Soviet Navy Perspectives

 

 

 

 

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industrial and technological base if the Soviet Union is to compete with the West either economically or militarily in the next century.

In the short run, perestroika is meant to improve the Soviet civil economy and industry, but in the long run, it will also improve Soviet defense capabilities.

How Soviet Forces Might Be Cut

Cutbacks in the Soviet military cer­tainly will be shared by the Soviet Navy,

Northern Fleet, in a January 1989 inter­view on new training tasks for the navy, made reference to a “. . . forthcoming considerable reduction in the Soviet Armed Forces on a unilateral basis.” What the exact impact of such a reduction will be on the Soviet Navy is uncertain, but may well involve:

► Manpower cuts, to include an up-or- out policy for the officer corps

►  Reduction in the number and size of staffs and other shore assignments

►  Increased removal of obsolescent ships

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more capable now than when Gorbac came to power even if some obsolesc® units have been removed from the v | Remember, these reductions in old ^sC ^ active units have been accompanied ^ the addition to the order of battle of most capable ships and submarines 1 Soviets have ever produced.

The Construction Program

In this regard, the Soviet Navy building program continues apace

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control system (AWACS) and now in^ cated in the Baku carrier. These achie^ve ments are counterbalanced, however, i a setback in the sea-based fighter p^r°

have

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stalled development of a Forger

most likely to develop a credible air by the early 1990s. SNA R&D prog

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developed as a potential ASW repla^ce ment for the aging Mail and May

What does seem clear is that the So Navy has reduced O&M costs over past several years and has done so m", by reducing its operational tempo ( . Tempo). OpTempo is the number of ^ that an operational Soviet ship is at^s

The Soviets continue to dedicate sig­nificant resources to building nuclear subs. Modern SSNs such as the Akula (above), Sierra, Mike, and Victor III give them a force of about 30 modern, first-line ASW platforms.

Soviet nuclear submarine production maintains a consistently high level of funding. Although submarine production levels have slightly diminished since the mid-1980s, this has been primarily due to the greater technological sophistication of newer model boats such as the Delta IV SSBN, Typhoon SSBN, Akula SSN, and Oscar SSGN, which require more time to produce than did older classes. In 1988 the Soviets launched four such nuclear submarines: one Akula, one Victor III SSN, one Oscar II, and one Delta IV. (They also built four modem Kilo-class diesel submarines, three of which were for export.) I expect to see these subma­rine construction numbers remain at least consistent and possibly even increase somewhat. In any event, the total tonnage of general-purpose submarines launched has increased and the qualitative gain they have realized is substantial. Given the need to upgrade an aging nuclear sub­marine force and the importance of this force to Soviet wartime strategic objec­tives, a continuing dedication of signifi­cant resources to the construction of nu­clear submarines is probably a safe assumption.

With Sierra, Akula, Mike, and Victor III SSNs, the Soviets currently have a force of about 30 modern submarines available as first-line ASW platforms, approximately one-third of their SSN order of battle. This percentage will in­crease over the next decade. A larger number of this 1999 modem attack sub­marine force, however, will be made up of Victor Ills, whose combat capabilities are less than the Akula, Sierra, or modem U. S. SSNs. Sierra and Akula incorporate substantial advances in sound quieting and warfighting capability over previous Soviet SSNs. The Akula produces noise levels that the United States had not pro­jected the Soviets to attain until the early 1990s. These lower noise levels were achieved using known technologies im­plemented in the Soviet Union at an ear­lier date due primarily to the high pace of Soviet technology transfer successes. These efforts were probably spurred on by the knowledge of U. S. ASW capabil­ities the Soviets gained from American spies John A. Walker and Jerry Whit­worth.

Advanced Soviet SSNs are also capa­ble of carrying long-range land-attack submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). The torpedo-tube-launched SS-N-21 was operationally deployed beginning in 1987, probably on board the Akula-, Victor-, and Yankee Notch-class SSNs. Additionally, platforms currently under development are expected to carry the much larger SS-NX-24, which re­quires specially built, dedicated launch tubes. The Yankee SSGN is the only unit capable of launching this missile at this time.

With regard to surface ship develop­ments, there has been some question as to the Soviet commitment to these expen­sive items, especially their new aircraft carriers. While such programs would appear to be prime candidates for cancel­lation if more substantial diversion of resources from the defense sector were required to sustain perestroika, con­struction of surface ships, to date, re­mains high with no indication of immi­nent reduction. Moreover, shipyard ex­pansion projects continue at a number of Soviet yards that specialize in surface warship construction.

