World Naval Developments

This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected.  Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies.  Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue.  The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.

Th^°^Ur            developments stand out.

. first involved the events in the Per­' ^an Gulf, particularly in April and in in which U. S. forces demonstrated

^that their

did

ond

new advanced weapon systems

indeed, work as advertised. A sec- ^was the roll-out of the B-2 “stealth”

^rnber (and the revelation of the F-l 17A _b^s'ealth” fighter). A third was Mr. Gor- nev’s extraordinary 7 December ^^eeeh at the United Nations. A fourth ^s the introduction, in West Germany 'n Sweden, of the first modern cycle submarine propulsion power

and

^c|osed-_c Plants.

These events occurred in the context of _an^^reas'ⁿg East-West military tension, . also of a decline in the level of re-

^°^Urces available for Western militaries, ine in tension does not make a

^Tlle decl

^rriaj_0r

such

war inconceivable. It does make an i ^{3 War muc}h le^ss likely, in the near- in_c ^rrie^'^Um-term. Most importantly, it is ^reasingly accepted that, should a p ^ ^war break out in Europe, it would ^at)ly not escalate to a nuclear ex- ^hange.

1, ^U

seems that the Soviets have calcu- ihat a tactical nuclear exchange by broadly equivalent forces would

portions of NATO’s territory. Indeed, when presented with an explicit statement of NATO strategy, most West Germans reject it out of hand. They find any for­mulation of the future that includes any type of war fought on their territory unac­ceptable.

Europeans, increasingly disturbed by what is seen as a series of U. S. warfight­ing initiatives (including the Maritime Strategy itself) have revived the Western European Union (WEU) as an indepen­dent force within NATO. The WEU cur­rently is little more than a forum for pol­icy debate, but clearly it has the potential to serve as a focus for a European defense community which, after 1992, might par­allel the European Community (the Com­mon Market) itself. The expectation is that after 1992 all customs barriers within the Common Market will be eliminated, creating a “Europe without frontiers.”

There is widespread belief that after 1992 the European Community will erect considerable economic barriers to keep out both U. S. and Japanese goods. The effect of those barriers would, presuma­bly, reduce the U. S. inclination to con-

By Norman Friedman

munity have some forum for cooperation outside of the larger NATO alliance.

It is not clear that European economic integration would automatically translate into political or defense integration. NATO Europe and the European Com­munity do not quite match up. Iceland, Norway, and Turkey are not members of the Community (although Turkey will probably join soon); all three are impor­tant within NATO. Similarly, Ireland, a neutral, is a member of the European Community but is not willing to join NATO, since that would amount to an alliance with Britain. As this is written, there is a particularly intriguing possibil­ity that Hungary, which has strong trade links with the West, will seek to become a member of the European Community (presumably while remaining a member of its Communist counterpart, COCOM). East Germany already has a somewhat ambiguous position, since the West Ger­man government does not count trade with it as foreign trade.

The WEU’s revival began in 1984-85 as a reaction to changes in the U. S. de­fense posture, primarily the Strategic

ated ^eve_n

^ . ⁰ great impact on the outcome of a Vent "¹ ^^uroP^e- The side losing the con- ti_nu ^10nal battle would necessarily con- hav_e i-° *^ose- The winner, then, would _0t)s ''ttle incentive to use nuclear weap- _th,_m^^CePt to deter the loser from using s_em- .^A,l °f this has, of course, the es- ⁿate *7 ^caveat that anyone who can elimi- t₀„ ^ne other side’s nuclear weapons al- ing ^{Cr can} get much mileage out of us- ^ ^0r even threatening to use, his own. ily _o^Urrcnt NATO doctrine depends heav- deter*¹ threat of nuclear escalation to ^Venti ^^ov'^ets from attempting a con- U_Sll ,°^aal attack on Western Europe. The te^p. ^foril1u,ation is that NATO will at- a d_ep,^{a con}ventional defense, but if such \v_ea ^Cnse fails, it will fire a few nuclear fio_Us°^{as t0} show the Soviets that it is se- cl_ear' ' this fails, then large-scale nu- the _n ^{USe w}'*f be inescapable. Of course, the Jj^{Xt ste}P'^s that NATO must threaten c|_ear ^tlniate escalation, to strategic nu- ^callin^Warfare' The Soviets arc. in effect.

