Gorshkov’s Final Words: What Do They Mean? A Matter of Timing?

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This book seems to have several re­lated purposes:

►  To show how naval forces can contrib­ute to strategic objectives under the doc­trine of “reasonable sufficiency”

►  To show how naval forces can fit into the diplomacy of “defensive” versus “offensive” forces

►  To give non-military Soviet civilian leaders a vision of the evolving world of strategy driven mainly by science and technology

But mostly, the authors aim to show why, in the competition of “restructur­ing,” naval forces deserve a larger piece of a shrinking pie. The arguments are rig­orous and quaintly Leninesque. But in the end, it will boil down to rubles.

The authors list the critically important strategic mission requirements satisfied by the navy, how they will be performed, and how modern science and technology will ensure the viability of this approach. There has always been a second implied justification for having a large navy: it is one of the trappings of greatness. These two reasons for having a navy converge (perhaps unintentionally) in this book as the authors juxtapose a rigorous method­ology for force structure and resource al­location with a long discussion of the role of the navy in “local military conflicts and wars,” citing the Falklands Conflict extensively.

The authors clearly are at pains to con­tinue improving the status of the navy among the Soviet military forces. Not only is any navy-go-it-alone thinking re­jected, but the success in war of other forces is shown to be dependent on a healthy navy. Arguably, the more thor­ough integration of the navy into the mis­sions of the other military arms will en­sure its continued health. Admiral

Gorshkov states that the proposed rigor­ous methodology for “objective program planning of naval forces” can be used for “substantiating the balanced disarma­ment of opposing sides.” This reveals his vision for a larger navy role in the post­Strategic Arms Reduction treaty strategic nuclear rivalry. Finally, the authors take an appropriately global great power posi­tion: They reject adventurism and aggres­sion, but maintain that a balanced Soviet Navy operating with advanced communi­cations, electronic warfare, and floating logistical support means that the Soviet Union need not shrink from defending its interests anywhere.

All this may be true, but will it mean a larger slice of the perestroika pie for the Soviet Navy?

Admiral Gorshkov always railed against the argument that the Soviet Union is not a maritime nation to the ex­tent of the NATO nations or Japan.,But it is true. Although Soviet reliance on the seas is increasing, it will never reach that of the United States. To argue for naval force level parity with the West, then, would be to plead for a false symmetry. So the question of how much Soviet Navy is enough is left open.

A second force working against the Soviet Navy (one the authors do not dis­cuss) is bad timing. For the Soviets to maintain a force of 280 principal surface combatants, 308 submarines, 311 auxil­iaries, and the additional 1,173 lesser combatant ships and craft, replacing them with new construction at the end of a nominal 30-year operational life, will be an extraordinary burden. Furthermore, much of the Soviet Navy’s dramatic buildup was in the 1960s and early 1970s, meaning that a disproportionately large fraction of the force will retire dur­ing the 1990s.

Additionally, new ships and aircrat simply cost more than those they repla^ce' Although the resulting navy is more po"' erful, its costs are higher and its numbed are lower. The Soviets are facing ^ tough decision of whether to allow th® navy to begin a slow decline by the end ⁰ the century.                                                  .

Arguments as to whether the Sovi® Navy is offensive or defensive are mean" ingless. There is nothing in the current proposed development of Soviet na^v;1 forces to indicate that they are inherent!) defensive. The forces required for tb^e primary missions can perform nearly aw other naval mission on demand. Furth®^r more, even a vigorous economy may ⁿ' be willing to support the high cost of tb^e technology needed to adopt a more d® fensive posture—as the SDI debate in th^e United States has shown.

Despite Admiral Gorshkov’s call ¹ elevate strategic antisubmarine warfare t° the status of a national mission and h¹^ j emphasis on the strong role the na^vJ would play in “repelling an enemy aef° space attack,” the fortunes of the SoV>°j Navy ride on the strategic strike miss¹⁰ of the SSBN force. Strategic strike g^et’ j the largest share of the Soviet Navy’s ^tC\ sources, a point that is doubly clear wh^e one considers the assets required to ] sure the SSBNs’ combat stability. If _' Soviets were to take SSBNs out of ^s°^r i vice as a result of an arms reduct¹⁰ I agreement, there could be pressure I take a large piece of the rest of the f>^e | with them.

The book argues forcefully for the ability of the strategic strike role in ^ navy. The fleet is reported to be able ensure the combat stability of the SSB*\ in the near term, and technology pr⁰¹¹¹

138

Proceedings / Naval Review

ense-in-depth for both sea control and

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^ISes to make them more powerful and jljore nearly invulnerable in the future. ^Jnc could also argue that as technology ■ncreasingly provides for the invulner- ^ab'lity of the SSBN, so it will tend to en­^SUre, in other forms, the increased vul­nerability of the strategic rocket forces. ^Wl|h a sharply reduced inventory of stra­fe nuclear weapons, there may be in­^Creased pressure to move them offshore nⁿd guard them well. Of course, the stra- ^egic rocket force could be expected to ^See things differently.

