Although several issues must be resolved before a strategic arms reduction talks (START) agreement may be concluded, since late 1987 a great deal of attention has been devoted to long-range, nuclear-armed, sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). Indeed, according to Soviet officials, SLCM control has proved to be “the most difficult” question, some even asserting that no START agreement will be possible without treaty constraints on SLCM numbers and an intrusive verification regime.1
Such dramatic formulations appear to be intended to encourage a process of public diplomacy and pressure in which the United States might make unnecessary and unwise concessions to reach a START agreement. If the other elements of a START package were defensible on their own merits in terms of Soviet interests, the Soviets would probably agree to accept compromises regarding SLCM control.
The history of Soviet proposals for SLCM control suggests, at any rate, that the Soviets have long sought treaty constraints that would have asymmetrical effects damaging to Western security interests. Rather than accepting such proposals, the United States should uphold a more equitable and prudent policy of unilateral and adjustable limitations, a policy that would promote SLCM control while protecting U. S. and allied security interests.
Soviet Proposals, Past and Present
During the SALT II negotiations, the Soviets proposed that all SLCMs be constrained to a range limit of 600 kilometers. The SALT II Protocol of June 1979 prohibited the deployment of SLCMs with a range in excess of 600 kilometers until after 31 December 1981. The Soviets made it clear that they would seek an extension of this deployment ban during follow-on negotiations, for at least the duration of the SALT II Treaty (until the end of 1985), and that this ban would apply to both nuclear- and conventional-armed SLCMs. The United States repeatedly said that it would not accept such an extension.2
During the START negotiations from 1982 until June 1986, the Soviets sought to ban the deployment of all SLCMs (with nuclear or conventional warheads) with ranges greater than 600 kilometers. In June 1986, the Soviets reportedly proposed that surface-based SLCMs exceeding 600 kilometers in range be banned, and that a numerical ceiling on submarine-launched SLCMs be determined.3In July 1987, the Soviet draft agreement for START reportedly proposed a ceiling of 400 for nuclear-armed SLCMs with a range greater than 600 kilometers, to be deployed solely on submarines.4
At the December 1987 Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Washington, the two sides agreed to “find a mutually acceptable solution to the question of limiting the deployment of long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs,” with SLCM ceilings distinct from the START limitations of 6,000 warheads and 1,600 strategic offensive delivery systems. The sides agreed “to seek mutually acceptable and effective methods of verification of such limitations, which could include the employment of National Technical Means, cooperative measures, and on-site inspection.”5
Since the December 1987 summit, the Soviets have publicized their proposals for verifying SLCM ceilings: inspectors at cruise missile production sites and naval bases, radiation detectors on helicopters and ships, and follow-up ship inspections if such sensors suggest the presence of unaccounted-for nuclear SLCMs.6 According to Alexei Obukhov, head of the Soviet delegation in Geneva, “The Soviet side favors the strictest possible verification, also as regards long-range sea-launched cruise missiles, up to inspection of any naval ship.”7
The Soviets have also gone beyond the December 1987 principles by asking the United States to accept limits on conventional-warhead SLCMs, which were not mentioned in the December 1987 agreed statement and fall outside the nuclear subject matter of the START negotiations. The Soviets have nonetheless proposed since February 1988 a ceiling of 1,000 for all types of long-range SLCMs (still defined by the Soviets as those with ranges greater than 600 kilometers). Of this total, 600 would be conventional SLCMs on certain agreed categories of ships and 400 would be nuclear SLCMs on two types of submarines and one type of surface ship.8
The Soviet SLCM proposals are obviously significant in the context of other aspects of Soviet nuclear arms control policy. Why, for example, have the Soviets been portraying the SLCM as the primary obstacle to a START agreement in recent months rather than the U. S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)? Have the Soviets judged that SDI is virtually moribund, owing to political and budgetary problems, and that the SLCM is a more worthy target of political pressure? Are the Soviets so satisfied with the foreseeable constraints on the START-counted forces that it seems advisable now to press for SLCM limits as well?
In a comprehensive analysis, moreover, the Soviet SLCM proposals would be related to other initiatives oriented toward achieving Soviet objectives by political means. The Soviets have recognized that restrictions on the freedom of the seas and naval forces are asymmetrically disadvantageous for the Western alliance, which consists of an array of maritime coalitions. Soviet proposals for naval arms control would diminish U. S. and allied maritime forces and hinder their operational flexibility by establishing various types of exclusionary zones—e.g., submarine-free zones, nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs), and antisubmarine warfare-free zones. Soviet-proposed “zones of peace” would exclude or limit U. S. naval forces in regions such as the Baltic, Norwegian, North, and Mediterranean seas; and the Indian, South Pacific, South Atlantic, and Arctic oceans.9 Some Soviet officials have hinted that the Soviet Union might even seek reductions in U. S. naval capabilities in return for limits on Soviet ground and air forces in Europe.10 In other words, Soviet as well as Western advocates of the denuclearization of Central Europe may attempt to portray the U. S. Navy as an obstacle to achieving the “conventional stability” that would, in their view, permit the creation of such a NWFZ.
Such arms control arrangements could interact synergistically with the Soviet-proposed SLCM ceilings. Maritime NWFZs could, obviously, in conjunction with numerical ceilings on SLCMs with ranges in excess of 600 kilometers, simplify Soviet military planning and intelligence operations, at least in peacetime and in crisis situations short of war. To be able to attack specific Soviet targets with nuclear SLCMs, U. S. Navy ships would have to be in range. Therefore, NWFZs—or restrictions on the patrol zones of SLCM-carrying ships, excluding them from striking range of foreign shores—could limit U. S. options for holding Soviet targets at risk.11
Universal respect for naval NWFZs or similar zones throughout a conflict may, however, be regarded as doubtful, as with NWFZs on land. Soviet aggression and violations of such zones would free other parties from their obligations. The same principles would apply to “zone of peace” ceilings or exclusions affecting conventional naval forces, including conventional SLCMs.
