Tomorrow’s Fleet

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of funds for three more Henry (T-AO-187)-class fleet oilers (t,,^Slx more air cushion landing craft So vehicles than the Navy wanted. ‘‘I^^{0 a}ccounts, like the DDG-51 and the clas^Ved” ^{Los An}S^eles (SSN-688)- f_e attack submarine programs, suf- ,_ions Ending (but not numerical) reduc- th_c ?. 'ⁿ the main, however, everything -j,J^avy requested was approved.

^: Senate Appropriations Committee

$9 Jj^ed Navy’s 1989 SCN request to 5|_s billion, but approved five DDG- re_So~~^dlree funded with fiscal year 1989 y_ear ^rces and the other two with prior- w_asf appropriations and savings. This rey ^otally unexpected, as the Navy had fc*** only three DDG-51s for fiscal ^Rar 1989 - - -             •                                          -

Art,

while the previous year the

th_e r-¹ ^^Urke program was “zeroed” by T(_c ‘’Ugrcss in favor of buying out the pro/^{1 er}°ga (CG-47)-class Aegis cruiser N;iy,^rani- The Senate approved the t^UfJ'.i ^rc9^uest for two SSN-688s, but ^cUr«

,_rp^UCed «>e

‘feme.

$304 million advanced pro- ^r>tjl|P^lcn‘ request by 42% to only $175 Po„_e ⁿ’ J^Ust enough for the nuclear com- l98g ti! ^tor 'he^two boats the Navy said in futu_r ^at it wanted in fiscal 1990 but not T-,\q years. The Senate funded four that q, ^ “^eet oilers rather than the five the v>^e ‘h)use approved, and it scolded

h^Jvy for

^on the relatively small ship-

imposing “considerable

Iq,

After her launch on 15 July 1988, the Chancellorsville, the 12th Ticon- deroga-class Aegis cruiser, is guided to her outfitting berth, while the amphibious assault ship Wasp is readied for her March 1989 delivery to the Navy.

assuming the requests are eventually ap­proved, the Navy will have 574 battle force ships by the end of fiscal year 1990 and 571 ships at the close of fiscal year 1991.

House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Chairman Les Aspin (D-Wl) remarked that the 2% real growth re­quested by President Reagan will not be approved, and that the President’s de­fense budget would be lucky to stay even with inflation. Senator Sam Nunn (D- GA), chairman of the SASC, was simi­larly pessimistic; he noted even before the Reagan budget was formally submit­ted to the Hill that zero real growth was the best the Pentagon could hope for.

Indeed, President Bush’s amended fis­cal year 1990 budget submitted in Febru­ary 1989 acknowledged the inevitable, allowing Defense Department spending to just keep pace with inflation. The Bush Office of Management and the Budget reportedly sent the January defense bud­get back to the Pentagon to cut about $2 billion from each service’s account, a process held up because of the Roman Circus-like atmosphere of former Senator John Tower’s bid to become Defense Secretary. Even then, some commenta­tors hinted that much more savings would have to come from defense accounts to ensure that Bush’s campaign promises for “a kinder, gentler nation” would be ful­filled and that the budget deficits would finally be brought under control.

These politico-fiscal deliberations in 1989 and the coming years will be carried out against a backdrop of national secu­rity and naval policy soul-searching, and international conventional arms negotia­tions that might be expanded to include naval disarmament. For example, the HASC’s Seapower Subcommittee an­nounced in February that it would hold hearings during 1989 on five key naval issues: the ability of ships to defend against cruise missiles, the implications of arms control initiatives for the Navy, the composition of the future surface navy, ship overhaul policies, and mine warfare programs, the latter a perennial sore point between Congress and the Navy. HASC sources, moreover, indi­cated that the hearings would also exam­ine the most fundamental dimensions of U. S. national strategy and policy, U. S. foreign commitments and the require-

fiscal year 1990 and $320.9 billion in fis­cal year 1991, each a 2% “real” increase (above inflation) over the previous year’s funding. The Navy asked for $101.7 bil­lion in budget authority for fiscal year 1990 (compared to $97.4 billion it re­ceived in fiscal year 1989); for fiscal year 1991, the Navy requested $105.1 billion. Secretary of the Navy William Ball III, in his “posture statement” released in March, stated that: “In real terms, Navy and Marine Corps funding remains below that of any fiscal year since 1984. We have trimmed every possible account in order to support National commitments .... We have supported and funded per­sonnel and material readiness, and en­deavored to protect force structure gains of the past years in an overall balanced program.”

The theme of the 1990-91 defense budget requests, however, was that the Navy’s share of the defense pie shrank, and was no longer the favorite among the armed services for funding. For example, the Navy received 43.8% of the fiscal year 1980 budget, compared to the Air Force’s 36.3%, a relationship that held throughout most of the Reagan years. By 1991, if all goes according to the January 1989 submission, Navy funding will ac­count for 37.6% of the total defense bud­get, while the Air Force will command 43.8%.

Navy shipbuilding plans envision 20 new ships and two conversions in 1990 and 14 new-construction ships in 1991, for a projected cost of $10.4 billion and $9.8 billion, respectively. (See Table 1.) Counting programmed retirements, and

that are building mine counter­Ending cost-overrun claims.

asu_r,

ⁿg'!

es

(MCM) ships by not settling

Set, * ^Cnt Reagan’s final two-year bud- *3* g 'uitted in January 1989, called for Ptllion in defense spending for

ers for the next 200 years!” We shot¹ j

therefore, look to future requests

CVN-76 (in fiscal year 1996), CVN-y

and follow-on “modified repeat” Nii^,u'

■ ition

class ships in a “heel-to-toe” acquis¹

badl^e

tivisf¹’

including sp®^c' Duld carry out n

types of missions. Nevertheless

purpose SSNs that would carry out ¹

$139 million in fiscal years

in'¹'¹;

fis^

f4a^vy

No funds have been requested for years 1990 and 1991, but other submarine warfare initiatives may _s compass future SSN developtm ^ However, at least given what is ^vism ,_vil the surface, similar initiatives are under way in 1989 with regard to to j ons to the Ohio (SSBN-726)-class ^rl ballistic-missile submarines.              ._aVy

All this being said, the U. S-

ju­nto

urce^s. and"

Bush shares his predecessor’s

maintaining a strong defense, but a

vices face challenges to once-sacr° national security “imperatives claims on the nation’s treasury.

