Understanding the Independent NATO Partner

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The winds blowing Europe toward integra­tion also are bringing more widespread acceptance of France’s stubborn military self-reliance. After all, the six French SSBNs, including Le Terrible, which is being refitted with MIRVed M4 missiles, contribute to Western Europe’s nuclear safety net.

Like any other medium-sized navy of the West, the French Navy is a mix of old traditions and new trends.¹ While it is not under NATO command, it is as ready as any other alliance navy to join up at any time. It routinely carries out ship-to-ship communications in English, has compatible data link systems, uses the NATO signal book, and takes part annually in a dozen joint exer­cises. President Charles de Gaulle clearly and firmly es­tablished the defense policy of the country 30 years ago and it has been pursued consistently by his successors. But changes loom on the horizon. Emerging international de­velopments might well have a destabilizing short-term impact on French policies and, consequently, on the role of the navy.

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, the “peace of­fensive” of glasnost and perestroika, and to a lesser de­gree the spinoffs of the Iraq-Iran War, the birth of the Unified European Market now firmly scheduled for 1992, and the growing necessity of effectively controlling coastal and offshore waters will inescapably affect the French Navy’s future. The details remain hazy, but one thing is certain: the trend is toward more integration.

The construction of Western Europe is a slow and pain­ful process that must overcome powerful traditions and interests. In the absence of a supranational authority able to impose common goals and to iron out trivial peculiari­ties, each step forward evolves only from emergencies, not from concerted planning. Against this background, the

French policy of self-sufficiency at any cost may app^ear some as courageous and rewarding for all. To ^ot •' France is just another wagon in the heavy European ^tr ^

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rather than pulled. France is a turbulent wagon, but moving, while others quietly keep their feet on the bra

The French Nuclear Submarine Strategic Force Aft*, the INF Treaty: Simply put, President de Gaulle ^c°^nS1

ered that defense in the nuclear age was a matter

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vival and that relying entirely on someone else’s g^o0^'_t, could prove risky. Moreover, he had in mind that the

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lantic Alliance did not cover France’s interests over

and obligations in Africa. Self-reliance, therefore, ^waS

master word to him. Nevertheless, de Gaulle was a

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worthy ally. When .the Cuban Missile Crisis broke °^u 1962, he was first among Western heads of state to ^ca^ President John F. Kennedy his full support. But that same year, he politely rejected a transfer of Polaris _{ siles offered by President Kennedy on the grounds , these missiles would have been kept under U. ^%^?_hj_sis and he had decided that France would go it alone." ¹ ^ why, 27 years later, the small but credible force ⁰ ^ French Navy nuclear-powered fleet ballistic-missile marines (SSBNs)—unlike Britain’s—stands as the ⁰ . strategic nuclear force enjoying technical, operati and therefore political independence on this side o Atlantic. The Astarte system, equivalent to the • ^ TACAMO (take charge and move out) system, ^vV1 operational in 1989.        . -^s

The current M20 submarine-launched ballistic rnj^s ^ (SLBMs) on the five Le Redoutable-class SSBN^.^ being replaced by the new, longer-range M4 rn¹ (which are already on the L’Inflexible), equipped 3

multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle^5, „ seventh boat, Le Triomphant, the leading unit of ^J ^ ^ generation, is due to be commissioned in 1994 un ^ eighth will be ordered in fiscal year 1989. Both ^vVl ^ armed with the new M45 SLBMs. When the refit P^^ti of the first six boomers is completed in 1990, the “

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increase naval forces to prevent the Soviets from

Despite its nuclear preeminence, the French Navy suffers from budget malaise. The number of surface ships, espe­cially, is headed toward an unacceptable level in 1992. A program to build 12 frigates to replace the aging Com- mandante Riviere class (here, the Doudart de Lagree oper­ates with a U. S. Navy HH-46 helo) is in the works, but has not been funded.

Navy will handle 90% of the total French nuclear fire power. For the time being, of course, this force is strictly national, as it was intended. But big changes are looming on the horizon. Signs are clear to those who care to read between the lines.

France believes that the West must maintain a modem, sizable conventional force to match its nuclear deterrence force. The reason for this is so that the potential enemy, with its overwhelmingly superior conventional forces, “could not cut into, split, or skirt around, the nuclear deterrence.”⁴ By supporting such a policy, France implies that a conventional threat to any European nation is also considered as a threat to France. For a time, France stood almost alone in this commitment to both conventional and nuclear forces. But, as the French minister of defense pointed out, “The French thesis is on the verge of becom­ing formally that of Europe as a whole.”⁵ The foreign and defense ministers of the Western European Union signed the agreement on European Interests Regarding Security in October 1985. It states clearly that “nuclear deterrence is a necessary support of conventional forces which will always be outnumbered by those of the Warsaw Pact.”

