Gorshkov’s Final Words: What Do They Mean? Foreword

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Introduction________________

By Captain Steve F. Kime, U. S. Navy

In some ways this book was an anom­aly. The Navy: Its Role, Prospects for Development, ami Employment appeared at a time of doctrinal ferment in the So­viet Union, and it probably does not rep­resent what is acceptable to those who are, or may become, dominant in Soviet military doctrine. Certainly it would be an error for Western analysts to take the book as the accepted Soviet view of the maritime threat to the Soviet Union, of how the Soviets plan to respond to that threat, or of how the Soviet Navy will be used in the future. Much remains to be seen.

On the other hand, the book is proba­bly a good indicator of the views of very influential Soviet naval thinkers. It is in­teresting that they managed to have their say, if not their way. We should heed Admiral Gorshkov’s words if for no other reason than that they are the last pro­nouncement of one of the most influential proponents of naval power in our era. The discussion of missions is important not because much is new but because missions are reordered, and because an attempt has been made to place old Navy wine into new “defensive doctrine” bot­tles. (See the comments of Admiral Brooks that follow this excerpt.)

The excerpt published here is from Admiral Gorshkov’s foreword to The Navy. While Gorshkov’s comments break no new ground, the doctrinal con­text in which naval policy must be made is changing. What is, in fact, remarkable is that the most influential naval spokes­man in Soviet history managed to hold his course in spite of changing seas and winds. Equally interesting is that well- known naval writers were able to include nuclear war-fighting and offensive tasks in a discussion of missions, albeit in ”d^e' fensive” and “joint” contexts.

The book might well turn out to be n° more than the Soviet Navy’s last-ditch attempt to argue that Gorshkovian-styk- sea power remains relevant in an era o tight budgets and perestroika. At a min¹' mum, it represents how respected nava spokesmen would prefer to integrate the Soviet Navy into the emerging doctrinJ context of the Gorbachev era. Regardless of whether or not this kind of thinkinf carries the day, Proceedings readers should be aware of it.

Captain Kime, a former U. S. naval attache to ¹ Soviet Union, is Director of the U. S. and Intern¹¹ tional Studies Division of the U. S. Naval Acadehh and a member of the Naval Institute's Board of C^on trol.

The Navy: Its Role> Prospects for Development, and Employment

Foreword by Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union S. G. Gorshkov

”... World War II made substantial corrections to the constant rivalry of the navies of imperialist powers for propri­etorship of the sea. While it was still possible prior to the war to compare, for example, the American, French and Brit­ish Beets in the Atlantic or the American and Japanese Beets in the Pacific, the situation changed sharply with the end of the war.

“Having taken advantage of the fact that the Soviet Armed Forces decisively defeated the principal striking forces of world imperialism, fascist Germany and militaristic Japan, the American Navy affirmed its preeminence among the navies of imperialist powers.

“Since that time there have been steadily increasing aspira­tions in U. S. policy to subordinate other countries to its domination, to block the path of mankind’s social progress, to intervene in the affairs of other peoples, and to perform the functions of guarantor of an international system of ex­ploitation and oppression. . . .

“The primary role of the American Navy as well as of the navies of satellites in aggressive military blocs consists of preparing for war against the Soviet Union from the ocean axes. This is evidenced by the direction of the American Navy’s development; the open, purposeful preparation of pos­sible theaters of military operations (TMOs); the content and purpose of combat training of NATO Allied Armed Forces and of their maneuvers and exercises, usually held in ocean and sea areas contiguous to our territory; and the constant ocean combat duty ... of nuclear powered missile subma­rines and aircraft carrier striking forces.

“The submarine nuclear missile system deployed by the United States in the ocean is intended for delivering strikes from ocean depths against the most important ground targets located thousands of kilometers from the missile launch areas Over the last 25 years, the United States has created five generations of strategic missile submarines. In this same p^e" riod the number of nuclear warheads aboard one missile sub marine has grown by 12 times and the missile Bight range four times. Every OHIO-Class missile submarine is armed with 24 ballistic missiles with more than 190 warheads.

