Comment and Discussion

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Contents:

The Lessons of Oliver North

Keeping the Air War on the Ground

JCS and the Goldwater-Nichols Act

Navy Medicine: What’s the Prognosis? Battle Force ASW: M³

Bulldog Ductus Exemplo—The Platoon Commander

Far From Sinking Our Navy

Keeping the Faith With Marine Aviators

Safeguarding the Hospital Ships

The Israeli Exchange

No Right to Fight

Sending Women to Sea

Women in the Brigade

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“The Lessons of Oliver North”

(.See F. Haynes, p. 18, March 1989

Proceedings)

Raymond J. Barrett, retired Foreign Ser­vice officer—The basic lesson of Oliver North is not to send a Marine Colonel to do a diplomat’s job.

The appeal of the military officer’s “yes sir, can-do” attitude is seductive to the busy politician. But Oliver North’s case shows clearly that approach ignores the subtleties that have too often brought U. S. foreign policy to grief. A Marine lieutenant colonel has neither the experi­ence nor the training to deal with the un­certainties and ambiguities of interna­tional affairs. A military officer is superbly trained for combat. If I wanted a machine gun nest charged, I wouldn’t send for a Foreign Service officer. I’d send for Oliver North. If I had a problem in international affairs I’d be a fool not to send for a foreign affairs expert.

I can vouch for the benefits of applying together the separate talents of military and Foreign Service officers. On the ex­change program between the Depart­ments of State and Defense, I served two years in Air Force Headquarters as deputy chief of plans. And I later had a two-year tour at Fort Bragg as State Department adviser to the JFK Special Warfare Cen­ter. My military colleagues’ expertise was invaluable in one touchy situation after another. Their input was essential to effective U. S. foreign policy questions such as insurgency and instability, secu­rity of overseas oil supplies, and arms control verification. I, in turn, was able to point out complexities and interna­tional reactions that also had to be fac­tored in. 1 think, for instance, we wound up with a sound and constructive Air Force contribution to the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. And, with the Army, I also believe we developed a real­istic awareness of military aspects of U. S. vulnerabilities in our Middle East oil supplies.

The United States has superbly trained people in military, international and in­telligence affairs. The real need is to draw on the talents of each in their own areas and combine that expertise effec­

tively to the greater good of the United States.

Paul D. Owen—General Haynes cor­rectly distinguishes the “emblem of ser­vice” from a “visible character refer­ence.” I realize now that I made a mistake in wearing the uniform in traffic court when I was a midshipman eight years ago. I was justly found guilty of improper driving and fined $15. A mem­ber of the Coast Guard also appeared in uniform and pleaded guilty to speeding, for which he, too, was fined (in an en­tirely unrelated case). No doubt he, as did I, sought leniency through the reputation of the uniform. In retrospect, we did the uniform some disservice. If military per­sonnel customarily appear in court in uni­form to defend themselves, perhaps we need to reconsider the practice.

“The Israeli Exchange”

(See N. Polmar, pp. 181-182, March 1989

Proceedings)

Russell S. Hibbs—As part of its success­ful effort to maintain strong U. S. sup­port, Israel emphasizes two themes: that it is of strategic value to the United States, and that it is a democracy and the only reliable U. S. ally in the Middle East. Author Polmar states that much of the information contained in his column resulted from conversations with senior Israeli military officers. Consequently, it is not surprising that the column repeats the Israeli themes—themes that deserve hardheaded evaluation.

In 1975, then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger told a group of Jewish leaders: “The strength of Israel is needed for its own survival but not to prevent the spread of Communism in the Arab world. So it doesn’t necessarily help United States global interests as far as the Middle East in concerned.”¹

Israel, aided by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), has successfully propagandized the contrary—- i.e., the putative strategic value of Israel- In 1982, AIPAC began publishing a se-

aborted.

nes of “position papers” calculated to demonstrate Israel’s strategic value to the United States. AIPAC couples these pub­lications with generous financial support to members of Congress who support Is­rael, and with aggressive action against those who do not.² Andrew I. Killgore, former U. S. ambassador to Qatar, writes: “Our legislators receive millions from Israel’s lobby, and vote billions for Israel in return. The best deal in town. The biblical seven to one for those who cast their bread upon the waters became a thousand to one for a foreign state sup­ported by a powerful domestic lobby.”³

in assessing Israel’s strategic value to the United States, we must begin with the strategic value of the Middle East, of which Israel is but a minute part.

