The U. S. Marine Corps in 1988

 

 

 

operational experience. The 1988 con­gressional mandate that the multiple RPV research and development programs be consolidated within the DoD should not limit the Marine Corps programs. The latest Marine RPV concept is Pointer, which is undergoing conceptual evalua­tion tests. Pointer, a product of Aero Vironment Inc., is a model of simplicity. Both the flight unit and the ground con­trol station are small enough for a single man to backpack. The small, quiet system—with a daylight viewing range of about five miles—is designed to give frontline commanders a look over the next hill.

As a result of 1988 decisions, the over­all Marine Corps budget slides from an estimated $9.73 billion in 1989 to $9.49 billion in 1990. Marine Corps ammuni­tion and communications-electronics procurements were particularly hard hit. (Marines used more ammunition than they bought in 1988, which meant that they had to dip into their reserves for the first time since the Reagan buildup.) The M-1A1 main battle tank buys were re­duced to 66 during 1988. Nevertheless, the Marine Corps will still seek funding to buy 155 of the M-l Abrams tanks in 1990 and 255 more in 1991.

The light armored vehicle (LAV) em­barked for the first time for a full six- month shipboard deployment during 1988. A contract was negotiated with the Army to buy about 2,300 combat net ra­dios with built-in security components fa^r the LAV. And as a result of a December 1988 acquisition milestone meeting, t'¹¹’ 105-millimeter cannon was selected as the assault gun variant for the LAV(AG) The development strategy for the assail

By the Honorable Ben Blaz

While reviewing the impact of events in 1988 on the U. S. Marine Corps, I first thought—as one who once wore the green—that regardless of the tide of national and international events the Marine Corps will remain one of the President's most versatile instruments of U. S. power and diplomacy. With that in mind, this is my look "over the trench,” from which the Marine Corps has always had to fight for survival.

First, 1988 brought the end of the Reagan buildup, which was significant because it marked the first time since Dwight Eisenhower’s presidency that we enjoyed eight consecutive years under a single commander-in­chief. In my opinion, Ronald Reagan’s successor, George Bush, is equally strong in his leadership and his commitment to a national defense apparatus that is fully capable of protecting our vital national interests and meeting all of our international commitments.

Second, our new commander-in-chief and the Marine Corps are confronted with new fiscal reality, which leaves uncertain the level at which modernization can continue and the level of force structure that can be maintained. It is possible to sink to a level of defense spending that would compel a slowdown in moderniza­tion efforts, if we strive to maintain the high states ol readiness to meet our worldwide commitments that we have attained during the 1980s. The problem of decrea^' ing defense dollars is compounded by the fact that the

Forging Ahead . . .

By the Honorable John W. Warner

what the American public expects and deserves. In addi­tion, General Gray’s willingness to solicit the advice and counsel of retired Marines is widely praised and very welcomed.

Undoubtedly, there will be lean years ahead for the Department of Defense. The warfighting center at Quan- tico has been activated at a propitious time, for there is ^a need today for an aggressive intellectual center with a mandate to solve the problems of maintaining high readi­ness with dwindling resources. The Marine Corps Coniba¹ Development Command promises to do just that.

On balance, 1988 was a good year for the Marines. Th^e Corps should be able to look through 1989 and beyond with confidence and optimism.

Representative Blaz (R-GU), a retired Marine Corps general, is a mcniN^ of the House Armed Services Committee.

For the Marine Corps, the preeminent event of 1988 was the ending of the Reagan era. In 1980, our defense posture was really as bad as Ronald Reagan said it was. He told us he was going to rebuild America’s defenses, and he did. The Marine Corps was a major beneficiary of this revival. The Corps was modernized. War reserves were replenished; new weapon systems were delivered; facilities were renovated; pay and allowances were made more equitable; and end strengths were increased. Mr. Reagan supported a naval strategy that underscored the importance of amphibious forces and a light, mobile Ma­rine Corps. His global strategy moved us away from our fixation on Europe, and permitted us to shift appropriate concern to the Pacific, which is—in the words of former Secretary of State George Shultz—“our nation’s future.” President George Bush has committed to continue on this course, but the hard facts of the budget deficit and com­pelling domestic issues mandate a new austerity.

The continuing development of the MV-22 Osprey dur­ing 1988 was significant, in my view. This tilt-rotor air­craft, replacement for the medium helicopter, is the new­est example of the Marine Corps’s ability to innovate and to pioneer revolutionary concepts. The Osprey’s speed, range, and lift translates into unprecedented battlefield and strategic mobility, survivability and tactical flexibility.

The survival of the AV-8B Harrier V/STOL program was the result of a hard-fought battle by the Marines here on the Hill. The Harrier is another example of the forward thinking of Marines, and that aircraft’s potential finally seems to be getting well-deserved recognition from the other services.

The tragic death of Lance Corporal Jason J. Rother in the Mojave Desert served to remind us of the need for constant reinforcement of our professional precepts at every rank and every level of command. And the loss of one of our own, Lieutenant Colonel Rich Higgins, as a captive to Middle Eastern terrorists was another sobering event. Further, the events of 1988 confirmed that we have yet to define adequately the role of women in the armed services.

