datalink, the Naval Tactical Data System, voice, etc. Planners need to address real-time data transfer shortfalls between DoD detection platforms and U.S. interdiction forces.
ComCaribRon ships recently began using shipboard air search radars to detect air-smuggling planes departing the north coast of Colombia. On occasion, the USS Ticonder- oga (CG-47)-class cruisers with their Aegis (SPY-1) phased-array radar systems have been used. Air target information is passed to U.S. air interdiction forces through the joint Coast Guard/Customs Service command, control, communications, and intelligence facility in Miami, Florida. The routine use of Navy shipboard air search radars will noticeably enhance the air interdiction effort.
Navy detection platforms supporting the drug interdiction mission will have to sort drug-smuggling ships and aircraft from other Caribbean traffic. The Navy’s sort capability is gaining importance because of the service’s increased involvement in low-intensity conflict (LIC) operations near shore. This fact was recently illustrated by the USS Vincennes (CG-49) Iranian airbus incident and Iranian go-fast boats attacking Navy ships in the Persian Gulf. Unlike incoming bogies, drug smugglers will be avoiding rather than engaging U.S. forces. But the sort concept is the same: ship COs must be able to discern legitimate targets from neutral shipping and air traffic.
Navy ships with Coast Guard LEDET personnel embarked will become familiar with vessel-boarding issues, such as boarding team security, visit-and-search requirements, hot pursuit, consensual boardings, and vessel search techniques. Professional boarding skills were an important part of coastal and riverine patrols in Vietnam and will be valuable in future LIC operations near shore.
Finally, DoD pilots will have the opportunity to practice covert, nighttime flying by tracking drug-smuggling planes. Nighttime drug-smuggling aircraft are routinely followed for hundreds of miles to their dropoff locations. If the smugglers spot tracker aircraft they jettison the drugs or fly back into Colombia. Consequently, U.S. air interdiction agencies use “see-in-the-dark” sensors like forward-looking infrared radar, night vision goggles, and low-light Activ-gate TV. All of these instruments’ and techniques are also routinely used in military operations.
Drug smuggling also provides DoD with an excellent opportunity to test various war-fighting concepts against a real-world threat. In this relatively low-threat environment, DoD will be able to experiment with innovative warfare tactics and techniques. For example, the geo-
graphical choke points in the Caribbean (such as the Yucatan Channel and Windward Passage) are ideal for testing the concept of sea control through protecting/denying sea lines of communication. For several years, the Coast Guard has maintained a near-continuous presence in the Caribbean choke points. This year, the Coast Guard will add several sea-based aerostats (SBAs) to the assets it has to deny the use of these areas to drugsmuggling vessels. SBAs are radar-equipped, blimp-like balloons that are teth- . ered to ships. Normally flown at 2,500 feet, the SBA can detect
contacts within a 60-
countermeasures.
Two other warfare concepts that will be tested in drug interdiction operations are operational security (OpSec) and operational deception (OpDec). To counteract the smugglers’ countersurveillance measures, federal agencies involved in drug interdiction, including DoD, will have to employ effective OpSec techniques. The safeguarding of ships’ schedules, task force strength information, and unit locations will be crucial. The Navy will also be able to test innovative OpDec techniques against a determined adversary.
mile radius, and it also has a limited air-search capability.8 Raw radar data is downlinked from the balloon directly to patrolling Coast Guard cutters. The SBA’s advantage over fixed, land-based systems is its at-sea mobility. At $10 million a copy, SBAs could enhance the Navy’s surface detection capability at a fairly low cost. Operated in a relatively benign environment, the SBA system could support antisubmarine warfare, antisurface warfare, and mine
At great expense, drug smugglers have reacted to U.S. interdiction pressure in the past by shifting transportation modes, concealment methods, or transshipment routes. Navy OpDec personnel can devise ruses that will convince drug smugglers that U.S. forces are located in one place when in reality they are someplace else. By avoiding the perceived threat, smugglers might be steered to waiting interdiction forces. Navy OpDec personnel could also help to create the perception that U.S. interdiction forces are so pervasive that the chances of getting caught are not worth the risk. In addition, OpDec personnel will be able to test psychological warfare techniques. If they could devise a scheme that resulted in drug smugglers turning against themselves, the United States could significantly disrupt the drug-smuggling network without dedicating an exorbitant amount of resources.
