The U. S. Navy in 1988

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At the beginning of 1988, the Navy sailed into waters made perilous by in­creasingly constrained budgets and newly evolving threats. When Secretary of De­fense Frank C. Carlucci III presented his amended fiscal year 1989 budget to Con­gress in February 1988, the revised Navy topline had fallen to $96.4 billion from the original request of $108.7 billion—a decline in real growth of 6.8%, the worst of the services’ figures.

It also was a time when a U. S. presi­dent and a Soviet party secretary had shaken hands over a major arms control agreement. The fiscal year 1989 defense budget came to Capitol Hill hard on the heels of hearings on the Intermediate- range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Pun­dits began to speak of a “post-INF era,” as NATO nations and other allies grap­pled with addressing national security issues that will persist in spite of the treaty. Together, the Scylla of budget constraints and the Charybdis of subtle, but dynamic, threats compelled the Navy to make course adjustments in strategy and force structure.

When Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Carlisle Trost presented the amended fiscal year 1989 Navy budget to Congress in March 1988, he told law­makers that long-term zero or negative growth would force the Navy to recon­sider its forward strategy or find another. Other dialogue and developments during 1988 are producing a rapidly evolving service view of'naval warfare into the next century.

“We’ve got to use our technology both in a war-fighting and military-geopoliti­cal sense; we’ve got to use it to put the right kinds of weapons together to sup­port a strategy; and we’ve got to be able to do it in a way that we can afford,” said retired Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III, former Deputy CNO for Surface Warfare, at the U. S. Naval Institute’s July 1988 “Future U. S. Naval Power” seminar in San Diego.

In large measure, the Navy thinking that emerged last year greatly benefited from the lessons learned during the suc­cessful 16-month Persian Gulf convoy operation. For the first time since the Vietnam era, the service experienced a sustained tempo of conflict and near­

conflict operations that in practice—not theory—graphically demonstrated how naval warfare has changed. (These opera­tions are detailed in feature articles in this issue.)

The Navy is now forcefully arguing that the world is no longer as it was in 1947, when it was characterized by a bi­polar confrontation between two super­powers, and the only meaningful threat to U. S. naval forces was a Soviet one. Today the world is increasingly interde­pendent, multipolar, and militarized. While the Soviet Union will remain its most formidable potential adversary well into the future, the U. S. Navy now views Third World regional conflicts as more likely contingencies, for which it must also be highly prepared.

Other defense officials have noted that recent Moscow rhetoric has shifted em­phasis from “supporting wars of national liberation” to “exploiting intercapitalist contradictions.” “What appears to be in store for the United States in the future is a more flexible, more subtle foreign pol­icy aimed at creating divisions among us, our traditional allies and the principal Third World nations.” The purchase of submarine propeller milling equipment from Japan and the sale of a Charlie-I- class nuclear-powered guided-missile submarine to India are clear examples of how this shift in Soviet policy can com­plicate the Navy’s calculations.

Now and into the next century, Third World challenges to U. S. naval forces are no longer “primitive.” They require responses that combine arms for antiship missile defense, antisubmarine warfare, and antisurface warfare (ASUW). In the Persian Gulf, the U. S. task force faced threats that included mines, land- and sea-based cruise missiles, high-perfor­mance aircraft, high-speed naval surface combatants, special operation forces, and sophisticated intelligence and sensors.

As always, naval aviation will con­tinue to be key to the Navy’s ability to project power. Of growing importance will be the use of the aviation community for challenges in this hemisphere. For example, as a result of congressional mandate, the Navy will more routinely apply ocean and air surveillance assets for drug interdiction.

While the need for long-range powC projection has never been more acute, th<- United States is finding that its overseas access is decreasing. The Navy continues to remind lawmakers that since 1947 the number of countries hosting U. S. na'J bases has declined 60%, from 95 to 3»- (Although the United States had abm" 2,000 overseas military bases in 1947.¹ now has only 759.) As such, the Na'J will rely increasingly on maritime prep⁰" sitioning squadrons for pre-staging mat¹- rials that can remain mobile and untM U. S. control.