Overall, I like what I see in the Corps under Comman­dant A1 Gray. It seems to us on the Hill that he has fo­cused on the right priorities. His renewal of warrior train­ing and warfighting skills for an elite corps of Marines is

The Corps in 1988

?^Un is to provide two manufacturers with ^lvv° guns and two LAV chassis each, for ^which they will develop turrets for inte­ntion into the LAV configuration.

During 1988 a new generation of the ^man-portable Stinger surface-to-air mis- ^Sl'^e (which provides an ultraviolet as well ^as infrared tracking mechanism) was toadied for fielding in 1989. It is called ^ac Stinger RMP (for reprogrammable ^Couiputer microprocessor) and expecta- ^tlons are that 8,000 will be delivered dur- jj'g 1989 if funding holds out. However, ^ae pedestal-mounted Stinger (a turret with two four-pack Stinger launchers for mounting on the rear of the HMMWV [high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle]) was delayed by budgetary re­straints. The Marine Corps also signed 1988 contracts with General Electric and FMC to build prototypes of an air defense LAV, which could include the Stinger as the antiair weapon (a 25-mm. weapon, the Hydra 70 pod could be chosen, as well).

The emphasis on the Corps's LIC role in no way diminished the requirement for adequate amphibious shipping; it may

even impose heavier requirements. In the next 14 years, the Navy is scheduled to retire 55 amphibious ships. The prospects for replacing them become dimmer by the year. According to General Gray’s an­nual report to the Congress, U. S. naval forces require amphibious lift for two Marine expeditionary forces (MEFs), one from each coast. The prospects for get­ting a two-MEF amphibious lift are re­mote. Some 1988 developments were encouraging, however. Ingalls Ship­building was awarded $341.4 million to design, construct, test, outfit, deliver.

Mar'^rani°^Unt mgredient in a formula for the future. The ^r'He

^ar'ⁿe Corps Combat Development Center and the Ma- ^Ccmps Research Development and Acquisition Com-

By the Honorable Sam Nunn

The events of 1988 provided additional and, in some instances, significant reinforcement of trends that had emerged earlier. In national affairs, the prospect of flat defense budgets remained, owing to continuing fiscal pres­sures and diminishing public support. On the international scene, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev announced bold policies and proposals that further raised hopes for a more stable superpower relationship and peaceful resolu­tion of some regional conflicts. Notwithstanding the heightened attention to East-West relations, the predomi­nant form of global violence continued to be unconven­tional warfare, including terrorism. Less important, but still significant—especially for the Marine Corps—were more troubled negotiations and increasing costs, both fi­nancial and political, associated with foreign-based U. S. forces.

Forecasting the outcome of these events and trends is difficult. Moreover, some developments, especially those related to new Soviet policies, must be approached with considerable caution. Even while resisting the temptation to arrive at unwarranted conclusions or to take premature

Senator Warner (R-VA) is the ranking minority member on the Senate Committee on Armed Services.

. . . Into the Future

increasing budgetary constraints have forced attention on means of replacing massive worldwide troop presence with smaller, highly mobile, quick-reaction capabilities. The Special Operations Force, for example, is here to stay and will receive increasing support from Congress.

In short, 1988 may well have produced historic events that will ensure the quality of our nation’s defense, and will forge forever an expanding role for the warriors of the United States Marine Corps.

I have just completed my first day of hearings with President Bush's newly designated Secretary of Defense. I have known and worked with Dick Cheney for more than a decade. We jointly sponsored the legislation that eventually led to the law requiring the annual National Strategy review. His responses to my questions on the need for the United States to continue the force structure needed to support the doctrine of maritime superiority were totally supportive. And the Navy-Marine Corps team is the very heart of this strategy.

^Were ^^ot'¹ established at Quantico, transforming r,₀, .tstoric Marine Corps training base into a true war- j^'ng center.

, action, the Marine Corps completed the ground­ed °ⁿ an upgraded program of professional military C^ation for its officers, staff noncommissioned offi- them ^an(l noncommissioned officers. This will be imple- d_eecj^Sc* 'aim this year. The goal of this effort—and in- efp ’ ^lbe certain collective results of all of these 1988 ^letice^S '^wiH be enhanced morale and operational compe­ting ^{at a}b grade levels and in all specialty codes and Slip ^asslgnments, adding luster to the Corps’s already p reputation for professional military excellence.

to_ ^{as a} result of—and largely as a complement

itite_n. ^6Se Ifltintives, the Corps formalized its own low- ny conflict capabilities, in an environment where

Manpower pool of young men and women needed for °^Ur armed forces is shrinking and will continue to do so ^until 1996. Recruiting and reenlisting high quality per- >nel will pose a leadership problem for the Corps dur- ^ln8 this period.