It appears that the Soviets will try to introduce constraints on SLCMs in the new Vienna negotiations on conventional forces in Europe (CFE) and in the associated negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs).12 The more immediate question, however, is assessing the specific implications of the SLCM proposals the Soviets have linked to START. These proposals would have an enormous impact on the U. S. Navy’s capabilities. The United States would be obliged to rely mainly on carrier-based aircraft for antiship missions (at ranges beyond the Harpoon’s 90 kilometers or so) and land-attack missions. This would mean bringing aircraft carriers and their aircraft far closer to both sea- and land-based threats. Except for the Soviet-proposed maximum of 600 conventional SLCMs, the U. S. Navy would be deprived of the expanded strength that it plans to obtain from significantly larger deployments of conventional SLCMs for antiship and land-attack purposes. Nuclear SLCMs would be held to levels below foreseeable U. S. requirements for deterrence and flexible response, for allied as well as national security.
The Soviet proposals are, moreover, inequitable for three reasons aside from the verification difficulties:
► Differing programs and deployment practices. The Soviets apparently have at least three antiship SLCMs (SS-N-3, SS-N-12, and SS-N-19) with ranges far greater than that of the Harpoon, but evidently have not confirmed that any of them have ranges exceeding 600 kilometers. Most Soviet SLCMs (more than 2,700 weapons) would therefore not be affected by the Sovet-proposed treaty regime.13 The United States would be forced to forgo plans for long-range conventional antiship and land-attack SLCMs in excess of the 600 ceiling. The United States would probably have to establish a new program for conventional SLCMs, with artificial (less than 600 kilometers) range constraints. The allowed SLCMs would be limited to certain (so far undefined) ship categories, constraining U. S. Navy deployment flexibility. Soviet options would not in practice be as limited, partly because the Soviets tend to rely on dedicated SLCM platforms more than the United States. The U. S. Navy places a greater emphasis on multipurpose ships and plans to disperse SLCM capabilities among a large number of submarines and surface ships.
► Geographical asymmetries. Confining most U. S. SLCMs to ranges less than 600 kilometers would make it difficult for the United States to use SLCMs to attack targets in the Soviet Union. The coastal locations of many U. S. and allied targets could, in contrast, make the West more vulnerable to attacks from SLCMs with ranges of less than 600 kilometers. The argument that SLCM ceilings would benefit the United States because of the deficiencies in U. S. air defenses is not plausible, however, partly because the United States would remain increasingly vulnerable to other Soviet air-breathing threats (bombers and air-launched cruise missiles ALCMs). The existence of Soviet SLCMs is only one of several reasons why U. S. air defenses should be improved.
The three most plausible theaters of potential U. S.-Soviet conflict (Europe, Southwest Asia, and Northeast Asia) are, moreover, on the periphery of the Soviet Union. This means that the Soviet Union is far less dependent on sea-based firepower projection and other types of maritime power than the United States and its allies. The Soviets can therefore more readily afford to forgo long-range SLCMs and, indeed, a number of other types of naval capabilities. The Soviet Union stands to benefit more than the United States from an agreement cutting permitted SLCM numbers to a small fraction of what might otherwise be deployed by the U. S. Navy.
► Technological asymmetries. The Soviets state that they are developing SLCMs with ranges and accuracies comparable to those of the U. S. Tomahawk.14 Yet the Soviets may in fact believe that highly accurate long-range SLCMs represent an area of technological advantage for the United States. It would therefore stand to reason that the Soviets might seek an agreement comparable to those pursued in similar circumstances in the past (e.g., the Anti-Ballistic Missile ABM Treaty)—an accord that would allow the Soviet Union to carry forward its own research and development, but limit allowed deployments to a low level. Constraining head-to-head competition with the United States in areas of high technology appears to be an established principle of Soviet political-military planning.15 The Soviets may anticipate that such an accord would win them time to carry their own SLCM (and air defense) programs forward, and encourage a slowdown in U. S. technology development in this area. An agreement such as the Soviets are seeking would obviously limit important future U. S. options for applying new technologies (guidance, propulsion, signature-reduction, munitions, and so forth) to SLCMs.
U. S. compliance with the terms of an accord would be assured not only by the Soviet Union, but by the U. S. Congress, the media, and attentive publics. Soviet compliance, however, could not be assured, even with on-site inspections. Any conceivable on-site inspection arrangement could be circumvented within hours. There would in practice be no reliable limit on numbers of long-range Soviet SLCMs, while the Soviets could have high confidence in U. S. compliance with the ceiling of 1,000 SLCMs.
The Soviet SLCM verification proposals appear to be intended to restrict U. S. naval capabilities in fundamental ways, even though obvious inadequacies would burden the Soviet-proposed system of checking for the presence of nuclear-armed SLCMs with radiation detectors based on nearby ships and helicopters. Such sensors might not be capable of distinguishing nuclear SLCMs from other naval nuclear weapons or from the radiation of nuclear propulsion systems. The radiation sensors could, moreover, be ineffective with some types of nuclear materials and/or thwarted with lead shielding around the nuclear warheads.16 The sensors would, however, provide the Soviets with pretexts for inspections of U. S. ships.
On-site inspections of ships potentially carrying nuclear SLCMs could be risky at best. Unless the regime was carefully designed to limit opportunities for deception (with short-notice or surprise inspections), on-site inspections would establish little or no knowledge about possible Soviet violations or about operational munitions loadings on Soviet ships. But they could give the Soviets opportunities to learn a great deal about U. S. naval operations and specific types of submarines and ships. Legitimizing the concept of on-site inspections to verify things that are intrinsically unverifiable (because of their relatively small size, SLCMs could be easily stockpiled covertly) would also be dangerous because it could open the door for onsite inspections in areas that would be even less verifiable (e.g., total numbers of nuclear warheads maintained by each country).
Given the advantages that such an inspection regime might offer the Soviets, it is likely that they will claim that they could only accept the large-scale deployment of conventional-armed SLCMs with ranges greater than 600 kilometers (i.e., numbers beyond the Soviet-proposed ceiling of 600) and forgo on-site inspections if functionally related observable differences (FRODs) acceptable to them could be devised to distinguish nuclear- and conventional-armed SLCMs. There are only minor differences in the design of U. S. conventional and nuclear SLCMs.17 Therefore no such FRODs are feasible (they would, many experts would contend, be “frauds” rather than FRODs). Instruments could obviously be used to detect certain nuclear materials, but it appears that, depending on warhead design and shielding arrangements, only breaching the missile’s airframe to inspect its armament could provide absolute certainty. The findings of such inspections could be promptly invalidated if the missile’s payload package design allowed for convertibility. The Soviets would prefer that U. S. options be reduced to a total inventory of 1,000 deployed SLCMs (conventional and nuclear), with all subject to recurrent Soviet inspections.