The European reaction to the INF Treaty was panic. Facing the impending disengagement of U. S. ground forces from their continent, 323 million Western Europe­ans realized for the first time that relying for so many years on 242 million U. S. taxpayers to protect them against 280 million Soviets was unfair and unhealthy, to say the least.⁶ Looking around for help as they are used to, they suddenly discovered that the four British and six French SSBNs provided the only indigenous deterrent available on this side of the Atlantic.

Both France and Britain felt the wind of this bul They were quick to understand that the Soviets would* • to include the French and British strategic forces i° ¹ INF deal and that even if they did not succeed, their p^r°P

ward a total denuclearization of Europe. This is . France and Britain expressed in the INF Treaty their »' commitment to their respective nuclear strategic f°^rC Their signatures on the treaty added a new dimension the debate. This treaty cuts a mere 3% of the total nuc^e

weapons available, but it also opens the door to ^ reductions on which everyone is ready to agree as lonS ^ it affects someone else. Clearly, the British and F^rel1 j strategic nuclear assets are now at stake. Let us be ass¹¹ that the Soviets will do their utmost to create a situati^*¹ which the whole world will unite and tell France and &^ ain to please stop being “the enemy of peace” and to^L off their “toys.”⁷

Of course, neither Britain nor France is willing to ^c ply. If anything can be traded, Britain would gladly » ban the French force in exchange for the recognition o . right to retain its own. On the French side, the ind' ...

grated European self-defense.⁸ And to prevent any att® directed against France’s strategic force, President * ,j qois Mitterrand now must periodically remind the ^ “France is not bound to become the defender °

Moreover, as Norman Friedman pointed out,

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from a continental success to the occupation of Brrt*¹ _fS- France’s naval budget, which in fiscal year 1989 ^rt

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^e fleet of frigates and destroyers, particularly, is Pla^VVln® old- F°^r many years ships were not being re- ii, ^Ced >n a timely manner and most of them are approach- Ute end of their service lives. Politicians are not fully ^^re toat navy programming is a very long-term activity t₀ ..toey still consider surface ships as a luxury. From time ^sHc ^e’ ^an iH-tempered chief of naval operations (CNO) ttl £*ds in attracting public attention to this problem, and ^{ast one} resigned in protest of lack of funding. To Co ^en these occasional upheavals, the politicians have tli_e ^r,Vcd a mischievous trick. When the pressure reaches boi^^ed mark, they vote an ambitious “multiyear ship- th_{e D}^IaS program”—starting next year. To date, neither

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^Ser)ts less than 20% of all military spending, is likely to ^stffer further cuts. Every extra cent spent on tanks will ⁿ'^ean one less cent for the navy.

The net result of the INF treaty is that the Soviets have hven a wedge between Europe and the United States, etween nuclear and nonnuclear nations of Europe, and ^ehveen Britain and France. The Soviets are masters at ^£xPloiting the internal contradictions of the Western M>rld.

Conventional Naval Forces—Budget Constraints: , ^ever, perhaps, since the days of the American War of dependence has the French Navy enjoyed such a preemi- ^^ence within the overall defense system of the country, ^fortunately, its share of the military budget does not ^ ^ect this preeminence. Traditionally in France, the de­^nse budget is an easy piggy bank to break when the °^Vernment needs money to please the voters. Another ^adition has been that when cuts must be made, the navy ^0,1ies first.

p besides its main mission of nuclear deterrence, the ^r6nch Navy has many more responsibilities, most of ^lch, unlike those of the army or the air force, are as ^ pessary in peacetime as in wartime. These missions are: defense of the overseas territories and their associated ^ elusive economic zones (EEZs)

₍.^^uefense of national interests and implementation of na­P [^1 policies in regional crises such as those in Chad, ^^e°^anon, or the Persian Gulf¹⁰

_tr Commitments evolving from defense agreements con- ^^ted in the Third World, particularly in Africa

-called public service missions—“coast guard” re­abilities

_t. ,^0r the time being, the French Navy can fulfill these ^^s- The recent 14-month deployment of a carrier task [; ^UP and six mine countermeasures vessels in the Persian f_r ‘ area amply demonstrates its present capabilities, j ^uole, however, is looming ahead because of the lack of ^Pfopriate funding. If nothing is done promptly, the situation of surface assets might well become

‘Peal

Th, ‘ lan Bleu nor the Lot de Programmation Militaire, f Tears, has ever been fully implemented.