The Middle East is the center of world °tl production and, as a result, is crucial to long-term U. S. economic health. It sits astride important land, air, and mari- hrne routes linking Europe, Africa, and Asia. And it is the heart and soul of the Islamic world, which, in the year 2025, Will account for one in four of the world’s ■nhabitants. Islam is a powerful force that sffects U. S. national security.

Israel, on the other hand, has insignifi­cant oil reserves and a geographic posi­tion of less value than that of many Arab countries. It does not border the Soviet Union and does not sit astride strategic ^air> land, or sea routes. And Israel is not Part of the Islamic world; it is its principal

antagonist.

The defense-related advantages of T*- S.-Israeli relations cited by senior Is­raeli military officers and repeated in Mr. j olrnar’s column are debatable. First, the United States has indeed received signifi- ^car>t information on U. S. and Soviet Weapon performance as a result of “sev­eral major wars and continued armed dashes since the mid-1950s.” But these Wars and armed clashes have not fur­thered U. S. national interests. A direct Soviet-U. S. military confrontation would Provide even more information on the relative capabilities of U. S. and Soviet Weapons, but such a confrontation is not ^ln U. S. interests.

Second, although Israel has demon­strated its military research-and-develop- raent (R&D) capability, many U. S. 'rrns also could develop an antitactical allistic missile. They would welcome "e R&D funds being given Israel.

Third, Mr. Polmar, presumably citing an Israeli officer, states that “the U. S. 8°vernment refused to fund Israeli devel­opment of the Lavi strike-fighter. ...” n fact, the U. S. government paid $1.3 "lion for the project before it was

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described the U. S.-Israeli Lavi agree­ment as “stone soup”: Once there was a man with a stone. He offered to provide his stone to cook some soup for a stran­ger, if the stranger would provide a pot of water. And some carrots to flavor the soup. And some potatoes. And some on­ions. And some meat. . . . The U. S. of­ficial noted that all the Israelis needed to build the Lavi was U. S. technology and U. S. money.⁵

Fourth, the fact that Israel and the United States have purchased equipment and special weapons from each other is not necessarily an advantage to the United States. In some cases, U. S. mili­tary equipment and ammunition have

been drawn down dangerously low to accommodate Israel during “major wars and continued armed clashes.” In some cases, U. S. technology is threatened by the sale to Israel of weapon systems that have not been shared even with NATO allies.⁶ In spite of Israel’s receipt of the latest U. S. equipment, Israel (via AIPAC) has consistently blocked U. S. sale of less sophisticated military equip­ment to moderate Arab countries such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia. As a result, they have turned to other suppliers with a resultant loss of billions of dollars to U. S. industry. Such losses increase the price of weapon systems for U. S. forces and reduce industry funds available for

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R&D and development of better military technology on which we predicate our defenses.

And finally, the sharing of U. S.- Israeli intelligence is a double-edged sword. Many countries are not enchanted with the idea of the United States passing intelligence to Israel. The perception that Israel knows all that the United States knows about the Middle East was fur­thered by the Jonathan Pollard case, when the Israelis decided to take by espi­onage what they didn’t receive officially from the United States. “Israeli assist­ance in the secret arms transfers by the Reagan administration to Iran” is an ex­cellent example that Israeli and U. S. in­terests do not always coincide. It was in Israeli interest to support Iran against Is­rael’s more immediate enemy Iraq. It was not in U. S. interests to fuel the Iran-Iraq war. Israeli encouragement to trade arms for hostages was “assistance” we could well have done without.

Another theme that Israel pushes is that “we are both democracies.” This argu­ment ignores the fact that Turkey and Pakistan are also democracies. Turkey provides more forces to NATO than any other member except the United States, yet receives only approximately 20% of the foreign aid the United States gives Israel. Pakistan, which helped rout the Soviets from Afghanistan, receives a similarly small amount of U. S. aid in comparison to Israel. Furthermore, a democratic government is neither a pre­requisite for nor a guarantee of mutual interests and cooperation. A democrati­cally elected Israeli government invaded Lebanon in 1982 and continues to settle the West Bank.

Finally, Israel claims U. S. support based on the idea that “we are still fam­ily.” Maybe the United States should recall the farewell address of George Washington, in which he warned: “The nation which indulges toward another an habitual hatred or an habitual fondness is in some degree a slave. It is a slave to its animosity or to its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its interest.”

We have failed to heed Washington’s words on both counts; we have allowed our relationship with the Soviet Union to be dominated by habitual hatred and our relationship with Israel by habitual fond­ness. The two violations of Washington’s advice have become symbiotic, feeding, and feeding on each other. Israel plays on U. S. fears of the Soviet Union to gain more support. U. S. support of Israel, coupled with frequent congressional de­nial of support to moderate Arab states, drives the latter closer to Moscow—

which appears to prove the Israeli conten­tion that it is the only reliable U. S. ally in the Middle East. If we are to break this cycle, we must cease to play the rich and forgiving uncle and predicate our actions not on “family” but on U. S. national interests.

