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By Lieutenant (junior grade) Bryan G. McGrath, U. S. Navy
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Surface warfare is still eating its young
While recently deployed to the Mediterranean, I was fortunate enough to witness a fierce battle fought in the pages of this worthy journal. The subject was the readiness, or lack thereof, of the U. S. surface forces. Set against the backdrop of the Stark (FFG-31), Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58), and Vincennes (CG-49) incidents, this topic certainly warranted a closer look. To read the thoughts of some of the best naval minds of our time was both interesting and educational for a young naval officer, and caused me to formulate my own opinions on the subject.
The surface force officer corps is frustrated. First-tour surface warfare officers fall into four categories:
- Those who have not been able to complete the rigorous training pipelines for the nuclear and aviation programs, and consequently wash out into the surface force
- Those who wished to enter the submarine or aviation communities but did not meet the stringent standards of both, and therefore had no choice but to enter the surface force
- Those who decided that the Navy was not a career possibility, so chose to pursue the warfare specialty with the shortest obligated service time
- Those who are genuinely interested in surface warfare and do not regret their choice, regardless of their career intentions
Officers in the fourth category are a minority. Surface warfare is not “sexy” as warfighting goes. The aviation community can point to Tom Cruise and the Top Gun movie to help glamourize a subject that really did not need much of a boost anyway. Tom Clancy has helped change public perception of the submariner to that of the techno-wizard silently combating the demon below.
Moreover, financial rewards are distributed unequally. The Navy is bending over backward to pay bonus money to pilots and submariners, but no such program exists for the surface community. Submarine pay and flight pay are earned in the training pipeline, while sea pay is not earned until a surface officer has 36 months of sea duty. Two commanding officers have had enough confidence in my abilities and judgment to allow me to stand officer-of- the-deck under way while 1 earned no sea pay. Yet there are officers in Submarine Officer Basic School earning submarine pay (not to mention their $6,000 “signing bonus”) who have yet to set foot on a submarine, and student aviators earning flight pay without having spent a single moment airborne in a Navy aircraft.
Moving beyond image and compensation, look at what surface warfare officers actually do. Dedicated surface warfare officers enjoy going to sea to train. But at-sea training periods are restricted because fuel consumption eats up already inadequate Navy funds and exercise assets are often unavailable. Creative pierside training is encouraged, but as every officer knows, there is no substitute for the real thing.
1 am the antisubmarine warfare officer on a ship whose major mission is ASW. I am responsible to my CO for managing the resources he has at his disposal to fight the Soviet submarine threat. But I am far more confident in my ability to fire off a correct and prompt reply to a letter of indebtedness of one of my sailors than I am in my ability to oversee the detection, localization, and neutralization of an enemy submarine. Because of a murderous schedule of inspections, assists, and visits, I spend more time scheduling and documenting training than I do ensuring that the training given is complete and meaningful. And as with all junior officers, collateral duties occupy a disproportionate amount of my time—time that could be better spent honing my tactical skills.
1 offer suggestions on how the surface warfare community can improve:
First, standards must rise. The surface force should cease to accept all comers. There should be entrance requirements, as in the other warfare communities. An officer who earned a college degree is not necessarily able to perform as a surface warrior. Surface Warfare Officer School should be longer and more intense, with emphasis on retention of topics learned, and less emphasis on short-term regurgitation.
Second, all surface warfare officers should earn sea pay, regardless of their longevity, as long as they serve in a seagoing billet.
Third, COs must be more aware of their junior officers’ collateral duties. Capable chief petty officers are qualified to perform some of these duties. This would release junior officers to pursue surface warfare officer qualifications and increase tactical prowess.
And finally, type commanders should give a long, hard look at repetitive inspections that sidetrack a ship’s training program and detract from its more meaningful planning. I suggest a three-year inspection cycle for all surface units. There would be a dedicated three-month period during which all inspections, visits, and assessments would be administered. No underway tasking or major maintenance could be accomplished during this time, unless it was essential to the completion of the inspection (i.e., operational propulsion plant examination); it would be an administrative inspection stand-down. Eighteen months later, the immediate unit commander would have the option to rerun the entire cycle for his own review. Between these heightened periods of inspection tempo, the ship would have the luxury of significant amounts of uninterrupted time to concentrate on the reasons they are there— war fighting, and its inevitable companion. damage control.