Aqq ^alleviate the continuing funding shortage, the ^ «AM (Association of Former Naval Officers) has ^an innovative countersuggestion to help raise the

money quickly while forcing the government to meet its commitments. It officially proposed financing to build 18 frigates or corvettes by issuing bonds on the financial mar­ket.¹¹ The navy would refund these in 20 years to the treasury, which would act as broker. The details of this plan are very clever indeed and one can only regret that it cannot be pushed further. Why not issue shares instead of bonds? In view of its growth potential and the quality of its management, the navy would have no problem raising funds; raiders would buzz around pushing the price of shares up; and the naval personnel certainly would love to own their navy and, at last, be their own bosses.

The CNO himself, in a move to make the procurement process safer, recently tried to arrange to lease six frigates, with some state-operated financial institution acting as the bank.

Both efforts collapsed and another “next year” pro­gram is in the pipeline to build 12 frigates by the mid- 1990s. Six will be full-fledged warships. The six others, called fregates de surveillance, will, in fact, be some sort of coast guard cutters, costing less than half as much as the warships. Of these, three have been ordered but no actual funding is firmly programmed in fiscal year 1989.

The high development cost is, of course, one of the reasons for the shortage of surface ships. While the French Navy is a partner in a few multinational programs such as the very successful “Tripartite” minehunter developed with Belgium and the Netherlands, it develops most equipment and systems domestically. France is not un­common in this respect; the “go it alone” disease is wide­spread in Europe, and each nation wants to export its prod­ucts. The competition is fierce, and involves even neutral countries such as Sweden and Switzerland that are not members of the European Economic Community (EEC). The full implementation in 1992 of the Unified Market, however, should alleviate this waste of resources. Theo­retically, then, any European manufacturer should be free to compete on a requirement or request of proposals from any ministry of defense. It will be interesting to watch what trick each country will develop to skirt the new regu­lations and keep the system working the way it does now.

Aircraft Carriers and Air Wings: In October 1987, the. French Navy started cutting metal for the construction of a new, nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, the 36,000-ton Charles de Gaulle, due to be commissioned in 1996. The navy thereby confirmed its firm commitment to conven­tional flat-top carriers. This derives directly from France’s overseas military responsibilities. Currently, the in­service 30,000-ton Clemenceau and Foch each have an air wing composed of single-turboprop Alizes (antisubmarine warfare), F-8E Crusaders (interceptors), and Super Eten- dards (attack, armed with tactical nuclear weapons and Exocet antiship missiles). The two carriers are therefore essentially peacetime assets. But in an all-out war, they would add to NATO’s naval air power.

It remains to be seen whether the Charles de Gaulle ever reaches the sea. France can afford to maintain two conventional carriers, if at the expense of other badly needed assets. But does it make sense? Considering that

75

^lnss / June 1989

Britain and the United States signed a memorandum of y lerstanding on the joint development of an “advanced ^ TOL” fighter and eventually, a quarter of a century the supersonic Harrier is again in the pipeline. _d ^[1]°^e may dream. If Europe as a whole had recognized in ^e time the tremendous new openings this aircraft offered q had teamed around Britain to develop a supersonic ^arr'er, the plane would have flown in the early 1970s.

l production, possibly with the United States, would yielded economy of scale and opened the door to

Nt ^rai>ce, along with the rest of Europe, recognized the •high, ^al °* ^l*^lc Sea Harrier, all Western European navies ^carrj ^^ave fl°^{wn a} single type of fighter from V/STOL % ^ers< Instead, France operates two 30,000-ton carriers, Ir^H . "’hich was deployed in the Indian Ocean during the raq War, and is building another of 36,000 tons.

their [the aircraft carrier’s] primary role has never been Nearly defined” and that even in the United States the nfrrier concept, which involves putting so many eggs in ^ae same basket, is periodically challenged, the answer is °ubtful.¹² Britain, Italy, Spain, and India all have in- fjflged in building 15,000-20,000-ton vertical/short take- jf landing (V/STOL) carriers operating Sea Harriers. j,^rance never discussed this option, apparently because the ^ea Harrier does not come close to meeting the French ^avY’s requirements.

This again is a typical example of the tragic inability of ^e Europeans to team on collective goals. The AV-8B ^arrier/Sea Harrier is obviously a major breakthrough in ⁿaval aviation. But it is by no means a newcomer; the j^totype flew in 1960. A supersonic variant was being ^U|lt in 1965 when the British government decided to drop program and it took almost ten years for the British J^°yal Navy to recognize the unique capabilities of a Sea arrier. Then the U. S. Marine Corps became an unex- ,, ^ted launch customer for the British-American Harrier

“nd.

^re industrial cooperation. A supersonic Harrier would _tlJ ^ay meet the requirements of the French Navy and even- _Sj y all Western European navies would have operated a [jj|. ^e type of fighter and enjoyed a true cross-deck capa- _d ^wy- Moreover, this would probably have saved the mur- b ^r';^us dog-fight between the Rafale and the European venter Aircraft, which will ultimately result in the irre- ^S|ble worldwide domination of the market by U. S. ^facturers.