Despite this evaluation of the interna tional situation and its associated threats- the Navy, by all accounts, has accept that it will not achieve a 600-ship f°^rce structure in the next few years. However- the service stands firm on the need ^t0 have 15 carrier battle groups (CVBGsi- four battleship battle groups, and the at tendant forces to support them. The N^a'- says that this requirement remains a ‘ ⁿ tional policy imperative.” To meet mⁿ damental security obligations in P^eaCf_t

time, four CVBGs will continue

of

deploy in forward areas, the nearest which is 3,500 miles from the Unite States. Three CVBGs must be ready

the

surge operations within 48 hours; ¹ remainder will maintain normal trainⁱⁿ-"

and maintenance cycles.                        .

The Navy is acknowledging the real' ’ of its force levels, however. “Throug out future SLEP [service life extens'⁰ program] and CV [carrier] nuclear '^L fueling/overhaul periods, we will ^c°ⁿ^ tinue to compensate for our shortfall i CVs by reducing our CV commitment¹ the Mediterranean or by easing the Inm Ocean requirement and scheduling bat' ship battle group deployments as g³!¹

fillers.”

id

How the Navy is revising strategy ^al^j

force structure in a time of constrain¹-'

budgets and a dynamic world is dire¹

etiy

y/e

related to changes in naval warfare have moved from short-range eng^a- ments, often controlled with strictly ^vlj’_I| ual sensors, to weapon engagement⁵¹ excess of 1,200 miles from our ba'¹ forces, with electronic means provid"¹:

the only evidence of action. It is from

th'^s

perspective that we maintain and sl’^aj\ our Navy of the future.” Key technolw

►

Inti

initiatives in research and development that the service wants protected are pro- Sfams for low observable (stealth) tech- ⁿ°logy, information management, beam Capons, electric-drive propulsion, and ^Sophisticated munitions.

The Office of the CNO released a re- P°rt of the Ship Operational Characteris­es Study (SOCS) in April 1988. The p CS group, which included unrestricted ^lne officers from Washington headquar­^ters staffs and from the staffs of the fleet ^Commanders-in-chiefs and surface force ^Commanders, worked on the study for ^rt)0re than a year. In promulgating the ^reP°rt, the CNO stated that he “sub­scribed to all [its] recommendations.” ctive Navy programs are already pursu- jⁿg some of the characteristics and oppor- ^unities recommended in the study.

The focus of the report was the opera- °nal characteristics of a 21st century surface combatant. Recommendations ^s° apply to other ships such as a large- ^^aPacity missile carrier and ships of the laphibious, combat logistics, and mine fees. The report did not propose to de- ,!^{ne a}ny hull form, but rather identified °Perational characteristics that would ^e suitable with any of the hull forms ■n which we have become familiar.” .^e objective of the SOCS is to maxi- _n ^1Ze the ship’s capability to put “ord- ^nce on target,” the phrase so closely ^sociated with Admiral Metcalf’s “Rev- ti°n at Sea.” According to the report,

"The 21st century combatant will ^e capable of both independent and battle Force operations. The ability to operate independently requires a stout ^Self-defense capability in every mis- ^Sl°n area UP, OUT and DOWN and ^an offensive capability in at least one ^niai^or mission area. To operate effec- h^yely with and contribute to a Battle orce requires speed consistent with hat of a CV, the ability to contribute ⁰ the protection of the carrier and ^Combat logistics ships and system ^CaPability with the other ships and air- ^Cfaft in the force.”

Th

'Uin ^{6 re}P^ort outlined, among others, 12 "‘w ^mtlVe operational characteristics as t ^fighting drivers”: a_reas°P^erative engagement in all mission

i 2'^ie8^rated machinery systems hurp>^rV'^Vability and the ability to “fight

sio^^hded readiness assessment, mis- ► _CoP^|anning’ and training

V   •,.^<>n<lition-based maintenance

V   _c°_o;^pedo self-defense

inf,_w °^Cation of ship control and combat Nation center

► Access control and security

► Alternative use of volume

► Smooth topsides

► New information management

► Organic aviation and other offboard vehicles

The report defined cooperative en­gagement as “an integrated and coordi­nated combat data and action system at the battle force level. The concept must be applicable UP. OUT and DOWN and not limited to AAW [antiair warfare].” Each ship must be able to “see” the en­tire battle as if it had every sensor and weapon in the battle force on board. It would have all data relating to detection, classification, and targeting, and the ca­pability to control weapons fired from other platforms, a feature called “for­ward pass” in AAW. Longer range weapons for AAW and ASW are required to expand this capability beyond ASUW and strike warfare, without which battle force geometry would constrain such use. Ship design should permit the last-ditch launch of weapons by the battle force commander. “The 21st century surface combatant should be designed not to go out of action with full magazines if its weapons are needed by the force,” said the SOCS report.