Third, there is little doubt that 1988 was a year in nich world and national events—both political and mil- ,,^ary reinforced the need for the U. S. Marine Corps as ^e cornerstone of future American defenses. Foremost in esc developments was the leadership of a practical, ft'amic, aggressive, and above all else, decisive Com- «ndant—A1 Gray, a giant among his peers.

my opinion, the most significant changes General ^ray has initiated in the Corps are: the reorganization hm the Fleet Marine Forces; the enormous effort to- _v | improved Marine battle skills training; and the de- °Pment of new concepts for professional military edu- iiall°ⁿ ^ ^{mUSt remem}^^ere^ ^at 1988 was the first / year of the “Gray administration,” and his deter- cbv^ P^erscverancc 'ⁿ making every Marine a warrior is yously reflected in his concentration on basic battle ’’kills

pi ^ Gray has moved out smartly. He has begun to im- >his'^{llent t}*^le G°ldwater/Nichols military reform act, and "nil enhance the Marine Corps’s position in the joint _s(r^aa- The Marines’ Total Force doctrine was given ^ cture as Manpower and Reserve Affairs were com- u ^d mto one headquarters element. Marine battle skills ^<*n^{le 3} ^^as'^c P^art °f ^ training plan at multiple lev- d mnnghout the Corps, as General Gray removed all ¹ about his conviction that a return to the basics was

and provide technical support for LHD-4, the fourth of the Wasp class of amphibi­ous assault ships. The lead ship should be delivered to the Navy in early 1989. The construction of LHD-2 commenced in July 1988 and LHD-3 will be started in 1989. The USS Wisconsin (BB-64), the last of the battleships being modernized and reactivated, rejoined the fleet on 22 October. General Gray was the principal speaker at the commissioning of the land­ing ship dock Comstock (LSD-45) at the

New Orleans Avondale shipyard in Janu­ary 1988. Jan Gray, the Commandant’s wife, was the ship’s sponsor.

Evaluation of the HAVIC-15, once known as the LAV sled, continued during 1988. The HAVIC (high-speed assault vessel and interdiction craft) was origi­nally designed to transport the LAV in a high-speed, over-the-horizon landing mission but it has potential for a much wider range of missions. The craft draws only 27 inches (slightly more than half of

other landing craft) and can achieve speeds greater than 20 knots fully loaded- Two contracts were let in 1988 for the construction of 15 more air cushion land­ing craft (LCAC). At present, nine LCACs are operating at Camp Pendleton (Assault Craft Unit 5) and six at the Little Creek, Virginia, Amphibious Base (As­sault Craft Unit 4). There have been three deployments of the craft in the Western Pacific, with three craft in each deploy' ment. The first three-craft deployment ot

Senator Nunn (D-GA) is the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Ah¹¹ Services.

the most serious conventional threat to the Western World-

At the same time, it should be noted that Gorbachev’s unilateral force reduction proposals would, if fully imple­mented, change the nature of the threat to NATO. The proposed Soviet troop, tank, and assault force reductions would significantly reduce the Warsaw Pact’s ability to launch a short-warning attack with in-place forces. NATO planning would focus more on an attack that followed a period of mobilization. In such a scenario. U. S. rein­forcements, including Marine forces for NATO’s flanks, would be much more critical than in a short-warning see^- nario, in which NATO might have to "go nuclear” befo^re reinforcements could arrive.

We should not lower our guard in Europe, but U. S. security efforts do need to be formulated in a broader g*⁰' bal context. And the United States does have worldwide commitments, many of which have received inadequate attention. Despite progress on some regional disputes, tfl^e United States’s interests in Latin America, the Middle East, and elsewhere remain threatened. Often these threats have appeared as insurgencies, terrorism, and other form* of unconventional warfare. We do need to give more at­tention to low-intensity conflict, in which there is a role for the expeditionary and amphibious capabilities of the Marine Corps.

Recognizing the need to be able to respond to the full range of security threats, General Gray has begun impl^e' mentation of some 30 initiatives to develop a lighter, a^c' tive-duty Marine force that is tailored for the expedition^ mission in low-to mid intensity conflicts. By shifting heavy support capabilities needed for global war to the reserves and by reallocating manpower to strengthen hig*¹ priority warfighting capabilities, these initiatives are de­signed to provide an active Fleet Marine Force that will ¹ able to respond in a more timely and decisive manner to the most likely threats.

On a related global matter, the network of overseas U. S. bases has always been essential to protect and p^r°' mote our worldwide security interests. Recent experience¹’ in base negotiations—-with the Philippines, Greece, and Spain, for example—raise obvious questions about the long-term prospects for this basing network. It now ap­pears to be prudent to be prepared to place more emph^aS1 on offshore capabilities.

A final clear conclusion from the events of 1988 is the Marine Corps will continue to represent a unique an irreplaceable force in U. S. national security capabilities

actions, though, we may begin to assess the potential im­plications for the Marine Corps of these continuing trends.

The impact on the Marine Corps of the defense budget crunch is likely to be more indirect than direct. General Gray has acknowledged that the Marine Corps is “basi­cally fully modernized today.” Moreover, he has already instituted his warfighting/warrior initiatives, with their emphasis on training and manpower quality. Tough budg­etary issues will undoubtably have to be faced, but the Marine Corps should be able to avoid serious resource problems.

In a larger budgetary context, however, two major un­dertakings are likely as the Department of Defense seeks to adjust to constant levels of defense spending—at best. First, there may be efforts to seek a greater specializa­tion—in other terms a more rational division of military labor—with U. S. alliance partners. If so, the U. S. mili­tary would be focused more on what it does best and what others cannot do as well. Measured against such criteria, maritime power projection capabilities would clearly be a U. S. specialization priority.

The second undertaking may be reductions in the num­ber of U. S. troops forward-deployed overseas. We hope that such reductions will be accomplished within the con­text of conventional arms reductions or other diplomatic agreements. In any case, such overseas troop drawdowns would naturally lead to greater emphasis on rapidly de­ployable forces, such as Marine air-ground task forces.

