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The old LVTP-7 “amtracs” have evolved into these assault amphibians (AAVP-7s), but old-style attrition warfare thinking persists in drawing an artificial line between shoreward movement and operations ashore. The LCAC (inset) and other advances have opened new vistas on the amphibious campaign, and the Navy’s responsibility no longer ends at the water’s edge. But then, it never did.
to be employed within an attrition mindset. This di little from the Navy’s approach to World War II amp1 ous operations: seeing a dividing line between the called ship-to-shore movement and operations ashore- reason this mindset has changed so little is that the tec cal and procedural aspects of getting from ship to sh°re^-s so significant that the Navy has focused primarily °n£on. aspect of the amphibious operation. Consequently-ll , tinues to see the landing as an end in itself rather tnan J one of the many means to an end—getting ashore so landing force can accomplish the mission stated in initiating directive.
Attrition Warfare
The Navy’s mindset is a carry over from the verX, r|d cessful amphibious campaigns in the Pacific during v War II. At the tactical level, these campaigns were acc plished through an attrition style of war.
“Warfare by attrition seeks victory through the clirI^y lative destruction of the enemy’s material asse s ^
Results
generally proportionate to efforts; greater expend*^, net greater results—that is greater attrition. The g
Attrition warfare is an attractive style for conduc OTH operations because it favors the side with the technological advances and it can be a simple and e tive way to control a very complex operation. W>
As the Navy begins the era of over-the-horizon (OTH) amphibious landings, it should recognize that the Marine Corps has officially changed from an attrition style of warfare based on firepower to a maneuver style based on movement. The impact of this change could forever alter the way amphibious landings will be planned and executed. However, since amphibious warfare by attrition places less of a premium on the operational level than maneuver warfare, the Navy has been content to focus upon the tactical movement techniques of the ship to shore phase. For maneuver warfare to be successfully applied to amphibious operations, the Navy must stop thinking of the sea and ground operations solely in tactical terms, and visualize the amphibious operation in its entirety, at the operational level of war.
The apparent success of the OTH program indicates that the Navy has accomplished its goal of ensuring that the ship-to-shore movement can be accomplished in the face of high-tech weapons. The problem with feeling satisfied with this success is that new technological assets are going
SUC'
superior firepower and technology.
est necessity for success is numerical superiority- tory does not depend so much on military compete . as on sheer superiority of numbers in men and eq ment.
Phasis on technology and the efficient application of SSed, accurate fire, movement tends to be ponderous an ternP° relatively unimportant.2 If practiced enough, attrition approach is a methodical, almost scientific tiyProach to war. Consequently, there has been little initia- ye to change a doctrine that rewards technological ad- et)yCes and offers a simple approach to commanding in an
cert!
Th,
c°mi atecf
'fonment that tends to be “inherently disorderly, un- ain, dynamic, and dominated by friction.’’3 e commander, amphibious task force (CATF), and
^ The CLF can then tactically search out the and wear him down until he is destroyed or surren-
Zander, landing force (CLF), have successfully oper- e . at the tactical level in attrition warfare because we rj J0yed numerical superiority and an overwhelming supe- j [>ty in firepower that we could concentrate against an frated enemy. The CATF’s tactical approach has come S(0111 a logistical standpoint and from a fire-on-target Cai Point, but has been stagnant regarding any new tacti- f aPproaches to amphibious operations. In attrition war- be- the CATF’s primary focus has been to ensure victory |q Providing enough ships to load a greater number of theflries anc^ reateriel than the enemy can muster within I amphibious operating area (AOA). At the tactical j| e‘> this has required that the CATF concentrate primar- ^ on ensuring that the ship-to-shore movement is con- „ cted so that a superior number of forces and material an land. e«en rs.
Pr°lrlern w>*h this attrition approach is that even teen World War II vintage threats it is very costly in casualties. “Success through attrition demands c 'villingness and ability also to withstand attrition be- Se warfare by attrition is costly.”4 The traditional way
of conducting an amphibious landing has been to achieve a relatively short distance of 1,500-2,000 yards for the ship-to-shore movement. The development of modem weapon technology and its potential to create even greater casualty rates have raised serious questions concerning the rationale of launching a frontal assault landing against the projected defensive threat. In addition, if the Marine Corps were to use an attrition style again it probably would not have the numbers to accomplish the mission— especially if the enemy is not stranded on an island and is able to reinforce or even withdraw temporarily. The Navy and Marine Corps have both recognized that the traditional frontal assault is not a viable tactic for conducting an amphibious landing. Flowever, they have used radically different approaches in responding to the questions raised by the traditional amphibious landing.
