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Vice Admiral Jerry Miller, U.S. Navy (Retired)
During the late 1960s, the Commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Western Pacific was Admiral William F. Bringle, one of the most highly respected officers in the history of the U.S. Navy. He is a quiet, gentlemanly professional, with a love of competition and a dedication to being the best. Many of us who had the pleasure and privilege of serving with Bringle believe that his most outstanding traits were his understanding of and respect for authority.
One of the Navy’s commitments during Bringle’s tour with the Seventh Fleet Was a periodic show of naval strength in Korean waters. This usually involved some rather innocuous air operations for a couple of days, using one of our aircraft carriers. During one such exercise, the Soviets mounted a challenge from the Vladivostok area that included mock attacks by bombers against the carrier. The attacks consisted of some high-speed Passes close aboard the ship. The Soviet action was embarrassing for the ship, but more so for Admiral Bringle, because it gave the opponents of carriers some ammunition to support the claim that such weapon systems were sitting ducks. Bringle did not care to have any of his forces tweaked, particularly by the Soviets.
I was serving two echelons below Bringle’s level as a task force commander operating with the carriers in the Vietnam area. 1 observed Bringle’s chagrin and shared his admiration for the capabilities of carriers. Like Bringle, I was confident that these great seagoing airfields could be quite surreptitious in their operations when the occasion demanded. Accordingly, I ordered my staff to prepare plans for an interesting exercise that would use forces of the Army, Navy, and Air Force not only to demonstrate the ability of the carrier to operate in close proximity to foreign shores without being detected, but also to probe the intelligence warning networks of two superpowers. 1 submitted the exercise plan to Bringle, who approved it enthusiastically. It was just What he wanted, and promised to demonstrate his long-time contentions concerning carrier capabilities. He obtained approval for the exercise from higher authority, including leaders in both the Korean and Japanese governments.
At the conclusion of the final briefing on the exercise, Bringle turned to me, the subordinate commander who was going to conduct the exercise, and asked a question that perhaps epitomizes the most important aspect of respect for authority: “Admiral, do you have enough authority to do what you want to do?”
With that one input he helped to guarantee the success of the exercise. He showed his trust and respect for the commander and the staff who had prepared the plan. Further, he put the opportunity for success on me, and I in turn passed more of the authority and opportunity on to the commanding officers of the ships and squadrons involved. Their pride and professionalism were now at stake. This delegation of authority and show of respect were hallmarks of Bringle’s skillful exercise of command. It demonstrated why he is so well-respected and loved, and why he was such a successful leader.
Not long thereafter, Bringle was promoted to a four-star position as Commander in Chief of U.S. Naval Forces in
Vice Admiral Bringle, right, asked the question of his carrier division commander, Rear Admiral Miller, on the USS Ranger (CVA-61).
Europe, headquartered in London. Under his command was the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. I was fortunate to serve as his Sixth Fleet Commander for almost two years.
This was a period of testing and questioning of authority in the Navy. It was the early 1970s, when the armed services of the United States were struggling with civil rights, equal opportunity, and charges of discrimination. Admiral Elmo Zumwalt was selected as Chief of Naval Operations and given the prodigious task of getting the Navy in step with the emerging changes in the social structure of the nation. Zumwalt’s hard-charging manner and his determination to get things done quickly made it seem that he was intent on having commanding offi-
cers exert their authority forcefully and effectively. But he also issued many orders that were rather radical in their departure from customs and procedures of the past. He promulgated more than 100 messages that came to be known as Z-grams. Some of these were perceived as taking authority away from the very people who he wanted to use more initiative in the exercise of their authority.
Perhaps the most damaging actions by Admiral Zumwalt in his intense desire to increase the Navy’s concern for individuals and their welfare were his personal visits to Navy units, which included so- called rap sessions with members of the crew, sometimes without the presence of the commanding officer of the unit. Most complaints by sailors were acknowledged by Admiral Zumwalt personally, usually with an order to a member of his staff to “look into that.” After such sessions, some commanding officers felt that their authority had been undercut, that respect for authority had shifted from the commanding officer to the Chief of Naval Operations.