'Department of State Memorandum of Conversation, Meeting with Jewish leaders, Hotel Pierre, New York, 15 June 1975, as cited in Edward Tivnan, The Lobby, Jewish Political Power and American For­eign Policy (New York: Touchstone, 1987), p. 167. "See Ibid.

"If the Cold War Ends, What Next For Our Costly Strategic Ally’?”, The Washington Report on Mid­dle East Affairs, March 1989, p. 18.

Martin Sieff, “Tempers fly faster, higher than the Lavi,” The Washington Times, 10 March 1986, p. 6a.

Charles Babcock, “How U. S. Came to Underwrite Israel’s Lavi Fighter Project,” The Washington Post, 6 August 1986, p. Al.

According to the 27 February 1989 Defense News, the United States plans to sell Israel the LANTIRN advanced navigation and targeting system that allows P'lots to fly in all weather and at night and evade fadar. A Department of Defense spokesman stated that the system scheduled for delivery to Israel does ^not have all the features of the system scheduled for Installation in U. S. F-15 and F-16 fighters. How­^ever, according to a spokesman of Martin Marietta, ^which manufactures the system, the LANTIRN scheduled for delivery to Israel is essentially the same ^as that for U. S. fighters.

war. This was a task the Argentines were not able to accomplish and contributed to their ultimate defeat.

JCS and the Goldwater-Nichols Act

Rear Admiral H. S. Persons, II. S. Navy (Retired)—The Goldwater-Nichols De­partment of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 reorganizes the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) organization by increasing the

powers and responsibilities of the chair­man, providing for a vice-chairman, and downgrading the role of the service chiefs. It also has many other effects.

The act gives the commanders of the unified commands and the specified com­mands (the combat commanders) a voice in the budget process. It gives them more control over their subordinate command­ers and some control over their logistic support.

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“Keeping the Air War on the Ground”

(See J. DiLullo, p. 113, January 1989

Proceedings)

Captain Carlos E. Zartmann, Argentine Navy (Retired)—As it stands now, read­^ers might be misled to believe that the single attack on Puerto Argentino (Port Stanley) airport in the Malvinas (Falk- lands) islands by a Royal Air Force Vul­^Can bomber on 1 May 1982 and the sev­eral further attacks by Harrier aircraft put the airfield out of duty for good and that the same was later brought back into ser- ^Vlce by the British ten days after the Ar- 8^entine surrender on 13 June.

The truth is that the Vulcan attack pro­duced only a single hit on the edge of the runway which did not prevent its further operation, and that the bombing by the Harriers was thwarted by the Argentine antiair defense, scoring no hits on the air- >eld. In fact, it was not put out of action ^0r the entire duration of the war. Argen- t'ne aircraft, like Hercules and Electras, operated from there till the very last day ^of the conflict.

Mr. DiLullo probably mixed up two different facts. One is the unsuccessful bombing of the airstrip. The other is that ¹¹ took the British forces ten days to ex­tend the length of the runway so it would d^e suitable for combat aircraft operations Bike the one shown in the picture) after he runway’s recapture at the end of the

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But the act does have its drawbacks:

► It reduces the role of the service chiefs, not only in JCS matters, but also in their service duties.

►  It establishes an occupational category, referred to as “joint specialty," for the management of officers who are trained in and oriented toward joint matters. Of­ficers in the grade of captain (U. S. Army, Air Force or Marine Corps) or senior lieutenant in the U. S. Navy, or higher grades, shall be selected by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) with the advice of the chairman. These officers must be given a joint school education and must complete a full tour of duty for three years in a joint duty assignment. The SecDef shall designate not fewer than 1,000 joint duty assignment posi­tions and each officer who fills such an assignment must have the joint duty spe­cialty. Also, the SecDef must ensure that approximately one-half of the joint duty assignments in grades above captain (lieutenant in the Navy) are filled at any one time by officers with a joint spe­cialty. And the SecDef must ensure “that officers who are serving on, or have served on, the Joint Staff are expected as a group to be promoted at a rate not less than the rate for officers of the same armed force in the same grade and com­petitive category who are serving on. or have served on. the headquarters staff of their armed force.” And there is the same directive for officers who have the joint specialty and for officers who are serving in, or have served in joint duty assign­ments. The SecDef is also required to monitor the promotions and career as­signments of those mentioned above.