The SOCS also recommended an inte­grated decoy and deception capability at the battle force level, coordinated to avoid one platform decoying an incoming weapon into another friendly platform. An automated “combat maneuvering” system would minimize detection and damage, while permitting selected, auto­mated initiation of “anticipatory” dam­age control action in the threatened sec­tion of the ship while the weapon is still incoming.

A second key characteristic is the inte­gration of propulsion and machinery sys­tems. “This characteristic, Integrated Machinery,” said the SOCS, “is the only one in which we are recommending a

Termed by the Navy “the best bar­gain around,” the carrier SLEP returned the Independence (CV-62) to the fleet in 1988 with another 15-year lease on life, and began work on the Kitty Hawk (CV-63), above.

specific solution to the operational char­acteristics we prescribe.” It added, “The change to a new machinery system is so fundamental to building the future sur­face combatant and to its performance that the propulsion, auxiliaries and elec­trical generation systems decisions will affect every other aspect of the 21 st cen­tury ship. We should commit to a new propulsion system now.”

Integration will reduce ship signatures, particularly acoustic, infrared, and “pro­pulsion constituent of wake,” and pro­vide adequate power reserves for future directed-energy weapon systems. The SOCS said, “Increased reliability of electric power, in fact assured electric power, will be essential to support the information and computing demands of the 21st century combatant.” The system recommended is an integrated, electric drive machinery. “Electric drive inte-

^pro_c

grated with propulsion-derived ship ser- ^Vlce power generation will result in ^Weight reduction and improved fuel effi­ciency. The adoption of intercooled, re­generative gas turbines can contribute to ’’’'Proved fuel efficiency and reduced in- rared signatures associated with exhaust Missions.”

Stealth, although an important devel- °ping technology, should not be oversold ^as a concept applicable to ships. Accord- ^lng to the SOCS, “Seeking to make ships j^nvisible, that is to remove all observab- ^es> would not be the best allocation of resources. Preventing classification and ^argeting of our ships is always appropri­^ate> more likely achievable, and should ® °^Ur objective.” Instead, ship design mould rely on technology that will im­Prove decoy and deception techniques. Stealth considerations would apply to ^e recommendation for smooth topsides. ^cmoving stacks and funnels and putting Pausting combustion gases through the ¹¹ would reduce radar cross-section, as offu           stowage of aircraft and other

board vehicles, such as those carrying ^rPedo destruction devices. Flush and ^closed stowage has the additional ad- ^vantaj

and

'ge of the ability to load, maintain,

The

repair during inclement weather.

its

ship

after "hth It

report said the Navy must improve

.combatants’ ability to “fight hurt.” A must be able to continue to fight one hit by an antiship cruise missile ₍ a nominal one-metric-ton warhead. sile'^{USt surv}'^{ve two} antiship cruise mis- ^e hits or one under the keel, which _tj ^Ust he strengthened. In calling for “an- _s Tatory damage control,” the SOCS tjj |,’hat fiber-optic cables embedded in dat and ^used as a sensor system for t_u ^a transmission could measure struc- Ernb ^Stress hy deflections in the cable. „ medded sensors would also provide sp₍ ^ndlt’^on based maintenance” to re­ins , ',° ^^adure as opposed to “open and . Peet approaches of preventive main- nance Th > '

’ion ^C-^{StUdy says} ’h^at despite the atten- tiis f^{1Ven t0} defending against cruise the '^es’ "defense against torpedoes is JjQn'yfahness that needs the most atten-

bv ^cording to some estimates, a hit ¹ one ■

°f the Soviets’ largest diameter _actP-es could “put a CV out of °ⁿ- “The change of emphasis in

toi

^irPedo: ^:ti(

3V

^Cruis_e

^V’^et ASUW attack tactics—from i\o_t ’ missiles to torpedoes—although

Pe_ct ^aammeed, should not be unex- ^s'ninl ^cau*i°ⁿs that it is insufficient att_ac|^ ^lo decoy the torpedo: During an \v_ater ’ many torpedoes will be in the threat’ ^3nd decoyed torpedoes remain a q₍, ^{and must} h^e destroyed.