Currently major combatant shipbuild­ing programs in the Soviet Union include: The Tbilisi-class carrier, the Kirov- and Slava-class cruisers, the Sovremennyy- and Udaloy-class destroyers, and the Krivak class frigate. The Soviets’ first large-deck carrier, the Tbilisi, is in the late stage of fitting out at Nikolayev ship­yard in the Black Sea and is expected to commence sea trials this year. The sec­ond unit of the class was launched late last year and could become operational in 1993. The third Kirov became opera­tional last year with more capable antiair warfare systems than its predecessors. Soviet destroyer programs also continued apace. A Sovremennyy and an Udaloy were added to the fleet last year, while other Sovremennyys and Udaloys remain under construction.

As a result of this overall construction effort, the number of Soviet surface com^­batants is expected to remain relatively constant through the 1990s, as it has through the 1980s.

The trend of Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA) has been one of growth over the past several years. This growth is e*' pected to continue through the 1990s an into the next century, due primarily to th^e expansion of sea-based aviation. Emph^a' sis will be placed on more costly bn* more capable land-based platforms sue as Backfire, Bear F Mod III, and a vanced fighters. Soviet fighter production emphasizes fourth generation units sue as Flanker and Fulcrum. Full air bah ^e command and control capability is ^eV1 dent in Mainstay airborne warning gram. Technical problems appear to follow-on, suggesting a major delay ‘ development of a V/STOL aircraft for¹ ^ Tbilisi's air wing. We believe aircra carrier compatibility testing with Flank aircraft was accelerated last surnm^e' also continue apace with the Tag D ^se3 plane, similar in size to the Bear D, be"¹ aircraft. With open-ocean landing ^cd$.i bility, Tag D could also perform rap resupply of naval platforms at sea.

Soviet efforts to build a thoroug modem, balanced navy—proba ^ smaller numerically but certainly m° capable than today’s—will thus conti"^ through the century; however, the deg* to which Gorbachev’s program will ¹ pact on production rates over the Ion- term remains unclear.

Naval Operations either in local training or operations^ ^ volved in an exercise, or deployed _s area, as a factor (a percentage) ot " j| available for such operations. 0^^e _<c- Soviet Navy OpTempo remained a tf^£ duced levels last year, continuing ,_£t trend begun in 1986. In 1988, naval units spent more time in port an

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tutelage, Cuban collection capability have also improved dramatically 'ⁿ , last few years. Additionally, the So Union continues to rely on Havana support/supply its intelligence collee ships (AGIs), which routinely dep along the U. S. East Coast.  -_et

► Despite an overall reduction in So

facility at Lourdes, Cuba. Under

naval OpTempo and out-of-area

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anchor and less time at sea than in previ­ous years; they also reduced the extent of distant deployments and exercise ac­tivity—especially out-of-area exercises. OpTempo for Soviet general purpose naval forces since 1986 has been lower than in previous years. Additionally, al­though overall SNA strength continues to grow, SNA sortie rates have declined since 1986. Such reduced OpTempo has an immediate impact in reducing costs for major consumables such as fuel, and also may reduce the burden on shipyards since required repairs can be scheduled at longer intervals.

Reduced OpTempo simultaneously addresses other concerns of the Soviet Navy as well. Major Soviet naval exer­cises in 1988 continued to be conducted in waters close to the Soviet Union, a trend first established in 1986. This re­flects not only economic constraints and a desire to portray the military as more de­fensively oriented for Western consump­tion, but also shows increased concern for developing an improved close-in, combined-arms counter to the U. S. mar­itime strategy of forward deployment at the outset of hostilities. The decline in OpTempo has also increased the number of ships in port ready to respond to an enemy attack, thus improving (in Soviet eyes) the ability of the Soviet Navy to transition rapidly to war. This has proba­bly been at some cost to its overall level of operational expertise, compensated only in part by substantially increased use of shore-based combat simulators.

Despite a general decrease in at-sea deployments, there were significant gains for the Soviet Navy in 1988. For exam­ple, Northern Fleet capabilities were con­siderably enhanced by the arrival of the Kiev-class Baku and a second Kirov-class cruiser, as well as by upgrading the Tu-16 Badger regiment at Olenegorsk to Tu- 22M Backfires. This latter deployment represents the first time SNA Backfires have been permanently deployed north of the Arctic Circle and notably increases the Soviet ASUW threat to Western naval forces operating in the North Atlantic. In the Pacific, Sovremennyy and Udaloy DDGs and an Ivan Rogov LPD joined the Pacific Fleet’s inventory. Most Soviet Navy exercises in 1988 continued to be relatively short, were conducted in ocean areas contiguous to the Soviet landmass,

The Soviets maintain a strong rela­tionship with Cuba and, despite a lower operations tempo, they sent a task force to Havana. The force, including the destroyer V. A.