A

merits for specific naval force levels and mixes to meet those commitments, and the relevance of the Navy’s declared mar­itime strategy in the international envi­ronment of the 1990s. Similar reviews of Navy policy and strategy were expected in the Senate.

U. S. Navy officials have privately acknowledged the arms control “threat” to naval forces, especially those capable of launching land-attack cruise missiles, but argued that Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev’s promises of far-reaching perestroika and dramatic arms reductions had yet to be fulfilled. Furthermore, they hinted at the fragility of the Soviet politi­cal system, that Gorbachev’s government and his policies could change overnight, and that in any case the Soviet military threat to the West will remain essentially intact. Moreover, if Gorbachev’s reforms are successful, the Soviet Union’s mili­tary could become even stronger in the future—a daunting proposition.

The bottom line from the U. S. Navy’s perspective was that of course the United States should proceed with arms control negotiations. But the government should do so cautiously to ensure that any modi­fications in overall U. S. force structure will preserve those elements that, first, can respond best to the widest spectrum of contingencies the United States is most likely to face, and, second, will most ef­fectively permit the United States to meet its commitments in the decades ahead. Given this world view, any fundamental alteration in U. S. naval force levels and structures, especially the reduction in number of deployable carrier battle groups, would be foolish. On the other hand, about those Army divisions and Air Force wings in Europe and Korea. . . .

Several 1988 analytical efforts, such as the Navy’s ongoing Quo Vadis? study at the Center for Naval Analyses and the National Academy of Science/Naval Studies Board Navy 21 study, looked well beyond the turn of the century, and addressed future technology requirements of and implications for the fleet of 2030. Other initiatives that came to fruition dur­ing 1988 will perhaps have a more pro­found effect on the Navy’s near-term fu­ture forces. Perhaps the most far-reaching was the approval by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) of the broad recom­mendation in the surface warfare office’s Ship Operational Characteristics Study (SOCS) and Surface Combatant Force Requirements Study (SCFRS), part of surface warfare’s “Revolution at Sea” initiative.

The SCFRS specifically called for a revised notional surface combatant force level of 224 ships, compared with 242 under the previous plan, comprising 120 “battle force combatants” (BFCs), 100 “protection of shipping” (POS) units, and four “mission essential units” (MEUs). Getting there from here will require a sustained shipbuilding program of five or six ships per year and, more radically, embracing a revolutionary con­cept of “flexible transition.” This calls for allowing “battle force” ships—those that operate in concert with carrier battle forces and surface action groups—to transition to less-demanding roles, i.e., protection of shipping—underway re­plenishment groups (URGs), convoys, and the like—rather than undergo exten­sive and costly mid-life upgrades in the hope of being able to defeat future threats.

Thus, if all goes according to plan, the future Navy will comprise only three fun­damental “types” of surface warships, with today’s BFCs—existing cruisers and destroyers—being relegated to POS roles in the early 2000s and beyond. The Navy will also forego any future “frig­ate” construction, as the emphasis will be on acquiring only multimission battle force ships and four MEUs to replace today’s Iowa (BB-61)-class battleships. According to current schedules, the first BFC of the 1980s, the USS Spruance (DD-963), will “transition flexibly” to a POS role in 2003; more DD-963s will follow. Expect, as well, to see today’s Ticonderoga-class Aegis cruisers escort­ing tomorrow’s amphibious groups, URGs, and convoys—a surprising de­nouement. Between now and then, how­ever, the Navy must expect to be chal­lenged directly on what its plans are for the existing frigates. Will they or should they get antiair and antisubmarine up­grades to allow them to play meaningful roles as POS units in the transition be­tween the “traditional” Beet of 1989 and the Revolution at Sea fleet of 2005? And, if so, how many dollars will really be available to make it happen?

There were indications that the Revo­lution at Sea efforts, although focused on the next century, could still have an im­portant effect on near-term DDG-51 con­struction. In a September 1988 speech at the Naval Surface Warfare Center, the CNO declared that “integrated electric drive, with its associated cluster of tech­nologies, will be the method of propul­sion for the next class of surface battle force combatants, and I am directing all the major Navy organizations involved in these efforts to concentrate their energies toward that objective.” The first candi­date for electric drive in surface combat­ants could be one of the later “Flight 3” Aegis destroyers, probably one requested

in fiscal year 2003, a possibility outline by Vice Admiral John Nyquist, Assistan CNO for Surface Warfare at a briefing f°^r the HASC in late February 1989.                                       ^

Nothing so dramatic as SOCs an SCFRS has been undertaken for ® Navy’s aircraft carrier and submarine (a tack and ballistic-missile) forces. ‘ word has been “steady as she g°^eS’ with former Navy Secretary John man’s comment of a few years ago? ticularly appropriate (if hyperbolic): will continue to build Nimitz-class earn

program to maintain desired earner t group (CVBG) force levels.

Propelled by congressional activ the Defense Advanced Research P^f°J Agency’s advanced submarine war initiatives may bring new technology and platforms into the fleet, but t°^r _((| time being the Navy’s position ^seeII,L. be “Seawolf forever!” Yet testimony! , leased last fall) by then-Vice Adm¹^ Bruce Demars, former Assistant CN*- Undersea Warfare, seemed to indica _y willingness to consider several alte tives to the SSN-21,                             ' ’

Navy’s attack submarine develop'’’^ program, after being funded at a to¹¹¹^ in fiscal vears 198° ....