The Navy has responded to the growing challenge of the enemy’s increased weapon range and lethality against an amphibious task force by concentrating on technological advances within an attrition style of warfare. It has spearheaded an enormous technological investment of $50 billion from the Navy and Marine Corps to develop the capability of OTH assaults. Experts at Quantico working on the Marine air ground task force (MAGTF) master plan for the year 2000 project that attaining a full OTH amphibious assault capability—the ability to land a MAGTF on a hostile shore from 25 nautical miles or more at night and in adverse weather—will soon be a reality.5 It is important to note that the Navy has not seriously considered employing its OTH assets by any doctrine other than the traditional method. The solution requires more than the mere application of technology.6
The Marine Corps has recognized that technology is not the answer to the problems of an attrition war against modem weapons and foes having a numerical and material superiority. In response it has adopted a maneuver warfare doctrine that offers the best alternative to attrition concepts. Marine Commandant General A. M. Gray has said that “realizing that many of our potential enemies could bring superior numbers of men and good equipment to bear against us, it would be foolhardy to think about engaging them in firepower attrition duels. Historically, maneuver warfare has been the means by which smaller but more intelligently led forces have achieved victory.’’7
Maneuver Warfare
The Marine Corps has adopted maneuver as a path to success against a numerically superior enemy, because the Corps can no longer presume a numerical advantage.8 Maneuver warfare attempts to circumvent a problem and attack from a position of advantage.
“Maneuver relies on speed and surprise, for without either, we cannot concentrate strength against enemy weakness. . . . Tempo is itself a weapon. While attrition operates principally in the physical realm of war, the results of maneuver are both physical and moral. The object of maneuver is not so much to destroy physically as it is to shatter the enemy’s cohesion, organization, command, and psychological balance. Successful maneuver depends on the ability to identify and exploit enemy weakness, not simply on the expenditure of superior might.”9
The salient difference between maneuver warfare and attrition warfare is that the aim of “maneuver warfare is to render the enemy incapable of resisting by shattering his moral and physical cohesion—his ability to fight as an effective, coordinated whole—rather than to destroy him physically through incremental attrition, which is generally more costly and time-consuming.”10 Maneuver warfare presents the opportunity for the amphibious task force to win quickly, with minimal casualties against a physically superior foe.
The major challenge to the Navy’s entrenched tactical approach to conducting an OTH amphibious assault is not the new concept of beginning the ship-to-shore movement from over the horizon, but rather the Marine Corps’s shift from attrition warfare to maneuver warfare. Unlike the Navy, the Marine Corps has recognized that technology alone is insufficient to solve the problems associated with the capabilities and lethalities of new weapons on the modem battlefield. Consequently, the Marines have gone to maneuver warfare.
Commander Amphibious Task Force Responsibility
The Navy might find ridiculous a challenge to integrate a new land combat doctrine with its current style of warfare. Why should the Navy get excited if the Marine Corps employs a maneuver or attrition style in securing its amphibious task force and landing force objectives? How could one style of combat within the confines of a force beachhead be that different from another?
Actually, the Navy should be very concerned about 0 the Marine Corps intends to fight because the Navy ^ CATF is held responsible for the entire operation. ^ joint doctrine for amphibious operations clearly de * the CATF’s role: Upon commencing operations, he a sumes responsibility for the entire force and the opera i The CATF also exercises authority over the operations the landing force units. Even though the CATF wl^5vjf fer control over various functions to the CLF, the U remains responsible for accomplishing the landing to mission. ^
Joint doctrine dictates that the CATF must employ most effective style of warfare to accomplish his miss As with any new change that might affect amphibious erations, the Navy will examine the Marine Corps s s y of maneuver warfare and its implications for OTH op tions. The challenge will be for the Navy to see mane.Uve| warfare as a style that requires more than the current 1 of attention. ,t,e
This will be a difficult challenge for CATF. Because^ attrition style of warfare was successful during Worl II, the CATF has accepted that most of his duties are co pleted when he delivers the assault troops to the ^ water mark. Then a tactical break occurs and it |S^(S CLF’s responsibility to take tactical control of these y
and accomplish the landing force objectives. The j
has accepted this separation of amphibious operations ^ has concentrated primarily on the ship-to-shore m ment.