No basis has been determined yet for distinguishing conventional-warhead ALCMs from nuclear-armed ALCMs. Even if verification methods for ALCMs were devised, they would not necessarily provide useful precedents for SLCMs given the substantial differences in ALCM and SLCM system design. Conventional as well as nuclear ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers were outlawed by the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, so GLCMs furnish no worthwhile precedents.
The Soviet concept of designating which types of U. S. ships could carry SLCMs would “tell the Soviets the whereabouts of a weapon that was expressly designed to be concealed from the Soviets.”18 It would restrict U. S. deployment options and simplify Soviet efforts to monitor the locations of U. S. SLCMs (nuclear and conventional) and thus make these retaliatory systems more vulnerable to Soviet attack. Reducing SLCM survivability prospects would in turn erode U. S. deterrent capabilities and strategic stability. The Soviet interest in confining U. S. SLCMs to a few classes of submarines and surface ships would substantially curtail U. S. flexibility. The United States, however, could have no confidence in Soviet compliance with the ceilings, which would be biased against the United States in geostrategic and operational terms.
Other concepts proposed for resolving the verification difficulties include:
► “Tamper-proof” tags to identify each SLCM, its armament, and its place of manufacture
► Portal monitors around the perimeters of SLCM production facilities
► On-ship inspections to ensure that untagged SLCMs not be deployed, to “interrogate” each SLCM’s tagging device, and to test for the presence of concealed nuclear warheads
► Nuclear warhead detectors near every opening on every ship that might carry SLCMs
► Encoded and secure communications channels to ensure that the periodic reports from the nuclear warhead detectors would not reveal the ship’s location to the other side
► Agreements about loading nuclear warheads onto ships slowly, to make sure the nuclear warhead sensors would work, and magnetic sensors to ensure the proper speed of nuclear warhead loading procedures
► Periodic on-site inspections of the nuclear warhead detectors19
Even if all of these proposed mechanisms worked reliably, the regime could be circumvented by the Soviets through the covert production of SLCMs of tested designs.20 The undeclared SLCMs could be stockpiled for the contingency of war. Some could be maintained at sea on Soviet merchant, fishing, or research vessels. Nonnuclear SLCMs would obviously not be detected by the radiation sensors, and could subsequently be equipped with nuclear munitions, possibly even at sea. (It is not known whether the warheads of current Soviet SLCMs could be readily converted, nor is it clear how possible design changes and variations could be monitored.)21 Since some types of SLCMs could be loaded—or offloaded—as readily as torpedoes, it could be relatively easy for the Soviets to evade an elaborate cooperative verification regime in various ways, including the deployment of SLCMs on platforms other than those designated in a treaty.
The argument that the special precautions required for the handling of fissionable materials would be visible may underestimate the Soviet capacity for strategic deception and overestimate U. S. capabilities for reliably estimating and monitoring the total Soviet nuclear stockpile. Similarly, the common belief that neither side could redeploy or augment its SLCM capabilities until after the start of war is based on the doubtful assumption that an in-place SLCM arms control regime would be effective in peacetime and during any transition-to-war crisis. The opportunities for Soviet cheating would be extensive: It would, for example, be possible to extend the range of SLCMs nominally incapable of flying further than 600 kilometers. If such efforts were detected, the Soviets might insist that the necessary testing concerned missiles of a permitted range or function. The total Soviet SLCM inventory simply could not be verified without an inspection regime far more thorough and draconian than either government is likely to accept. The available evidence of Soviet SLCM cheating could be too ambiguous or incomplete to allow the United States to undertake a timely response. Given the differences in political culture and strategic objectives, the net effects of an intrusive SLCM inspection regime would probably handicap the United States more than the Soviet Union, and would not contain the threat of Soviet circumvention and eventual breakout.22
It may be hypothesized, furthermore, that the Soviets would like to establish a treaty right to search U. S. ships for nuclear SLCMs in order to undermine the U. S. “neither confirm nor deny” policy regarding the possible presence of nuclear weapons on particular ships. Compromising this policy (which is shared, incidentally, by the nuclear-armed navies of Britain and France) would entail several disadvantages for the United States and corresponding benefits for the Soviet Union. It could become more difficult for U. S. ships to make port calls in allied and neutral countries where special nuclear sensitivities prevail. Anti-nuclear and anti-American protestors would have a ready focus for agitation and demonstrations. Nuclear safety arrangements would have to be made even more stringent, because precise targets for terrorism and sabotage could be more easily identified. It may also be argued that U. S. ships with nuclear weapons could become more vulnerable to attack, in that they could be more readily identified for enemy surveillance and targeting. Some experts have added that the deterrent potential of the U. S. Navy could be degraded, in that the magnitude and pattern of its nuclear deployments would become more calculable.23
As Sidney Drell, Co-director of the Center for International Security and Arms Control at Stanford, and Thomas Johnson, Director of the Science Research Laboratory at West Point, have pointed out, “the essentially unverifiable nature of the SLCMs will not be changed by wishing the situation were otherwise.”24 It appears that no intrusive SLCM verification regime can be devised that would be plausibly negotiable and effective without entailing undue disadvantages for the United States, in terms of confidence in Soviet compliance and other aspects of security (the risks in authorizing Soviet access to critically important naval vessels, undermining the ‘‘neither confirm nor deny” policy, etc.).
Some have pointed to the disadvantages of an intrusive verification regime as an argument for banning long-range nuclear SLCMs.25 A treaty to this effect could, however, establish a verification regime anyway, because the Soviets might demand the right to inspect U. S. conventional SLCMs to ensure that no nuclear-armed SLCMs were covertly deployed. If a ban on nuclear-armed SLCMs were established, the United States might also seek on-site inspection rights, because a modest amount of Soviet cheating could substantially enhance Soviet capabilities in these circumstances. An unverifiable ban might pose severe problems in U. S. treaty ratification proceedings.26
National SLCM Controls
What is needed is a method of SLCM control that would avoid the inadequacies and disadvantages of an intrusive verification regime and protect U. S. nuclear SLCM acquisition options, in the interests of allied as well as national security. The most sensible method would therefore be to rely on unilateral declaratory limits. Public exchanges of information on nuclear SLCM acquisition plans would not create any treaty obligations, so no need for intrusive verification measures would arise. Such exchanges of information could be seen as a “cooperative measure” in support of national technical means of verification.