In addition to the rap sessions, a flood of letters came from individual members of the Navy to headquarters in Washington. Complaints were wide-ranging— from missing allotment checks at home to all the problems of life on board ship. Replies to these went directly to the individual rather than through his commanding officer. At times, some commanding officers were asked to explain their own actions in regard to the complaints. As a result, Admiral Zumwalt’s initial popularity was tremendous, like that of most permissive parents. He was perceived by many to be the only officer in the Navy who cared about the troops. He became, to many, the real St. Elmo, patron saint of sailors.
The result was confusion on the part of some commanding officers and a weakening of respect for authority. This loss of respect filtered down through the officer structure to the ranks of the chief petty officers, the backbone of discipline in ships of the fleet.
I believe that discipline in some ships broke down because of Admiral Zumwalt’s approach. A special congressional subcommittee, formed to investigate discipline in the Navy, in its published report concentrated on two “race riots” that occurred in carriers of the Pacific Fleet. The report contained some useful information that could have been helpful to commanding officers of all military units as they struggled with the social problems of the times. Nevertheless, distribution of the report was severely restricted within the Navy, by mandate from the Chief of Naval Operations.
Review of the report after 17 years tends to reinforce the views of the subcommittee, namely that the problems of the early 1970s were probably not racial, but rather a breakdown of respect for the authority of officers and leading petty officers. Two quotes from the report are appropriate.
“The record is replete with testimony that middle management, the junior officers and senior petty officers, perceived their authority to have been diluted by the Chief of Naval Operations when he addressed all naval personnel in a series of Z-grams which, being general in nature, permitted individual interpretation of his direc- tions.”2
“One black chief petty officer described the change in discipline and the attitude toward discipline, as ‘just one gigantic cop-out by people like us.’ When the CNO sends a direct message to everybody in the field, the senior petty officer community and the middle management officer community have thrown up their hands and said, ‘He has taken all our power away and we can’t do anything.’”3
Officers involved in any of the several disciplinary incidents that occurred in our
Navy at that time could well identify with the words of the subcommittee.
The disciplinary problems of the time forced leaders to review in detail the basic principles of the military service; to examine the concepts of authority; and to study the law as it related to their role in the military. For the Navy, that meant considerable concentration on Article 5947 of Title Ten of the U.S. Code which reads as follows:
“All commanding officers and others in authority in the naval service are required to show in themselves a good example of virtue, honor, patriotism, and subordination, to be vigilant in inspecting the conduct of all persons who are placed under their command; to guard against and suppress all dissolute and immoral practices, and to correct, according to the laws and regulations of the Navy, all persons who are guilty of them; and to take all necessary and proper measures, under the laws, regulations and customs of the naval service, to promote and safeguard the morale, the physical well-being, and the general welfare of the officers and enlisted persons under their command or charge.” (Emphasis added.)
A broad interpretation of this article gives a commanding officer considerable leeway. Taking “all necessary and proper measures ... to promote and safeguard the morale, the physical well-being, and the general welfare” is a broad mandate. The words “under the laws, regulations and customs of the naval service,” acting as modifiers of the broad authority, can create some problems, particularly if a aluminous set of detailed instructions cmanates from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
During the early 1970s, there was confusion about authority, and the result was a breakdown in respect for that authority. Restrictions upon authority always breed a lack of respect, something that parents learn in the rearing of their children. Further, it takes away some of the fun of life, and it took away some of the enjoyment °f being the commanding officer of a ship, which should be the apex of any Professional naval officer’s career.
Knowing Admiral Bringle’s philosophy on authority, I took the broad approach to the interpretation of Article 5947 as his Fleet Commander in the Mediterranean. We took several steps to ensure that commanding officers in par- hcular, and all other officers and petty officers, in the Sixth Fleet knew their rights and the extent of their authority. For example, every commanding officer ordered to the Mediterranean during that Period of time received a personal letter from me before his arrival. That letter vvelcomed the commanding officer to the fleet and then it emphasized the authority 'hat the commanding officer could enjoy. The letter opened by saying, “Commanding Officers are my favorites.” Then it quoted Article 5947 of Title Ten. That was followed by my interpretation °f the article, the broad approach. A couPle of paragraphs from one of those letters might be of interest.
“I know from years of experience with Admiral Bringle that he likes commanding officers, and so does his boss, General Burchinal. The command structure under which you will operate is on your side. This is a time to rejoice that you are a commanding officer and make the most of the opportunity.
