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Specials
“Desert Shield”: The First Lessons Learned
Lieutenant Commander Michael N. Pocalyko, U.S. Navy, a naval aviator serving as the political-military analyst in the Secretary of the Navy’s Office of Program Appraisal—Contemporary history has yet to settle on a name for the conflict this nation entered when Iraqi forces stormed into Kuwait on 2 August. It is still “Operation Desert Shield 1990,” even in the media. Events are changing daily within the operation, and they are also changing the nature of geopolitics and strategy. It is certainly too soon to tell what the eventual outcome of the conflict will be, or even how politically successful the world arrayed against Saddam Hussein will fare after his defeat. But it is not too early for the naval services to draw the first strategic and operational lessons from the events of August and September.
By deploying a force of more than 65 ships, putting one Marine out of every four in Saudi Arabia, and supporting the huge Army and Air Force ground garrison there, the United States has embarked upon the largest military and naval operation since the Vietnam War. This deployment has validated nine familiar principles of national military strategy:
- Naval forces are the nation’s first choice in crisis. As they have been in 43 other Mideast-Persian Gulf crises since 1945, naval forces were the first considered and the first called. The Navy’s and Marine Corps’s ability to respond quickly and decisively, using forces that include their own infrastructures, was once more the centerpiece of national strategy.
- The aircraft carrier battle group leads any U.S. military response to crisis. On the day of the Iraqi invasion, before the President began “contemplating any intervention or sending troops,” the important question had already been asked: “Where are our carriers?” The USS Independence (CV-62) and USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69) battle groups moved from the Indian Ocean to the Arabian Sea and from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Red Sea, respectively. From that point, the full range of military options was already available—arguably enabling the full-scale deployment of ground forces to forestall an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia.
► The Marine Corps is the best rapid- response element in any joint ground effort. The concepts and doctrines that undergird Marine Corps operations are as valid in a joint ground force as they are in amphibious operations: The Marines traveled light enough to get there, and
heavy enough to fight. The first tanks on line were the Marines’. In Desert Shield, Marine forces were used as intended: as the lead element in joint ground operations.
- Prepositioning is vital to early response in crisis. The first maritime prepositioning ship from Diego Garcia unloaded in Saudi Arabia three days after the lead Army unit” arrived, and one day after the First Marine Expeditionary Force command element and the Seventh Marine Expeditionary Brigade hit the beach. Massive airlift and sealift are still arriving, but the “first to fight” were also the first ready—as maritime prepositioning ships also supplied sister services, exactly as planned.
- Unity of command works. This principle is simple, but its execution rarely is.
In this operation, joint and centralized command and control were exceptional, and unity of command under the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command, made the deployment succeed. From a military organizational perspective, Desert Shield has so far proved the efficacy of a single, overall deployed unified commander, despite the Navy’s traditional misgivings about centralization in the defense reorganization debates of the 1980s. We are winning now because naval forces are superbly integrated within the joint command structure.
► Sealift matters even more than you planned, no matter how well you planned. In this conflict, the only strategic warning the world received was when Iraq moved into Kuwait, and each day that Iraq did not move into Saudi Arabia provided better opportunities for defensive positioning and for sealift to supply forces to meet the potential threat. The United States has transported more than 95% of its forward military infrastructure by sea—to a place with no permanent allied bases, where no indigenous military surge siting or supply exists (such as the European “prepositioning of material configured to unit sets”). Fortunately, the offloading points handled the large volume of sealift extraordinarily, validating the strategic logistics principle that no matter how good lift and its maritime protection are, the security and capabilities of the end point are most critical to success.
► Strategy becomes logistics when it moves from paper to action. Our joint time-phased force deployment lists, which are planning documents, were modified while they were being used, even as they provided an excellent blueprint for bringing unprecedented volumes of materiel into Saudi Arabia. More important, unity of command worked in this
U.S. COAST GUARD (C. KALNBACK)
Desert Shield proved that the United States could build up a sizable military force half way around the world and sustain it. The Coast Guard’s 110-foot patrol boat Key Largo (WPB-1324) leads the fully loaded SL-7-class container cargo ship Regu- lus (T-AKR-292) out of Savannah en route to the Persian Gulf.
instance. The hard lessons of strategy are usually learned in the relationship between the supported and the supporting.