National technical means of verification could not provide the United States with much confidence in the Soviet Union’s compliance with its declared acquisition plans.27 But no negotiable verification regime would be likely to provide much more confidence. Since SLCM ceilings are essentially unverifiable, it would be unwise to codify such ceilings in a treaty regime. As a general rule, it is unwise to conclude agreements that cannot be reliably verified. It would be doubly unwise to establish an inherently inadequate verification regime that would entail asymmetrical consequences for the United States, owing in part to its higher degree of dependence on sea-based military capabilities. An intrusive SLCM verification regime would be so harmful to U. S. interests (and so ineffective in ensuring Soviet compliance) that it would be preferable to rely on national declaratory ceilings.
Some might argue that a national approach to SLCM control would represent a return to past U. S. policy. According to some sources, the United States first agreed to explore the possibility of negotiated limits on SLCMs at the October 1986 Reykjavik summit.28 But as a sovereign government the United States is free to change its mind. Several elements of the Reykjavik package, e.g., the proposed elimination of all ballistic missiles in ten years, have already been modified.
In the December 1987 joint statement, the Soviet Union and the United States expressed a commitment to “establish ceilings” on SLCMs and to “seek mutually acceptable and effective methods of verification of such limitations.” Later Reagan administration policy statements indicated, however, that the United States could support national SLCM controls based on declared acquisition plans. According to a November 1988 statement by the U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, “Thus far, the U. S. has not identified any effective verification approach for SLCMs. In the absence of a plan for effective verification, the U. S. proposed that the sides make nonbinding declarations of nuclear SLCM numbers.”29
The Soviets are not likely to accept this approach cheerfully, since they evidently judge that they could benefit substantially from their proposed set of treaty constraints on SLCMs. They may continue to claim for some time that no START agreement will be feasible without such limits on SLCMs. They may even assert that the Soviet Union would somehow deserve some sort of compensation if SLCMs are not subjected to a treaty regime such as they have proposed.
But such claims and assertions should not determine U. S. policy. The United States could and should advise the Soviets that a START package capable of standing on its own merits ought to be concluded without collateral treaty constraints on SLCMs, and that the United States regards declaratory statements regarding unilateral and periodically adjustable SLCM limits as the only sensible solution. The value of the emerging START package for U. S. and allied security is, of course, rather hypothetical when many of the most important START provisions have yet to be definitively determined; but the elements of the START package should be mutually advantageous enough to justify their approval, quite aside from the SLCM question. Given the Soviet threats to back away from START unless Soviet-proposed SLCM constraints are accepted, the United States should carefully evaluate the specific merits of particular START limitations and of the START package as a whole, if the Soviet price for an agreement is a collateral accord on SLCMs that would have unbalanced effects damaging to Western security interests. If the START package was desirable in other respects and the Americans firmly maintained a position favoring national SLCM controls, the Soviets would in all likelihood accept the infeasibility of pressuring the United States to accept their SLCM control proposal.
There are precedents in SALT for excluding air-breathing nuclear delivery systems. The SALT I Interim Agreement in 1972 was concerned exclusively with certain types of sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers.
The 1979 SALT II package excluded the Soviet Backfire bomber from the ceilings for strategic nuclear launch vehicles, partly because the Carter administration decided to accept Soviet assurances that the Soviet Union did not intend to give this aircraft intercontinental range.30 The Backfire precedent is also of interest because the United States accepted a unilateral Soviet declaration of intent about force acquisition plans that was open-ended: The
Soviets promised simply to limit their annual production to 30 aircraft, with no ceiling on total numbers in the long term. It should be noted, however, that the Backfire exclusion is regarded in some sectors of the U. S. defense community as one of the most serious flaws of SALT II. Moreover, some would see the Backfire precedent as irrelevant to possible cruise missile limitations.
As noted earlier, the SALT II protocol provided for a temporary ban on the deployment of SLCMs (and GLCMs) with ranges in excess of 600 kilometers, but the United States made it clear that this ban would not set a precedent for further accords. SLCMs differ from most of the nuclear delivery systems covered in the SALT and START negotiations because of their mode of deployment—on surface ships and submarines with non-“strategic” and nonnuclear missions.31
The national approach to SLCM control makes sense for at least five reasons:
► The United States needs SLCMs. The U. S. Navy should be able to deploy nuclear and nonnuclear SLCMs with substantial flexibility to meet its international security responsibilities. SLCMs could provide large numbers of surface ships and submarines with unprecedented long-range strike capabilities, owing to their precision accuracy and excellent survivability prospects (based on the mobility and wide dispersion of SLCM platforms). Land-attack SLCMs could be used to: neutralize specific targets, such as fuel and ammunition stockpiles; interdict logistical assets, such as airfields, ports, and railheads; and suppress air defenses and prepare the way for carrier-based aircraft, without putting U. S. or allied pilots at risk. The strike potential of SLCMs could also lessen the burdens placed on carrier aircraft owing to their increasingly weighty air defense duties.32 U. S. aircraft carriers could at the same time supply some air defense protection for SLCM-capable ships operating in forward areas. Land-attack SLCMs could also threaten the enormous Soviet investments in land-based naval aviation, and thereby deter the Soviets from using Backfires and other aircraft to launch nuclear antiship missiles against U. S. ships.33
With continued improvements in range, speed, signature-reduction, accuracy, terrain-following capabilities, and command-and-control (for rapid and flexible retargeting), SLCMs could be capable of undertaking a wide spectrum of nonnuclear missions, in Third World low- intensity conflicts as well as in more demanding (though less likely) East-West contingencies. These capabilities would offer a fundamental contribution to U. S. prospects for deterring aggression and, if necessary, defeating it. In actual strike operations, the accuracy and discrimination potential of modem SLCMs could enable the United States to reduce the collateral damage from attacks and thereby diminish the attendant political and military risks, including the danger of uncontrolled escalation.
Dispersing nuclear SLCMs on a large number of mobile platforms may be expected to enhance deterrence by greatly complicating Soviet attempts to threaten U. S. retaliatory forces. SLCMs could augment U. S. nuclear reserve forces with survivable systems able to hold many types of military targets in the Soviet Union at risk and thereby enhance U. S. prospects for controlling escalation and bringing about favorable war termination in the event of Soviet aggression. Conversely, banning or severely limiting nuclear SLCM deployments would tend to concentrate the Navy’s air-breathing nuclear assets into a small number of lucrative targets. SLCMs also offer improved options for selective long-range nuclear strikes, with certain advantages over both carrier-based aircraft and SLBMs for such missions.