“With all that . . . authority, the smart thing to do is use it. 1 will back the commanding officer to the hilt as he explores the fringe of the performance envelope. In this regard, there are many rules, regulations, instructions and so forth, which have been promulgated. At times, they may become restrictive rather than helpful in nature. The commanding officer should understand that when he is operating under my operational command, there is nothing in any of these rules, regulations, or instructions that takes the place of common sense and logical reasoning as practiced by him the commanding officer. That is his general prudential rule. The commanding officer should never quote some Sixth Fleet instruction as a reason for not doing something that makes sense to him on the spot. 1 will back his judgment, at least until it is proven to be faulty. If something makes sense to the on-scene commanding officer it probably makes sense to higher authority. So act, keep me informed, keep the unit/force commanders informed, and we can sort out the pieces later if poor judgment is indicated.”4
Such a broad mandate was difficult for some commanding officers to believe, particularly in the early 1970s. Accordingly, shortly after the arrival of a ship in the Sixth Fleet, I paid a personal visit, usually at sea, to the commanding officer. During the visit, we would review the letter to ensure that the commanding officer was fully cognizant of the degree of authority in his hands and the respect that Admiral Bringle and I had for commanding officers. Respect for authority down the line is probably more important than respect for authority up the chain of command.
The task at hand was to restore respect for authority, the authority of the commanding officer, his junior officers, and his chief petty officers. In addition to the letter and visit to commanding officers, I held “rap sessions” with the crews of several ships, but only at the request of the commanding officer and only with the commanding officer and his junior officers and leading petty officer present. During these sessions, I placed great emphasis on the authority and responsibility of the commanding officer. 1 pointed out to all hands that the commanding officer had the authority to order the fleet commander from his ship, should he not like any action that was taking place. I also pointed out in response to the usual questions about assignments of liberty ports that the crew had to work out that issue with their commanding officer; that the commanding officer selected the liberty ports and that the fleet commander merely took action to gain diplomatic clearance for such visits. If anything will impress a sailor about authority, it is the power to select a liberty port. In short, the skipper was the authority. The fleet commander respected the authority of that skipper—and I made it obvious that it was to the advantage of all hands to show similar respect. The entire program was aimed at restoration of respect.
The basic principle embodied in Bringle’s question, “Admiral, do you have enough authority to do what you want to do?” was carried out throughout the Sixth Fleet. As a result, some sticky problems were either avoided or solved with a minimum of confusion. Progress was made in many areas, and commanding officers had considerable satisfaction while filling the most unique and challenging positions of their careers. Further, they demonstrated great respect for the authority that had delegated so much authority to them. One could conclude from the situation that the primary role of leaders is to acquire as much authority as possible from those above and pass on as much authority as possible to those below.
There was nothing new or revolutionary about the action taken in the Sixth Fleet. Parents learn early that as soon as children are capable of using authority, it should be given to them so that they may act on their own. Besides contributing to the maturity of the children, the process builds respect for the parents. In more sophisticated circles, Lord Nelson certainly put the principle into practice as he created, with his commanding officers, his famous “band of brothers.”
There are lessons to be learned from the Navy’s disciplinary problems of the early 1970s; they might be summed up as follows:
- Respect for authority down the chain of command is at least as important, if not more so, as respect for authority up the chain. Respect down begets respect up.
- When a loss of respect for an officer’s authority occurs, that officer should be removed, rather than legislating more rules and regulations that, in effect, weaken any officer’s authority.
- Senior leaders (military and civilian) should avoid any perception that they have usurped any of the authority that belongs to commanding officers of ships, squadrons, and other commands.
- Subordinates should respect the authority they hold and fight tenaciously to keep it from being usurped by those above.
'Report by the Special Subcommittee on Disciplinary Problems in the U.S. Navy of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Ninety- second Congress, Second Session, 2 January 1973. (H.A.S.C. No. 92-81)
2Ibid, p. 17689.
3Ibid.
4PcrsonaI-confidential letter to Captain R. W. Barker, Commanding Officer, USS Intrepid (CVS- 11), 12 December 1972, from Commander, U.S. Sixth Fleet.
Vice Admiral Miller has seen combat in three wars. He has been a professional and amateur student of authority for more than 50 years.