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► Repelling an enemy aerospace atm1
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Attempting to understand the impact on the Soviet military of perestroika, “reasonable sufficiency,” “defensive doctrine,” and other pronouncements issuing from Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev presents Western analysts with significant challenges. The best of the analysts freely admit that they cannot predict what will happen, only that something will happen. And it likely will entail significant reductions in resources allotted to the Soviet military.
But which forces will be reduced and by how much is not apparent to us yet, and I wonder if it is greatly more apparent to the Soviet military establishment. In this climate it is easy to imagine a good deal of jockeying for position among the five branches of the Soviet military as each tries to justify its share of the nation’s defense funds.
It is not surprising that the Soviet Navy appears to have been first out of the starting gate in this race for justification. Building a navy requires heavy capital investment and significant long-term dedication of scarce production resources in key sectors of the Soviet economy. At least equally important, however, are the lessons of history. Soviet naval leaders are mindful that the history of the navy under both czars and commissars has been one of marked highs and lows. In times of prosperity, when outside forces did not threaten. Moscow has turned to building navies. When the economy failed or a threat arose on the border, the navy languished. Admiral Gorshkov saw two of these cycles in his lifetime: the reduction of the navy during the two decades after the 1917 revolution was followed by Stalin’s efforts of the late 1930s (efforts revived in the early 1950s) to build a true high-seas navy; Nikita Khrushchev’s attack on the navy (“Cruisers are great iron eaters,” he said), was followed by Gorshkov’s laborious rebuilding effort under Brezhnev.
Could the cycle turn against the navy once again? Clearly the Soviet Navy has had in recent years a compelling requirement to articulate to the Politburo that times have changed: the most dangerous threats are not from the land but from the sea and air, and the navy is key in defending against these threats. At this time in the Soviets’ history, with their ambitions for continental domination and world influence deterred by a maritime power and entering as they are an era of defensive doctrine as they try to rebuild their political, economic, and military competitiveness, the navy may be the Soviets' best investment.
Thus, it is logical that a book extolling the virtues of the Soviet Navy would be published in this new age. It is also not surprising to find Gorshkov recruited to author the foreword and to “edit” the book. He brings prestige to the project and, perhaps more important, he affords an umbrella of plausible denial to Fleet Admiral Vladimir N. Chernavin and the other naval leaders if the book rouses too much opposition. Nonetheless, it took almost a year to get the book published after it was delivered to the censors, which suggests that, Gorshkov’s prestige notwithstanding, the book was controversial even before it appeared in print.
And understandably so. The book— really a rather loose amalgamation of what appear to be four different papers^ has a remarkable central theme. Wh*'e the Soviet disarmament propagandists ^ preaching the gospel of stability, antis^" marine warfare (ASW) free zones, an reduction in numbers of nuclear system*- this book openly and forcefully cspou*c’ strategic ASW as a primary role of Soviet Navy. Gorbachev proclaims ^ clear wars cannot be won; yet nuclear 'vJ| fighting and damage limitation are centm tenets of Gorshkov’s last hurrah. .
The authors expound on the Sovie Navy’s missions within a framework “the basic missions of war” that are ‘ 0 vital interest to the state”: ,
► Suppressing the enemy’s milimO1 economic potential
► Destroying enemy groupings of foN*’ Under the first national strategic mlS
sion comes destruction of nuclear weaP on airfields, and warfare against nava nuclear weapon platforms. The authc’r prescribe a major role for the Soviet N3'' in all of these, a role ranging from seJ, ward air defense against aircraft, cru|S missiles, and submarine-launched t>a listic-missile attacks on airfields, to al tacks on enemy ballistic missile subn1^ rines (SSBNs) during the conventio11, phase of the war and the use of mocle beam weaponry against systems
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CVel of a national mission” and a com- jned-arms force such as PVO Stranyj to'r ^e^ense °f ^ie Homeland) may have 0 be created to focus navy, air force, cket force, and other assets on the r °blern. This combined-arms effort may expand to target enemy aircraft carri-
^/ces for battling them.” This new com- ^ned-torces command would, of course, under the aegis of the navy.