1989, has now been given short ^s j faces an uncertain future, especta the competition for scarce resoi tensifies through the next decade at- ^._r the 21st century, and as the adn^1,111 ^ tion and Congress wrestle with tlw eral deficit and other intractably^ costly national problems. Parb^c ^ ominous for the Navy is the sword ⁰ ₉( Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act: the J of sequestration, in which 50% of ⁿ g savings would come from defers _|1(,i counts, if deficit-reduction targets a .^i

met. There is no doubt that P^reS

inters⁵¹

AIRCRAFT carriers

^by the

success in 1987 in gaining con­

Nav

y^s planned 15. Senator Edward

Kei

The Navy’s carrier programs, buoyed

cessional approval for two Nimitz-class ^Carriers (fiscal year 1988 budget), almost deeded into the background during 1988.

°ut there was great concern within the „^avY 'ⁿ early 1989 about congressional meddling’’ intended to reduce the num- ^er °f deployable CVBGs below the

nnedy (D-MA) has mounted several ,' °^{rts s}>nce fall 1987 to have the Midway ₍. '41) and/or Coral Sea (CV-43) re­^red earlier than planned (CV-43’s retire- pf,^nt Planned for fiscal year 1992 and ha *^{n flsca}! y^ear 1997). These efforts ^ave died in the Senate, but Kennedy’s Porters vowed to take up the issue in - 'when the environment would be conducive to budget reductions.” ther congressional leaders raised stions about carrier numbers as well. (j_r Chairman Sam Nunn said that a ng ^review of the nation’s defense f- ^{s ba}d to include the issue of how pjmy u s. Navy CVBGs are needed in rev'^Cet'^{me an}^ ^war' N^unn stated that this nat'^{eW Wou}^ have to start at the level of °ⁿal strategy and the importance of

carrier forces to securing U. S. national security interests. HASC Chairman Les Aspin was also said to be looking at re­ducing the number of CVBGs to about 13 as a means to save scarce operations and maintenance funds.

There have been numerous reports, moreover, that there is sentiment in the Bush White House, especially in the of­fice of National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, to cut the number of CVBGs to 13, if not 12.

The carrier service life extension pro­gram (CV SLEP) continued without drama, demonstrating why the Navy con­siders it the “best bargain around.” As the Independence (CV-62) rejoined the fleet after completing her SLEP overhaul, the Kitty Hawk (CV-63) entered Philadel­phia Naval Shipyard to begin the work necessary to add another 15 years of op­erational life to her hull and systems. The Ranger (CV-61) has been dropped from the SLEP schedule and will instead re­ceive an “incremental maintenance pro­gram.”

The Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) was launched on 13 February 1988. She is slated to be commissioned in late 1989, when the Navy will finally reach the 15 deployable carrier force level, a goal es­tablished in the first year of the Reagan administration.

An issue that dogged the carrier Navy in early 1989 was the program to refuel and overhaul the Enterprise (CVN-65). The total cost is estimated by some inde­pendent analysts to exceed $2 billion (the Navy’s estimate was $1.46 billion), for an additional 15-17 years of service life. One Senate staffer indicated that if the Bush administration disregarded the Navy’s objections and did not want to sustain 15 CVBGs, it made no sense to refuel the Enterprise. That belief was viewed as creating problems for the rest of the Navy, especially the surface war­fare community, because the Navy’s overall general-purpose force levels are based essentially on the number of de­ployable carriers. If the number of CVBGs were reduced, his argument went, this would also reduce the need for escort ships: "After Enterprise. Midway, and Coral Sea, the most likely target for budget savings in the long run is to re­duce the Navy’s program for DDG-51s.”

^Rface combatants

^r_e„ ^e*,^baP^s the most startling development othg ⁿ2 the Navy’s surface forces, for !7^^{an tbc} Revolution at Sea proposal Ptov ,^^ex'^bl^e transition,” was the ap- d_as ^{al of} five Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)- |t)£g Aegis destroyers in fiscal year nij_(t ' ^^ast summer the Defense Subcom- . °f the Senate Appropriations Ev_er^rn'^ttee responded to the arguments of N|_av ^Ctt Tyatt, Assistant Secretary of the H(l_di^y Shipbuilding and Logistics, by itw¹¹® ^tWo more DDG-5 Is to the Navy’s l9fi§^eSt' fyatt noted that in fiscal year cn,i ^-^ongress authorized five Aegis N_Uv.^{Crs but} funded only four, leaving the ‘If Y °ⁿ '^{ts own to} f'^nance the fifth ship, artel -°^U *^3e*‘^eve Aegis ships are important 0n_Ce^{are a} priority, this approach worked So _ ^Urici it can work again,” Pyatt said. Iat_ed ^^Suasive was his argument, and re- ^c°tith. ^{aVy tes}timony about future surface jeet_M ^ant force requirements and pro- C_0ni shortfalls, that the Appropriations b_Cp'ⁿ'^Uec stated that it "expects the Jhitcnt of Defense to budget for at Piiz_e 'y^c destroyers in the future to mini- me surface combatant shortfall.”

Taking that as a cue, in early 1989 the Navy articulated a DDG-51 program of five destroyers per year for the foreseea­ble future.

The Navy acknowledged in mid- February 1988 that it desired a “multi­year program” for the 25 DDG-5 Is in the fiscal year 1990 five-year plan, rather than the standard annual authorizations and appropriations of individual ships. The Navy’s position on DDG-51 multi­year procurement is to proceed with “multi-year competitions” instead of annual shipbuilding competitions. The first will be in fiscal year 1990 for the ten ships in the fiscal 1990 and 1991 re­quests, the second in fiscal year 1992 for 14 “Flight 2” ships. Funding will remain on an annual appropriations basis. (Al­though contracts for the ships may be in place, there is no guarantee that Congress will in the future allocate the funds to cover them.) The Navy expects to save about $645 million during the 1990-94 five-year plan. Some congressional ob­servers questioned the strategy, noting that although eight DDG-5 Is had been funded through fiscal year 1989, only three were under construction. They ar­gued that the program cannot be consid­ered sufficiently “mature” to achieve the 12% savings required for multiyear pro­curement.