Gorbachev’s policies and proposals offer the greatest opportunities for enhanced security and stability in Europe. Beyond the withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan, moreover, Moscow also appears to have encouraged client states to attempt to resolve regional disputes in Southern Africa and Southeast Asia. Some Americans, seizing upon these positive Soviet initiatives, may conclude that high- intensity conflict involving the superpowers is extremely remote and may advocate an immediate shift to planning and preparing for mid- and low-intensity conflicts.

The time for such thinking may come someday, but such thoughts now are premature. Even if Gorbachev’s proposals are sincere, he may still fail and be forced to return to more traditional Soviet policies—or even be re­placed by a Kremlin hardliner. There is also a possibility that reforms in Eastern Europe could set off a “tinder box” flash fire among populations long-yearning for new freedoms. In such event, heavy-handed Soviet military in­tervention could threaten to spill over the East-West bor­der, raising anew the specter of conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Even though we should seek to ex­ploit opportunities that arise in superpower relations, then, the United States must continue to give high priority to the mission of NATO defense, to counter what remains

NlPF operations have been added to the us at the Marine Corps Schools at

to support the field commander accounting of pay, personnel, logis-

Mth

tic.

night-sight units for the TOW 2 l)_ev ^ assault antitank weapon systems, leu, ⁰P^rnent was also under way for a

vehicle). And in September, Con-

^0ved the

development of a new antiar­

j^-ACs with a Fleet Marine Force, At- ^antic Unit took place in December 1988. No single initiative contributes more to ^ae Marine Corps’s striving to be the pre- ^rriler force for LIC than the maritime pre- P°sitioning ship (MPS) program. An ex- JMlent Marine Corps Gazette update on g Program by Lieutenant Colonel David . • Brown cited these accomplishments:

, Mi Operational Handbook OH-7 has ^een developed that provides operational Mitlelines for MPS planners and users. U three MPS MEBs (Marine expedi- ^nary brigades) are conducting several ^'^Xercises each year.

Two week-long MPF (maritime prepo- toning force) planning exercises being ⁷⁾nducted each year.

*he Landing Force Training Cont­is ^n<T Pacific, is conducting a two-week

► ^Pfenning course

^syllab,

^^uantico.

reservoir of experience gained in „• h operations is providing sound poli- and procedures.

. ctlective communications between the

>   ^F MABs are sharing lessons learned. Automated MPF information systems V*P and running.

^MIFASS (the Marine integrated fire hut ^ ^suPP^ort system) died during 1988. *he replacement for the outmoded machine”—the FMF’s standard hoa* ^ru28^ethzcd computer—came on

klc ^an<^ intelligence. The laser Maver- surf ³ short-range, laser-guided air-to- t_ra ^ace missile, survived 1988 budget t_Ul. ^nias as it moved through the Opera­te ^a *^est 111 phase. Six position location ^vi[j ’ⁿ8 system (PLRS) sets, which pro- i_0c:^battiefieid navigation and position ^ . ¹⁰ⁿ to field units, were delivered the year. The Mark 19 40-mm. Unit '^ne 8^un began to appear in FMF (Li; ' Contracts were let by the Army to

Sv

^aSsaui|*^ne T*^ow f°^{r l}h^e AAV (amphibious PfovI³ⁿ? ^the Reagan administration ap- mor weapon, Dragon III, which will provide significant warhead improve­ments over Dragon II.

All things considered, Marine Corps operations, maintenance, and system procurement did not fare badly in 1988. However, when the the Commandant tells the troops “You ain’t seen nothin’ yet,” he may really be describing the fis­cal austerity that lies ahead.

General Gray has waged a vigorous campaign to bring about change in the Marine Corps. He has also acknowledged the debt he owes to those who set the stage for his agenda. The Commandant’s agenda includes the following principal elements:

Third World Combat Orientation: The Marine Corps is inherently well suited to conduct low-intensity conflict operations in the Third World. The MPF capability, now well established, pro­vides many of the advantages of forward basing without the disadvantage of hav­ing immobile prepositioned stocks on foreign soil. The integration of Marine FMF units into the fleets gives them pri­macy for best use of amphibious ship­ping. The Marine Corps’s historic com­mitment as a force-in-readiness is well established and has been nourished by the Commandant, who confirmed in his 1988 testimony before Congress: “we main­tain forward deployed . . . MAGTFs with a wide range of special operations capability.”¹⁵

Inculcating Maneuver Warfare Tac­tics: General Gray has been an advo­cate of maneuver warfare since at least 1984 when, as the commanding general of the 2d Marine Division he espoused the concept.¹⁶ Again, in his 1988 testi­mony before Congress, he described the tactics of such warfare as

“. . .a high tempo, fluid, combined- arms, maneuver-oriented conflict. Our goal will be to collapse our oppo­nent, destroying his ability to fight as a cohesive, organized force; this is the way to obtain quicker results with fewer casualties. In battle, our princi­pal advantage will be our ability to fight in such a way as to disrupt our opponent’s decision process. That is to say, our advantage will be due less

Drawing only 27 inches and capable of 20 knots—fully loaded, the HAVIC-15, formerly known as the LAV sled, is another key component of an over-the-horizon assault capability.

to equipment than to our excellence at tactics and the operational art.”¹⁷

The Operational Handbook (OH) 6-1, Ground Combat Operations, distributed in 1989, documents the Commandant’s adherence to maneuver warfare concepts as doctrine under development. It defines terms and provides guidance for ground commanders at each echelon. It provides the doctrinal foundation for the Comman­dant’s tactical concepts. The MAGTF Master Plan delivered to Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, and major com­mands for review during December, as well as all other war-fighting concepts developed in 1988, reflect General Gray’s espousal of maneuver warfare.