DoD and drug interdiction forces also will mutually enhance their intelligence capability as a result of the drug war. All intelligence agencies are understandably protective of their information. However, a coordinated interagency campaign such as the drug war requires a significant amount of intelligence sharing. DoD’s new responsibilities have given the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) an even larger role in drug intelligence gathering and dissemination. Interdiction agencies will have to establish essential elements of information in order for foreign collectors to know what information is needed. DIA will have to state criteria for determining releasable information, weighing the need to share pertinent drug intelligence against the need to protect highly sensitive national security information, sources, and methods. Allsource intelligence fusion centers will need to establish conduits to pass tactical (real-time) intelligence between agencies and the interdiction platforms. This is especially critical in the fast-moving air-interdiction scenario. As a result, military and civilian intelligence officers will better understand the information and sources available.
Perhaps the greatest, long-term military benefit that will result from the drug war is increased interoperability between the armed services. The two services with the most to gain are the Navy and Coast Guard since in time of war, the Coast Guard is transferred to the Department of the
Emerging Technologies
DoD can benefit from re- search-and-development (R&D) spinoffs of the drug war that have military applications. For example, with eight to ten million shipping containers entering the United States annually and pressure to keep them moving, a technological breakthrough is being sought that will allow rapid inspections of container contents dockside and at sea. This system will have to use low energy levels to prevent damaging the container’s contents. It will have to be large enough to inspect whole containers at once, thereby avoiding the need to access the inside. This type of system would have far- reaching military applications. For example, U.S. Marine Corps guards at American embassies worldwide could use it to inspect incoming packages and vehicles. Plus, much of the antidrug technology has direct military applications and is funded by private industry.
DoD can also promote its own R&D projects by exploring their possible application in the drug war. Both the Navy and Air Force are developing a land- based, over-the-horizon (OTH) radar capability. The Navy’s ROTHR (relocatable over-the- horizon radar) and the Air Force’s OTH-B (over-the-horizon backscatter radar system) could possibly contribute to the air interdiction effort. High-tech space-based systems might also be employed to support drug interdiction operations (e.g., space surveillance, satellite communications, Satellite Navigation Set
[Global Positioning System], and SATWX information).
The Naval Research Laboratory is working on a radar system, the AN/APS-137 radar, that extends a ship’s surface detection range over the horizon and will also allow the ship to classify acquired targets by using a phenomenon called radar ducting. Ducting occurs most prominently in high humidity areas. Radar signals travel through a layer of water particles near the earth’s surface and detect contacts beyond the radar’s line of sight. The system is being tested for drug-detection applications in the Caribbean, where environmental conditions are favorable for radar ducting.
Another advantage of the APS-137 radar system is its ability to classify OTH radar contacts. The synthetic aperture radar uses the surface contact’s movement (i.e., the doppler effect) to define the contact’s outlining profile. A computer then converts the information into a video image that depicts the contact’s silhouette in pixels. With sufficient image resolution, this technology could significantly alter the way we conduct surface drug-detection patrols and antisurface warfare operations.
Another high-tech computer system that will be employed in the drug war is the video-integrated display system (VIDS). The VIDS system obtains allsource intelligence data and retransmits the information to field units. It produces a video display (snapshot) of a battle area and is inter-theater capable. VIDS was originally envisioned to be strictly strategic. But, partly because of DoD’s new drug detection responsibilities, it will now have some tactical usefulness as well. VIDS will be installed at several key drug- detection centers. VIDS terminals may also be placed on Coast Guard cutters in the near future. However, real-time input to the VIDS network requires a data-transfer capability that Coast Guard cutters lack. Consequently, in order to use VIDS tactically, Coast Guard cutters will have to operate with Navy data-link or Navy Tactical Data System-capable platforms, until they obtain this capability.
—Lieutenant Charley Diaz, U.S. Coast Guard
Navy. The Coast Guard’s major wartime responsibility is the defense of our coastal ports and waters. Critics often cite the lack of a credible homeland defense as a serious weakness of the maritime strategy. To fulfill this mission requirement, the Coast Guard has developed the Maritime Defense Zone (MDZ) concept. All U.S. forces conducting coastal defense operations in time of war will operate under the MDZ and “chop” to Coast Guard commanders on respective coasts. Coastal defense operations may include maritime air patrols, port security, defensive mining, domestic mine countermeasures, and coastal ASW and antisurface warfare. Joint antidrug operations between
One long-term benefit of DoD’s involvement in the drug war will be the eventual establishment of a radar system along the entire southern border of the United States.
the Coast Guard and Navy will greatly enhance MDZ implementation in the event of war.