^feadyk ,^'^s bluff. The Soviets must al- ’e_stc ^SUsPoct that few governments in - ⁿ Europe will readily lay down

ato.

'Pic f_ire

on Soviet forces occupying

tribute to Western European defense. By 1992, if not earlier, the United States will quite possibly be under intense economic pressure to reduce the costs of its over­seas garrisons. Even the prospect of such a development requires that the major defense members of the European Com-

Andrey Kokoshin, deputy director of Moscow’s semiofficial Institute of the USA and Canada, told the House in March that troop reductions are a part of a “comprehensive transfor­mation of [Soviet] military doctrine and military strategy.”

ex­

1989 it was reported that China was

are

charges of West German assistance

Thus the context of the future may

Tlii^rci

lOSC^

Defense Initiative and the U. S. willing­ness to reduce reliance on nuclear weap­ons, both of which could be interpreted to mean that the United States was willing to fight a protracted non-nuclear war.

The European minecraft and frigates in the Persian Gulf were sent, not as a NATO force, but rather under the aus­pices of the WEU. Since June 1988 three British, one Belgian, and one Dutch mine countermeasures ships have been operat­ing in the Gulf as a single joint force, under British command and supported by British frigates and destroyers and logis­tics ships.

In the new NATO, the Europeans would take up almost complete responsi­bility for ground forces, and the United States would contribute a combination of standing naval and air forces and a mobi­lization base for additional ground forces.

Stealth might prove to be so strategi­cally useful that Lockheed’s F-117A fighter will justify the expenditures involved in developing this new technology.

In the past, proposals of this type have been rejected because without substantial American forces on the ground in Europe there was no obvious tripwire to link a Soviet advance on the ground to the threat of nuclear counterattack. It might be argued in the future that, with two nuclear powers (Britain and France) in Europe, this U. S. tripwire is less impor­tant. The logic of division of labor might well lead to further reductions in the NATO navies, since more money would be required for ground forces to match those of the Soviet Union, at least until U. S. reinforcements could arrive.

The Soviets are offering troop reduc­tions in Eastern Europe. Thus far, NATO has argued that these reductions will only reduce the enormous disparity of forces currently in place, and therefore it cannot offer more than a 5% reduction of its own. It seems at least conceivable that a U. S. government hard-pressed to reduce defense spending will choose to cut per­sonnel, which may mean active army units. One way to justify such a reduction would be to emphasize the U. S. contri­bution to overall NATO naval force lev­els. Naval forces in particular are not tied directly to NATO; they are, for example, essential for operations in the Third World.

As 1988 ended, the U. S. Department of Defense was conducting a major stra­tegic review, and clearly such ideas were under discussion. The review is driven partly by the need to absorb drastic re­ductions in overall defense spending. The shape of any such cuts is determined in part by contracts drawn during the Rea­gan administration. For example, the two carriers (CVN-74 and -75) now on order will be expensive to complete, but they would also be extremely costly to cancel. They are not unique. Much of the Reagan build-up is on order, or under construc­tion. At least in the past, the most practi­cal way to make immediate cuts was to reduce personnel or operating tempo. Hence the announcement of the current proposals to eliminate two carrier battle groups.

The central question is going to be whether the cuts will be more or less even, across the services, or whether they will be based on a new U. S. national strategy, for example one emphasizing sea power or strategic air (or missile) power. The opening shots in this battle have already been fired, in the form of increasingly emphatic claims for a new generation of extremely accurate long- range conventional cruise missiles. Pro­ponents of such weapons have argued that these missiles can even replace nu­clear weapons in some aspects of U. S. war planning, and thus restore some nu­clear-like options in a new world in which nuclear warfare itself is virtually impossible.