“The military-strategic situation in the ocean has become especially strained in recent years. American aircraft carriers with nuclear weapon delivery platforms aboard, nuclear p⁰" ered missile submarines, and groupings of surface combat¹¹¹¹ monitor the Northeast Atlantic and Norwegian Sea, appear periodically off the shores of the Near East, and are con­stantly in the Pacific and Indian oceans. The United States has established over 100 naval and air bases located in vari­ous regions of the world, many of them near the Soviet Uⁿ" ion’s maritime borders.

“A strategy of ‘direct confrontation’ with the USSR on a

clear honal it i

War as well as ‘limited’ wars employing both conven- and nuclear weapons. In accordance with this strategy

he the principal forces of naval aviation. Ship-based

aviation .              -

is d_Cv ¹ with VTOL aircraft and helicopters in the inventory ^yeloping as part of our navy.

________ Shipboard ABM Defense__________

". . . the appearance of new kinds of weapons (lasers, particle beams, etc.) and extensive use of space means for naval purposes will allow specially equipped ships to detect and destroy missiles flying from sea sectors at con­siderable distances from the friendly coasts and thus will allow an increase in depth of the ABM [antiballistic mis­sile] system's combat alignment."

S'obal and regional scale is the basis of U. S. military doc- f'ne. According to a statement by U. S. Secretary of Defense • Weinberger, the strategy of ‘direct confrontation’ is aimed ^at achieving ‘total and indisputable U. S. military suprem- ?*»' ‘restoring America’s leading role in the world,’ and ‘ac- ^lve|y countering the USSR in everything and in all regions the world.’ Specific aims of U. S. military doctrine and of ^e strategy of ‘direct confrontation’ were formulated in the ocument Directives on Building the U. S. Armed Forces. ^he aims of this document attest to the fact that American ft'htary doctrine is offensive and places reliance on nuclear

Capons.

, United States also has elaborated a doctrine (strategy) flexible response,’ which now is official NATO doctrine, envisages the possibility of conducting both an all-out nu- ^ls not mandatory that nuclear missile forces be employed ^^ediately at the outbreak of a military conflict. At the _Q^arne dme the NATO doctrine does not preclude the first use nuclear weapons, but bears this possibility in mind. . . . l All these doctrines of threats and blackmail are countered y the doctrine of Warsaw Pact member states, which is a £ ^arantee that not one of its countries ever will initiate mili- actions against any state or alliance of states under any il<)^CUniStances, if the Warsaw Pact member states themselves ⁿ°t become the object of aggression; and that they never „ he first to use nuclear weapons. . . .

_0(i 'ⁿ the face of a constantly growing threat of attack on y ^r. ^c°untry and countries of the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet ⁿi°n and its allies are forced to keep their armed forces at _r strength and at that level which would allow them to T]|^{)e an}y attack from without against any Pact member state. ^e,r combat readiness also is sufficient so as not to be ^u8ht unawares.

. The allied socialist countries lay no claim to greater secu- 1 ' than other countries, but they also do not agree to a £_Q^{Ser Sec}urity. This is why, by decision of the CPSU Central Cre mhtee and Soviet government, the course was set toward sta ^ln® ^{our own} oceangoing navy capable of resolutely d_e ^dlng in the path of any threat. Priority was given to the topment of submarine forces and aviation.

I_{C( |} ^ornarines became that naval force arm most fully af- th_e ^e<T hy results of scientific-technical progress, above all in _rtlj_s^area of nuclear power engineering as well as shipbuilding, ^aut|)^Sl'^{e construc}tion, underwater situation display equipment, i_nji mation of control, and navigation systems. All principal ^t'Uc]^Cal0rS characterizing any modern navy are concentrated in biij_t^ear P°^werefl submarines: great striking power, high mo- hat ^ ^ant* concealment, and the capability of conducting com- _ge,/chons on a global scale—destroying enemy ground lar­i’submarines, and surface combatants. ni_t j.^Clent‘fic-technical progress also presented a real opportu- f°rrn °^{r creat}>ⁿg ^new surface combatants possessing high per­tly ^ariCe characteristics and more effective armament than

“\y^rec*^ecessors'

c_0a ^e Presently have diverse oceangoing combatants and CojJ¹ combatants capable of accomplishing a wide range of de_nti ^{at m}>ssions in oceans and in closed theaters indepen­, y> as well as together with submarines and aviation.