The Arleigh Burke is being built under a $321 million fixed-price contract with Bath Iron Works, her keel laid on 6 De­cember 1988. Ingalls Shipbuilding won the right to build the second ship with a bid of $162 million, while Bath is build­ing the third under a $189.9 million con­tract. In December the Navy announced the award of construction contracts for the five DDG-5 Is approved in fiscal year 1989: Bath won three with a bid of $610 million; Ingalls won two with a $466.5 million bid.

The battleship Wisconsin (BB-64) was recommissioned on 22 October 1988, marking the end of the battleship reacti­vation program.

Restoration of the Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58), severely damaged by an Ira­nian mine in April 1988, began at Bath Iron Works in September. The 14-month,

Suspended next to the mine-damaged Samuel B. Roberts is a ship section replacement module being used in the 14-month restoration of the guided-missile frigate—the first-ever use of such modules.

$96 million effort will see the first use of “replacement modules” to repair entire sections of the ship. Bath engineers spec­ulated that at least two of the ship’s 16 modules will have to be replaced up to the second deck.

The Navy’s interest in developing a new-design patrol craft (PXM), a pro­gram that had $13 million in research and development funding in earlier programs, finally came to a halt in 1988. In spring 1988, Vice Admiral William Rowden, Commander Naval Sea Systems Com­mand, remarked that “we are a blue- water Navy, and one must serve the blue- water Navy first. The PXM must take its place.” That place, apparently, is out of the picture, as no funds have been re­quested for it in 1990 or beyond.

Instead, the Navy appears to be devel­oping a fast coastal patrol boat (PBC), perhaps in response to congressional ini­tiative. The House Appropriations Com­mittee, for example, approved $72 mil­lion in prior-year appropriations for eight or more PBCs, stipulating that “these new patrol combatants must be con­structed to designs that are now in do­mestic production or have been con­structed within the past six years by

proven domestic builders.” The Navy announced in December its intention to award a contract in 1989 for 16 PBCs. As follow-ons to the 65-foot Mk-III patrol boats, the new craft wilbbe used for naval special warfare support, coastal p^atr< surveillance, and interdiction operati⁰ " The service’s tentative plans are f°^r ^ craft 110-140 feet long and a full'l° draft of no more than eight feet.

SUBMARINES

Navy’s programmed SCN budgets cb\ the 1990s. Most observers outside o . Navy’s submarine community are sK ^ cal about the Navy’s chances of s^ucC The Navy’s ballistic-missile subma

Capping a year of speculation, on 9 January 1989 the Navy announced that General Dynamics’s Electric Boat won a contract worth $726 million to build the Seawolf (SSN-21) attack submarine. Electric Boat’s selection came as a sur­prise to some, because Newport News Shipbuilding was responsible for the overall design effort on the Seawolf while Electric Boat designed only the reactor/ propulsor section. The two companies will compete for each additional boat in the class of 30; the SSN-21 is scheduled to enter the fleet in 1995.

The Navy cut short its plans to con­tinue construction of the “Improved” Los Angeles (SSN-688) attack subma­rines, which have come under fire in re­cent months for budget and schedule dif­ficulties. The Navy will close out the SSN-688 line in fiscal year 1990, rather than 1992 as programmed just last year, and will move out more aggressively on the SSN-21 program. In last year’s bud­get submission, for example, the Navy indicated that it wanted two SSN-21s in fiscal years 1991 and 1992, after which three ships per year would be requested. Under the current plan, the Navy will request two Seawolfs in fiscal year 1991 and three per year in fiscal year 1992 and following years. This change came after congressional oversight in fiscal year 1989 dramatically reduced the amounts the Navy wanted for long-lead items for the SSN-688s in the out-years.

In June 1988, the Navy awarded Elec­tric Boat $82.4 million to cover cost overruns the company incurred while in­stalling the new BSY-1 advanced subma­rine combat system on five *SSN-688s, beginning with the first—the San Juan (SSN-751)—and including the Pasadena (SSN-752), Topeka (SSN-754), Miami

(SSN-755), and Alexandria (SSN-7 . The Navy agreed that the P^r0 g_Ci stemmed from outdated and >^nC°^r!_ia(| plans for the SSN-688 design that ^ been provided to Electric Boat *          .

Newport News Shipbuilding. The Juan was commissioned in August 1 six months behind schedule.               _vy

Despite these difficulties, the reached its goal of 100 SSNs de^r' 1988; but the force will drop to 97 ^u j in 1991. It will be difficult to regaif j, maintain the 100-SSN force level, depends upon garnering approval three SSN-21s per year. At $1-5              ^

each, the Seawolf class W" ^ count for more than one-third ⁰

"a* ^‘^asa^^ena> second of the “Improved” Los Angeles-class attack submarines, pi^{s eo,}nmissioned in February 1989, but the program will end earlier than ⁿⁿed so the Navy can focus on the new Seawolf attack boat.

force, free from major controversies last year, may not escape unscathed in 1989. U. S. Representative Charles Bennett (D- FL), the Chairman of the HASC Sea- power Subcommittee, . commented in February 1989 that he wanted to explore the possibility of delaying one Ohio-class SSBN requested in fiscal year 1990 to pursue development of “smaller” naval ships as one way to achieve the 600-ship Navy. Bennett argued that delaying one Trident could free up $1.3 billion for other, more useful general-purpose com­batants or smaller ships like MCM ves­sels and ocean surveillance ships. Last spring, Bennett also tried, but failed, to remove one Trident SSBN from the Navy’s fiscal year 1989 request.