^ the experts were ever right about the Soviet Navy ridiculed and re­^Jected aircraft carriers, they are wrong ⁿ°'^v- The authors call for more robust air J^uPport for the fleet in the form of sea-

def,

rategic air defense against cruise mis- ^es and bombers, and note that aircraft ^^rr,ers can take extraordinary punish- and keep fighting. They add that based aviation lacks responsiveness staying power, j this praise for aircraft carriers is ^served, but once again the timing is .. ^a- What does a distant power projec- ⁿ capability in a clearly continental . ^l0n say about that nation? How is such Capability consistent with a drawback _Ce°* Third World opportunism? The ne- ,_h ^s% of proving the defensive nature of l_a^e Soviet military may demand shunning t|J!^e carriers. The Soviets simply started ^lr carrier program too late. ⁿ general, despite difficulties, the W _n^1Ct blavy will be enormously powerful bn i, ^{lnto tbe next} century- From the tio ' conclude that any force reduc- _ret^{as w}°uld likely be in the form of early ^rcrnents and not in modernization. As

Almost one-third of Soviet ballistic missile warheads are on SSBNs, such as this Delta I-class submarine.

forces are reduced the current balance favoring submarines and aviation will be retained. ASW and sea-based aviation will get some added emphasis at the ex­pense of lesser surface combatants and operating tempo out of home waters. Air­craft carriers will form the nucleus of the surface forces. Submarines and other ASW forces will be the principal benefi­ciaries of emerging technologies. Opera­tions will reflect a strategic role of air­craft carriers in strike and air defense. The aviation and ASW lessons learned from the Falklands Conflict will be ap­parent.

The emphasis on missiles of all kinds will remain. The Soviets feel surrounded.

chiefly by the U. S. Navy, and seem to have developed a two-track solution. The first is an aggressive arms control pro­gram aimed at the U. S. Navy, and the second is the wholesale move to cruise missiles.

If this book were to be the only salvo the Soviet Navy intended to fire in the “perestroika war,” the navy would lose. But it will not be the only salvo. The Soviets have some significant technologi­cal and industrial advantages, and the Cold War is not over. Instability is still a major factor in the world, and the Soviet Navy’s roles are now well established.

The U. S. Navy should continue to emphasize antisubmarine warfare and antiair warfare, and vigorously renew its emphasis on command, control, and communications countermeasures. The Soviet intention to use satellite targeting against mobile targets continues to have implications for the U. S. antisatellite program. If the Soviets strongly adopt the cruise missile track, the United States could face significant force posture and strategy questions.

In the end, the Soviet Navy probably will not get a larger fraction of the perestroika pie because the underlying rationale is wrong. First, a strident navy is incompatible with Gorbachev’s “new thinking.” Second, a world-class navy does not confer superpower status. In the modern world, to be a superpower is to treat the people decently and to comport one’s national self on the world stage in a manner that contributes to justice and prosperity. With this in mind, the Soviet Navy should adjust for the depression of budgets and the windage of diplomacy before firing for effect.

Captain Cebrowski, a naval aviator selected for a car­rier command, is serving as a Federal Executive Fel­low at the Council on Foreign Relations.

^11 Down on the Red Horizon

^ Captain Larry Seaquist, U. S. Navy

For ^sboai_s

"i th ^reasons partly linked, naval leaders a. ^e Soviet Union and the United States ate navigating their services around

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Srw,' ^ln home waters. Cuts in military ^shri u^{8 m}'ght soon force each fleet to g₀j ^{x ar}>d to cut back on the pace of sea- ^e3ch^ °P^cral'ons. An era of growth for One ^SIC*^C bas come to an end—though to .'^,Vondcrs whether the Soviets have yet °Us ® ^UP "ahead slow” on their vigor- j_vi^naval construction program. ar_c °^{re tban} budgets and building rates '^nv°lved. The national security cli­mate for each country is being trans­formed by more rapid and fundamental change than has occurred at perhaps any time since the end of World War II. While changes in the Kremlin dominate the military news, equally portentous re­arrangements are under way in interna­tional economic matters. Despite the res­pite from the protracted wars of Iran and Iraq, in Afghanistan, and in Angola, vio­lence and outright war continue to be the norm in several regions. Chemical, nu­clear, and missile weaponry proliferates while seemingly intractable starvation, sickness, and ecological damage leave many inhabitants of the world small hope for peace and prosperity. Little in this catalog of daunting problems yields to military intervention by the superpowers. As a result, the central concerns of na­tional security decision makers are shift­ing from the military dimension of the Cold War to economics, diplomacy, and their military underpinnings.

In political calculus, lower tension and less money do not add up to larger na-