'owhere is the book more specific or st0re forceful than in calling for the deletion of SSBNs “before their missiles e Punched at the onset of war,” the . P°se being “to minimize the damage ear missile strikes of submarines.’ ut how can this be done? The oceans vast and the modern SSBN with ex-
tens of millions of square miles, authors accept that this is a formida- pa ask, but maintain that significant if for *a' success >s likely. Soviet naval 0neCS Wou‘(‘ Pursue enemy SSBNs using 1 ^ °f a half-dozen means: at llng them with barriers constructed \ ®8ress points
deriv°^U,Cting “likely area searches” i CQC , ‘rorn pattern/operations analysis systems (unspecified)
► Using “worldwide systems”
► Using space-based systems
The most interesting questions about these approaches relate to the use of space-based sensors. The book provides no specifics, but there are references to cuing from space-based sensors and even to ASW space-based sensors being developed as part of the U. S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program.
It is significant that the book mentions the Soviet Navy’s role in space numerous times. The authors cite the need for space sensors, space systems for communications and navigation, and shipborne antiballistic missile and SDI-like systems. They view denial of space as akin to sea denial in preventing an attack on the homeland and contend that ships stationed at great distances from the Soviet Union, potentially armed with laser and particle beam weapons, should be a major part of the effort. This is fascinating reading, but it provides more questions than answers.
Throughout the book the authors speak repeatedly about capabilities of tomorrow—or even possible capabilities of the distant future—as though they were in the fleet today. This is a typical phenomenon in Soviet military writing and must engender at least as much confusion among Soviet military readers as it does in the West.
Under the second mission (“Suppress enemy military-economic potential”) the authors cite the traditional “strike against the shore” strategic attack missions, including not only SSBN and submarine- launched cruise missile strikes against Western targets, but also the protection of
The Soviet Navy is so concerned with the ASW mission—here, an 11-38 May aircraft and a Krivak-class frigate on patrol—that policy makers may designate antisubmarine efforts a “national mission.”
Soviet SSBNs and destruction of Western ASW assets. (They specifically mention air bases and the infrastructure that supports airborne ASW.) Interdiction of sea lines of communication is also included under this second mission, but is treated in a very conventional fashion. One new element that finds its way into the listing is the interdiction of offshore Western oil and other seabed resources. The authors imply that the Soviets would protect their own such assets.
Under the final mission area (“Destroy enemy armed forces groupings”) the authors provide a fairly standard treatment of war in the theaters of military activity— or TVDs—to include the oceanic TVDs. “Joint” (combined arms in Soviet parlance) is “in.” The navy will support the land theaters, but the navy should remain in charge of the naval action. Certain truths transcend even ideology.
Following a chapter dedicated to an arcane description of how one justifies, sizes, and arms a navy by “scientific methods” (to include a host of formulae), there is a chapter on “prospects for the development of the main forces of the Navy.” This chapter obviously came from a paper, or perhaps even a speech, designed to impress an audience with the wondrous things modem science could bring to the navy of the future. Again, it is difficult to separate what is here today from what is planned or hoped for. The chapter is broken down into sections on general naval developments, submarines, surface ships, and aviation. Of all the book’s chapters, this makes the most exciting reading by far. According to the authors, the Soviet Navy can expect to have submarines with speeds of 50-60 knots “soon” and 100 knots in the future. They expect to develop submarines able to dive to depths of more than 6,000 feet and carry 200-300-knot torpedoes, vertical/short takeoff and landing aircraft, and surface-to-air missile systems. The authors extol aircraft carriers and nuclear-powered surface ships. They look for larger surface effect ships and air cushion vehicles, remotely piloted vehicles for reconnaissance, strike, and ASW missions, longer range air-launched cruise missiles for sea and land targets, stealth aircraft (and even ships), conventional warheaded “zero CEP” [circular error probable] cruise missiles, and anti-
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caused some discomfort in Moscow.
ship ballistic missiles (remember the old SS-NX-13?).
These systems are all technically feasible. But the credibility of the list as a definitive articulation of systems on hand or building comes into question when in the next breath the authors mention nuclear- powered aircraft and dirigibles and flying submarines. The list is nonetheless useful (and should be taken seriously) as an indicator of the sort of capabilities that interest the Soviet Navy leadership today.
In summary, this book attempts to articulate how the Soviet Navy plays its role within the Soviet Union’s new national missions. No really new missions are found for the Soviet Navy, but the previously articulated ones are reworded and reordered. Strategic attack (“Strike against the shore”), which had been first, is renamed and is now second; defense of the homeland against seaborne threats, which had been second, is now greatly expanded and ranked first. This is all befitting of the new defensive doctrine. But the emphasis on defense is in name only. . The book is fundamentally a nuclear warfighting treatise on how the navy can contribute to damage limitation. It is this emphasis that is new.