Training to Fight—Exercises and Op­erations: In General Gray’s words, “Our training is going back to basics to emphasize battlefield orientation.” Those who have witnessed the evolu­tion of training theories and practices in the Marine Corps will recognize that this is not a novel approach. Competent Ma­rine commanders have been going back to basics for generations. However, this Commandant is doing it with a venge­ance, relentlessly focusing the energies of his staff and senior commanders on the requirements of the battlefield. He has a four-stage program. Stage one included resurrecting the demand that every male Marine—whether he be a communicator, driver, or mechanic—must also be a ri­fleman. The new recruit training syllabus for basic warrior training (BWT) was ini­tiated in February at both Marine Corps recruit depots. The basic change from the former recruit training syllabus is an ex­tension of the recruit’s stay in the field from six to 13 days, to improve individ­ual infantry skills and survivability in combat and to provide additional training with infantry weapons. The change did not extend the period of basic level train­ing. A similar change applied to women as well as male recruits, but the women’s field training was more tailored to defen­sive combat. General Gray visited Parris Island on 18 February to observe the first recruits going through the new training routines.

In 1988, stage-two plans were com­pleted to provide Marine combat training (MCT) to all new graduates of the recruit depots. The program, slated to take effect in June 1989, will send all male Marines

direct attacks on civilian shipping-

On 17 February, Marine Lieuten

iant

mefflh^L’^r

isioⁿ

kidnapped by P^r°

ade­

Marines must be supported by an

quate operating and supporting

_ees

were made in 1988. Many were driven

by

partment of Defense. A force struc

ture

“to take a hard look at the Corps structure. In facing the f^utu | the Corps must protect the crih^c‘

imp°^r'

for low The total force will

the

ap-

to 28-day infantry training schools. The MCT training syllabus will build on the infantry skills acquired during recruit training.

The Marine Corps has announced that the stage-three one-week Marine leader­ship training (MLT) program will also be initiated in 1989. The MLT is designed to teach staff noncommissioned officers (SNCOs) how to lead a platoon-sized unit in combat. There are two phases in the development of this program. Phase one is being conducted at the Quantico SNCO Academy and at Camp Lejeune and the Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, Cali­fornia. Phase two will introduce the pro­gram to the remainder of the Marine Corps.

The fourth major training start-up was for unit sustaining training (UST), which is being designed to integrate the Marine basic skills training levels once achieved by BWT, MCT, and MLT. As the name indicates, UST will be conducted at the unit level, maintaining the combat skills appropriate to that unit’s combat mission.

Other training initiatives were intro­duced in 1988. Then Secretary of the Navy James H. Webb, Jr., directed that midshipmen at the U. S. Naval Academy who have opted for commissions in the Marine Corps must attend the Officer Candidate School “Bulldog” training at Quantico during the summer between their third and fourth years at the Naval Academy. A Naval Academy graduate himself, Secretary Webb was concerned that lieutenants from Annapolis were achieving relatively low rankings in their Basic School classes and even failing se­lection for promotion to captain.¹⁸

Marine Corps Order 6100.3J published in early 1988 redirects the Corps’s ap­proach to physical fitness. Marines are to put greater emphasis on the type of physi­cal fitness that promotes survival on the battlefield (defined as physical readiness and occupational and competitive condi­tioning activities). And every Marine is required to participate in an effective conditioning program on a regular and a progressive schedule.

In 1988 the House Armed Services Committee reported on a year-long inves­tigation of professional military educa­tion. The study panel recommended that the services and joint schools put more .emphasis on the study of strategy and joint operations. At least partly in re­sponse to the Committee’s recommenda­tions, a message went to all commands addressing “Professional Military Edu­cation, PME.” Among other directives, it announced that all commissioned and noncommissioned officers must maintain professional reading routines. The Corn-

Last year, the Marine Corps received a half dozen sets of the position loca­tion reporting system (PLRS), which provides battlefield navigation and position location information to units in the Held.

mandant stated his concept for profes­sional self-improvement in these words:

“In contrast to specific MOS or billet- related skills, PME is the lifelong study of the profession of arms within the framework of Marine Air-Ground Task Force operations. . . . The de­tails of the overall PME plan will be forthcoming in 1989 when the re­quirements for professional develop­ment will be laid out for all ranks from E-4 to 0-7.¹⁹

It was a good training exercise year for Marines. In February and March, the 7th MEB engaged in a major force-on-force exercise at the Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center at Twentynine Palms, California. The exercise pitted the Ma­rines against the Army’s 7th Infantry Division (light), which was reinforced by Marine Corps units. Exercise Valiant Usher in the Philippines included a raid, a hostage rescue, and other special opera­tions. The 4th MEB conducted a cold weather exercise, Alpine Warrior ’88 at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin. In March and April, the Marines of III MEF engaged in joint exercise Team Spirit ’88 with some 139,500 Koreans. Besides the 15,800 Marines, the U. S. forces included some 12,000 sailors, 15,300 airmen, and 26,800 soldiers. Exercise Ocean Venture, designed to demonstrate the U. S. capa­bility to protect national interests in the Caribbean, was supported by 40,000 U. S. military personnel, including 5,400 Marines from the 6th MEB. A combined NATO amphibious exercise, Dragon Hammer, was held at Capo Teulada,