^er recommendations included the

colocation of ship control with the com­bat information center below decks and improved security of the ship’s informa­tion systems. The study recommends the “ship as a home” concept for alternative use of interior volume. One step beyond the paperless ship concept, says the SOCS, would be a “cashless ship.”

In a similar way, the aviation commu­nity has responded both to evolving threats and developments in naval war­fare. In congressional testimony last year, Vice Admiral Robert F. Dunn, As­sistant CNO for Air Warfare, noted among his goals that naval aviation must be ready to respond to crisis, particularly today when faced with a higher probabil­ity of small conflicts, and where deter­rence requires that U. S. forces prevent those conflicts from getting larger. “We must capitalize on what naval aviation does best while integrating the strengths of sister services and allies. We intend to increasingly employ standoff weapons and electronic systems as force multipli­ers. Naval aviation must continue to con­solidate the number of different aircraft and weapon types to save manpower and support costs through commonality and modular design.” With regard to joint tactical integration, Admiral Dunn high­lighted the successful operations in the Persian Gulf that demonstrated the excel­lent capabilities of the Army MH-6 spe­cial operations helicopters and Air Force airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft and tankers.

Through the year, the Navy found it­self before Congress defending the goal of 15 CVBGs. Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) attempted to lead a bid to retire the Coral Sea (CV-43) and Midway (CV- 41) early. Part of the logic behind this supposed budget-saving effort derived from a case made by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in a November 1987 report about alleged shortfalls in the Navy’s combat aircraft. The CBO pro­jected that with tight budgets ahead the Navy could not correct the shortfall.

The issue was critical and used by some lawmakers to question the point of a 15-carrier Navy if the service did not have enough planes to go around, partic­ularly attack aircraft. In any case, as a result of the budget negotiations within the Pentagon, the Navy was forced to decommission its 14th carrier air wing (CVW-10) based at Naval Air Station Miramar, California. CVW-10 was in fact a reserve wing that had been acti­vated for only a year-and-a-half. The stand-down coincided with a dip in the carrier deployment cycle. The Navy looked ahead to see that nuclear carrier refuelings, normal overhauls, and the

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more weapons than any other submariⁿ® to date, in any country.” With a larg.^ diameter torpedo tube, the Seawolf w be able to exploit advances in future ^tor pedo technology and in submarine launched unmanned underwater vehic

velm

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combat system (fire control and so

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of F“^r cal'

Any further improvements would req a larger hull, another reason why

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Navy

Naval aviation felt the budget crunch in 1988: One carrier air wing retired and the transition to the new strike- oriented air wings associated with the Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71), above, slowed.

SLEP will put more than the average number of carriers in long-term mainte­nance, reducing normal carrier deploy­ments by one. The retirement of CVW-10 enabled the Navy essentially to reduce its aircraft requirements by 126 carrier- based aircraft that could be redistributed elsewhere in the force structure. How­ever, the overall aircraft force will age slightly from the fiscal year 1988 average of 13.2 years to a projected 14.7 years in fiscal year 1994. Carrier-based aircraft will age about one year. In addition, the Navy will slow the transition to the “Teddy Roosevelt” air wings (refers to new air wings on board the new carrier Theodore Roosevelt [CVN-71]) to only three in the five-year defense plan. The shortfall is particularly troublesome with regard to attack aircraft; nevertheless, it is being managed by continuing crossdecking, using pipeline and training assets, and deploying two or three Marine Corps A-6 squadrons.

Budget constraints and pressure from the Senate Armed Services Committee contributed to making clear to the Navy that it had to refine its plans for naval aviation, where it was going, and how it would get there. In February 1988, 12 senior Navy and Marine Corps aviators, representing a cross-section of aviation communities, gathered in Washington as the Project February study group. Their brief was to identify the aviation mission through the year 2010 and recommend the composition of future air wings, in view also of budget and manpower con­straints.