Sixteen Ohio-class SSBNs are now in service (nine) or under contract (seven), and some observers estimate that no more than 20 Trident boats will be acquired. The Navy’s plan for fiscal years 1990­94, however, calls for building one per year. If all are eventually approved, and the service continues the program beyond fiscal year 1994, that 20-SSBN projec­tion will be exceeded. The first SSBN armed with the D-5/Trident II missile, the Tennessee (SSBN-734), will be opera­tional in December 1989. All remaining ships in the class will be armed with D-5s, and beginning in the early 1990s the eight active Trident SSBNs now car­rying the C-4/Trident I missile will be converted to carry the Trident II.

Mine

WARFARE SHIPS

^caHy, in the same month that the _sive"^e/ Roberts suffered such exten­d'd u'^ne ^^amag^c> the Navy announced it thre ^ ^final'y award the contracts for the c_0(j^e Avenger (MCM-l)-class mine l9j.^^ttrnieasures ships approved in fiscal thr_e ^atlC* seek funds for the final Thjj⁶ ships in the 1990 budget.

b]_C(] ^^as seen as helping bring the trou- m_ert        program to a close, but nu-

4v_e ^s controversies concerning the Ve_ar^S<^ class simmered throughout the th_e lew* ^eventually held up the award for In i ^sll'P^s-

thre_e    Marinette Marine, builder of

fi\_)tri ^^Vengers, received $12.2 million fo_{r e} . Navy to settle several requests Dionth¹'*³*³*^{6 at}U^ustrnent (REAs) after 34 The Pp discussions with the Navy, lion ₀f ^Were submitted for compensa­te ■ i,^{C0StS mcurr}ed because the Navy after L °^U1 '^,000 changes in the design An_otu ^arinette was awarded contracts. ^er 51.4 million will be paid as an

REA for future work on these ships, al­though $63 million in claims was still outstanding at the time of the agreement and threatened Marinette’s continued participation in the program. By year’s end, the resolution of the $63 million in claims and the Navy’s extension of the deadline for bidding on the remaining six ships allowed Marinette to reenter the competition. However, the last three ships requested in fiscal year 1990 are options on a contract with Peterson, ef­fectively removing Marinette from the program.

The Navy’s beleaguered mine warfare program also suffered problems with its Osprey (MHC-51)-class coastal mine- hunters. In early May 1988, the Navy reported that the lead MHC-51 would cost about $120 million, $20 million more than the Navy had requested in the fiscal year 1989 SCN budget. That an­nouncement proved to be instantaneously controversial. One industry analyst was quoted as saying that the ship, being built by Intermarine USA in Savannah, Geor­gia, was originally priced at around $35 million, with average costs of follow- ships estimated to be about $26 million. Private assessments in mid-1988 pro­jected a final cost for the lead Osprey as high as $150 million. The Navy disputed those claims, saying that Intermarine never proposed costs as low as $35 mil­lion. Officially, the Navy estimated that the ship will cost no more than $120.1 million.

Nevertheless, the MHC-51 problems apparently arose when the Navy, follow­ing the demise of the Cardinal-class air- cushion minehunter in 1986, decided to “scale-up” the Italian Lerici-class coastal minehunter, change the propul­sion system, and add much heavier mine­hunting equipment than the Italian de­signers had anticipated. The original Intermarine proposal, for example, re­portedly called for a full-load displace-

Controversy has dogged the Osprey coastal minehunter, an upscaled ver­sion of the Italian Lerici, though work began on the lead ship in May 1988 and congressional support is strong for the 17-ship program.

ment of about 540 tons; the ship is now projected to have a displacement of 851 tons. The initial construction of the lead MHC began on schedule in May 1988, but at a meeting later that month Inter­marine provided new production data indicating that the original plan, with the ship to be delivered in April 1991, was “optimistic.”

The Navy, in response to congres­sional interest, is proposing that the third unit will be competed in fiscal year 1990, with the second unit going to Inter­marine. A total of 17 ships are in the pro­gram.

Congress approved two MHCs in the Navy’s fiscal year 1989 SCN program, and the current Reagan/Bush budget re­quests three MHCs each in fiscal years 1990 and 1991. Shipbuilders have been watching Intermarine’s progress.

A plan espoused by the Naval Reserve Association to upgrade the Naval Reserve Force’s harbor minesweeping capabilities was causing problems in mid-1988, in­volving the Navy, Congress, and ship­builders in kibitzing about the future di­rection of the Navy’s craft of opportunity program (COOP). The NRF is slated to get 22 converted commercial ships and naval yard patrol craft in the COOP initi­ative for peacetime training and route conditioning of harbors and near-shore coastal areas. These 22 vessels could be

augmented in war with another 66 take up from trade in an emergency. The sn'P are being outfitted with niinesvveep¹¹¹' equipment, though some observers q^uy tion the capabilities of the COOP vesse ^ Instead, proponents of a propose acquire up to 20 “Super-COOPs ^ that by acquiring new versions of the 683 craft and outfitting them with bo^ minehunting and mine-neutrali^³ ^ equipment, these “Super-COOPs’ ^c°^u,_s more capably augment the N^a Avenger- and Osprey-class ships. Iⁿ fiscal year 1989 Appropriations ^ ^ Congress directed the Navy to test “Super-COOP” proposal, in ^essel|_ve replicating a 1987 congressional direo ^ to try out a YP-683 outfitted with equipment. In the initial trial the tn° . fied YP-683 was shown to be inapP^r°P ate for the task.

AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE SHIPS

Work continued on the Wasp (LHD-1) class. The Wasp was launched in 1987 and delivered to the Navy in March 1989. Three additional ships have been author­ized and are under contract. Because of “budgetary pressures,” the fifth and sixth ships in the planned eight-ship pro­gram have been deferred to fiscal years 1992 and 1993, respectively, and two ships may be requested after fiscal year 1994. The program for the Harpers Ferry (LSD-49/LSD-41) “cargo variant” dock landing ship will go forward, probably as a package to Avondale Industries, the incumbent yard. Two were to have been requested in fiscal year 1992, but the pro­gram has been “stretched,” allowing for only one ship per year under the current five-year plan.

