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By their own admission, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the Coast Guard, to mention two of more than 35 agencies involved, are not restricting the flow of illegal drugs into this country to any great extent. According to our policymakers, who have been energized by political frustration and perhaps an opportunity to grandstand, an organization with lots of people, money, and sophisticated gadgets is obviously needed to win this recently declared pseudo-war. Department of Defense—here we go again!
And why not? The military receives the largest slice of the federal budget pie. Although not specifically trained or equipped for this drug war, DoD has two million talented people as well as equipment and data-collection capabilities that exceed even that of the cleverest and richest drug smugglers. But the capability of DoD to do the job is not the real issue here. The issue is: Should it be involved in this war?
There are, of course, significant obstacles that must be overcome before the DoD can become a productive force in the drug-interdiction effort. Opponents of the military’s involvement convincingly present many of them as insurmountable. But from the viewpoint of a pragmatic naval officer (who never envisioned being a policeman), each obstacle can be solved, but only with difficulty and with an unusual degree of civilian sacrifice and political cooperation.
If the interdiction effort is to be successful, there will be an unavoidable invasion of civil liberties. At the very least the populace will be inconvenienced; more likely it will be spied upon. As has already happened in many drug-ridden cities, this battle will be fought on our own turf. Neighbors may be the enemy and innocent civilians will die. Property may be destroyed. There will be a disruption of trade and tourism. This drug war will require civilian sacrifice that this country has not encountered since the Civil War.
The 53 House committees and subcommittees and the 21 Senate panels concerned with the interdiction of illegal drugs will join with the executive branch to produce the drug-interdiction strategy. This master strategy will contain clear and attainable goals, well- defined rules of engagement, some form of measurement to tell when we are winning and when we have won. Although the likelihood of such a united, nonpartisan political product
occurring is highly improbable, it Is impossible. If we intend to win this war, however, it is mandatory.
Congress will also have to revise t Posse Comitatus Act of 1878. This 1**^ was created—appropriately—to Pre'/C-([ the military from becoming involved 11 civil actions. Revising this act to Pr°‘ vide the military with powers of arre- will be a tacit admission of failure ot the civil law enforcement system.
Military drug interdiction is a cleat example of using the wrong tool for the job. Illegal drug use is a social
76
Proceedings / October
the em l^at reclu’res the attention of ltsClv'l law enforcement organization. . '^ability to stem the flow of drugs
15 not i -
lulitai
'ional
a logical reason to involve the ,ry. Drug abuse does affect na-
Alr>« Secur'ty> as do the problems of ,j0 Poverty, and illiteracy, but that With ^ justify saddling the military $e u-"16 tas^ °f providing the solution. Cjai ln8 a military solution for this so- Cj . Pr°blem improperly relieves our 1 and social structures of their rees. The role of the military Protect the United States from for- enemies and domestic insurrection.
Is to e'gn
Mi
hi °reover, drug interdiction is proba- Drni , wrong solution to the problem.
U0^ abuse is a debilitating manifesta- intesoc'a* regression and family dis
sipation.
h|e ® Interdiction effort is an incredi-
ntiir allenge; t*iere are more ^an * ^ Car kk scluare rniles to patrol in the °ean and Gulf of Mexico alone, aiilr t*lousan(l ships and more than 13 ;,b()10,1 tons of goods (that we know 10Utl enter this country each year. As hts aS a ^emancl f°r illegal drugs ex- rriis' interdiction is a no-win situation, a b^'on without an end, and one that at S|a ,'V,H stabilize as an expensive (jru °ff between the military and the 8 Peddlers. As the drug money has
Nevertheless, each of the above obstacles is surmountable. Despite the misallocation of irreplaceable assets, the military could stop the flow of illegal drugs. While some mistakenly believe that there are two million military men and women shining brass, looking good, pushing paper while waiting for something to defend, the well-informed and responsible policymakers realize that the military operates with fixed resources, and that adding the mission of drug interdiction would force the military to omit some other mission or, as more commonly occurs, neglect it. The military’s plate is full. The only way to take on a new mission is to scrape an old mission off the plate or to take reduced portions. A dilution of missions is certainly not the answer. Then the military might perform all of its missions poorly, seesawing between each one in a schizophrenic dither.
The Coast Guard is a prime example of a service that has been overtasked and lacks the resources to perform all of its missions. The Exxon Valdez disaster caught the Coast Guard concentrating on drug interdiction rather than environmental protection.
Policymakers, who have historically been unable to reduce the number of military taskings, should therefore care-
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lUiljpted foreign governments, so the c0rruary will be the victim of bribery, The ^tl0n’ and terrorist-type violence. tremC.0st Per drug bust has been ex- Per equating to $2 million
haVeavT se>zure. The other services Palt Pr°duced similarly expensive yet 10J suits. This war promises to be aiore and expensive. Further-
f0r ’ the drug interdiction mission— C;*ry'h|lnt °* some other organization bec °f assuming it—will prove to lev Stlcky, permanent role. Once in, er out.
fully rethink the problem and define succinctly what they hope to gain before forcing the military into the drug- interdiction mission. This is a situation where the military does not belong, because it would force the services to neglect their primary mission of defending this country. The Department of Defense should not be assigned the drug interdiction mission.
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ShiTPT|
&
Commander Kenny is currently a fellow at the Brookings Institution. He has served as executive officer of the USS Antietam (CG-54).
1675-H Crystal I 10376 Main St. Square Arcade ■ Fairfax. VA 22030 Arlington, VA 22202 j : (703) 691-1670 (703) 521-NAVY ;
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eed'ngs / October 1989
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