Such limited nuclear strike capabilities could be especially important to ensure the credibility of NATO’s “flexible response” strategy in the years ahead, as the INF treaty is implemented and U. S. Pershing IIs and GLCMs are withdrawn from service.34 Treaty restrictions on U. S. nuclear SLCMs could make many responsible West European strategists and officials apprehensive, because such an accord could mean that the United States would have fewer long-range instruments through which U. S. nuclear guarantees might be honored. British Defence Minister George Younger has said that assigning SLCMs to Supreme Allied Commander Europe could be “a sensible option,” and that there is “no new principle involved” in the concept of SLCM-armed U. S. submarines operating from Holy Loch, Scotland.35 On the other hand, the United States cannot expect many West European politicians to recommend publicly that Soviet pressures on SLCM be resisted, even at the price of a START agreement. In the current political context, the commitment to detente and to the furthering of the arms control process is so profound and widespread in West European political circles that relatively few officials would be willing to insist upon the need for U. S. flexibility in nuclear SLCM deployments if the Soviets succeeded in portraying U. S. SLCM policy as the only obstacle to a START agreement.
► Self-limiting factors would contain the hypothetical risk of an important circumvention of the START ceilings. Some observers have expressed concern about the possibility that an absence of treaty limits on SLCMs could lead to a “dizzying proliferation” of nuclear SLCMs.36 Several factors, however, would tend to hold down numbers of nuclear SLCMs.36 Nuclear weapons are operationally useful only in the most extreme contingencies, and the Navy has long been reluctant to give up scarce magazine space for weapons of limited usability. Moreover, numbers of nuclear SLCMs are likely to remain within reasonable bounds because of resource constraints (the costs of SLCMs, launch platforms, and associated capabilities are hardly negligible) and strategic considerations. As many have noted, modem cruise missiles are not suitable for large-scale prompt counterforce attacks owing to their relatively slow speeds and other technical limitations.37
The U. S. Congress, the news media, and attentive publics would also be certain to constrain U. S. nuclear SLCM levels, for nuclear SLCM procurement plans would be closely monitored. Indeed, under a system of declaratory limits, the U. S. Navy would have to define its ceiling for nuclear SLCMs carefully, because domestic political constraints could make it hard to gain approval for an increase. Given the various missions of nuclear SLCMs (a reserve force for escalation control, possible selective strikes in support of extended deterrence commitments to allies, etc.) and the need for some redundancy in the interests of flexibility, survivability, and credible deterrence, the ceiling should probably be higher than in currently defined procurement plans (approximately 750 in some published accounts).38 Further analysis is needed to advance understanding of what number would be prudent to meet these requirements.
► The flexibility of self-imposed SLCM constraints would be a critical safeguard of U. S. and allied security in an uncertain strategic context. In normal circumstances, of course, the self-limiting factors described previously would function to hold U. S. nuclear SLCM numbers at or below the declared ceiling. But an agreement to exchange updated information on nuclear SLCM procurement plans every year or two would formally establish the legitimacy of an adjustable approach. This approach would leave the United States free (in principle, at least) to alter its procurement objectives if such revisions became necessary in the light of changing strategic and political circumstances. If should be noted, however, that a formal system of declaratory limits might prove to be in practice almost as inflexible as a treaty regime in constraining U. S. force ceilings. Such a system could, moreover, promote a false sense of security about Soviet activities and capabilities and thereby provide excuses for defense budget-cutting.39
Advocates of a ban on nuclear SLCMs have argued that “adding 1,500 warheads to the already agreed limit of 6,000 on other strategic weapons would make a mockery of President Reagan’s intention to achieve deep cuts in strategic arsenals.”40 Formulations of this sort are misleading in several ways. As the Defense Policy Panel of the House Armed Services Committee has pointed out, the actual ceiling on START-counted nuclear weapons would be “more like 9,000-10,000 on each side rather than 6,000,” largely because of the counting rules regarding air-delivered weapons.41 Even this ceiling could be exceeded substantially by a relatively rapid breakout from START ceilings on the basis of permitted stockpiles of Warheads, ballistic missiles, and ALCMs. According to the Defense Policy Panel, chaired by Congressman Les Aspin (D-WI), “In addition to the limit of 6,000 weapons, the Soviets could ‘legally’—and are likely to—deploy another nearly 3,000 weapons and could ‘legally’ have available nearly 11,000 additional weapons that are a source for a sudden breakout from START.”42
The risk of a Soviet breakout from START ceilings could be even more serious than the risk of a Soviet breakout from the SALT ceilings of the past, because START would involve reductions in U. S. strategic forces that could make U. S. forces more vulnerable to Soviet attack—depending in part, of course, on the character of the U. S. post-START force structure and U. S. investments in force survivability measures. Numerically smaller U. S. forces could also be less capable of penetrating Soviet defenses against ballistic missiles and air-delivered weapons. START will not establish any limits on Soviet air defenses, and the limits on Soviet ballistic missile defenses in the ABM Treaty are vulnerable to erosion and possible “creepout.”
While a Soviet breakout from the ABM Treaty appears unlikely at present, it would be politically and strategically imprudent to rule out the contingency entirely and to be without countermeasures suitable for timely implementation. In other words, an adjustable ceiling on nuclear SLCM plans would give the United States the political flexibility it might require to deal with Soviet START or ABM Treaty breakout or creepout and/or advances in Soviet air defenses.
Moreover, the “deep cuts” pursued in START will not necessarily have stabilizing effects. Radical reductions are not inherently desirable unless they function to strengthen security. For security, including the maintenance of political and strategic stability, the United States needs a nuclear posture that is survivable and capable of deterring (and, if necessary, countering) Soviet coercion or aggression at various levels of conflict. Under a START regime, U. S. land- and sea-based ballistic missile launchers and bomber delivery means will decrease in number. This decline in numbers will enhance the importance of a survivable reserve force at sea, including mobile and dispersed SLCMs, for deterrence and escalation control.