Early in 1989, the House Appropria­

tions Defense Subcommittee beg^an consider speeding up LCAC pr°^clirc ^ ^ as one way to reduce the total price ⁰ program and perhaps to acquire ^ LCACs than originally planned. ^ Navy’s fiscal year 1990 five-year ^ calls for 57 LCACs to be acquired. ^ lower rates than the 15 per year tha ^ House wanted. The Navy’s request ~g nine LCACs ($222 million) and 12 * '

Marine Corps Commandant Alfred Gray, Jr., had to be pleased with the January 198$ launching of the dock landing ship Comstock, the fifth ship of the Whidbey Island class, and the news that the Harpers Ferry (LSD- 49) cargo variant is in the works.

million) in fiscal years 1990 and 1991, respectively, with 12 per year through fiscal year 1994. Originally planning for 90 LCACs, the Navy, according to cur­rent estimates, will eventually order more than 100 of the 50-knot air-cushion craft.

The Marines are actively investigating the development of a new, fast, long- ranged motorized amphibious landing craft to replace the obsolescent LVTP7, which recently got a face-lift and was renamed the amphibious assault vehicle. As many as 1,400 units of the envisioned “advanced amphibious assault system” are projected.

fleet

AUXILIARIES

^SCVen of its Henry J. Kaiser (T-AO-187)- th_e ^^eet oilers between two shipyards;

shi ^{US Went t0} Avondale) to keep more Pyards in business, in support of rec- “tttine ■

ship, °^{n tbe} grounds of maintaining the W_as ,^Ul'ding base. However, the Navy tiat; ^lrectcd by Congress to pursue nego-

*ons —•

_Co ^arly in 1988 the Navy responded to th §^ress>°^nal pressure and announced ^ut *t Would split the contracts for the last

^clas:

service originally had planned for a t_a, ^ncr-take-all competition, apparently _Sp ^by Avondale Industries. A Navy ^sPl',^esrnan noted that the service was f , 'ⁿ8 the program (four of the seven

■ L/S Wf»nt tn A\jntirlo1o\ f 1/Aon mnro ^^ndations of the President’s Com-

°ⁿ on the Merchant Marine and ^c‘^ense

•pL

Avr, ^Ut P^rovecl to be a contentious move, oi^dale, the lead yard with 13 of the 15 the ^fS *^{n tbe} program, threatened to sue _C government if the Navy is forced by thr_e;^r^^{ss t0} open up competition for the _viou^e,T-AO-187^s that the Navy had pre- _Avq% indicated it wanted to award to th_e ^lJj^a*^e' December, the Secretary of $h₍₎'| ,^avy argued that the three ships the awarded to Avondale because Co_st^eStimat^ed $90 million in additional 'ified ^l° ^w‘^{tb anotber} yard ^was not jus

Se_e j-'“ ^w'th Avondale’s competitors to itiov ^thcy could beat Avondale’s price, a en_e. | that prompted Avondale’s threat- th_e yj ^c8^ai action. In mid-February 1989, ti_aie l ^extended its deadline to renego- 1_87s |d-^s on the three remaining T-AO- ' Orders were placed with Avondale

on 20 March, ending the dispute.

This situation was exacerbated by re­ports in early February 1989 that Penn­sylvania Shipyard might be asked by the Navy to stop work on the two T-AO-187 oilers under construction because of fi­nancial problems at the yard, and that another yard would complete the ships. One of the ships was about 90% complete and the other about 70%, although some industry analysts thought these estimates were too high, thus increasing the risk to any shipyard invited to take over the two ships. In any event, there could be monu­mental political problems for the Navy if it tries to shift the two Penn ships to Avondale and persists in the plan to have Avondale build the final three ships. However, the two Penn oilers could be transferred to Avondale and the remain­ing three ships awarded to a third yard, which would be a neat political solution, especially if Congress increases the an­nual buys of LCACs from Avondale and Textron.

There were reports in early February 1989 that the Navy was becoming con­cerned about possible plans by the own­ers of San Diego-based National Steel and Shipbuilding Company (NASSCO) to shift the work on two Supply (AOE-6)- class fast combat support ships then under construction to another yard, possi­bly Avondale. Corporate officials of Morrison-Knudson, the owner of NASSCO, were apparently trying to di­vest the shipyard through an employee buyout, and were said to have ap­proached Avondale about taking over construction of the AOEs. Some observ­ers said NASSCO had underbid the AOE program, creating severe cash-flow prob­lems just as Morrison-Knudsen officials began trying to sell the company. If NASSCO/Morrison-Knudsen were suc­cessful in transferring the AOEs to Avon­dale, this was seen as creating problems for the Navy with regard to its intent to have Avondale build the final three T-AO-187s. Early in 1989 Morrison- Knudsen reportedly received from the Navy an agreement to release it from its corporate financial obligations guarantee­ing adequate funding to complete the AOEs. This would allow it to sell the shipyard to its employees, and would also allow NASSCO to keep the two ships rather than transfer them to Avondale. Within days of this report, talks between Morrison-Knudsen and Avondale were broken off; the two AOEs already awarded will now probably stay in San Diego.

In an April 1988 report, the Congres­sional Budget Office (CBO) warned that the Navy may be significantly understat­ing the actual combat logistics force re­quirements. The CBO report analyzed current and projected peacetime and pos­sible wartime operations under the Navy’s maritime strategy, examined the implications of the new vertical launch systems in Aegis cruisers and destroyers for underway replenishment, and calcu­lated the real needs for combat logistics forces. The upshot is that the CBO re­jected the Navy’s estimate of 65 ships as being far too low to meet the real require­ments, and estimated that 93 ships would be more realistic.