As immediate security issues seem to recede, Western governments will inevi­tably emphasize trade, particularly trade with countries formerly more or less embargoed on security grounds. Trade with the Soviets and their allies is one example; some of the West Europeans, particularly the West Germans, chafe in­creasingly at restrictions on high-technol­ogy exports. They are impelled in part by the unhappy knowledge that, despite eco­nomic growth (and a favorable balance of trade), they have been unable to cut un­employment to anything like the level enjoyed by the United States. This unem­ployment, in the midst of apparent pros­perity, has made for severe political problems in West Germany and France. The case of West Germany is further complicated by U. S. pressure to cut ex­ports of military technology to the Third World. The United States has charged that West Germany provided the crucial equipment for a Libyan chemical weap­ons plant, and for various Third World nuclear plants.

Since the ceasefire in the Persian Gun all the major Western European countries have scrambled to open relations with Iran, in hopes of supplying the material to reconstruct the country. All have shrunk from cutting economic relations, even in the face of Ayatollah Khomeini’s demand for the murder of Salman Rushdie, the British author of The Satanic Verses.

It seems likely that, given a reduce emphasis on denying advanced technol­ogy to the Soviets (due to reduced East- West tension), there will be increasingly furious competition between the Western Europeans and the United States for ^a somewhat shrunken arms market in the Third World. Both sides will encounter some aggressive competitors, perhaps most notably the Soviet Union (more than ever in need of hard currency) and China- In particular, China seems willing to se a wide range of modern weapons, inclu ing long-range ballistic missiles. Early ^,n

porting such missiles to Middle Easted¹ states, including Libya, via North Korea- Such exports do not, of course, ind^u nuclear weapons. However, if ^tn

accurate, the Libyans (and others) ha^v access to an alternative type of mas⁵ destruction warhead in the form of che¹¹¹ ical weapons.    _

During 1988 the United States did ^sU^ ceed in convincing the Western produc • of ballistic missiles to limit sales. agreement, however, did not apply such increasingly sophisticated arms P^r° ducers as China, India, and Brazil- .

/wel'

include a much better armed World, freed of the constraints imp¹ in the past by the two conflicting sup¹- powers.

The details of the events in the Gulf _£ summarized elsewhere in this issue. E events in Libya in 1986, operations ^a swered the single greatest question ot Reagan Administration arms builu j. which was whether all that moderniz^atj^₍ had been worthwhile. It now appears , electronic systems have finally ^reaC the level of reliability associated, 'ⁿ. past, with guns and other relatively ^sl ^ pie weapons. When the button is P^ressC^_c the radar turns on reliably. The m'^sS^ leaves its launcher and can generally^ expected to find its target. This is new; it is part of the same revoluti°ⁿ^.

k

^sh

30

*i

sic

on

in

solid-state electronics which has

-----------  -----------  '

duced modem, extraordinarily reha desk-top computers.

ha

fir.

lit

ap|

nance

such

eillance in cold war or in low-inten-

Slty

The Reagan buildup filled out U. S. ^0rces with this much more reliable gen- ^tra,i^Qn of weapons. That may have im- Portrint implications. It may be possible ^0r the military to survive on a much- t^duced diet of spare parts, particularly ®^etronic spares, and it may also be pos­^e t° make do with many fewer techni- ^l|^lans than are currently included in stan- ^ard ships’ companies and army and air 'ts. That may mean that we have over­climated future life-cycle costs (or, more j °P^erly, that we will find ourselves pay­S much more heavily than expected for ® remaining examples of earlier tech­° °gy). In the U. S. Navy, for example, facing the F-4 and A-7 with the F/A- ^aPparently drastically reduces mainte­

man-hour requirements. Radars as the SPY-1 can operate continu- sh'^S, ^^w’thout repairs or shutdowns) for a _tj *P ^s entire deployment. The implica- felt*^{S t}*^lese advances have not yet been