The group began with several assump­tions, notably that while the global threat will remain a Soviet one, naval aviation must plan for more regional contingen­cies in the Third World. As for force lev­els, Project February assumed 15 deploy­able carriers with 15 carrier air wings (13 active and two reserve), four Marine Corps air wings (three active/one re­serve), and 37 maritime patrol squadrons (24 active/13 reserve). Project February also assumed that the Navy would con­tinue with the supercarrier and the slow transition to nuclear propulsion.

The group concluded that the Navy should reduce the types of aircraft in its inventory and develop in each type a multimission capability. Moreover, it emphasized the growing importance of joint/allied operations and the application of space to naval warfare. As to weapons and systems, it noted that requirements are increasing for a night operations ca­pability and active sensors for ASW. In­formation management is assuming a frontline role, and common electronic warfare systems can no longer be re­garded as an afterthought in design. The group also noted the importance of the guiding cruise missiles launched by other aircraft. It said that in terms of procure­ment the CVBG and the CVW must be viewed as a unit and not as an amalgama­tion of “discreet platforms,” which per­mits one platform to retire and be auto­matically replaced.

Project February recommended that the Navy move to four types of multimis­sion aircraft that, with another four, it designates as “musts.” The CVW first must have the A-12 (the new name for the advanced tactical aircraft) to replace the A-6. Second, the group identified the requirement for an all-weather plane, costing about $30 million per unit and called the advanced strike fighter (ASF), to replace the F-14 and F/A-18. (The ASF may be a Navy-designed aircraft rather than the Air Force-led advanced technology fighter [ATF] that Congress mandated as a joint program. The ATF is under development by a Northrop/ McDonnell Douglas team and a Lock­heed/Boeing/General Dynamics team; ^a competitive flyoff is scheduled in 1990. A decision to acquire an ASF based on an F-14 upgrade could save Grumman as an airframe producer for the Navy. The ven­erable A-6, another Grumman program, was terminated in 1988.) The third air­craft recommended by Project February is the advanced support plane (ASP) ¹⁰ replace the S-3, C-2, KA-6, and possibly the EA-6 if the A-12 cannot. The fourth in the group’s “four for eight” is the SH- 60B/F Seahawk helicopter with a dipp*ⁿ? sonar.

In addition, the study says the Navy must have: the MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft to replace the CH-46; an ad­vanced tactical battle management air­craft (ATBM) to replace the E-2C an maybe the S-3; the long-range advance antisubmarine-warfare-capable aircrat (LRAACA) to replace the P-3; and a Hg^ht experimental helicopter (HLX) to repla^ce the H-l.

Congress approved $1.7 billion t°^r procurement and research and develop ment for the first Seawolf (SSN-21)-d^a** attack submarine. The Navy signed tn contract with the Electric Boat Divisio¹¹ of General Dynamics in January 19™^- Vice Admiral Daniel L. Cooper, Ass>^s tant CNO for Undersea Warfare, said tha the Seawolf will be “undoubtedly m^e quietest ship in the world." Most imp^reS sive, according to Admiral Cooper, is ^tn Seawolf s firepower—“at least

(UUV) and automated underwater cles (AUV) systems for ASW or missions.          .

Last August the Navy commission®

the San Juan (SSN-751), the first of¹¹¹ so-called “Improved-688s.” By the en of 1989, the service will have 42 Angeles (SSN-688)-class attack subma­rines. Four Los Angeles-c\ass submarm ' were commissioned in 1988, and the s®^c ond “Improved-688,” the Posad?¹’ (SSN-752), was commissioned in Feb ary 1989. The two “lmproved-688s the first in the class with the under-* capability. They also have the BS

suite) and bow planes instead water planes. “It is the best ship we ^ build right now,” Admiral Cooper sa^|U

Navy must go to the SSN-21. The . will have 96 attack submarines by th^c .-j of 1989: 42 Los Angeles (SSN-688), ^a

After 16 successful pad launchings of the new Trident II (D-5) submarine- launched ballistic missile, the D-5 has begun submerged tests with the Ten­nessee (SSBN-734), commissioned the ninth Ohio (SSBN-726)-class “boomer” in December and the first to carry the D-5.

Sturgeon (SSN-637), nine Permit (SSN- 594), and three diesels.