Nuclear SLCM requirements also could increase owing to changes in force structure. The difficulties in U. S. ICBM modernization since the late 1970s (and the many disadvantages and risks in ICBM vulnerability and in certain supposed “solutions”—e.g., launch-under-attack capabilities) have led some analysts to conclude that the United States may have to place greater emphasis on sea-based land-attack capabilities, including SLCMs. U. S. long-range capabilities will almost certainly need to be augmented substantially with systems capable of undertaking nonnuclear attacks with great precision and discrimination. For this reason as well, it would be unwise to accept treaty constraints on SLCM numbers.
► Nuclear SLCM deployments could be strategically stabilizing in several ways. Some critics of nuclear SLCM deployments have argued that such missiles would “raise the odds of nuclear war by giving both the superpowers an incentive to shoot first in any confrontation.”43 It can be argued, however, that the Soviets would be less likely to undertake such an attack if they were facing a large, diversified, and survivable U. S. retaliatory force.
As noted earlier, even advanced cruise missiles of current types are unsuited for large-scale prompt counterforce attacks owing to their long flight times and other technical characteristics. SLCMs in particular offer remarkable crisis stability advantages, because their survivability could be based on an extensive dispersion of numerous mobile launch platforms—ships and submarines that would be no more attractive as targets for Soviet attacks than other nuclear-capable platforms, including aircraft carriers. For this reason, Drell and Johnson have argued that it would be advantageous to “accept an arms control regime that prescribes no limits on certain classes” of cruise missiles—above all, SLCMs. “The United States’ unilateral actions to insure a high survivability of the independent components of its deterrent are more important than its seeking to establish rigorous equality in the numbers of warheads through negotiations.”44
► The risks that might be posed by Soviet SLCM proliferation under a regime of declaratory unilateral ceilings should be placed in a broad strategic perspective. Some proponents of a treaty banning or severely limiting numbers of SLCMs have argued that, in the absence of such an accord, “the Soviet Union could deploy far more nuclear-armed SLCMs than the United States.”45 This argument is based on a mirage—the belief that the Soviet SLCM proliferation potential could be contained by a treaty. The advantages that might redound to the United States under a treaty regime banning or limiting SLCMs are essentially hypothetical, because of the infeasibility of achieving effective verification.
The true question is one of net assessment: Would it benefit the United States and its allies more to have an arms control understanding based on unilateral and adjustable SLCM ceilings, with no verification except for information exchanges and national technical means, or an arms control package based on more binding treaty-codified ceilings, with an intrusive verification regime comparable to that proposed by the Soviets? Key disadvantages of the latter arrangement have already been reviewed. The assumptions of proponents of this arms control package should, however, be critically examined.
On one hand, the Soviets have been developing and testing two SLCMs capable of long-range land-attack missions, SS-NX-21 and SS-NX-24. The Soviets may have begun deploying the torpedo tube-launched SS-NX-21 in 1988, and may soon deploy the much larger and faster SS-NX-24, which requires dedicated launch tubes.46 On the other hand, the Soviets have not expressed much interest in relying on SLCMs as a means of delivering nuclear munitions against land-based targets. One observer of Soviet military affairs has noted: “Ballistic missile submarines are still presented as the main means of nuclear deterrence, together with the land-based ballistic missiles and bombers, while cruise missiles remain tied to the antiship mission.”47
It would be uncharacteristic of the Soviets to rely on SLCMs for long-range land-attack purposes because of the long-standing Soviet interest in assuring positive control over nuclear strike assets, with the launch platforms under the close supervision of the authorities in Moscow. This is one of the advantages of deploying SSBNs with intercontinental-range SLBMs in bastions near the Soviet Union. The Soviets are not likely to develop intercontinental-range SLCMs to complement SLBMs for such missions, partly because SLCMs operating at such great ranges would provide the United States with early warning and better prospects for taking defensive and retaliatory action.
At least in the medium term, a heavy emphasis on nuclear SLCMs in threatening or attacking the United States (or third parties) would be inconsistent with the Soviet tradition of preferring to use instruments with which Soviet forces are most familiar and practiced, weapons with a higher degree of proven reliability. The Soviets have devoted far more attention to improving the effectiveness and survivability of other nuclear forces, and the Soviet nuclear SLCM threat to the United States (and other countries) is likely to remain secondary in relation to the ICBM, SLBM, and bomber/ALCM threat for many years to come.
In the longer term, of course, the Soviet nuclear (and nonnuclear) SLCM threat to the United States and its allies could become much more significant owing to various technical performance improvements. Geography favors the Soviet Union. The United States and its allies in Europe and Asia are for the most part maritime countries, with far more coastal targets vulnerable to sea-based firepower projection. The Soviets have already invested heavily in a series of air defense lines on land in an attempt to protect the most highly valued assets of the Soviet state, and the radars, surface-to-air missiles, and antiaircraft guns of Soviet naval forces have extended the Soviet Union’s air defense envelope at sea.48 It would be costly for the United States and its allies to deploy comparable defenses against sea-based aerodynamic threats. These geographical differences probably help to explain the Soviet interest in severely limiting SLCMs with ranges greater than 600 kilometers.
On the other hand, the Soviet Union’s ability to capitalize on these geographical asymmetries for offensive missions would continue to depend on the Soviet Navy’s ability to bring SLCMs within range of U. S. and allied coastal targets. The Soviets would not be able to bring their SLCMs fully to bear unless they could defeat U. S. and allied forces at sea. While no one can predict the outcome of the battles that might be provoked by Soviet aggression, the U. S. Navy would enter such battles with certain advantages in force structure and operational experience—in sea-based aviation and naval logistics, above all. U. S. and allied naval forces could benefit by the teaming of manned aircraft and SLCMs in ways that Soviet naval forces could not match for many years, depending of course on how effectively the West continues to maintain and improve its naval assets in the face of evolving Soviet capabilities. Competing effectively with the Soviets is more likely to involve the development of better defenses against Soviet antiship and land-attack cruise and standoff missiles than the negotiation of intrinsically unverifiable treaties that could damage Western security interests.