The most remarkable thing about this book is not that a book justifying the navy was written but that this book, justifying the Soviet Navy in this manner, was written at this time. It is certain to have should be useful to the West in highlight' ing that “defensive strategy” notwithstanding, the Soviet Navy still believe* the best defense is a good offense.
Admiral Brooks is the Director of Naval Intelligence'
A Matter of Timing?-------------------------
By Captain Arthur K. Cebrowski, U. S. Navy
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This book seems to have several related purposes:
► To show how naval forces can contribute to strategic objectives under the doctrine of “reasonable sufficiency”
► To show how naval forces can fit into the diplomacy of “defensive” versus “offensive” forces
► To give non-military Soviet civilian leaders a vision of the evolving world of strategy driven mainly by science and technology
But mostly, the authors aim to show why, in the competition of “restructuring,” naval forces deserve a larger piece of a shrinking pie. The arguments are rigorous and quaintly Leninesque. But in the end, it will boil down to rubles.
The authors list the critically important strategic mission requirements satisfied by the navy, how they will be performed, and how modern science and technology will ensure the viability of this approach. There has always been a second implied justification for having a large navy: it is one of the trappings of greatness. These two reasons for having a navy converge (perhaps unintentionally) in this book as the authors juxtapose a rigorous methodology for force structure and resource allocation with a long discussion of the role of the navy in “local military conflicts and wars,” citing the Falklands Conflict extensively.
The authors clearly are at pains to continue improving the status of the navy among the Soviet military forces. Not only is any navy-go-it-alone thinking rejected, but the success in war of other forces is shown to be dependent on a healthy navy. Arguably, the more thorough integration of the navy into the missions of the other military arms will ensure its continued health. Admiral
Gorshkov states that the proposed rigorous methodology for “objective program planning of naval forces” can be used for “substantiating the balanced disarmament of opposing sides.” This reveals his vision for a larger navy role in the postStrategic Arms Reduction treaty strategic nuclear rivalry. Finally, the authors take an appropriately global great power position: They reject adventurism and aggression, but maintain that a balanced Soviet Navy operating with advanced communications, electronic warfare, and floating logistical support means that the Soviet Union need not shrink from defending its interests anywhere.
All this may be true, but will it mean a larger slice of the perestroika pie for the Soviet Navy?
Admiral Gorshkov always railed against the argument that the Soviet Union is not a maritime nation to the extent of the NATO nations or Japan.,But it is true. Although Soviet reliance on the seas is increasing, it will never reach that of the United States. To argue for naval force level parity with the West, then, would be to plead for a false symmetry. So the question of how much Soviet Navy is enough is left open.
A second force working against the Soviet Navy (one the authors do not discuss) is bad timing. For the Soviets to maintain a force of 280 principal surface combatants, 308 submarines, 311 auxiliaries, and the additional 1,173 lesser combatant ships and craft, replacing them with new construction at the end of a nominal 30-year operational life, will be an extraordinary burden. Furthermore, much of the Soviet Navy’s dramatic buildup was in the 1960s and early 1970s, meaning that a disproportionately large fraction of the force will retire during the 1990s.
Additionally, new ships and aircrat simply cost more than those they replace' Although the resulting navy is more po"' erful, its costs are higher and its numbed are lower. The Soviets are facing ^ tough decision of whether to allow th® navy to begin a slow decline by the end 0 the century. .
Arguments as to whether the Sovi® Navy is offensive or defensive are mean" ingless. There is nothing in the current proposed development of Soviet nav;1 forces to indicate that they are inherent!) defensive. The forces required for tbe primary missions can perform nearly aw other naval mission on demand. Furth®r more, even a vigorous economy may n' be willing to support the high cost of tbe technology needed to adopt a more d® fensive posture—as the SDI debate in the United States has shown.
Despite Admiral Gorshkov’s call 1 elevate strategic antisubmarine warfare t° the status of a national mission and h1^ j emphasis on the strong role the navJ would play in “repelling an enemy aef° space attack,” the fortunes of the SoV>°j Navy ride on the strategic strike miss10 of the SSBN force. Strategic strike get’ j the largest share of the Soviet Navy’s tC\ sources, a point that is doubly clear whe one considers the assets required to ] sure the SSBNs’ combat stability. If _' Soviets were to take SSBNs out of s°r i vice as a result of an arms reduct10 I agreement, there could be pressure I take a large piece of the rest of the f>e | with them.
The book argues forcefully for the ability of the strategic strike role in ^ navy. The fleet is reported to be able ensure the combat stability of the SSB*\ in the near term, and technology pr0111