If the objective is to develop staff offi­cers skilled in pushing paper around, it is undoubtedly a fine idea to catch them early, in the formative years, but 1 don’t want any of these officers working for me. 1 want well-rounded officers, who have served with troops, in aircraft squadrons, or in the fleet. Such officers will have had the opportunity to gain es­sential operating experience. It is possi­ble to develop well-rounded staff offi­cers, with the necessary operating experi­ence, and the joint schooling and joint staff experience. I can find nothing in the act, however, that demands that opera­tional experience be a factor in selecting candidates for “joint specialty.”

The Reorganization Act further med­dles in promotion procedures by requir­ing that the secretary of the service de­partment submit promotion selection board reports to the JCS chairman for review to determine whether the board gave proper consideration to joint duty assignments in their selection delibera­tions! If the chairman is not satisfied with the report, when he returns it to the de­partment secretary the latter may return it to the selection board, or he may convene a special selection board, or he may take other appropriate action to satisfy the concerns of the chairman.

To add further to the powers of the chairman, when an officer is nominated for initial appointment to the grade of lieutenant general or general, or vice admiral or admiral, the chairman shall submit to the secretary his evaluation of that officer’s performance as a member of the Joint Staff and in other joint duty as- sigments. The SecDef must also submit the chairman’s evaluation to the President at the same time he sends his recommen­dations to the President.

In promotion procedures, no officer may be selected for promotion to briga­dier general or rear admiral (lower half) unless that officer has served in a joint duty assignment.

The Reorganization Act charges the JCS chairman with 12 specific responsi­bilities, as well as the catch-all phrase “shall perform such other duties as the President or the SecDef may prescribe.” The major responsibilities of the chair­man include:

► Preparing strategic plans to provide for the strategic direction of the armed forces, including plans which conform with the resources projected by the SecDef

►  Advising the SecDef on the extent to which the program recommendations and budget proposals of the military depart­ments and other components of the De­partment of Defense for each fiscal year conform with the priorities established in strategic plans and the operational re­quirements of the unified and specified commanders

►  Advising the SecDef on the extent to which the major manpower programs and policies of the armed forces conform with strategic plans

►  Providing for the preparation and re­view of contingency plans that conform to policy guidance from the President and the SecDef

►  Preparing joint logistic and mobility plans to support the contingency plans, and recommending the assignment of logistic and mobility responsibilities to the military departments and armed forces in accordance with such logistic and mobility plans

►  Advising the SecDef on critical defi­ciencies and strengths in force capabili­ties, including manpower, logistic, and mobility support, identified during the preparation and review of contingency plans, and assessing the effect of such deficiencies and strengths on national security objectives and policy and strate­gic plans

► Assessing joint military requirements for defense acquisition programs, espe­cially in the area of communications, in order to enhance the ability of the armed forces to operate jointly

►  Developing doctrine, subject to the approval of the SecDef, for the joint training of the armed forces that enhances their ability to operate jointly

►  Formulating policies, to be approved by the SecDef, for coordinating the mili­tary education and training of the armed forces, particularly the education and training of officers who serve in joint duty positions

►  Not less than every three years, sub­mitting a report to the SecDef containing recommendations for changes in the functional assignments of the armed forces as the chairman considers neces­sary to ensure maximum effectiveness of the armed forces (including recommen­dations for changes in policy directives, regulations, and legislation as may be necessary to achieve these recommended changes in function assignments)

In addition, the chairman must review records and recommend proposed assign­ments for flag and general officers, rec­ommend officers for assignment to duty on joint staffs, designate officers for joint specialty, and review promotion board reports.

Most of the responsibilities assigned to the chairman in regard to strategic, con­tingency, and logistic plans, and man­power programs and mobility plans were previously the responsibility of the JCS. In order to assist the chairman in dis­charge of these expanded duties, there­fore, a vice chairman is authorized and the Joint Staff is placed directly under the chairman instead of under the JCS. Well, the chairman must be a superman to carry out these vital and formidable duties. And there is grave doubt that he can meet these responsibilities without placing enormous confidence in “the faceless members of the Joint Staff,” and quite possibly without sufficient time for the chairman to exercise adequate supervi­sion of their work.

Since 1946, one of the great fears con­cerning reorganization has been that the result would be the creation of a “Prus­sian General Staff,” an organization that would place a small group of military of­ficers, headed by a supreme commander, in full control of our military destinies. In deliberations before the act was adopted, the act purposely did not create a “Gen­eral Staff.” The act, however, did create the machinery for such a powerful group.