Kulakov, was shadowed by U. S. P-3s on its way across the Atlantic (right).

and emphasized defense of the homeland and submarine bastions. In the spring, all four fleets and the Mediterranean Squad­ron (SovMedRon) participated in joint force exercises.

With regard to out-of-area operations, while Gorbachev has evidently adopted a more pragmatic policy concerning Soviet global military involvement, the Soviet Navy continues to maintain a presence or routinely use support facilities in a num­ber of strategically important locations around the world—Havana, Cuba; Tar- tus, Syria; Luanda, Angola; Dahalak Is­land, Ethiopia; Aden, South Yemen; and Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam. Additionally, Soviet Naval Aviation reconnaissance and ASW aircraft continued to deploy to and operate from Cuba, Angola, Libya, Syria, South Yemen, and Vietnam during the past year. These deployments give the Soviets the capability to monitor and col­lect intelligence on U. S. Navy opera­tions in virtually all forward operating areas worldwide.

Although 1988 saw a slight reduction of force levels at Cam Ranh Bay, the Soviets continue to maintain a substantial force there which includes two to three submarines, three to four surface combat­ants, a composite Tu-16 Badger squadron with antiship missile-carrying strike vari­ants, a MiG-23 Flogger squadron, and Bear D and F aircraft. The infrastructure there is also impressive—the airfield has been upgraded, there are now seven piers, a drydock, and storage has been dispersed and hardened. Additionally, permanent housing and POL (petroleum- oil-lubricants) facilities continue to be upgraded. The future of this base from the Soviet standpoint remains uncertain, however, especially in light of Moscow’s offers to trade it for U. S. withdrawal from Subic.

In the Mediterranean, there is uncer­tainty over the ultimate scope of Soviet facilities at Tartus, Syria. Facilities adde in 1988 have been minimal. At present. Tartus provides only a modest nava maintenance and support facility for Sov­MedRon units—but one which can sup­port longer deployments and an overa increased Soviet presence in an area o considerable political-military volatility- While there is currently no evidence to support early reports that SovMedR°ⁿ would be based at Tartus, such a develop ment is still possible. The Soviet-Syriaa relationship remains strong. Althoug Moscow did not provide Damascus wit any new naval equipment in 1988, j Soviet and Syrian navies conducted joint exercise in October—Novento® 1988 which included a Tartus port vis* by the entire Soviet Mediterranean Squadron—the largest concentration Soviet units ever, including the earn Baku and ten other units.

The Soviet-Cuban relationship ^a remains strong and continues to p°^se significant threat to the Caribbean regio Soviet military use of Cuba for '^ntc _s gence collection against the United Sta and periodic naval/naval air deploym^e continue.        -_e

► The Soviets continue to improve ^ signals intelligence (Siglnt) collec¹¹⁰

activity a Soviet task force visited Havana November 1988 after a two-year g^aP

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Soviet vessels (four ships: an Udaloy, a ^^r'^vak, a Boris Chilikin, and a Tango), ,^ere consistent with those of the five pre- ^Vl°us deployments, but this visit lasted ®^n,y 30 days, vice the average 45 days.

. ^he Soviet units spent about half the time ^ln Cuban ports; the remainder was spent ^Clrcurnnavigating the island and conduct­'s ASW/air defense exercises with the ^uoan Navy. In contrast to some past the force did not enter the Gulf of

Mexico.

Bear D and Bear F deployments to ^u°a continued last year’s trend of fewer ^an normal—three of each, compared usual totals of seven to nine Bear Ds Bear Fs. This is consistent with e lower naval operational tempo noted 1988, the Soviets continued to t_Ur ^nta‘^{n a} higher than normal force pos­^e >n the Persian Gulf—including two ^dJ°^r and three minor combatants— warily for escorting merchant ships yj_s_ ^tankers. They also conducted a port

I ^l° ³ fi^ers'^an Gulf country since 1979.

^anuary of this year, they reduced their l_c^'^lr combatant presence to pre-1987 Is, but overall force levels are ex- on_e ^{to rema}*ⁿ high ^antl should include ijj . ^c°rnmand-and-control ship, one , combatant, three to four minor

^^d Submarine Technology

s_ea ^e Soviet ASW threat to U. S. under- Co\y’°^rces continues to develop. Mos- W_e]i * ASW research effort is a dynamic, te_Ch aoded program encompassing all iron h

. ^nas resulted in the development and

ents. These technical improve- i threat.