In December the Navy commissioned its ninth Ohio (SSBN-726)-class fleet ballistic-missile submarine, the Tennes­see (SSBN-734). The Tennessee is the first submarine to carry the new Trident II (D-5) missile and is now operating from Kings Bay, Georgia. The first subma­rine-launched test shots of the D-5 will begin this spring. In two years of D-5 testing, 18 pad shots from Cape Canav­eral, Florida, resulted in 16 complete successes and two that were only partially successful, owing to minor failures that now have been corrected.

The Trident II program has won praise from the General Accounting Office (GAO) and Les Aspin (D-WI), Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, for meeting its schedule and performance goals. “It’s a sound, well-managed pro­gram,” Aspin said.

Admiral Cooper said that the Trident is a “major success story” that ranks alongside the legendary Polaris program.

Nine years ago the Navy’s Office of Stra­tegic Systems Programs planned for the D-5 to be available for the Ohio when she completes her first overhaul in 1992. Sometime in 1983, Admiral Cooper said, the decision was made to put the D-5 on the ninth Trident hull, the Tennessee. “So in fact, we accelerated the D-5 pro­gram by about four to five years.”

By the end of 1989, the SSBN fleet will comprise 24 Poseidon missile sub­marines (of which 12 will carry the C-3 Poseidon and the other 12 the C-4 Trident I), eight Trident missile subs with the C-4, and two Trident boats with the D-5.

Since November 1960, when the George Washington, the first SSBN (con­verted to SSN in 1981), went on her first patrol, U. S. ballistic-missile submarines have conducted more than 2,600 strategic deterrent patrols and never fired a missile in anger. Navy submarine-launched bal­listic missiles (SLBMs) provide the stra­tegic “triad” (bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and SSBNs) with about 50% of the warheads for strategic deter­rence for about 25-27% of the portion of the defense budget that goes to strategic programs. At a time when Congress is looking closely at where the cuts might fall in strategic programs, the Navy is fortunate to have completed its strategic modernization. Originally, the rationale for the triad was based on the notion that land-based missiles were the most accu­rate, bombers were recallable, and sub­

marines were the most survivable. the D-5, said Admiral Cooper, the N^;iV-' has a missile “as accurate as any”; ® communications links to the SSBNs ^;1|X “99.9%” fail-safe; and those subs ^ still “the primary survivable leg of ^tn‘ triad.”                »

Other miscellaneous highlights in 1“ included:

► Signal aviation programs: The N^a'^; commenced testing of the T-45TS tra*¹* ing system, that includes both the T-4^?; Goshawk aircraft (McDonnell Dougl^ British Aerospace) and ground-con^tr automatic training modules, simulat⁰*⁵'

and computer-aided instructional sysi

-4J'¹!

that will replace the T-2C and TA-— ., the Naval Training Command. The in**¹*

operational capability (IOC) date *^s

1990. In June, the service began test!¹¹-' the SH-60F Seahawk derivative wi**¹ ,

dipping sonar. The SH-60F will rep

the SH-3 carrier air wings; IOC is in

juiy

1989. The Navy also decided to pu*

th®

the

P-3C Update-IV modernization into LRAACA, thereby maintaining condⁿ ity with Lockheed in the ASW airera

► Lowest aviation accident rate ^e'

Navy and Marine Corps aircraft _f involved in only 2.16 accidents P 100,000 flight hours during 1988. ‘ „ 1988 rate improved upon the previoU⁵

1 ¹

lowest rate, established in 1987—

$

accidents per 100,000 hours. The rate years ago was 51 accidents per 100. hours. Admiral Dunn attributed the ^s

^Cess to the recent levels of funding, ^hich have allowed for sufficient flying ■tours and spares, and quality recruit­ment.

^ Aviation readiness: In 1988 the Navy ^enJoyed its highest ever readiness rates in ^lerms of full-mission-capable aircraft and ^aircraft carriers. This readiness translated ■o success in the air and surface actions ^against Iranian naval targets in the Per- ^s,an Gulf last April and in the heroic res- off the coast of Florida of 67 sailors ^tr°m the USS Bonefish (SS-582) by Heli- ^°Pter Squadron 7.