All it now needs is a chairman ambitious enough to pick like-minded people and to set the necessary procedures in motion to achieve this end.

There are other problems (or gaps) that are raised by the act’s sweeping changes. Tor example, the writers of the new law used the old statutes governing the De­partment of the Army as a model and applied them to the Air Force and to the Navy with minimum changes. The result produces anomalous situations such as the absence of any reference to the sea service mission of the Department of the ^Navy. In fact, the act gives no power to the Secretary of the Navy (SecNav) “to construct, equip, and employ naval ves­sels,” as was previously authorized, un­less the SecNav can construe “the con­struction, maintenance, and repair of military equipment” to cover this need.

There is another important omission. The new law does not state that the Chief °f Naval Operations is principal naval adviser to the President and to the Sec- Ttef, so no one now has that responsibility.

As some legal authorities have pointed °ut, the authority of each service secre­cy has been broadened over many years hy statutes, revisions to statutes, legisla­te history, executive and congressional mterpretations of law, and a massive number of court and administrative law uases. This sweeping abrogation of exist- ^lng law not only will call much of that history and authority into question and Produce administrative confusion and ^chaos but will, in all probability, unleash ^a Hood of litigation that will clog the or­derly flow of the Defense Department’s business until authorities and responsibil- dies have been redefined, in other words, ^everyone who can sue will do so.

1 am sure that there are a number of ^0[her omissions that will receive attention m the next few months, but these, and ^others cited in the foregoing, are rela- hvely minor when compared with the two [host important changes:

£ The powers given to the JCS chairman ' The effect on the morale of the officer u°rps by the preselection, at an early P°mt in an officer’s career, of an elite ^gr°up of joint specialists who will be fa- ^v°^red for certain high-level jobs

*n divesting the JCS of numerous re- ^sP°nsibilities, particularly strategic, lo- S'stic, and budget planning, and giving

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^se responsibilities to the chairman, fhe

ngress has chosen a risky course. The

chairman is an experienced officer, but ®'s experienced in warfare on land, in u air, or on the sea, but not all of these. ^Is knowledge of the other services is neoretical and not based on personal experience. When the JCS had those re-

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sponsibilities, the plans that were written were based on corporate experience since those plans had the approval of each ser­vice chief. And those strategic plans had been analyzed by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, consisting of a senior planner from each service, with the Joint Staff Director for Plans as chairman. The same procedure governed the preparation of logistic plans, communication plans, etc. The services had appropriate input early ^ln the planning process. I hope that the chairman will ensure that similar plan- ^mng committees have a role in the new planning process, although he now has no legal responsibility to get the service chiefs’ recommendations on plans.

And, when the Congress interjected the chairman into the duty assignment ^and promotion process of each service, a Pandora’s box was opened. Although the chairman cannot possibly have firsthand knowledge of each junior officer, he must advise” the SecDef on the selection officers of the grade of captain or senior lieutenant (Navy) to the designation of “joint specialty,” an affirmative action which, at this early point in an officer’s career gives him a leg up throughout that career. And, the chairman has a veto on selection to subsequent higher grades, even through general or flag officer.

The Reorganization Act managed one commendable action. It reduced consid­erably the number of reports that the Sec­Def and the services must make to Con­gress each year. The act requires the President to make an annual National Security Strategic Report to Congress, however, to set forth our national goals and objectives; our defense capabilities; the planned use of our political, eco­nomic, and military power. Moscow must have cheered when this was en­acted, considering the United States track record for keeping secrets.

The Reorganization Act gives too much power to the chairman. Neither Admiral William J. Crowe, the current chairman, nor his immediate predeces­sor, Army General John W. Vessey, rec­ommended such sweeping powers for the chairman. The act, in effect, can make the chairman an American Caesar. Knowing the current chairman, Admiral Crowe, I have no fear that he will use that power unwisely, or fail to supervise ade- U.S. NAVY SHIP’S CAPS

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quately the operations of the Joint Staff. But, there is always the chance that some future chairman may have more ambition than patriotism and truly become the American Caesar. To quote Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 is a blueprint for disaster.” I have a fer­^Vent hope that God will give future bod- ^les of Congress the time, and the wis­dom, to correct the mistakes of the 99th Congress.