The old expression, “Surface Warfare: We eat our young” is alive and well in today's Navy. We must learn to work smarter, and not necessarily longer. Junior officers must become surface warriors, not paper tigers. The community must strive to become more attractive to the top-performing officer candidates. Finally, we in the surface force must be more critical of ourselves. We must endeavor constantly to improve our efficiency and proficiency, and take pride in the knowledge that we are the backbone of the Navy.
Lieutenant McGrath is halfway through his first division officer tour in the USS McCandless (FF-1084).
Nobody asked
me, either, but.
• •
By Rock Daze
Two-career families vs. the Navy
Many top officers are leaving the Navy because of family stresses that still have not been adequately addressed by the detailing and promotion process. These experienced officers are important to the Navy, and every incentive should be used to keep them. Perhaps the time has come to consider homesteading as a retention tool, instead of a promotion inhibitor.
The two-income household has caused significant changes in the Navy of the past decade. What once was an extended Navy family with strong support and social interaction from the service wife is gone. And as each working wife enters the Navy circle, there is even less Navy involvement by the wives, accelerating the trend toward seeking outside support. If one doubts this erosion of the military “family,” ask a Navy chaplain who must administer the needs once filled by volunteer wives.
Volunteer work alone does not provide the satisfaction for today’s educated spouse that it may have for her mother. Today’s spouse, stronger and more independent, understands the man who serves his country because she too is motivated. Professional accomplishment and peer recognition, often the officer’s prime career motivators, are equally important for her. She can support her husband’s career, but is the reverse also true? The husband can understand his educated spouse, her career, civilian friends, and nonmilitary support group. But when the time comes for a transfer and a career choice, who comes first? Today’s military career includes multiple transfers that are incompatible for most two- career families.
Money is another changing factor in the career decision that can no longer be considered solely from the military viewpoint. There are now combined incomes, and rarely does a move bode well for the civilian-employed spouse. Sales requires customers, management requires seniority, and teaching requires varied credentials. In the long term, it is often extremely costly to transfer, not to mention having to prove oneself time and again. Moreover, the security of a good second income makes it easier for the military officer to transition to the civilian workplace, further reducing an important hold the military once enjoyed.
A male officer at the eight- to ten- year point in his career begins to view his family differently. Now in his early thirties, he becomes more family and friend oriented, and is no longer as career driven as he was in his twenties. He begins to empathize with his wife’s personal support needs, the very ones she developed during his long absences. He realizes that time away is not the only issue (consider the pilots who opt for airline jobs). Transfers throughout a career may make it impossible for him to meet both his and his wife’s needs. As these stresses accumulate, the conflict between a happy marriage and a successful naval career becomes a real one. And a career that openly fosters this continued conflict within the family is contrary to the service ideals motivating most officers.
The current system fosters this conflict.
Any evidence or suggestion of homesteading is a negative reflection for an officer. Rather than use it to entice retention, detailers warn of the dire consequences of staying in one location. In fact, every officer does not need to change geographic locations. The movement of officers is not necessary; it is a tradition that is proving too costly to continue. Why is it bad for a top officer to get professionally challenging jobs if they are all in the same area?
Some will argue that corporations, too, require their top executives to move around. But the difference is that the civilian is given a choice. Rarely must one move or quit, or move now and move later. For civilian managers, retaining recognized expertise is more important than forging every executive into a senior vice president.
Not every officer can be offered a homesteading choice; individual qualifications, geographic area, and Navy requirements must be weighed. But given the centralized location of major activities, why not use an option that is available and applicable to the needs of the 1990s? The Navy must fully address the two-career family problem, using homesteading as a tool, not as a club.
Mr. Daze, formerly a Navy lieutenant commander whose most recent assignment was as F-14 project officer at Naval Aviation Depot, North Island, now sells commercial real estate in Newport Beach, California. The reasons he cites in this article contributed to his departure from the service.