Italy, in May with the 26th MEU (Special Operations Capable [SOC]) participating- Exercise Freedom Banner found the 7th MEB demonstrating procedures for off' loading an MPS ship in June. In July and August Marines of the 15th MEU partici­pated in exercise Cobra Gold ’88 in the Gulf of Thailand with Thai troops. UNI' TAS XXVIX was launched in July when a detachment from the 2d Marine Di^vl" sion sailed with a naval task f°^rcx’ through South American and Caribbean waters to conduct a series of exercises to promote regional cooperation.

In June, in response to the Iranian min' ing of the USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFC' 58), U. S. naval forces attacked two b^a' nian oil platforms that had been used to well-trained, well-rehearsed Contingenc) MAGTF, (CM) 2-88, embarked on board the USS Trenton (LPD-14), employ^ special operations techniques in boardmf and destroying one of the gas and oil sep arations platforms. Marines, including 56-man fleet antiterrorist security team- were also sent to Panama to reinf°^rC security forces there.

Colonel William R. Higgins, a of the United Nations Truce Superv

Organization, was          .

Iranian terrorists near the city of Ty^rej Lebanon. As the year ended he was st held captive.

Streamlining the Force Structure: • ^ Gray vision for training and fightnV

fore⁶

structure. To that end, numerous chant¹ the end-strength reduction of 3,000 l^^a rines that had been directed by the O

study group was convened in Jam¹ with the charter

Marine ire- cal

while sacrificing the merely - - _s tant. . . . The active force will f°^₍ on constant readiness for employ⁰¹ to mid-intensity confix' focused

general war against fully modern, ^a

forces.’

The recommendations made by six-week study group that have been proved for implementation withm next five years follow (changes m . organization of tank units are depend^ upon and will be implemented when M-IA1 Abrams tanks enter the M^afl Corps inventory):

ⁿi2e

lank battalions to the reserves. Orga-

lytii

l^h-i

^ntynine Palms.

^Reduce the division headquarters by

^ Place three infantry battalions in a £^adre status.

* Man the remaining 24 full-strength “^attalions at 94% of authorized strength, j-'ght of the remaining battalions that "^ave a MEU(SOC) mission will be aug- ^nted with a fourth rifle company. The ° ^other infantry battalions will have re- *^erve rifle company affiliates. All of the ^ full-strength infantry battalions will ^add ammunition men to the 81-mm. mor- ^ar and heavy machine gun platoons and ^fte shoulder-launched multipurpose as­^Sault weapon (SMAW) sections. Nine Platoon guides, 18 SMAW ammunition ^Carriers, eight 81 -mm. mortar men and heavy machine gun ammunition men y enlisted billets) will be added to each ^ the battalions.

Deactivate three Marine expeditionary ^r'gade (MEB) command elements, ^ransfering the functions of these head- barters to the parent MEF.

Man the remaining three MEB and the ^ree MEF command elements at 90% of b'horized strength.

Consolidate the intelligence, target ^C(Juisition, surveillance, and reconnais- ^nce activities within a single group as- >ed to each MEF.

^ ^ransfer three general support artillery ,^attalions to the Marine Reserve.

Ij ^Xransfer the TOW units from the tank j.^ahalions to the infantry regiments to tai'¹'^{1 3} ^®W platoon within the regimen- ^ headquarters.

j Add a scout platoon to the infantry reg- ^ ^ei>t headquarters.

. Add four scout-infantrymen to each L5 within the line companies of the ^ battalions.

. r/^enamc the LAV battalions “light red infantry” (LAI) battalions. th_e ,^ansf^{er t}^^lc i°^urth company of two of

^e a reinforced tank battalion at Twen- >ne Palms that would be oriented to ^ s'-intensity mechanized operations, tec ⁿ the fourth line company in the '^>nnasissance and engineer battalions \ 4 and 90% strength respectively. ^s0\j °^ns*^stent with availability of re- i_0n^rees, bring the three infantry battal- _S|_r ^s lhat will be placed in cadre up to full l^lglh, add a fourth line company to the l₀ ¹ battalions, add an assault gun pla­t ^ 1° each of the 12 LAI companies, (if i Activate the headquarters elements ^AG-15.

ti_0ji Activate the MAG-15 Marine avia- 1a logistics squadron and the two I jAM batteries.

finale the expeditionary airfield at ► Reduce strengths and possibly units in the FSSG (specific units not announced in 1988).²⁰

On 8 February 1988, the communica­tions assets of the Marine aircraft wing were reorganized. A Marine wing com­munications squadron is now capable of simultaneously supporting two MEBs. The Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development, and Acquisi­tion, was disestablished and replaced by the new command, the Marine Corps Research, Development, and Acquisition

General Gray spent much time on the road (here, at Parris Island) and in the field in 1988, listening to the troops while driving home his views about the warrior spirit and combat readiness.