The most serious long-term threat to the United States that the Soviets might pose with nuclear SLCMs may not be a massive attack with large numbers of missiles, but rather the possibility of a surprise attack—what one group has described as “a decapitation strike, or the leading edge of a large-scale attack, for which only small numbers of SLCMs would be required.” No SLCM control treaty could provide protection against this threat to key command, control, communications, intelligence, and national leadership assets: “It would be quite easy to covertly deploy this number of SLCMs under any imaginable arms control regime.”49
While the probability of the Soviets pursuing such a capability is hard to assess, given other Soviet options (e.g., ballistic missiles) for such attacks and the operational challenges (e.g., launch coordination) and high risks that such attacks would present, the most suitable hedges against this threat would consist of improved U. S. air surveillance capabilities (for more timely warning, for the dispersion of U. S. bombers and other mobile military systems) and active air defenses of the most critical U. S. assets.50 Oddly enough, some commentators oppose a relatively liberal arrangement on SLCM control on the grounds that it could lead to an increased Soviet aerodynamic threat to the United States while simultaneously opposing the development of defenses against the actual and foreseeable Soviet air and missile threats to the United States.
The MIRV (multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle) analogy raised by some proponents of banning or severely restricting nuclear SLCMs seems ill-founded. According to this argument, the Americans are running the risk of repeating the mistakes of the early 1970s, when they allegedly failed to pursue a MIRV ban because of a belief in U. S. technological superiority in this domain—a temporary superiority that became irrelevant because Soviet superiority in ICBM throw weight eventually enabled the Soviet Union to deploy far more MIRVs on ICBMs than had the United States.
This analogy is based on false history. As many have pointed out, the United States attempted without success during the SALT I negotiations to achieve MIRV control, and “the Soviet Union bears a heavy responsibility for avoiding direct negotiations on MIRV at a moment when the U. S. domestic political setting was uniquely favorable to restraining such weapons.”51 Soviet indifference to the opportunity for MIRV control may have been partly based on a judgment that Soviet ICBM throw-weight advantages could be used to support a large MIRV deployment in the long term.
It is also misleading to imply that U. S. experts and officials were unaware of the potential advantages that MIRV could provide the Soviets in the long term, owing to the Soviet advantages in ICBM throw weight and the domestic political obstacles to expanding the U. S. ICBM force and/or developing heavy ICBMs comparable to those of the Soviet Union. The United States went ahead with MIRV after the Soviet attitude made it clear that MIRV control was not feasible, but MIRV was not considered a panacea, but rather a force-improvement measure of transitory utility in an ongoing process of competition and negotiation, with the need for future force modernization recognized.
The MIRV analogy is also misplaced in that (despite the Soviet advantage in submarines able to launch SLCMs) the Soviet Union does not enjoy an advantage in naval systems comparable to the Soviet advantage in ICBM MIRV platforms. Indeed, the United States has an advantage in sea-based aviation and naval logistics that promises to enable the U. S. Navy to employ SLCMs, if necessary, in a synergistic and effective fashion. The Soviet interest since the 1970s in establishing restrictions on U. S. cruise missiles, with a particular emphasis on SLCMs since 1987, stands in noteworthy contrast to the Soviets’ indifference to MIRV control during the SALT I negotiations.
This suggests that the Soviets see advantages for themselves in a highly confining SLCM regime that they did not perceive with respect to MIRVs. In other words, they are trying to achieve a unilateral advantage by negotiating a nominally balanced arms control regime that would in practice have unequal effects.
This is consistent with Soviet diplomatic practice, which has traditionally regarded arms control and disarmament negotiations as forums for political and strategic competition. The United States should make every effort to steer the competition in directions that strengthen prospects for successful deterrence and war prevention. The United States should, in short, adopt a policy that protects U. S. and allied security interests and be straightforward in defending it. When sensible international arms limitation treaties are feasible and mutually advantageous, the United States should pursue them; but when they are not feasible (as in the case of SLCMs), the United States should say so.
The United States should insist on the obvious compromise—an understanding calling for unilateral and periodically adjustable declaratory ceilings, with no verification beyond national technical means. It is most unlikely that the Soviet Union would reject an otherwise desirable
START package for the sake of SLCMs, given the self-limiting factors within the United States that are likely to constrain SLCM deployments. It would nonetheless be most surprising if the Soviets admitted at this juncture that they are bluffing in their contention that no START accord will be feasible without SLCM constraints on their terms. The Soviet Union is in effect testing U. S. resolve—and vice-versa—and the outcome could matter enormously, for U. S. and allied security.
1. Viktor Karpov cited in Michael Getler and Gary Lee, “Soviet Arms Expert Calls for Limit on Sea-Based Misiles,” International Herald Tribune, 8 April 1988.
2. Thomas W. Wolfe, The SALT Experience (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1979), pp. 90, 202, 212–215, 233.
3. Sigurd Boysen, “Gorbachev’s Disarmament Proposals,” Aussenpolitik, no. 1, 1987, p. 15.
4. R. Jeffrey Smith, “Soviets Offer Detailed Treaty Cutting Strategic Nuclear Arms,” Washington Post, 1 August 1987, p. A19.
5. Joint statement of 10 December 1987, in Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 14 December 1987, p. 1495.
6. Karpov cited in Getler and Lee, op. cit. in n. 1; and Don Oberdorfer, “Shevardnadze Left Washington With Little to Show for It,” Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 4–10 April 1988, p. 16.
7. Obukhov cited in Reuters dispatch, “Soviets Link Cheating Rules To Progress in Arms Talks,” International Herald Tribune, 11 July 1988, p. 3.
8. Michael R. Gordon, “Soviet Said to Harden Stance on Missiles,” New York Times, 14 February 1988, p. 3
9. For background on these proposals, see Adm. C. A. H. Trost, USN, “The Soviet Naval Arms Control Offensive,” Vital Speeches of the Day, 1 May 1988, pp. 421–424.
10. See, for example, Edvard Shevardnadze’s speech to the U.N. General Assembly special session on disarmament, 8 June 1988, in Pravda, 9 June 1988, pp. 4–5, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Soviet Union, Daily Report, 9 June 1988, p. 7.
11. “Col. Vladimir Nazarenko suggests this arms control measure in Jane’s Defence Weekly, 16 July 1988, p. 87.
12. For background, see Captain William H. J. Manthorpe, Jr., USN (Ret.), “Why Is Gorbachev Pushing Naval Arms Control?” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1989; and the statements by John Matheny of the Defense Department, cited in Peter Almond, “Soviets knock at ‘back door’ to erase missiles,” Washington Times, 30 March 1989, p. 6.
13. Adm. Trost cited in Charles W. Corddry, “U. S. Admiral: Soviets Aim to Defang Navy,” originally published in the Baltimore Sun and reproduced in The Herald (Monterey, CA), 12 June 1988, pp. 1A–4A.