“No Right to Fight”

(See N. G. Golightly. pp. 46-49, December 1987; R. M. Hixson, pp. 26-28, January 1988; ^M- A. Walker, G. A. Bleyle, H. Sage, D. 1. Hewitt, L. Melling, and J. R. Gentry, February •988; J. Perez, pp. 17-19, March 1988; N. F. Caldwell, J. J. Kennedy, B. A. Bell, and A. A. Balunek, pp. 31-32, April 1988; J. Stevens,

C- M. Butler, J. T. Broglio, C. L. Reeves,

B. Streich, V. L. Starzy, T. B. Schlax,

A. Shimer, R. E. Bryan, pp. 134-139, May ¹⁹88; J. Gleason, p. 28. June 1988; N. L. ^G°lightly, pp. 31-32. November 1988; Proceedings)

“Sending Women to Sea”

^(Sfc pp. 123-145. May 1988 Proceedings)

‘Women in the Brigade”

f^ee K. M. Klein and J. E. Good. pp. 103- H)8, April 1988; M. Camilleri and J. J. Tarpey, p- 22. July 1988; L. J. Hertzog and W. M. ' ^r'Plett, p. 93, December 1988 Proceedings)

enior Master Sergeant Michael H. 'nookler, U. S. Air Force Reserve— _ Her closely following the recent articles !*^nc* letters regarding women in the Navy, have come to the conclusion that the • S. Navy is neither ready for nor de- ^^ryes women. Why women choose the ^avy over a more integrated and open- minded branch of the service like the Air _T⁽'^rce is beyond my comprehension.

nere are more professional/military opportunities open to women in the Air ^0rce than in the Navy. Women are ^reated as equals in the Air Force, not as Individuals trying to break down any ^lnner sanctums of male tradition and Pfide. Most of the responding male writ­^ers seem worried about how their tranquil '^v°rlds are being disrupted by having '^Vomen on their ships or in their midst. The opportunities for officers and en- sled female personnel in the Air Force ^3re excellent. To quote from the August ^1Ssue of Airman magazine:

The Air Force is looking for a few good—women ... to fill all crew Positions on TR-1, U-2, TU-2, EC- 130, and C-29 aircraft .... the op­portunities for women in the Air Force are the best they have been in the ser­vice’s 41-year history ... the Air Force consistently has been on the forefront of integrating women into military service to the full extent al­lowed by law.”

Navy Medicine: What’s the Prognosis?

Lieutenant David A. Randall, Medical Corps, U. S. Navy—Thank you for ad­dressing such an important topic at the Naval Institute seminar in Washington, D.C., on 17 February. As an intern at Portsmouth Naval Hospital, I regularly see the dwindling teaching staff, materiel shortage, and routine practice of denying health care to dependents and retirees because of inadequate personnel. 1 antici­pated leaving the seminar more educated and encouraged about the future of naval medicine yet was disappointed for two reasons.

Most people know the value of vague promises offered by the federal govern­ment, and those of us associated with this health care system recognize the acute need for correction of long-neglected problems. Admiral Leon A. Edney de­scribed the many legitimate points identi­fied by the Blue Ribbon Panel, yet both he and Vice Admiral James A. Zimble failed to mention any specific plans or timetables. They described such well- known problems as pay differentials and bonuses without mention of when or how they would be addressed. The need for specific and timely action becomes espe­cially important when considering that important posts like Surgeon General and Vice Chief of Naval Operations are typically held for only a few years. Based on the talks; it would seem that the Navy has no work on track for correcting the problems.

Also disturbing were Admiral Edney’s several remarks about “not solving prob­lems by throwing money at them,” and making more efficient use of resources. This sounds as if the line still wants the problem fixed without spending more money, especially in the anticipated tighter budget climate. A system with regular shortages of basic items (blood tubing, alcohol pads) and minimal nurs­ing staff, even with civilian supplements, has almost no fat to trim. And added into the cost formula must be the efficiency of our primary mission—to support Beet readiness with combat medical capability.

The lack of specifics might well be because of the speakers' unwillingness to

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commit themselves, but it may also have been because of the format of the semi­nar. It seemed as if the participants pre­sented their material without knowledge of what others would say. Vice Admiral Zimble remarked that the keynote address covered the bulk of his speech. A lecture format might have prevented redundancy.

Perhaps the panel and Surgeon Gener­al’s office might accept your published invitation to use Proceedings as the ap­propriate forum to reach both line and staff communities in the U. S. Navy on a semiannual or quarterly basis.

“Battle Force ASW: M³”

(See P. D. Voss, pp. 52-59, January 1989;

G. H. Montgomery, p. 29, March 1989; J. C.

Mosier, J. H. Richards, J. G. Stavridis, pp. 20­25, April 1989 Proceedings)

Rear Admiral William J. Holland, Jr., U. S. Navy (Retired)—Commander Voss’s perceptive analysis of the prob­lems with task force antisubmarine war­fare command and control fails only in reaching his obvious conclusion. His pro­posed solution to the problems is to make the carrier commanding officer the ASW coordinator (ASWC). Assigning a person who has other major duties to be a war­fare coordinator, and assigning someone who does not have the interest or ability to execute that function, delegates the real tasks of command to persons even less competent.