► Soviet response is critical when evaluating allied options in a crisis. This is really the first post-Cold War crisis. Even as recently as a year ago, United States and other Western political-military decisions could not have been made the way they were without a cautious look over our collective shoulder at the Soviets. Soviet support for a former client, Iraq, and probable Soviet actions during allied military operations would have been central to planning. Today, the Soviets, while not participating as a military ally in Saudi Arabia, are actively supporting worldwide sanctions against Saddam Hussein and have played a key role in United Nations action. The Soviets, by their action and alignment in this crisis, have taken an important step in the new world order, signaling intentions clearly and standing with civilization against a despot at no small international political cost to themselves.
► Reserves make a difference. The presidential callup of reserves to fill critical billets because of Desert Shield validates another enduring strategic principle—the necessity for a strong, useful, ready, and integrated reserve force. No U.S. strat- ■ egy can work without this kind of backup. The efficiency of reserves is never an issue, only the depth of active commitment needed before reserve personnel become necessary for military success.
If the crisis becomes war before this appears in print, there will doubtless be more lessons—the importance of integrated carrier battle groups operating within a “land” war, the primacy of surface strike warfare, and the validated need for amphibious forces and naval special operations prominent among them.
Proceedings / October 1990
Still, hard-leamed lessons are being applied today. They may not guarantee any particular outcome, but they are right for the moment.
Federal Employees Called to Active Duty Receive Support
Constance Berry Newman, Director, U.S. Office of Personnel Management— The President’s recently announced decision to call certain reservists to active military duty places special obligations on employers. The federal government is by far the largest single employer of reservists, and we as federal employees are proud of the dedication and commitment of these fellow workers in a time of international crisis.
The call to active military duty will not be without cost to all those involved. Reservists will find that their lives and the lives of their families will be painfully disrupted. Fellow workers will find they must step up to the challenge of performing the work left behind by their colleagues. And many federal agencies will find it necessary to adopt a creative management style to maintain necessary governmental functions with minimal disruption to the public we serve.
In this time of crisis, our first obligation as an employer is to make sure that those friends and colleagues who perform active military duty are able to leave their employment temporarily with the knowledge that their affairs are in order and their rights protected. Federal law provides many important rights and benefits for federal employees who perform active military duty. This office is issuing technical guidance to directors of personnel outlining these provisions in detail. But we must do more than what is required by law. I am asking each federal agency to take the following steps:
- Retain employees who perform active military duty on the agency’s employment rolls in the same position held before their departure.
- Pay the employee’s share of health benefits premiums while in a leave- without-pay status (i.e., military furlough) during this crisis.
- Use employee assistance programs to provide counseling and referral services for affected employees and family members.
These steps demonstrate the federal government’s commitment to support the efforts of our armed forces in the Middle East and of employees who perform active military duty during this crisis. As events continue to unfold, we may find it necessary to issue additional guidance or adopt alternative means of accomplishing these goals.
Author’s Note: Federal agencies have informed the Office of Management and Budget that furloughs of civilian employees will be necessary in many cases to accommodate severe budget cuts mandated by the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings sequestration process. While hopeful that such reductions will not be required, many agencies are in the process of notifying their employees of proposed furlough actions.
I encourage each federal agency to make exceptions from furloughs for any civilian employee who performs active military duty during the crisis in the Middle East. The basis for this exception is the overriding need of the federal government for the services of these employees in a time of international crisis. The effect of such an exception is that affected employees would be able to request the use of any available paid military leave or accrued annual leave without fear that such leave would have to be cancelled in the event a furlough becomes necessary.
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Proceedings / October 1990