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AS\v ^IrnP^r°ving the full measure of lo_Caj. ^Capabilities: surveillance, tracking, ^ S₀^l2ation- targeting, and attack.

Md_e *^{ets are} developing and deploying a tic d_et^Variety °f active and passive acous- tial t_o^eCt'°^{n s}y^stems that have the poten­cy, j 'ⁿcrease Soviet detection capabil- ^syst_e^ ^Uding fi^XC(J systems, air deployed titles ^S’ ^antf towed arrays on subma- continue intensive nonacoustic

►  Soviet submarine technology and oper­ational experience continue to mature. The latest Soviet attack submarines have become quieter more rapidly than previ­ously expected.

►  Soviet ASW weapons have improved markedly over the years as vigorous R&D efforts bear fruit.

►  Nonetheless, the Soviets continue to be unable to detect or conduct surveillance of U. S. SSBNs on open ocean patrol. We believe they will not deploy such a capability in the 1990s, and we see no Soviet solution to the problem on the ho­rizon.

►  The Soviets also lack a fixed acoustic long-range detection system and must rely on mobile systems for a very limited open-ocean search capability.

ASW Surveillance Capabilities

The Soviets continue to deploy Cluster Lance planar acoustic arrays in Pacific Ocean waters near the Soviet landmass where broad area surveillance is desired. The Soviets may also be deploying bar­rier arrays at points of ingress and egress from SSBN operating areas in the Bar­ents, Greenland, and Kara seas placed in or near trenches at choke points along the Polar Archipelago. These configurations would serve as choke point trip wires and would not be for long-range surveillance.

The Soviet Union is also testing a probable surveillance towed array, simi­lar to the U. S. surface towed array sen­sor system (SURTASS). The Soviets would gain most from such a system if used to monitor approaches to Soviet bas­tion areas rather than against U. S. SSBNs. This is due to platform vulner­ability and because theoretical studies have shown they would pose little threat to SSBNs as quiet as the USS Ohio (SSBN-726) class, the predominant com­ponent of the U. S. SSBN force when such a system becomes operational.

By the early-to-mid 1990s acoustic sensors for mobile platforms that will increase detection ranges will include:

►  Improved towed hydrophone arrays with more effective acoustic processing capability

►  Improved surface ship and submarine hull-mounted sonars with reduced self­noise

►  Computer-aided signal processing Nonacoustic ASW

The Soviets lack a fixed, broad area, ocean surveillance system analogous to the U. S. SOSUS, and the nature of the U. S. submarine threat makes it unlikely that any single system or even combina­tion of systems will provide an easy solu­tion for the Soviets. As I have pointed out, the Soviets are improving their mo­bile and limited fixed acoustic sensors. They are also expending considerable effort in the area of nonacoustic sensors. These sensors include:

► Surface signature detection systems that sense the disturbance on the ocean surface caused by a passing submarine

►  Wake detection systems that sense the turbulent wake, internal wave wake, or contaminant (chemical or radioactive) wake

►  Magnetic and electric field detection systems that detect the submarine or the subsurface disturbances caused by its passage

Soviet research in all these areas con­tinues, but no great success is known to have been achieved, and none is antici­pated due to the difficulty of the problem. Nonacoustic sensors that have been de­ployed on ships are not considered threat­ening due to low search rates and sensor and environment limitations.

Conclusion

If perestroika proves successful, we will face a Soviet Union in the next cen­tury that is an even more formidable competitor with the West—militarily, economically, technologically and politi­cally. To make it work, Gorbachev needs peredyshka—“breathing     space”—to

relieve both internal and external pres­sures so that assets required for his country’s reconstruction can be made available and effectively used. His do­mestic and foreign policy initiatives have all been undertaken with this goal in mind.

The point here is that we must be care­ful not to be lulled into complacency by a Soviet politician of some cunning who spends as much time posturing for West­ern audiences as he does for his own at home. The bear has not become a pussycat—he remains a bear. Kipling recognized this many years ago—

“But . . . this is the time to fear, When he stands up like a tired man, tottering near and near;

When he stands up as pleading, in wavering, man-brute guise,

When he veils the hate and cunning of his little, swinish eyes;

When he shows as seeking quarter, with paws like hands in prayer, That is the time of peril-—the time of the Truce of the Bear!”

Rear Admiral Brooks succeeded Rear Admiral W. O. Studcman to become the 54th Director of Naval Intel­ligence on 1 July 1988.