Commander Voss said, “The tactical radio discipline in a battle force is usually garbage at best.” This testifies to the re­sults of this delegation of duty. Opera­tions in which the warfare coordinator himself attends the radiotelephone exhibit more concise and clear communications and more effective command and control. Carrier skippers cannot do this and super­vise air operations. Being a warfare coor­dinator is a full-time job for an officer who knows the business at hand.

It is not unusual to find the ASWC ig­norant of the environment, unconscious of the critical and multifaceted role of command, control, communications, and intelligence (C³I) in task force ASW, and tactically inept for all platforms other than his own. There is no way to sur­mount all these problems. But Com­mander Voss is correct to suggest that ASW is effective only when it is viewed through the eyes of a submariner.

The obvious conclusion is that the ASWC ought to be a submariner. A sub­mariner understands enemy intentions and the limitations of the submarine plat­form. He also has the greatest experience in and knowledge of the submarine envi­ronment. Those who operate in the ocean naturally possess more familiarity with the vagaries of the water column than those who operate on or above it.

The staff supporting an ASWC who is a submariner has to be somewhat larger than for destroyer squadron commanders or ASW aircraft officers because senior- level submarine officers will not under­stand the abilities of the surface or air­borne platforms that he is to control, nor will he have a grasp of the mechanics of task force C³. But these deficiencies are easier to supplement than a lack of an innate feeling for the submarine environ­ment or the enemy.

Assigning a submariner to be ASWC will not solve the entire predicament. ASW is a team game. No one person pos­sesses all of the skills Commander Voss requires of an ASWC. The ASWC must lead a team that understands every ASW platform’s capabilities and limitations and that embodies a cooperative spirit and a common goal. The commander and his staff must be large enough to endure a long haul because ASW persists over weeks not hours like antiair warfare or antisurface warfare. The team must be smart enough to process clues from mul­tiple sources and gather fragments of data in non-real time with varying degrees of accuracy to assemble coherent patterns. There is no radar to provide range and bearing in ASW. The command post must have immediate access to the battle group commander and the watch officer must be able to order the entire battle force to move in order to avoid danger. As Commander Voss infers, more than one carrier has steamed blissfully into green Bares while the ASW module was trying to find someone in authority who would listen to their warnings.

To accomplish real task force ASW, those interested in it must form a union so strong that they can interrupt aircrait launch to get up the ASW helo. When that happens, the task force will under­stand what is the major threat and the ASWC will have some real control.

“Bulldog Ductus Exemplo—The Platoon Commander”

(See G. K. Holcomb, pp. 115-118, November 1988; P. F. Donohue, pp. 20-22, February 1989; A. DeNunzio, pp. 30, March 1989 Proceedings)

Midshipman First Class G. C. Allen. U. S. Naval Academy—Why would a Naval Academy graduate choose to be a Marine Corps officer and not be moti­vated to perform well in this pursuit after spending four years preparing to become an officer?

The answer is that many midshipmen

do not want to join the surface warfare community, and before the advent of Bulldog, going Marine Corps was sup­posedly an easy alternative. Few mid­shipmen come to the Naval Academy with visions of being a surface warfare officer (SWO). A plebe given a choice for service selection today would proba­bly reply, “I want to go Navy air, sir!” Rarely does a plebe want to become a SWO. The upperclassmen encourage this type of thought by perpetuating the myth that all surface warfare officers are fat, 'azy, coffee drinkers who lead a life that keeps them at sea, and away from their family and friends. Peer pressure has shaped the minds of midshipmen so they do not want to go SWO. The thought of being a surface warfare officer is so re­pulsive to some midshipmen that they hope to become “not physically quali­fied” (NPQ) for surface warfare so that they may choose a restricted line billet.

Alter three-and-one-half years of anti- S\VO propaganda, midshipmen have to choose what branch of the naval service they are going to enter. By that time Tnany of the midshipmen who wanted to 8° Navy air have been deemed NPQ for Navy air, usually because their eyesight has deteriorated, and most of the mid­shipmen who wanted to choose special Warfare, submarines, or some other highly sought billet have found that they d° not meet the qualifications to go into 'heir desired community. They find that 'hey have only two options for service flection: surface warfare or Marine ^L°^rps. Before Bulldog, many of these ^m'dshipmen chose to go Marine Corps.

