This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
and the Reagan administration to forge a budget deal for both
,Sether "seal ■
Budgetary concerns, the use of the c '.'tary in the interdiction of illegal nar- . lcs, and the Persian Gulf experience r8ely shaped the congressional perspec- 1V® °n the sea services in 1988.
Many of the themes that emerged from ges" actions will carry over into 1989. r 1 ln contrast to the relative calm sur’ i9^'n§ defense budget debate in
o. the early round of activity sur- bud^ing tdc hscal year 1990 defense i 8et seems a harbinger of intensified de e^est ^or the remainder of 1989. In- ha®d> *t appears that the budget will, as it ke m recent years, again emerge as the
I. y element driving congressional thinkS about the sea services. And as Con- jj ss an<J the new administration of Pres- fisnt] ^eor8e Bush attempt to set the the 3 Path f°r defense spending for 0n "ext several years, a series of debates Grc) 6 efficacy °f the “15-Carrier Battle P> 600-Ship Navy” seems more and m°re likely.
uecades that Congress presented (jenjC^ular appropriations bills to Presi- the Konald Reagan for signature before l)en.art °f the fiscal year. As a result, the cal yartment °f Defense (DoD) began fis- atj0n ar 1989 with a full-year’s appropri- as.Us lns,ead of the seemingly business-
"an\ ---------- ---------- ’----- ’
'Parke, 1 Sreater importance, the stock
tesuic crash” in October 1987 and the Con 'n® Budget summit that brought
tr,_ ® eSS anrl tho Pnrnn r, i c
ThisyearS 1988 and 1989.
Spenjj SUrnmit agreement cut defense- Peatiy n" ""thority for fiscal year 1989 by ~ ^ Billion from the originally re- Mari- ^23.3 billion. The Navy and the red^ 0IPS "Bsorbed $12.3 billion of "tion. For the most part Congress
upheld the proposed reductions in the President's amended budget submission, cutting 16 older frigates of the Brooke (FFG-1) and Garcia (FF-1040) classes; halting the standup of the 14th carrier airwing; terminating the airship and A-6F programs; and cutting back on planned increases in active-duty, reserve, and civilian personnel. Significantly, Congress acquiesced to the DoD plan to forego attainment of a 600-ship navy from 1989 until an indeterminate date in the 1990s, notwithstanding the fact that it added five ships—two Arleigh Burke (DDG-511- class guided-missile destroyers and three fleet oilers—to the Navy’s request.
Congress made changes in the amended budget request, even though the bottom line was fixed by the budget summit. Congress reordered the pay raise request of 4.6% for military personnel and 2% for civilians to a 4.1% across- the-board raise for both. In addition to increasing the number of ships in the Navy request, Congress also boosted purchases of the Mk-48 Advanced Capability (AdCap) torpedo and staked out nearly $300 million for special operations force equipment. The Coast Guard ended up with $2.9 billion for fiscal year 1989, a $400 million increase over the fiscal year 1988 level. In addition, Congress
restored $60 million in cutbacks made in the 1988 Coast Guard appropriation.
Notwithstanding the general agreement between the legislative and executive branches, Congress took a series of steps in the defense authorization bill to reshape the President’s strategic nuclear forces program, including the procurement and deployment of MX missiles and the research emphasis of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Congressional Republicans rebelled, voting against the bill and, when it was passed by the Democratic majorities of both houses, called for a presidential veto. President Reagan complied, and his veto of the bill was the first since President Jimmy Carter vetoed the defense authorization bill in 1979 over congressional inclusion of what later became the carrier Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71). As a result, the defense authorization bill languished until the late
Budgetary pressures are likely to keep a 600-ship navy out of reach for the mid-range period, at least. Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA), here visiting the Okinawa (LPH-3), favors early retirement of two older aircraft carriers to accelerate a fleet drawdown.
To meet budget reduction goals agreed on with the President, Congress cut 16 older frigates. Pakistan received two of these ships in a ceremony on 8 February 1989 in San Diego.
fall when both sides agreed to a deal that removed the restrictions on SDI funding and booted the tough decisions on deployment of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles over to the next administration.
Changes made in 1987 to the Gramm- Rudman-Hollings Balanced Budget Act had a significant effect on the budget outcome in 1988. The most significant change—basing the deficit calculation solely on Office of Management and Budget (OMB) estimates instead of also including those of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)—produced a deficit estimate of just less than the maximum $136 billion, thereby precluding further spending reductions made to avoid the automatic budget-cutting mechanism known as sequestration. Indicative of the imprecision of these estimates, both the
CBO and the OMB currently estimate that the deficit for fiscal year 1989 will exceed $160 billion.