Communications interoperability is another area that DoD involvement in the drug war will enhance. As in any military campaign, platforms in the drug war need to be able to talk with each other and with the boss on the beach. To develop effective interservice and interagency communications, the Interagency Working Group on Drug Enforcement Communications was established. DoD chairs the group, which has developed a comprehensive telecommunications master plan for drug enforcement operations. The Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy (commonly referred to as the Drug Czar) has considered the group’s findings in formulating a national antidrug strategy. Using a joint concept of operations, the master plan identifies communication requirements and proposes several solutions. It outlines a compatibility program of equipment upgrades and replacements for each agency. The plan also standardizes communications equipment purchases to ensure future connectivity between drug law enforcement agencies and DoD forces. But simply being able to communicate with each other does not always ensure success. Elements must also be able to communicate in a secure mode and with reduced emissions.
We know that drug smugglers listen to our communications. DoD forces are recognized experts in secure communications and emissions control (EmCon) procedures, which will be required for a successful theater-level campaign. The Navy’s EmCon experience will prove invaluable to drug interdiction agencies conducting secure voice, data-link, and pulse data-burst transmissions. The Navy will also be able to assist the drug interdiction effort by conducting electronic warfare (EW). It can employ artificial communications to simulate ongoing operations. By filling the airways with continuous radio traffic, EW personnel will make it difficult for the drug smugglers to determine when U.S. forces are operating.
Long-Term National Benefits: In response to the drug problem, the United States set out to establish a system of sea-based and ground-based radars along our entire southern border. Radars are now being placed in the Bahamas and along the Florida and Gulf coasts and the southwest Mexican border. Funding and support have also been provided to make the Caribbean Basin Radar Network a reality. In conjunction with various over-the-horizon radar systems, the United States will, by the mid to late 1990s, have nearly 100% air coverage of its 3,600-mile southern flank to combat drug smuggling and for use in case of war.9
The drug-smuggling problem has refocused U.S. attention on the Western Hemisphere. The maritime strategy is often criticized as short-sighted because it concentrates extensively on Europe and the Pacific Rim. But an increased U.S. presence in the Caribbean and the Gulf of
Mexico for drug operations may silence some critics. Despite the diplomatic snafu surrounding the proposed deployment of the USS John F. Kennedy (CV-67) to waters off Colombia in January, the Navy should be able to gradually build up its Caribbean forces under its antidrug detection mission.10 This will enhance our military posture for monitoring Latin American hot spots, such as Panama, Nicaragua, and Cuba, and for conducting possible contingency operations, such as those recently concluded in Panama. Further, our strategic sealift capability will be enhanced by antidrug operations in and around the Gulf of Mexico, where a majority of the European wartime resupply effort will originate. With this in mind, the Navy should use those ships designated as convoy escorts for the resupply of Europe (e.g., the Oliver Hazard Perry [FFG- 7]-class frigates) for antidrug patrols in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico.
An increased U.S. presence in Latin America, under the auspices of international narcotics control, will fortify neighboring democratic forces. Supplemental to U.S. security assistance programs, the Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics Matters, can fund military training teams in support of foreign antinarcotics forces. Perhaps the most exigent need for these foreign forces is special operations training in the jungles of Peru and Bolivia. Also, because many of the areas are infested with terrorist groups, these forces desperately need training in area and personal defense tactics. The synergistic effect of increased U.S. training and unit operating time will significantly raise the competency level of foreign antinarcotics forces. And since many of these law enforcement forces are the country’s military, the government’s enhanced ability to combat drugs will also be of use in combating terrorism and insurgencies. The nature and extent of these operations will have to be consciously tempered in light of the Latin American backlash to the U.S. intervention in Panama last December.
DoD’s new drug role might also be helpful in mitigating some of the damage that will be caused by impending DoD budget cuts. As the federal pie is divided up each year, politicians are increasingly eyeing the biggest piece as a solution to the twin U.S. deficits (federal and trade). Historically, DoD has argued for a strong military defense based on the primary military threat, the Soviet Union.
I
But American attitudes about defense spending are changing rapidly, fueled by U.S. economic uncertainty, events in Eastern Europe, and a perception that Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev’s Soviet military is less threatening than before.11 DoD knows full well that deception and public disinformation are an important part of Soviet military doctrine. Despite this, exposing the new Soviet rhetoric as political propaganda may be impossible.
DoD should consider expanding its funding justification to include increased federal funds for its “new” drug detection and monitoring mission. It should showcase antidrug applications of various detection systems and research and development projects to illustrate their versatility and true worth. By highlighting its new antidrug mission vis-a-vis Soviet propaganda, DoD will be viewed as carrying out the American will instead of attacking potential Soviet peace offerings. Shifting the emphasis of a portion of DoD’s budget toward its new peacetime mission will help DoD retain certain resources and manpower while satisfying domestic pressure to increase the drug interdiction effort.