1 contend that most of those Naval Academy graduates who did not perform '^VeH at The Basic School (TBS) were the same ones who selected the Marine Corps '° avoid being a surface warfare officer after realizing that they could not enter "^c community that they originally de- ^Slred. in many cases, these people were j'⁰' going to be enthusiastic about being Marine Corps officers; therefore, they did ^not perform well at TBS.

Making Bulldog a prerequisite for aval Academy midshipmen to select 'arine Corps should improve Academy ®^raduates’ performance at TBS because °^nly those midshipmen who are highly motivated to be Marines are going to Staduate from Bulldog.

Midshipmen, however, still do not p ‘^lnt to be surface warfare officers. I be- ^eve the Naval Academy could solve the P^r°blem if it screened its applicants more ^Carefully. These prospective midshipmen ⁿ'Ust be made aware that if they want to '’me to the Academy they had better ^am to be surface warfare officers, even if that is not their primary interest, be­cause the Academy gears most of its pro­fessional training toward the develop­ment of surface warfare officers. This fact is not stressed enough. It was not stressed to me when 1 went through the admissions process, and it certainly does not appear to have been stressed to most of the midshipmen I have known, espe­cially the ones who were forced to go SWO.

“Far From Sinking Our Navy”

(.See M. D. Goldberg, pp. 22-25. March 1989

Proceedings)

Commander Alan K. Hayashida, U. S. Naval Reserve—As a former active-duty submarine officer who is still, through my civilian employment with the Arctic Submarine Laboratory, closely involved with the submarine force, I believe that many of Commander Goldberg’s asser­tions fail to answer the mail and are equally far off the mark in assessing the capabilities of today’s Navy.

First, Commander Goldberg disputes Tom Clancy’s observation that U. S. sub­mariners devote an excessive amount of time and concentration to the propulsion plant at the expense of operational and

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tactical disciplines. I have seen many submariners today lose sight of the fact that the nuclear power plant should be merely an improved means of driving the front half of the ship around, and not vice versa. After all, new officers do spend an entire year undergoing nuclear power training, but only three months in subma­rine school. (When I went through the pipeline it was worse; the sub school cur­riculum was only five weeks!)

Further, I wonder how many ap­proaches and actual torpedo firings offi­cers conduct before they become pro­spective commanding officers as compared with the number of engineering drills in which they participate. In my days as a junior officer, such a compari­son would have required invoking the mathematical impossibility of dividing by ^2ero, and I suspect that the balance today ^ls little, if any, better. If Commander Goldberg in his career has been able to spend more time on tactics and opera- donal subjects than on engineering drills, ^engineering-officer-of-the-watch and en­gineering watch supervisor seminars, monitor watches, and the like, I believe 'hat he is in the fortunate minority.

Commander Goldberg also quotes Admiral Kinnaird McKee’s maxim know the boat,” and cites the damage control efforts of the USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58) in support. While not fishing to detract from the splendid per- ormance of her commanding officer, 1 suspect that the outcome was more the result of the superior efforts of the dam- ^a§^e control parties working together as a '^Vell-oiled team than it was of the cap­^tain’s detailed personal knowledge. The commanding officer must know his hip’s engineering plant and its capabili- hes, but is it really necessary for him to ^e more of an expert than the engineer? Commander Goldberg’s attacks on Mr. lancy’s criticisms of the technology and c°st of the Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class ^attack submarines are based only on un­substantiated assertions that it “is the ^Cst submarine in the world, including ^any Soviet or British submarine,” and ^al “the United States has enough of cse submarines to win any conflict!” I °ubt that all submariners would rush to embrace that position, and I would ^r°ngly recommend that any who have h°t done so read Patrick Tyler’s book "Hnning Critical (New York: Harper & °w, 1986) for a flavor of some of the F °blems and compromises that have ^dgued the Los Angeles-c\ass program. °mrnander Goldberg attempts to bolster ^ls position by pointing out that the J’mvo// (SSN-21) is funded and coming. 'Fortunately, that submarine, too, has

been wrought with controversy, not the tiniest example of which was the chaos surrounding the development of its com­bat system.

Commander Goldberg hides behind the veil of protecting classified information while asserting without further support that Mr. Clancy is remiss in criticizing U. S. submarine design philosophy. However, as I read it, Mr. Clancy is merely restating an argument that others have already initiated—that there is, per­haps, more merit in the Soviet practice of designing multiple classes of submarines simultaneously and initially building only small numbers of each than in “putting

The Soviet Navy

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