The Military and Narcotics Interdiction: Last year witnessed a sharp escalation in congressional intent to involve the military in the interdiction of illegal narcotics entering the United States. Because of their unique sea- and aerial- surveillance equipment and frequent operations astride drug-smuggling routes, both the Navy and the Coast Guard became the focus of much of this interest.
Before 1988 most of this sort of activity centered on the transfer of Navy equipment, primarily E-2 Hawkeyes to the Coast Guard and P-3 Orion series aircraft to the Customs Service for use in existing statutory law enforcement roles. Navy ships also carried Coast Guard law enforcement detachments (LEDETs) when in drug-smuggling areas.
Using last year’s defense authorization bill as the vehicle, however, Congress initiated an effort to expand this role. The House of Representatives, for example, added an amendment to the bill that would have required the President to employ U. S. military forces to stop tht- flow of illegal narcotics into this country within 45 days. The amendment woul have given the military the authority t° arrest civilians for the first time since the 1860s and would have permitted military forces to conduct drug-related searches and seizures within U. S. borders.
With the Senate having adopted a considerably more conservative approach Congress ultimately agreed to make the DoD the government’s lead agency '(’r the detection, monitoring, and survei lance of narcotics smuggling into tn United States by sea or air. To assist this new mission Congress carved $d million from other DoD accounts to Pa' for additional steaming and flying hours- Ultimately Congress did not agree to e* panded arrest-and-search authorities 11 the military.
In addition, a $2.5 billion ornn'^ drug bill passed in the waning days ot 100th Congress directed the Navy to 1°^ three additional E-2C aircraft to the Guard for drug-interdiction work, a provided the Coast Guard with author') for 500 more personnel and $440 mill'® specifically for drug-interdiction ef'011^
Indicative of the congressional rn° on drug interdiction was the ill-fated tempt by the DoD to detach 16 1 Coast Guard patrol boats for Persian Ga duty. Congress vigorously opposed move based on the boats’ drug-inter0^ tion role—going so far as to pass , amendment to prohibit the transfer—"a the DoD and Coast Guard eventu" • withdrew the suggestion. ^
The Persian Gulf Experience: ^ Navy’s high-profile role in the Per ,j Gulf did much to shape congress^ perceptions in 1988. Although the sian Gulf mission was generally succ ful, it also raised congressional questl j about the efficacy of today’s na forces, including the lack of mine c° termeasures equipment and the ability of modem warships to such j. ond rate” threats as World '*'l'ar vintage mines. /tj
The shootdown of Iran Air High1 s on 3 July 1988 by the USS VinceU
If Congress Accepts the Base-Closing Legislation . . .
These Naval Bases Will Close:
Naval Station New York (Brooklyn, NY)
Naval Station Puget Sound (Sand Point, WA)
Naval Station San Francisco (Hunter’s Point, CA)* Philadelphia Naval Hospital (Philadelphia, PA)
Naval Station Galveston (Galveston, TX)
Naval Station Lake Charles (Lake Charles, LA)
Naval Reserve Center Coconut Grove (Coconut Grove, FL)
These Naval Bases Will Receive More Units and Peop‘e‘ Naval Station Long Beach (Long Beach, CA)
Naval Station San Diego (San Diego, CA)
Naval Station Pearl Harbor (Pearl Harbor, HI)
Naval Station Staten Island (Staten Island, NY)
Naval Station Ingleside (Corpus Christi, TX)
Naval Station Everett (Everett, WA)
*not to be built
1990
gan defense budget for fiscal year
►The extent to which both sides agree to near-term budget reductions that wu yield the necessary long-term savings from the Reagan plan
►Should the projected deficit worsen W the next several months, what further reductions in defense spending (alonr with other spending reductions and tax increases) may be needed to avoid the automatic Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Ac budget-cutting mechanism
The obvious solutions to defense spending reductions in the past have been to stretch out procurement programs
ter-
back
the
and
anced budget law, which slices ^ program and activity regardless of iinP tance, would be worse. So, sh°u'“ y economic picture worsen, both sides have to step up to further spending rC .fl dons. And finally, it remains uncei whether or how operational commit*^ would be reduced should the need anSL reduce Navy force structure.