A similar problem pervades the de- stroyer/submarine tender and ship-repair force, some ships of which date from early World War II years. Recent analy­ses of the Navy’s wartime battle-damage repair requirements have indicated that the service has woefully neglected its needs in this area. Yet replacements for these aging but critical ships are relegated to the far out-years in the SCN plan, making most reasonable observers as­sume that they will never be built until a crisis is upon the Navy.

In June 1988, the Navy began design­ing a new class of small waterplane area/ twin-hull (SWATH) ocean-surveillance ships that are expected to displace 60% more than the Victorious (T-AGOS-19)- class SWATHs to be operated for the Military Sealift Command. The T-

AGOS-23 will be 279 feet long, have a beam of 103 feet, displace 5,340 tons

fully loaded, and have an electric-drive plant. The mission requirement is to stay on station for 90 days with a 45-man crew. McDermott Shipyards is building the T-AGOS-19 SWATH ships, which are 231 feet long, have a 93-foot beam, and displace 3,438 tons fully loaded. The Navy has requested $156 million for the first T-AGOS-23 ship in fiscal year 1990. with another five ships to follow through fiscal year 1994.

STRATEGIC SEALIFT

The Navy’s strategic sealift force plans are essentially complete, although four crane ship (T-ACS) conversions must still be completed. Two of these were funded in fiscal year 1988 and will be placed under contract in 1989. The Mari­time Administration has requested fund­ing for the final two crane ships in its fis­cal year 1990 budget, although there has been some discussion about increasing the total number to be acquired. There will be a continued need, however, to provide the funds necessary to ensure the readiness of the Ready Reserve Force and National Defense Reserve Fleet to meet expected contingencies.

A Naval Sea Systems Command (Nav-

Sea) study on fast sealift technologies and developments was expected in early 1989 to revisit the debate on whether the Navy should increase U. S. strategic mobility by developing a fast sealift ship (SFS), even though Navy Secretary Ball report­edly quashed the proposal in December. Although there is strong support for the concept from the Army and some ele­ments of the Navy, the Navy’s civilian leadership remained convinced that a proposal to use about $11 million in bal­anced technology initiative funds for SFS research was “premature.” The British firm of Thomycroft, Giles and Company has been promoting a design it calls a “clipper ship”—a short, fat hull design of 25,000 tons fully loaded driven b) pump jets at 40-50 knots and capable o carrying 5,000 tons of cargo across the Atlantic in three days.

The debate about strategic lift ^vvaS highlighted in the fiscal year 1989 ^al1 thorization act, which required the Na^v> to “prepare estimates on the requireme , for fast sealift under the same scenarios used by the Joint Chiefs of Staff m ^|IS annual net assessments. One idea is have a multipurpose SFS that can be us® for amphibious warfare. Some Navy oi cials indicated that the service needs - 63 SFSs, at a projected cost of $500 m^l lion each, to meet the real strategic ⁿ'° bility needs of the United States.

U. S. COAST GUARD

In mid-1988, Commandant Paul A. Yost, Jr., praised the new Heritage-class patrol boats as the “best patrol boats in the world,” despite the fact that the pro­totype was not placed under contract until February 1989 and series production is not projected until 1992. Yost com­mented that “if the [Heritage class] is as good as it looks on paper, then I would build the 118-foot Heritage class for the remainder of my patrol boat buy, rather than the Island [WPB-1301] class.” The prototype is being built by Coast Guard shipyard Curtis Bay in Baltimore, while the yard’s future is debated.

Although praise for the new Heritage- class boats has been fulsome, the Coast Guard continued to look to its future needs in this area. NATO Special Work­ing Group 6 of the NATO Naval Arma­ments Group, chaired by U. S. Coast Guard Captain Arthur Shepherd, has been working on a concept paper for a future family of patrol boats using ad­vanced hull forms that could meet the divergent needs of the participating na­vies. The effort includes analyses of sur­face-effect ships, hydrofoils, air-cushion vehicles, wing-in-ground-effect vehicles, and planing hulls. Although the initial as­sessments include only coastal patrol missions, the effort is expected to be ex­panded to cover offshore roles, as well: antisubmarine warfare and ocean mine countermeasures, among others. The goal of current studies is to define tenta­tive top-level requirements for specific missions, to identify hull forms and tech­nologies best suited to meet those re­quirements, and to provide input for later concept refinements.

The global publicity of last year’s res­cue of two whales trapped in the ice off Point Barrow, Alaska, and reliance on two Soviet icebreakers in that effort, prompted the Coast Guard again to seek funds for its ice-breaking fleet. At the time of the whale rescue, the Coast Guard

had only three icebreakers, one of whi^c ^ the World War II-vintage North^ffl (WAGB-282), was taken out of ^serV'^cll_f January 1989. Nevertheless, in Octo ^ 1988 the Office of Management and get rejected a request for $300 mill'⁰¹¹ acquire a new icebreaker.        _f

The Coast Guard had spent $2 milb since 1987 to design a new icebreak j but nothing has happened because ^ dickering about whether the set'’ should build a ship or lease an exist ship. Toward the end of the year, it ^ announced after much wrangling that Coast Guard would be allowed to req^u j $200 million in its fiscal year 1990 1991 budgets to replace the Norths¹¹' j Like the Navy, the Coast Guard difficulties with its shipyards in ••^h _ft The service asked the U. S. District in Maine to dismiss a $90 million l^avvS _s, filed by Bath Iron Works in May, ^a<* _s ing the Coast Guard of hiding the cost of overhauling four Hcii'ⁿ

HEC-715)-class high-endurance cut- ^ers assigned to Bath. The case dated ack to 1985 when the Coast Guard hired ^ath and Todd Pacific Shipyards to mod- anuze 12 ₀f its 378-foot WHECs for 2 million. The Bath lawsuit contends ^at even then the Coast Guard knew that ^e repair work could eventually cost as ^Uc^ as $1 billion, citing a 1985 internal ^emo from the Coast Guard inspector ^nerai’s office, which stated that be- ^Use ‘accurate work statements and cost 'mates were not developed, uncertain­ly ^S ®^x'^st about the extent and cost of the sub ^t0 Performed.” In 1987, Bath $9()^m'^tted ^c*^a'^ms f^or additional time and radlion to cover extra costs in addi­tion to the $110 million initial contract price, stemming from the Coast Guard’s inability to find most of the 1,550 engi­neering drawings and blueprints of the Hamilton. Bath officials contend that no drawings of the combat system, diesel generators, propulsion plant, or helicop­ter hangar were provided, and that the Coast Guard could not document any design changes and repairs made to the cutters since they were commissioned in the 1960s.