Friendly fire: An inexperienced F-14 ^a,r crew shot down a U. S. Air National ^uard RF-4C Phantom, both crew mem- ^ers °f which were rescued, during exer- l^lj'^Cs >n the Mediterranean in April 1988. ue Tomcat pilot reported a diving, un- ^arked aircraft, received the order to °°t, and fired two armed Sidewinders, ^e second hitting the F-4. The Navy said _t ^ctl orders are common in exercises and ^at Pilots know not to shoot. The pilot craf *^{at6r restr}'^cted f^rorn flying Navy air-

^ Flack Sea bumping: The USS York- oh’„ (CQ-48) and USS Caron (DD-970), _ati^e^¹P^ting in February 1988 to conduct , innocent passage” through part of t^‘ iilack Sea claimed by the Soviets as j. ^lr territorial seas, were bumped by °^Vlet naval combatants. Contrary to in-

■erna*'

^ir>no.

ational law, Soviet legislation allows in i'^Cent P^assage in only five areas, not

>^Caiding the Black Sea.

y Medical focus: 1988 may become hi^0Wn as the year the problems with th ^ ^medicine received the attention deserve, culminating with the U. S. in W* ^{Institute s} February 1989 seminar _te ^ashington. More evidence of the in- _Na^Slty of this focus is the fact that the thiTv institute’s Distinguished Author of ’^ear award went to a Navy doctor,

>  P'ain Arthur M. Smith.

⁰¹ retention and the bonus: Faced atio '°ⁿi=^er deployments, increased oper- ^Cruit'^{a tern}P^os> and high-pressure re- tj_0ri ^u*8 from the airlines, the naval avia- pjj ^c°nimuⁿity is still struggling with

tiin ^retent'^on- in 1988 congressional tes- l₉°ⁿy- Admiral Dunn noted that in 'ots ’ ^vv*^len the airlines hired 1,330 pi- 42c/ ^tle Navy’s pilot retention rate was 9 qq„ in 1987, they hired more than 35% .|,^an(i Navy retention dropped to

good news, however, was that

WXj.                                                               I1CW.1, HUVYtVU, w                                                   11 It*l

p_ac,^gress passed the $12,000 bonus Ja_n. ^Ui=^e last year that took effect on ’ V ⁿ„^Uary 1989.

y^J_T^<rf('^{Ce a,,}d sub retention: The fiscal far_e ~~ retention rates for surface war-

rttari°^{fficers was 30%}’ ^{and 29% for sub}' ^ners. The latter got a 35% pay in-

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•          EMI-EMC, TEMPEST

•          TEMPERATURE,

HUMIDITY

•          STRESS SCREENING DEVELOPMENT AND TAILORING

•          NOISE TESTING

•               ACOUSTIC ANALYSIS

•               ROAD TEST COURSE,

RAIL IMPACT

•          DATA ACQUISITION,

DATA ANALYSIS

•          THERMAL ANALYSIS

•          INFRARED IMAGING

•          THERMAL VACUUM

•          INSTRUMENTATION

HUGHES AIRCRAFT COMPANY P.O. BOX 3310 FULLERTON, CA 92634

(714) 732-3191

HUGHES

Making 50 Hz a reality for shipboard electronic enclosures.

A & J Manufacturing Company's new 50 Hz open rack takes vibration and payload requirements for shipboard enclosures to the cutting edge of technology. And like its recently developed 33 Hz enclosure, the new 50 Hz rack utilizes A & J’s unique, proprietary bolted construction which proiidesyou the highest strength to weight ratio available.

For the severest of shipboard shock and mbration requirements, look to A &f’s new 50 Hz enclosure. Test reports available.

A & J Manufacturing Company

14131 Franklin Avenue, Tustin, California 92680, (714) 544-9570 Manufactured and distributed in Canada by the Devtek Corporation.

With no trace of the port damage from the May 1987 Iraqi Exocet missile hit, the Stark (FFG-31) left Ingalls’ repair yard on 28 August 1988 to rejoin the fleet. On the Ingalls quay were: the Aegis cruisers Princeton (CG-59), commis­sioned 11 February 1989, and Chancellorsville (CG-62), launched 15 July 1988; and the amphibious assault ship Wasp (LHD-1), delivered in March 1989.