h_e^^{e case} °f the Vincennes (CG-49) and _t: ¹" ^egis system suggests a new ques- re|\ ^final|y having achieved the kind of thr^{ab e} Performance sought for the last _(er^^{e or} four decades, are these the sys- taep ^^est adapted to the scenarios and l_a -^lcs °f the future? That may be particu- flj ^ Problematical if the most likely con- _Wh^ct °f the future is not World War III (for ty . H. S. weapons and systems are j_n( ^lcal|y designed), but rather some low- Q_u®^asity struggle, such as that in the

ratf⁶®'^{S Was} designed to deal with satu- attacks by bombers and antiship

Prohl ^S—*'^e’’          ^most difficult

att_a ,^e.^m Posed by Soviet naval forces’ _So|v ^kln§ carrier battle groups. Aegis h₀^^es ^is problem brilliantly. In service, s_Ur,^CVer’ d has filled a different role,

b_est'y^ar^^are- Because Aegis is by far the ti_atu ' naval radar system, it is the si_0n ^a choice for the surveillance mis- W_eii’ ^and as such it performed extremely ia_Ur°^ Lebanon and during the Achille ^et1ga° ^a^^a'^r' Still, it was designed with i(l_lw.^e.^{ment an}d not so much with target th_e Q '^Cation in mind. The misfortune in N_0nv jj” i^ast July illustrates this problem, the | ^{hat We} can do surveillance reliably, ^s°rtie ^SUe      "'Lether Aegis needs

es_sj_n ^suPplementary information-proc- ^vapt f_Q°^r display capability, totally irrele- Us_{e ln}°₍^lhe saturation attack scenario, for \y_ar nture editions of the Persian Gulf

In g .

ha_Sb_e ^Wlcler sense, now that reliability how ,^ⁿ attained, one can reasonably ask ^shap_e(j^{C s}ystems of the future should be cx_art) ^to fn the appropriate tactics. For P ^e' Harpoon has demonstrated an enviable level of reliability. It clearly suf­fices to put any Third World naval target out of action, but equally clearly it will rarely sink a target. Any commander fir­ing Harpoons at ships well beyond his horizon cannot be sure whether they are hitting or, if they are hitting, whether they are disabling the targets. He can probably be sure that the targets are dead in the water, that they are making smoke, and even that their radars are out of ser­vice. However, he has relatively few weapons, and an intelligent target might deliberately stop, make smoke, and turn off his radars, waiting for the commander to exhaust his limited reserves. After all, as good as Harpoon is, someone’s point defenses might actually defeat it. How can a commander, well beyond the tar­get’s horizon, know?

That is a tactical issue, not the sort of reliability or performance issue which has been emphasized in the past. It is striking that current weapons, such as the Stan­dard Missile, have nominal performance levels not too different from those desired in the early 1960s. The difference is that, where their predecessors might have achieved those levels perhaps 10% of the time, current systems achieve their nomi­nal performance 90% of the time or more. That has been an enormous achievement, and we can build upon it.

For example, now that Harpoon so obviously functions as intended, the question is whether the next step should take the tactical question, target damage assessment, into account.

The roll-out of the B-2 in the fall of 1988 might seem less than a naval occa­sion, yet it was probably the opening round in a new interservice war. During the Reagan administration, a wide variety of new high-technology weapons were developed as “black” programs—i.e., outside the standard Department of De­fense (DoD) review process. One reason for this process was to decide whether a given system could be afforded within the DoD’s projected budget and, by exten­sion, whether it was worth buying in a strategic sense. “Black” programs evaded such questions. They were justi­fied as a way of nurturing vital new tech­nology without having it seized by the Soviets; there was an underlying argu­ment that some new technology is so obviously worthwhile that it need not pass any sort of strategic scrutiny. The Air Force seems to have been particularly enamored of black programming; report­edly it spent 39% of its research and de­velopment money that way late in the Reagan administration.

This is not really a new problem. After

World War II, several radical new tech­nologies (such as jet propulsion, guided missiles, and nuclear weapons) were pushed hard by all three U. S. services, to such an extent that one historian, Dr. David Rosenberg, wrote of a “techno­logical” rather than a putative enemy as the goal of development. His point was that no one really knew where the new technology would lead, only that a nation failing to follow that lead would find it­self in an unacceptable position. By way of contrast, when technology is well un­derstood, it can be channeled, and forces can be built up to deal with a particular prospective enemy in one or more chosen scenarios.