The Coast Guard offered $25 million for compensation, but Bath rejected it. In mid-September, however, the shipyard dropped the lawsuit and agreed to negoti­ate its $90 million in claims, while con­tinuing to work on four cutters. Bath de­livered the Hamilton to the Coast Guard in November after completing her over­haul but without reaching an agreement on what the final cost will be. The other three cutters—the Dallas (WHEC-716), Chase (WHEC-718), and Gallatin (WHEC-721)—remain at Bath, undergo­ing their modernizations. The Dallas is scheduled to be delivered in August.

Dr. Truver is the Director of the National Security and Warfare Analysis Group at Information Spec­trum, Inc., and serves as the Director of Studies and Analysis for the Military Data Corporation, which produces the online USNI Military Database.

Table 2 U. S. Navy Shipbuilding and Conversion Status

•I/h '

Name

FY

Program                 Builder                 Status (Apr. 1989)

"73s Tennessee

ft.

SUBMARINES

%

^36      ^Pennsylvania

737  Z^eS’ ^Vir«^inia

^l6N-73₈     Kentucky

6\.73₉  Ktarylaud

^ftM-74A Nebraska

’41

%

■’23

^SUBm.

ARINES

1980        Electric Boat

1983       Electric  Boat

1984       Electric  Boat

1985       Electric  Boat

1986       Electric  Boat

1987       Electric  Boat

1988       Electric  Boat

1989       Electric  Boat

Comm. 17 Dec. 88 Lau. 23 Apr. 88 K.L. 18 Dec. 87 K.L. 18 Dec. 87 K.L. 18 Dec. 87 K.L. 18 Dec. 87 Ord. 5 Jan. 88 Ord. 5 Oct. 88

h-

^N’ss

7So       °Uahoma City

®           Nc

export News

■’52      ^san J_uan

’S3    '

’56

■757 Scr,

asadena

Albany

Topeka

Ktiami

•v>

’60

Qnton Alexandria

Ksheviu_e Teffersott City Annapolis

Springfield

Oolnmbus

Sante F_e Bois_e

Montpelier Oharlott_e Oantpton Hartford Toledo Tu,

icson

S!

1981       Newport News

1982       Newport News

1983       Electric  Boat

1983       Electric  Boat

1984       Newport News

1984       Electric  Boat

1984       Electric  Boat

1985       Newport News

1985       Electric Boat

1985        Newport News

1985       Newport News

1986       Electric  Boat

1986       Electric  Boat

1986       Electric  Boat

1986       Electric  Boat

1987       Newport News

1987        Newport News

1987        Newport News

1987       Newport News

1988                      Electric  Boat

1988        Newport News

1988       Newport  News

1989       Electric  Boat

1989        Newport News

Comm. 9 Jul. 88 Lau. 15 Mar. 86 Comm. 6 Aug. 88 Comm. 11 Feb. 89 Lau. 13 Jun. 87 Lau. 23 Jan. 88 Lau. 12 Nov. 88 K.L. 27 Jun. 86 Lau. 20 Feb. 89 K.L. 14 Jan. 87 K.L. 19 Oct. 87 K.L. 15 Jun. 88 Ord. 21 Mar. 86 Ord. 21 Mar. 86 Ord. 21 Mar. 86 Ord. 6 Feb. 87 Ord. 6 Feb. 87 Ord. 6 Feb. 87 Ord. 6 Feb. 87 Ord. 30 Jun. 88 Ord. 10 Jun. 88 Ord. 10 Jun. 88 Ord. 14 Dec. 88 Ord. 14 Dec. 88

4b,

4-,

'^raham U_ncotn orge Washington °^hnC.S,ennis

.'V

\ ^Missil_e

1983      Newport News

1983      Newport News

1988      Newport News

1988      Newport News

Lau. 13 Feb. 88 K.L. 25 Aug. 86 Ord. 30 Jun. 88 Ord. 30 Jun. 88

CRUISERS ^ Champlain

1984 Ingalls

Comm. 12 Aug. 88

FY

317

FY

TypeIHull                      Name                   Program                  Builder                 Status (Apr. 1989)

Number

TypeIHull

Number

Name

' FY Program

Builder

Status (AP^r

I*

USCG MEDIUM ENDURANCE CUTTERS

USCG ISLAND-CLASS PATROL BOATS

USCG ICEBREAKING TUGS

WTGB-109 Sturgeon Bay                             1985 Bay City

CONVERSIONS/REACTIVATIONS

BATTLESHIPS

BB-64                Wisconsin                               1986 Ingalls

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

CV-62                Independence

CV-63                Kitty Hawk

9 0

Comm- »           .

11

' 15 AP^r

20 Mr 24) f-:

30 + \

’ 2 S^P-' 7 Od¹ J ' 14 f*

' 21 J5l*‘

Del

Del

Del

Del

Del

Del

Del

Del

Lau

Lau

„ JO**

Com⁰¹'

Com⁰¹-

1985     Philadelphia NSY       ^Del ,_gJa»

1988      Philadelphia NSY       Start

AUXILIARY CRANE SHIPS

8 I* 12 '

1 h I* Pel

27

ja*¹ ‘

ACOUSTIC RESEARCH VESSEL

T-AG-195 Hayes                                                1987 Tacoma Boat

Sources: USNI Military Database; U. S. Navy; U. S. Coast Guard.

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