The Navy has traditionally considered the ship-t0's. fe movement to be an end unto itself. The CATF ther ^ believes that if the Navy can develop a tactical sche ^ resolve the technical constraints of landing a force tro , miles offshore, it would be making an even greater ta ^ contribution if it could land a force from 50 mileS ^ shore. In the context of maneuver warfare, whether Marines come from 12 or 50 miles is not as import how they come ashore and what they do after foef ashore. The Navy must learn that the scheme of mane ashore always drives the ship-to-shore movement-
The Operational Level of War
Because maneuver warfare places a higher premium ^ the operational level of war, the CATF is challenged ^ operating simultaneously at the tactical and opera > levels of war.
“Maneuver warfare relates directly to amphibious ^ fare at both the tactical and the operational level- tactical level, it offers the landing point amp*1* assault as an alternative to current doctrine. At tn erational level, maneuver warfare opens a vista 0I^ant amphibious campaign, which may be more irnP0aS„ under modern conditions than the amphibious sault.”11
Edward Luttwak explains that lack of awareness o operational level lies within the U. S. military tra,,*eeks which has not emphasized that level, whereby one
U. S. NAVY (C. KING)
attain the goals set by theater strategy through suitable paginations of tactics.”12 The difficulty the Navy en- °unters is that “the absence of the term referring to the National level reflects an inadvertence towards the °le conception of war associated with it . . . . It is not erely that officers do not speak the word but rather that ^ do not think or practice war in operational terms, or So only in vague or ephemeral ways.”13 C he tactical approach to commanding a maneuver war- lQre °TH landing is no longer effective because there is no n§er a distinction at the operational level between land d sea movement. The ship-to-shore and land move- (^ents are now blended. Luttwak was one of the first mili- ry thinkers to make the connection between maneuver U11 operational art. He comments that the tactics and sa- Cnt principles of war are all interrelated when one is com- anding a maneuver style of warfare. “It is because of [,ls interrelationship that the decisive level of warfare in fp relational-maneuver manner is the operational,” that ati'ng the lowest level at which the “key principles of war
sch,
tactics can be brought together within an integrated
leme of warfare.’
>14
^hile the Marine Corps has come to accept that maneu- warfare is also applicable at the tactical level, the im-
ver Port;
Hjaneuver warfare one must acknowledge the importance nj t*le operational level. The CATF and CLF must recog- Cie [hat the operational level is where one can effectively ofntrol a maneuver amphibious assault. The Navy’s lack ^ lecognition of this problem is exemplified by its contin- (Q emphasis on nonintegrated training, which concen- es primarily on tactics applicable to the Navy’s own a, a °f concern. The basic tactics of maneuver warfare, jj. aough vitally important, will be only of marginal value c1101 applied with a thorough understanding of the con- ePJ of the operational art.15
Ie he CATF and CLF must transcend to the operational pi^l to visualize and integrate the efforts of all the tactical
ases to achieve victory. Unlike attrition warfare at the °Per •
ance of Luttwak’s contribution is that when using
tact;
rational level which consists only of stringing together lcal victories, maneuver warfare at the operational
This Marine rifle platoon leader must deal with tactical concerns, such as flank security and fire support. But his landing force and amphibious task force commanders should be working at the operational level, selectively applying strength against identified enemy weakness.
level is based on the selective application of strength versus weakness, which puts emphasis on when, where, and how to accept or refuse battle.
Concentrating on the whole amphibious action, a CATF and CLF skilled in the operational art will be concerned with tactical events only if they affect their ability to achieve their objectives.16 What may appear to be uncoordinated movements of dispersed units at the tactical level will make complete sense at the operational level if the units are following the CATF and CLF’s intent.
An OTH amphibious landing is an operational scheme designed to exploit the potential speed of the air cushion landing craft (LCAC), MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft, and assault helicopters against front-wide linear defenses.17 While tactical maneuver will be accomplished during each phase of the operation, the OTH landing will be won or lost at the operational level of maneuver.