Command (MCRDAC) at Quantico. About 300 Marines and civil servants for­merly associated with acquisition in Washington have been transfered to the new Quantico activity. In response to the requirements of the Defense Reorganiza­tion Act of 1986, Marine Corps Head­quarters has been reduced to five deputy and three assistant chiefs of staff. On 8 July, the Marine Corps Combat Develop­ment Center (MCCDC) at Quantico offi­cially became operational.

May saw the passing of a tradition that had profoundly affected generations of Marines. Many recall awaiting Inspector General’s (IG) inspections with appre­hension and even terror. The era of the IG has passed, however. In 1988, the re­sponsibility for these inspections was shifted to major subordinate commands. The Inspector General of the Marine Corps will continue to provide guidance and standards but the biannual Command

Inspection Program will now be con­ducted by field commands.

Planning and Conceptualizing for Combat: Service (as contrasted to joint) planning and conceptualizing for war shifted from Washington to Quantico during 1988. MCCDC will now perform the following services for the Marine Corps:

►  War fighting doctrine will be devel­oped, reviewed, and disseminated from the Center.

►  A master plan which provides a beacon into the year 2000 will be promulgated by the Center. The plan will fill the gap be­tween planning and programming. (The first draft of the MAGTF Master Plan was sent from the Center to Headquar­ters, U. S. Marine Corps, and major commands for review and comment on 9 December.)

►  Campaign plans that have been devel­oped by each of the three expeditionary forces will be complemented by a war­fighting center plan that will provide an assessment of the assets and training re­quired to achieve MEF objectives in preparation for war.

►  Budget and resource estimates for war­fighting preparation will be provided by the Center for headquarters and field commands.

►  The Center will play a prominent role in organizing the FMF for combat.

Since activation, MCCDC spent much of 1988 shaking down and becoming familiar with its new organization, which includes a Wargaming and Assessment Center, an Intelligence Center, and the hub of the operation, the Warfighting Center. They were busy. There were studies and evaluations in a wide range of disparate subjects that included expedi­tionary airfields with ski-jump ramps to launch the F/A-18, finding the best as­sault gun for the LAV, seabasing propos­als, and force structure options.

Manpower and Discipline: The Ma­rines joined 33,400 recruits during 1988, of which 2,100 were women. Entry quo­tas were met, but the best indicator of a healthy recruiting environment is the number of delayed entry personnel (DEPs) signed. After years of having a full resevoir of DEPs, that resource pool has been shrinking for all the services.²¹

Most senior commanders and NCOs remain enthusiastic about the caliber of recruit the Marine Corps is getting. Army Major General David Jones, Deputy As­sistant Secretary of Defense for Military Manpower and Personnel Policy, de­scribed the Marine Corps personnel structure as a “perfect pyramid.” He added, “In the Marine Corps you either reenlist in a shortage specialty or you

hav

^av°lving the death or injury of one or _c ?^re Marines. How they respond to the ^ sis has often been a lasting measure of ^e!^r reputation and the perception of _er^ej^r competence to lead the Corps. Gen­^a Gray was tested with the death of 19- ar-old Lance Corporal Jason J. Rother, •j.^⁰ died of dehydration while lost in the j ^entynine Palms Mojave Desert train- _nj area. Rother was last seen on the ^8ht ₀f 3o_3i August 1988, when he j₀ ^s Posted alone as a guide for his battal- |j_v ’ ^which was engaged in a three-day, fou'^fire exercise. His remains were ^ⁿfi more than 17 miles from the point g_a(^ere he had been posted. The investi- Pr k⁸ °fficer assumed that the Marine /y'¹ ably died in the late afternoon of 31 ₆j. Sust at least 24 hours before search °J7s for him began.

_5vv ^he unit platoon commander was Cfied a general court-martial, the pla- sergeant and squad leader were ^arfied special courts-martial, the bat-

don’t reenlist.”²² Nevertheless, in 1988 Enlistments in the Marine Corps were down to 46%, reflecting a drop of 6% from 1987.²³

On 13 September, a selection board convened to select 16 noncommissioned officers to be “Marine gunners,’’warrant officers in military occupational specialty Oj06. A total of 55 Marine gunners will « selected within the next four years. *ne gunners will wear the distinctive and coveted bursting-bomb insignia of grade. The Marine Corps continued to strug- to define the role of women in the service. The Corps is not unique in this Epect. None of the armed services pro- ess to have found the optimal balance etween sexual equality and allowing for sexual differences. With a push from the ecretary of Defense, the Commandant ‘JPPi'oved the assignment of women as y*arine Security Guard watchstanders at easible overseas locations. The first eiriale students at the Marine Security Uard School enrolled in May. The ^0rnrnandant reaffirmed that sexual har­^assment and discrimination of women !>ld not be tolerated in the Marine °rps. The Marine Corps drew some ^solicited attention during 1988 when a _fo^avy dentist at Twentynine Palms, Cali- ftiia, was charged by the Marine com- ^and with fraternizing with a lance cor­. ^ra'- The charges were subsequently ^ropped and the pair married. _r | ‘th nearly 200,000 Marines on the C ^s engaged in the hazards of training ^r 'var, there will be few years that will ^as without a tragedy of some magni- ^e- There have been few modern Com­. ndants who during their stewardship ^Ve not been faced with a major crisis

talion commander and battalion executive officer were relieved of their duties.