The Down Side of DoD Involvement: DoD’s new peacetime mission may also have some adverse effects on its forces. Navy surface combatants assigned to drug detection operations will be operating independently or in squadrons and not within the familiar carrier battle group framework. The primary theater of operations will be the relatively warm waters of the Caribbean, not the nearArctic conditions of the Norwegian Sea or the Kuril Islands. Air targets will be slow, low-flying general aviation aircraft, not the fast, high-flying jets and missiles for which Navy and Air Force conventional air search radars are optimized. Finally, the enemy will be civilians engaged in criminal activity, not the military belligerents that DoD forces are accustomed to facing.
I offer the following warning to the American people and its Congress: there must be firm limits on DoD involvement in the drug war. Congress must not be allowed to get caught up in a frenzy of drug interdiction spending and policy to the detriment of our national military defense. We must all keep the drug war in global perspective by understanding two important military concepts.
► Posse Comitatus: Posse Comitatus prohibits DoD military personnel from engaging in direct law enforcement activity—essentially, soldiers (sailors) cannot carry out domestic law enforcement actions. Posse Comitatus originated just after the Civil War, when Congress feared that U.S. soldiers had too much power over domestic citizens. The Navy later adopted this law as policy. We should maintain Posse Comitatus restrictions on military personnel. Once DoD support has been substantially increased, Congress will likely reexamine this prohibition, initially on the high seas, followed by actions in foreign source countries, and finally within our nation’s borders. DoD forces should not be allowed to apprehend drug-smugglers, even though it may appear to be the next logical step in the drug war. The separation of our nation’s military and law enforcement functions is a principle that has served us well and distinguishes the United States from many other countries throughout history.
► Military “Sufficiency”: The United States must maintain—at the very least—a minimum level of defense to ensure not only its own survival, but that of its allies and indeed the Free World. DoD involvement in the drug war should not be allowed to jeopardize our deterrence or our ability to defend against a catastrophic military event (such as Soviet invasion). The use of DoD personnel to assist in the Exxon Valdez oil spill cleanup in Alaska illustrates how easy it is to turn to DoD’s ready force of assets as a quick fix for any national emergency.
The DoD detection and monitoring role should be limited in scope and temporary. DoD forces should only be asked to provide the impetus for establishing an effective nationwide drug-smuggling detection system. They should then be relieved of their duties and allowed to return to their military mission.
DoD’s Potential Effects on the Drug War: DoD’s increased involvement will have a significant impact on the war on drugs, but not in the way many people expect. DoD s entering the drug war will exponentially increase detections, helping to identify the enormity of the drugsmuggling problem. The detections will result in increased interdictions, thereby stemming the flow of illegal drugs entering this country. This reduction in supply will buy our nation time, until more effective education, prevention, and treatment programs are successful. Until then, DoD must continue a detection strategy that uses all pertinent warfare skills and that employs those wartime assets that can most benefit from executing this new peacetime mission. In so doing, DoD will assist our nation in its campaign against drugs while enhancing its war-fighting capabilities.
ly-S-'‘DcPartmcnt of Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 1989, united Stales Statutes at Large, Public Law 100-456, 100th Congress, 2d sess. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office 1988) 'Interview with Lt. William Dyson, USCG, Statistical Analyst for Operational Law Enforcement Division, U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington, D C : 19 Jan. 1990.
'U.S. Department of State, Report on International Narcotics Control Strategy (Washington, DC: 1989), pp. 6-7.
JU.S. Laws, Statutes, etc., “Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988,“ United States Statutes at Large, Public Law 100-690, 100th Congress, 2d sess. (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988),sec. 10-4102.
5Dyson, interview.
Secretary of Defense R. Cheney, "DoD and its Role in the War Against Drugs,” Defense 89, Novcmber/Dcccmber 1989, p. 2.
7Ibid., p. 6.
“Ron Barlett, “The War on Drugs,” The Tampa Tribune-Times 30 April 1989 p 10-A. ’
9U.S. President, Proclamation, “Remarks at the Dedication Ceremony for the C3I Drug Interdiction Facility in Miami, Florida,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 1 May 1989, p. 626.
'““Losing Ground in Latin America,” U.S. News and World Report 22Jan 1990 p. 20.
"“A Different Call To Arms,” U.S. News and World Report 13 March 1989 p 18. ' ’
Lieutenant Diaz, Surface Drug Interdiction Assistant Branch Chief at Coast Guard Headquarters, is the LEDET program coordinator and Operation Snowcap riverine project officer. He has conducted counternarcotics operations in Colombia and was recently selected as a member of a Coast Guard team that is assisting the Panamanian government in creating a coast guard organization. He is a Naval War College nonresident student in Washington, DC, and this summer will assume command of the Petrel (WSES-4), a surface effect ship in Key West, Florida.