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The events of 1988 provided additional and, in some instances, significant reinforcement of trends that had emerged earlier. In national affairs, the prospect of flat defense budgets remained, owing to continuing fiscal pressures and diminishing public support. On the international scene, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev announced bold policies and proposals that further raised hopes for a more stable superpower relationship and peaceful resolution of some regional conflicts. Notwithstanding the heightened attention to East-West relations, the predominant form of global violence continued to be unconventional warfare, including terrorism. Less important, but still significant—especially for the Marine Corps—were more troubled negotiations and increasing costs, both financial and political, associated with foreign-based U. S. forces.
Forecasting the outcome of these events and trends is difficult. Moreover, some developments, especially those related to new Soviet policies, must be approached with considerable caution. Even while resisting the temptation to arrive at unwarranted conclusions or to take premature
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and provide technical support for LHD-4, the fourth of the Wasp class of amphibious assault ships. The lead ship should be delivered to the Navy in early 1989. The construction of LHD-2 commenced in July 1988 and LHD-3 will be started in 1989. The USS Wisconsin (BB-64), the last of the battleships being modernized and reactivated, rejoined the fleet on 22 October. General Gray was the principal speaker at the commissioning of the landing ship dock Comstock (LSD-45) at the
New Orleans Avondale shipyard in January 1988. Jan Gray, the Commandant’s wife, was the ship’s sponsor.
Evaluation of the HAVIC-15, once known as the LAV sled, continued during 1988. The HAVIC (high-speed assault vessel and interdiction craft) was originally designed to transport the LAV in a high-speed, over-the-horizon landing mission but it has potential for a much wider range of missions. The craft draws only 27 inches (slightly more than half of other landing craft) and can achieve speeds greater than 20 knots fully loaded- Two contracts were let in 1988 for the construction of 15 more air cushion landing craft (LCAC). At present, nine LCACs are operating at Camp Pendleton (Assault Craft Unit 5) and six at the Little Creek, Virginia, Amphibious Base (Assault Craft Unit 4). There have been three deployments of the craft in the Western Pacific, with three craft in each deploy' ment. The first three-craft deployment ot
actions, though, we may begin to assess the potential implications for the Marine Corps of these continuing trends.
The impact on the Marine Corps of the defense budget crunch is likely to be more indirect than direct. General Gray has acknowledged that the Marine Corps is “basically fully modernized today.” Moreover, he has already instituted his warfighting/warrior initiatives, with their emphasis on training and manpower quality. Tough budgetary issues will undoubtably have to be faced, but the Marine Corps should be able to avoid serious resource problems.
In a larger budgetary context, however, two major undertakings are likely as the Department of Defense seeks to adjust to constant levels of defense spending—at best. First, there may be efforts to seek a greater specialization—in other terms a more rational division of military labor—with U. S. alliance partners. If so, the U. S. military would be focused more on what it does best and what others cannot do as well. Measured against such criteria, maritime power projection capabilities would clearly be a U. S. specialization priority.
The second undertaking may be reductions in the number of U. S. troops forward-deployed overseas. We hope that such reductions will be accomplished within the context of conventional arms reductions or other diplomatic agreements. In any case, such overseas troop drawdowns would naturally lead to greater emphasis on rapidly deployable forces, such as Marine air-ground task forces.
Gorbachev’s policies and proposals offer the greatest opportunities for enhanced security and stability in Europe. Beyond the withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan, moreover, Moscow also appears to have encouraged client states to attempt to resolve regional disputes in Southern Africa and Southeast Asia. Some Americans, seizing upon these positive Soviet initiatives, may conclude that high- intensity conflict involving the superpowers is extremely remote and may advocate an immediate shift to planning and preparing for mid- and low-intensity conflicts.
The time for such thinking may come someday, but such thoughts now are premature. Even if Gorbachev’s proposals are sincere, he may still fail and be forced to return to more traditional Soviet policies—or even be replaced by a Kremlin hardliner. There is also a possibility that reforms in Eastern Europe could set off a “tinder box” flash fire among populations long-yearning for new freedoms. In such event, heavy-handed Soviet military intervention could threaten to spill over the East-West border, raising anew the specter of conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Even though we should seek to exploit opportunities that arise in superpower relations, then, the United States must continue to give high priority to the mission of NATO defense, to counter what remains the most serious conventional threat to the Western World-
At the same time, it should be noted that Gorbachev’s unilateral force reduction proposals would, if fully implemented, change the nature of the threat to NATO. The proposed Soviet troop, tank, and assault force reductions would significantly reduce the Warsaw Pact’s ability to launch a short-warning attack with in-place forces. NATO planning would focus more on an attack that followed a period of mobilization. In such a scenario. U. S. reinforcements, including Marine forces for NATO’s flanks, would be much more critical than in a short-warning see- nario, in which NATO might have to "go nuclear” before reinforcements could arrive.
We should not lower our guard in Europe, but U. S. security efforts do need to be formulated in a broader g*0' bal context. And the United States does have worldwide commitments, many of which have received inadequate attention. Despite progress on some regional disputes, tfle United States’s interests in Latin America, the Middle East, and elsewhere remain threatened. Often these threats have appeared as insurgencies, terrorism, and other form* of unconventional warfare. We do need to give more attention to low-intensity conflict, in which there is a role for the expeditionary and amphibious capabilities of the Marine Corps.
Recognizing the need to be able to respond to the full range of security threats, General Gray has begun imple' mentation of some 30 initiatives to develop a lighter, ac' tive-duty Marine force that is tailored for the expedition^ mission in low-to mid intensity conflicts. By shifting heavy support capabilities needed for global war to the reserves and by reallocating manpower to strengthen hig*1 priority warfighting capabilities, these initiatives are designed to provide an active Fleet Marine Force that will 1 able to respond in a more timely and decisive manner to the most likely threats.
On a related global matter, the network of overseas U. S. bases has always been essential to protect and pr°' mote our worldwide security interests. Recent experience1’ in base negotiations—-with the Philippines, Greece, and Spain, for example—raise obvious questions about the long-term prospects for this basing network. It now appears to be prudent to be prepared to place more emphaS1 on offshore capabilities.
A final clear conclusion from the events of 1988 is the Marine Corps will continue to represent a unique an irreplaceable force in U. S. national security capabilities
Senator Nunn (D-GA) is the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Ah11 Services.
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