To successfully execute at the operational level, the CATF and CLF must have a clear understanding of their strategic objectives at all times and ensure that their intended tactical results attain the military objectives they have received or selected. Working at the operational level will allow them to coordinate each tactical phase from an operational viewpoint. This concept is significant to maneuver warfare because from a tactical view the thin columns rapidly penetrating the enemy’s linear front by LCAC or a unit that has penetrated deep by air behind enemy lines by MV-22 would appear vulnerable to attacks on their flanks. But from an operational view, the CATF and CLF would see that these mobile columns were very strong “because their whole orientation and their method of warfare gave them a great advantage in tempo and reaction time.”18
The process of conducting amphibious warfare at the operational level begins well before the landing force achieves its initial breakthrough. The CATF and CLF must begin visualizing the operation from the receipt of the initiating directive. During the planning cycle, the CATF and CLF are responsible for numerous decisions. One of the most important is the formulation of the concept of operations ashore by the CLF, with the concurrence of CATF, before promulgating the concept. If the CATF is unaware of the concepts of maneuver warfare, he probably will not be able to conduct landings at the operational level of war.
The art of logistics at the operational level is an area in which the CATF and CLF are seriously deficient. These commanders have enormous experience at the tactical level of logistics, which involves “concentrating on fueling, arming, and maintaining troops and machines.”19 Although important at the tactical level, at the operational level logistics govern what can and, perhaps even more importantly, what cannot be accomplished.20
The CATF and CLF must base their concept of opera-
tions on the logistic support immediately available upon arrival in the AO A, and be prepared to have adequate support arrive in time to meet intermediate and follow-on goals. While the amphibious landing plan could be just a phase of a larger campaign plan, the CATF must ensure he can attain follow-on strategic objectives. In attrition-style warfare, individual phases of the landing can only be executed when the necessary logistical means become available. However, with a maneuver warfare style, the phases between objectives become less distinct as the entire operation becomes more fluid. Consequently, the CATF must be prepared to support and exploit the relative speed and success of maneuver warfare.
As the Navy begins to focus on OTH amphibious landings, it should try to enlarge its view of amphibious warfare to include not only the sea operations but subsequent ground operations as well. Bright tacticians can solve the anticipated problems they will encounter, but at the CATF/CLF level, limiting their vision of the battlefield to the tactics they plan to execute is grossly inadequate. The next step for the Navy/Marine Corps amphibious team is to translate the concepts of ship-to-shore tactics and maneuver warfare ground tactics into a flexible amphibious warfare capability. We must strive to work at the operational level of war, which adds up to much more than the sum of its tactical parts. The Navy’s responsibility should be to ensure that OTH amphibious assaults are viewed as a fluid mobile war in its entirety, not an operation that shifts
to position warfare or slow ponderous maneuvers, 0 the landing force gets ashore.
'“Warfighting,” FMFM I U. S. Marine Corps, March 1989, pp- 28-29.
2Ibid, p. 28/
3Ibid, p. 64.
4Ibid, p. 28.
5As of 20 March 1989, Published copy not released. Collet1
6Capt. Richard Moore, USMC, “Blitzkrieg from the Sea,” Naval War ( Review, November-Dccember 1983, p. 38. i Staff
7Gen. A. M. Gray, “Maneuver Warfare,” Advance sheet for Command an College, November 1988, p. AS-C-9.
*FMFM /, p. 58.
9Ibid, p. 29.
,0lbid’p-37- „ • Corps GO'
"William S. Lind, “Misconceptions of Maneuver Warfare,” Marine c y
zetle, January 1988, p. 16. f//v.
l2Edward N. Luttwak, “The Operational Level of War,” International
Winter 1980-81, p. 61.
l3Ibid, p. 61.
l4Ibid, p. 73.
l5Moore, p. 40.
l6Ibid, p. 40. . i Sect*'
l7See Edward N. Luttwak, “The Operational Level of War,” ^nternati0^ ^ of rity. Winter 1980-81, pp. 61-79. Here Luttwak explains the operationa ^jous the Blitzkrieg. His analysis applies directly to the operational level of amp maneuver warfare.
18Luttwak, p. 68. MafC^
19LtCol. Clayton R. Newell, U. S. Army, “Logistical Art,” Parameters’
1989, p. 33.
20Ibid, p. 21.
. . glee-
Commander Pierce is currently Tactical Action Officer at the J01 . e£j tronic Warfare Center, San Antonio, Texas. He was previously a -ng to the U. S. Marine Corps Command Staff College before comp Naval Post Graduate School at Monterey, California.
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