The explosion of post-1945 technology lasted through the 1950s, and it began to lead to mass-production systems (such as missile systems) after 1955. Because the technology was very new, very large cost overruns were inevitable, and by the late 1950s, each service was experiencing severe problems. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara entered office seek­ing some resolution; fortunately for him, much of the revolutionary momentum in weapons development had been ex­hausted. Thus he was able to demand that projects be justified in terms of their well-defined military roles. He probably went much too far in terms of naval forces, which are inherently flexible, but some such rationalization was inevitable. It may even be argued that McNamara was only following the unhappy experi­ence of 1949-50, when a collision be­tween new technology and the cost of standing forces (an Air Force-Navy war) led to the cancellation of much of the Navy’s carrier force in favor of Air Force B-36 strategic bombers.

The problem of 1960 seems once more upon us. This time, one question is whether “stealth” is really an exotic new technology deserving special budgetary treatment. The idea is certainly not very new; past low-observable aircraft in­cluded the World War II British Mosquito and the low-flying A-6 Intruder. In each case, it was understood that the enemy could develop countermeasures, but some measure of low observability could be achieved at a relatively low, hence worthwhile, price. This time, low obser­vability has been cloaked in such secrecy that one cannot tell whether a wholly new technology, comparable in impact to, say, jet propulsion, is involved.

By the way of contrast to the technol­ogy represented by the B-2, current naval forces represent well-developed technol­ogy justified by central national strategic requirements. They lack the appeal of pure technology. Were the faltering Sovi-

of

with

some kind of guarantee that failure v/'h not carry, as in the past, severe Stat®

_; that wef

carry, as in the past, sanction. That would seem to require he deliberately limit government po

and

the sacrifices of World War 11 ^vvaS guarantee the buffer zone between

*1

the

the

use¹

experience of World War II has been¹ major unifying theme within

considerations

be

will

ets the sole likely antagonists of the United States, it might be argued that the breathing space Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev is providing should be de­voted to a rush towards the technology of the future (stealth, SD1, etc).

The B-2 and its primary mission, stra­tegic nuclear attack, seem less and less relevant (in terms of the overall context). It is particularly bizarre that so much money is now beginning to go into strate­gic nuclear delivery systems (particularly B-l modernization, the B-2 itself, the advanced cruise missile or missiles, and a mobile form of MX). It is possible that stealth is so important and so widely use­ful that aircraft such as the F-117 and the forthcoming Navy A-12 will justify the massive expenditures involved. If, how­ever, the future venue of U. S. military operations over the next decade or so is the Third World (as in the Gulf), then one may reasonably ask whether any wholly new U. S. strategic system is worth what it will cost. That will be the case if, as seems likely, drastic reductions in the overall defense budget threaten the carri­ers the United States uses to enforce its writ in the Third World.

The Air Force argument may well be that the new stealth technology, coupled with the new technology of very accurate missiles, permits the United States to strike at Third World enemies without deploying any forces there. Naval forces provide a kind of latent threat (presence) which may often be more valuable than direct military action. It remains to be seen just how this argument, reminiscent of the carrier versus B-36 war of 1949, will be resolved. In 1949, the winning argument was that the United States could not afford non-nuclear forces to balance the masses of the Soviet Army, and therefore that reliance on the bomb (and on the Air Force carrying it) was inescapable. The Navy argued that the bomb was a less potent threat than might have been imagined, and the outbreak of war in Korea in 1950 seems to have proven that it was correct. This time the key future problem seems to be the Third World, and one question is how little strategic nuclear investment we can af­ford, given the apparent decline in the Soviet threat.

That leads to the next notable event of 1988, Mr. Gorbachev’s speech. It was actually part of his ongoing effort to re­duce East-West tensions. Mr. Gorbachev announced that he no longer considered communism the sole legitimate form of national government, that other nations might, after all, have their own preferred paths to prosperity and development. He further announced a unilateral 10% cut in Soviet ground forces, to include with­drawals of some units from Warsaw Pact countries. The cuts are to be carried out over the next two years, and they are to include the withdrawal of the bridging equipment which many in NATO have seen as a prerequisite for a quick Soviet advance through West Germany.