The Marine Corps’s Self-Esteem as a Professional Elite: The Commandant has worked hard to engender a warrior spirit in the Marine Corps. Traveling around the Corps, one consistently finds that the last man in the rear rank knows and un­derstands the fundamentals of General Gray’s agenda. From private to general they share his enthusiasm for the profes­sional goals he has set. His agenda is not revolutionary. To the contrary, it is an emphasis on the basics of good soldier­ing. An organization has just so much energy within its corpus and thus far he has managed to focus that energy on the most important tasks. He has also made an impact on the American public, fea­tured in the CBS news magazine “60 Minutes” in a television segment entitled “Papa Bear.”

Short Rounds: Other significant Ma­rine Corps events in 1988 included the following—

►  The Marine Corps Association cele­brated its 75th anniversary.

►  The principal charges against retired Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North were dropped while proceedings continued on 12 lesser charges with a trial convened early in 1989.

►  Died: Retired Marine Colonel Gregory “Pappy” Boyington, a Medal of Honor and Navy Cross recipient, died on 11 January at the age of 75. He was a fighter pilot ace many times over with 28 Japa­nese aircraft to his credit. Lieutenant General Louis H. Buehl, III died 5 Octo­ber, having suffered a stroke. He was serving as the chief of staff at Headquar­ters Marine Corps at the time of his death. Retired Brigadier General James P.S. Devereux, a Navy Cross recipient and hero of Wake Island, died at the age of 85. He served four terms in the House of Representatives after his retirement from the Marine Corps.

An Assessment: 1988 was a good year for the Marine Corps. The quality of the individual Marine remained high. The Corps was well led. Marine Corps unit readiness was at a peacetime high. There were many successes. The death of Lance Corporal Rother was the most unsettling event of the year, for it raised the ques­tion of professional competence at the most basic, critical levels. Generally, Marines don’t believe that the incident is symptomatic of the quality of small-unit leadership in the Marine Corps. Never­theless, it was and remains the occasion for serious reflection on the concepts of responsibility, accountability of com­mand, and the basic precepts of good leadership.

‘Maj Mark Cancian, USMC, “The Crash of *89." Marine Corps Gazette, March 1988, p 58. ²Cancian, op cit.

³Ambassador George F. Kennan, McNeil Lehrer Show CNN Television, 23 December 1988.

⁴LGcn Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.), Marine Corps Gazette, November 1988, p 48.

⁵Peter Almond. “Army reaching for Air Force’s place in the sky,” Washington Times, 11 January 1988, p. A-l.

⁶William Matthews, “Expanding defense role pre­dicted for Navy,” Navy Times, 19 December 1988, p. 24. Many readers will recall Record’s 1975 article in the Washington Post with Martin Binkin question­ing the contemporary utility of the Marine Corps and their subsequent book, “Where does the Marine Corps Go From Here?”

⁷Jeffrey Record, “The Army’s Clouded Future,” The Washington Post, 15 November 1988. General Carl Vuono, Chief of Staff of the Army, took excep­tion to the Record article in the 7 December 1988 Washington Post, p. A-21, without mentioning the Marine Corps.

⁸Gen A.M. Gray, Commandant of the Marine Corps, “Annual Report of the Marine Corps to Congress” as printed in the Marine Corps Gazette, April 1988, p. 25.

^yMaj. Gen. William R. Etnyre, USMC, and Lt. Col. Michael L. Patrow, USMC, “Moving Ahead . . . Our Corps Is On the March” Marine Corps Gazette, August 1988, p. 46.

¹⁰As reported by Caleb Baker, “Harrier Approval Ends Navy, Marines Struggle,” Defense News, 24 October 1988, p. 40; Defense News, 24 October 1988, p. 1.

"John W. R. Taylor, “A Year to Remember” Air Force Magazine, January 1989, p. 66. ^l2Quotcd in “Getting the Jump on Base Damage,” Insight, 6 February 1989, p. 34.

"ibid.

^l4Navy Times, 16 January 1989, p. 18. ^l5Gcn. A.M. Gray, op cit.

^l6Col. John C. Scharfen, USMC (Ret.), “Tactics and Theory of Maneuver Warfare,” an interview with Major General Alfred M. Gray, USMC, Amphibious Warfare Review, July 1984, p. 10.

"Gen. A.M. Gray, op cit.

¹⁸As reported in the Marine Corps Gazette, February 1988, p. 7.

"Elizabeth P. Donovan, “Gray calls for books to join boots in Marines’ scabags,” Navy Times, 5 De­cember 1988, p. 16.

²⁰This force structure is a paraphrase of “Force Structure Changes Approved,” Marine Corps Ga­zette, July 1988, p. 4, and a similar report in the August issue, p. 4.

^2lNavy Times, 23 January 1989, p. 57.

²²As quoted in Navy Times, 6 February 1989.

²³Navy Times 23 January 1989, p. 57.

Colonel Scharfen received a bachelor of arts degree from Stanford University and a master’s degree in international relations from Georgetown University. He was a member of the Secretary of the Navy’s spe­cial study panel on progress of the war in Southeast Asia; a lecturer on Pacific strategy; general war plan­ner for Europe on the staff of U. S. Commander in Chief, Europe; and a lecturer at the U. S. Joint Staff College. He is a senior scientist at TITAN Systems, Inc. in Vienna, Virginia, and sits on the Board of the Marine Corps Historical Foundation.