14. Col. General Nikolai Chervov cited in Peter Adams, “Soviet General Unveils Cruise Missile Plans,” Defense News, 14 December 1987, p. 1
15. See Lt. Col. John G. Hines, U. S. Army, and Commander George F. Kraus, Jr., USN, “Soviet Strategies for Military Competition,” Parameters, Autumn 1986, pp. 26–31.
16. See Potential Verification Provisions for Long-Range, Nuclear-Armed Sea Launched Cruise Missiles, a Working Paper of the Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, July 1988, p. 6.
17. For background, see Rose Gottemoeller, “The Modem Sea-Launched Cruise Missile,” Naval Forces, July–August 1987, p. 65.
18. “START-Gazing,” editorial in the Wall Street Journal, 23 May 1988, p. 16.
19. Some of these concepts are examined in James P. Rubin, “Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles: Facing Up to the Arms Control Challenge,” and Herbert Lin, “Technology for Cooperative Verification of Nuclear Weapons,” both in Arms Control Today, April 1986, pp. 2–11. For a more recent (and more systematic and rigorous) analysis, see the Stanford working group’s paper.
20. Potential Verification Provisions, pp. 4, 5.
21. Potential Verification Provisions, p. 3.
22. For a discussion of the Soviet SLCM breakout potential, see the Report of the Defense Policy Panel of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Breakout, Verification and Force Structure: Dealing with the Full Implications of START, Committee Print No. 21, 24 May 1988 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1988), pp. 25, 35–36.
23. “Compromising the “neither confirm nor deny” policy would, of course, also oblige the United States to surrender the sovereign immunity rights under international law of its warships. For a discussion of the relevant legal principles, see the letter by James R. Van de Velde in the New York Times, 23 May 1988, p. A14.
24. Sidney D. Drell and Thomas H. Johnson, Technical Trends and Strategic Policy (Stanford, CA: Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, May 1988), p. 21.
25. See for example Leon V. Sigal, “Ban This Missile From the Seas,” New York Times, 9 June 1988, p. A23.
26. I am indebted to Capt. Linton Brooks, USN, for these points.
27. Potential Verification Provisions, p. 4.
28. Stuart D. Goldman, Paul E. Gallis, and Jeanette M. Voas, Verifying Arms Control Agreements: The Soviet View, CRS Report No. 87-316 F, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 10 April 1987, p. 81.
29. U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Office of Public Affairs, Nuclear and Space Talks: U. S. and Soviet Proposals, 16 November 1988, p. 2.
30. The Backfire’s potential for intercontinental operations has been subject to various assessments over the years. See David S. Yost, Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense and the Western Alliance (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), pp. 17–18; and U. S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1988, pp. 78–79, 85–86.
31. The December 1987 INF treaty prohibits both nonnuclear and nuclear GLCMs with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. One of the rationales for this prohibition was the judgment that banning conventional GLCMs would permit the elimination of dual-capable delivery systems and simplify verification. Banning long-range conventional SLCMs would not, however, eliminate launchers, because SLCMs may be launched from torpedo tubes.
32. As long ago as 1982 it was noted that “the present missile threat has already forced the Navy to bias its aeronautical resources toward defense of the battle group to the detriment of its offensive capability.” Naval Studies Board, National Research Council, The Implications of Advancing Technology for Naval Aviation (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1982), p. 3.
33. The practical effect of the Soviet approach would be to limit longer-range antiship versions of the Tomahawk as well as land-attack SLCMs, but U. S. experts seem to disagree as to whether “capturing” U. S. antiship SLCM capabilities is a primary or secondary Soviet arms control goal. For background on the various missions of SLCMs, see Cdr. S. J. Froggett, USN, “Tomahawk’s Role,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 1987, pp. 51–54.
34. It is not surprising that Soviet public diplomacy in Europe since the fall of 1987 has been trying to convey the impression that nuclear SLCMs are somehow inconsistent with the INF Treaty, and that assigning such SLCMs to Saceur would be unacceptable and an illegitimate circumvention of the purpose of the INF Treaty—which was intended, it seems, from the Soviet perspective, to help to make the Soviet Union a sanctuary, at least in terms of U. S. retaliatory forces based in and around Eurasia, particularly in Western Europe. Soviet efforts to establish a non-circumvention regime that would bar the United States from transferring SLCMs or SLCM technology to allies are predictable. For background on the Navy’s possible contributions (including SLCMs) to security in Europe, see James L. George, “INNF,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1987, and idem, “The Triad After INF and START,” Proceedings, May 1988, pp. 112–122.
35. Testimony by George Younger on 18 May 1988, in House of Commons, Defense Committee, Seventh Report, Statement on the Defense Estimates 1988 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1988), p. 3 of Minutes of Evidence.
36. Flora Lewis, “Arms Cuts Need Thought,” The New York Times, 27 March 1988, p. 29.
37. Drell and Johnson, op. cit. in n. 24, pp. 19–23.
38. According to the Stanford working group, the U. S. Navy “plans to have over 3300 long-range land-attack SLCMs by the end of FY93, approximately 750 nuclear and 2600 conventional.” Potential Verification Provisions, p. 2.
39. For these points, I am indebted to James L. George.
40. Sigal, op. cit. in n. 25.
41. Defense Policy Panel, op. cit. in n. 22, p. 3.
42. Ibid., p. 5.
43. Sigal, op. cit. in n. 25.
44. Drell and Johnson, op. cit. in n. 24, pp. 21, 34.
45. Andrew Mack, “U. S. Should Change Course on SLCM Limits,” International Herald Tribune, 17 May 1988.
46. Statement of RAdm. William O. Studeman, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, before the Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on Intelligence Issues, 1 March 1988, p. 33.
47. Gottemoeller, op. cit. in n. 17, p. 79.
48. Studeman, op. cit. in n. 48, pp. 7–8, 22–24.
49. Potential Verification Provisions, pp. 3, 13.
50. For an informative discussion of the challenges involved in building warning systems for defense against Soviet SLCMs, see Theodore A. Postol, “Banning Nuclear SLCMs: It Would Be Nice If We Could,” International Security, Winter 1988/89, pp. 193–202.
51. Alton Frye, A Responsible Congress: The Politics of National Security (NY: McGraw-Hill, 1975), pp. 64–66, 81; see also Gerard Smith, Doubletalk: The Story of the First Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (NY: Doubleday, 1980), pp. 173, 175.