(CG-49) caused three additional issues to become the subjects of congressional hearings and debate in 1988— discussions that are likely to continue this year. These included:
► The ability of modem warships to operate in lower-intensity conflict situations where real-time identification of friend from foe is essential
► The relevance of DoD operational test procedures to real-world threats and combat stress
► The ability of sailors to assimilate large amounts of information coming from systems such as Aegis during the stress of combat
A Final Note: Finally, one other event occurred in 1988 that may have significant effects for years to come. Base- closure legislation enacted in 1988 provides a one-time opportunity for the DoD to close or change the functions of bases no longer needed. Late in the year the Secretary of Defense submitted to Congress his approved list of bases to be closed as recommended by his Base Closure Commission. Starting 1 March 1989 Congress has 45 days in which to accept or reject the list as a whole; the law permits no amendments. If Congress allows the closures to proceed the Navy would be prohibited from initiating new home- ports in San Francisco, California; Galveston, Texas; and Lake Charles, Louisiana, and would have to close the Philadelphia Naval Hospital as well. The Army and Air Force would have to close even more bases.
Congress must deal with some tough strategic issues, and few are so well placed to influence the decisions as Sam Nunn (D-GA), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, here at the commissioning of the Tennessee (SSBN-734), the first sub to carry the D-5.
The Outlook for 1989
Absent some significant naval operations on the order of the Persian Gulf, it appears that the congressional view of the sea services in 1989 will be based primarily on budgetary restrictions. Indeed, should deficit-reduction pressures mount and budget consensus between Congress and the administration break down, the DoD budget could undergo a fundamental reexamination of force structure, with an attendant debate on naval strategy and worldwide commitments.
Just before leaving office President Reagan submitted the second biennial budget for the DoD for fiscal years 1990 and 1991. That budget calls for growth in defense spending at a rate of 2% more than the rate of inflation each year for the next five years.
Under this plan the Navy would realize after-inflation growth of 1% in 1990 and 0.3% in 1991. The service is requesting, among other items, 36 new ships and conversions and 418 new aircraft and conversions over the two-year period. The list includes ten Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, two Seawolf (SSN-21) attack submarines, 144 F/A-18s, 36 V-22s, and 48 AV-8Bs. The number of active-duty Navy personnel would increase by 5,000 over the two-year period.
For the Coast Guard the final Reagan budget would provide $3.5 billion in 1990—a 17% increase over 1989—and $3.3 billion in 1991. As in the past, most of these funds would support drug interdiction, law enforcement, and lifesaving operations. The 1990 budget includes nearly $250 million for a third polar icebreaker.
In early February, however. President Bush outlined his own budget priorities, indicating that defense spending would not increase above the rate of inflation in 1990 and would increase at a slower pace than the Reagan budget thereafter. Relative to the Reagan request, therefore, defense-spending authority would have to be reduced by $6.3 billion in 1990 and by more than $60 billion for the ensuing five-year period. No details were immediately available as to how the reductions would be made.
Congress and the administration will negotiate the overall budget scenario against the backdrop of the Gramm- Rudman-Hollings maximum deficit target of $100 billion for 1990. Although OMB currently predicts the deficit will be just under $100 billion, CBO currently has a more pessimistic view.
In analyzing this situation, one must bear in mind three key factors:
► The way in which Congress and the
administration agree to reduce the Rea' minating relatively few; and to cut on readiness-related items like sPare parts, ammunition, and operations. PreS ervation of force structure has been typical goal.
Given the factors noted above, ho ^ ever, Congress may choose this year go beyond these approaches and se more fundamental changes. For 1 Navy, such a move could center arou reducing the number of deployable ah craft carriers in the fleet. An effort to e back from the 15 deployable carriers tha^ will be reached in fiscal year 1990 to lesser number—13 or 14 have been b>ea tioned—would hasten the pace of naturally occurring reductions in >* size that seem inevitable after 1990. coming retirements of the Charles Adams (DDG-2)-class destroyers later the Sturgeon (SSN-637)-class atta<j submarines, coupled with the reIa*lV slow pace of construction of their placements, appear to place the 600-s navy goal out of reach for some (|
Two final points bear mention. 1° ^ final analysis neither Congress nor
administration want a sequestration
take place. Should the size of the de 1 warrant it, cutting billions more fro'11 . defense budget would have obviou^( devastating effects; cutting that anio^ out by the automatic process in the ^
por-
should
P
Dr. Cavaiola is a staff member of the House jn Services Committee and has been selected ^°r in the Naval Reserve. He has taught at the ^ ^ Postgraduate School and served in the Ofnc® .^3- Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis and ^3! tion) and as a principal analyst in the Congre Budget Office.