Wjjh ^nava* ^av>^at>on also became oceangoing. It is outfitted lo_n speed jet aircraft with a large payload capacity and b_ecat^ '8ht range. Missile armed and antisubmarine aviation

“Not one sector remains in the sphere of our navy’s devel­opment which has not undergone radical and fundamental changes in the postwar period. If we have succeeded in one way or another in preserving our planet for the present and future generations and in preventing a nuclear missile catas­trophe under conditions of the very acute opposition of two opposing social systems, and if plans for nuclear attack on the USSR repeatedly being nurtured by U. S. ruling circles have not been realized, it is only because the Soviet Union promptly eliminated American imperialism’s monopoly on nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles and, together with fraternal countries of socialism established, and firmly maintained a military-strategic parity between the USSR and United States and between Warsaw Pact and NATO countries. . . .

“The talk about the allegedly defensive nature of the American “star wars’’ program and of the creation of space weapons is of course a story for the naive. The plan is to at­tempt to paralyze the Soviet Union’s strategic weapons and to give oneself an opportunity for an unpunished nuclear strike against our country. Herein lies the essence of the matter, which the USSR cannot help but take into account.

“U. S. space ambitions aimed at achieving military su­premacy in this new sphere of warfare are not weakening Pentagon efforts to build up existing forces and means, among which the navy continues to hold the leading role.

“New systems of strategic arms are being created at accel­erated rates; the overwhelming majority of surface combatants and multipurpose submarines are being upgraded; new air­craft, missiles, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for automating control of forces and weapons, and reconnaissance and target designation equipment are being created; aircraft carriers are undergoing modernization; and attack submarines.

ships and aircraft have been turned into strategic missile plat­forms. Everything is being done to achieve a decisive military supremacy at any cost over the Soviet Armed Forces in all spheres of warfare.

“All this prompts the Soviet Union to constantly consider the changes occurring in the alignment of forces in the world arena and to react appropriately to the growing threat to our country from ocean and sea sectors.

“While confirming the immutability of the strategic con­cept of the need for combat actions to be conducted in con­cert by all branches of the Armed Forces to achieve victory, the specific nature of the ocean theaters is objectively advanc­ing the USSR Navy as the leading branch of the Armed Forces for accomplishing missions at sea and places special

¹ foe

requirements on its construction and armament. . . .

“Those times are long gone when the sphere of building navies entailed a clear-cut process of copying prototypes of ships which a potential enemy had or which he was planning to build in order to oppose them in naval warfare.

“Now that approach to developing navies has lost its prac­tical meaning and has become unacceptable. The arsenal of weapons of naval warfare and their combat capabilities have become quite different. The missions of fleets and methods of their combat employment have changed, and now it is not at all mandatory to send ships equivalent in capabilities—let us say, to cruisers—in order to oppose cruisers. Submarines, aviation, and even coastal missile units now are capable of accomplishing this mission in addition to surface combatants and with no less results. Moreover, the combat employment of mixed forces with their close coordination multiplies by many times the capabilities for accomplishing combat mis­sions of a character and content which in the past could not even be considered realistic for naval forces then available. The conditions for combat employment of today’s mixed naval forces are such that they require not a simple summa­tion, but the most rational combination of attack and defen­sive capabilities of all forces and their weapons and combat equipment participating in an engagement, joined together by automated control and target designation equipment.

“Therefore in planning naval development at the present time it is impossible to limit oneself only to forecasting the development of individual kinds of weapons and their plat­forms.

“In order to meet today’s demands, a forecast must en­compass the development of weapon systems, the means for controlling them, and means for global surveillance over vast areas which are adequate for the increased ranges of modern weapons. ...”

A Nuclear War-Fighting Treatise _

By Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, U. S. Navy