Again, this has naval implications, since it is part of a general attempt to cut Soviet forces. In each case, Mr. Gor­bachev or his associates have sought Western quid pro quos for their cuts. However, the cuts seem to be required, not for external political reasons, but rather to reduce the crushing effect of Soviet defense spending; defense is the only pot of money Mr. Gorbachev can distribute among the many needy sectors of his economy. Thus the tendency has been for Mr. Gorbachev to make unilat­eral cuts even when no Western cut has been offered. Early in 1989 it was re­ported that the Soviets were offering to scrap 100 or 150 submarines in return for the elimination of seven U. S. aircraft carriers. Some Soviet spokesmen have suggested informally that the future of the larger Soviet warships, including even the new carriers, is a matter of debate within the leadership.

In this particular case, the offer is somewhat disingenuous, since the Sovi­ets probably cannot economically operate their older submarines in any case, and since the bulk of their naval threat is pre­sented by perhaps fewer than 100 modem craft, none of which would probably be touched by the offer. One might note that the Soviets are already scrapping some older ships in Spain (reportedly two de­stroyers and up to ten submarines), with­out seeking any quid pro quo.

Again, the context is important. For the Western Europeans, it often seems that Europe is the world, and therefore that the only possible threat is provided by the Soviets. Soviet naval arms limita­tion would, therefore, justify drastic cuts in the European navies. For Americans, the situation is different. Third World leaders like Colonel Moammar Gadhafi and the Ayatollah are quite as threatening as the Soviets, albeit in very different ways. Naval forces are required to deal with them, and might well be justified even were the Soviet Union an altogether friendly state. Indeed, to the extent that the Europeans tend not to support U. S. operations in the Third World (e.g., Libya and Iran) it might be argued that their base support would tend to melt away as the Soviet threat declined. The United States would therefore need more naval forces (but fewer ground and

ground-based air forces) to maintain 4^s current Third World presence.

The great question, of course, is M^r- Gorbachev’s future. He seems to have decided that economic reconstruction can come only if the creative energies ot the Soviet people are unleashed, and that this economic revolution can be consum­mated only if the people are free to unseat the current bureaucracy. The unspoken caveat is that the movement against the bureaucracy should not unseat the Com­munist Party as the ultimate source power within the Soviet Union. These ideas are not really far from those whic impelled Mao to begin his own Cultur® Revolution in China. Moreover, M^r' Gorbachev must reckon with the very substantial nationalistic forces within his own country, and also within the Warsa" Pact alliance it heads.

Mr. Gorbachev currently has the mu’ tary power to suppress all of the pop^u'^ar movements. If he really wants Soviet cit izens to take risks, however, (whicm after all, is what economic reconstruction requires), then he must provide them

in a way no previous Soviet (or, for th^a matter, Czarist) regime ever has.

Having done that, Mr. Gorbachm must somehow keep the national'-^ strains within his country from tearing apart. He has an even more diff'^cU problem in the satellites, where nation³ ism is so often equated with anti-SoVi ism, and where it also may make for ^se^ ous strains both within countries among them.

For the Soviets, the question wil* ^ whether to tolerate gross instability their Western border. Economically-^ may be wisest for Mr. Gorbachev to P back and leave the satellites to their f^at^ He must take into account, however, tent Soviet fears of a resurgent Germ^a^ (which would presumably reunite in j wake of a total Soviet withdrawal)- ^al^- also of the strong feeling that the poi^{nt 1}.

Soviet Union and Germany. Since as a

Soviet Union, these very real ones.

All of this may mean that it '^v,“' || very difficult for Mr. Gorbachev to P out of Eastern Europe, and therefore army cuts will not come up to his e*P ^ tations. In that case, naval cuts will be anything, more important to the S°v and the United States can expect ^vt •