_Ce ~°ⁿtrolling Coastal Waters: Until the middle of this i^. ^Ury> controlling coastal waters in peacetime consisted _are'^nly of overseeing fishing activities in a few sensitive [,_rJ^s ■ The navy traditionally performed the task and no ’itn ^C°^mPl^a>^ne(T Today, however, the mission is a full- ^e J°b that draws heavily on the naval budget. There has th_e ^an explosive growth of large tanker traffic through iH_e English Channel (traffic that threatens the environ- L France has extended its national sovereignty over ^c₀ ^areas °T EEZ, and the air and sea rescue mission has iw^nie increasingly important. Moreover, “peace” is is^ ^an ill-defined word. Smuggling, international terror­’ ^an<J Soviet intelligence-gathering activities all tend to

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turn coastal and offshore waters into a jungle that must be closely and permanently patrolled. Overseas, France must control shores of multinational and strategic value, includ­ing the coast of French Guiana, the starting block of the European space launcher Ariane. In this area, for exam­ple, a new communist-sponsored brushfire recently erup­ted in the nearby Republic of Suriname (former Dutch Guiana) and thousands of refugees are now fleeing into French Guiana.

France ranks third behind the United States and Britain in the area of its EEZ, which, thanks to overseas territo­ries, covers about 11 million square kilometers (3,207,087 square nautical miles). Yet it probably ranks among the last in the number of ships and aircraft available per square mile. France badly needs a specialized service such as the U. S. Coast Guard, but has never formed one, partly due to the opposition of the navy, which fears it might have to fund such a service out of its own resources. The conse­quences are twofold.

First, the responsibilities of coastal control and sea res­cue are split among numerous organizations or agencies— Affaires maritimes, Customs, Civil Protection, Air Force Search and Rescue, and Gendarmerie—just to mention a few. Each reports to a different ministerial authority and has its own budget, facilities, traditions, and communica­tions frequencies. Before pulling a survivor out of the water, for instance, if one goes by the book, one should first ask him whether he came down from the air with an aircraft or fell overboard from a ship. Two different au­thorities handle the two categories.

Second, these agencies only operate very small motor launches. The government has set an upper limit for these craft (less than 40 meters long and 120-ton displacement) to prevent any overlap with the navy’s vessels. As a result, the navy actually carries the burden of coastal control and sea rescue—and the criticism whenever a mishap occurs— without enjoying either the credit or the necessary extra funding. No one seems to have understood that control and surveillance of coastal and offshore areas require spe­cialized equipment and training and, above all, unity. Using warships for this mission actually costs more than it saves. (This is why 6 out of the 12 programmed frigates will, in fact, be coast guard cutters.) The public service missions represent roughly 15% of the total activity of the navy.

The 1992 implementation of the Unified European Mar­ket, which will completely abolish all commercial borders among the members of the EEC, is likely to trigger a change. But this unification, which already has caused headaches on land, raises issues at sea that at the moment few have given thought to. Will the coastal and off-shore waters be included in the deal? Will there be an EEZ pool? A European merchant flag is likely to appear sooner or later. How will it fit into the present patchwork of national and international regulations? The Turkish Straits will keep their present status, but what of the very complicated fishing rights that already cause occasional clashes, as was the case recently between France and Spain? The question marks seem endless.

For all these reasons, the creation of a supranational

77

^edlnss / June 1989

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¹²Bill Sweetman, International Defense Review, February 1988, p. 149. _n ¹³Over the past ten years, more than half a million tons of crude oil have land ^

Western European Coastal Control Authority seems una­voidable. This authority will only be effective if a power­ful European Coast Guard Service flying a European flag is also created to act as its executive secular arm.¹³ This flag also could be the forerunner of a future common flag on Western European warships.

Throughout the long history of the French Navy, its role was often challenged in peacetime, mainly because its mission was not as clear-cut as it is now. Today, thanks to the media, the French taxpayers are fully aware that their navy is by far the busiest of all three services. In France, as in most countries, the navy is still what it always was: the senior service, shining an aura of excellence and profi­ciency. The French Navy is affectionately dubbed La Roy- ale, which in French implies king’s property as well as undisputed superiority. ^{* [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]}

antinuclear campaign directed against only Western military and civilian nude assets. The campaign certainly boosted the INF negotiation. Since then, the Sovi^ have restarted two identical unsafe plants, without raising a single word of p^rot in the West. ,

⁸The process is under way de facto. Surprisingly, few observers have highly*¹ the fact that the French and German governments have set up a symbolic Fra^nCf* German Army unit to make clear that attacking either country would automatic - mean attacking both.        .

⁹Norman Friedman, “Western European and NATO Navies,” U. S. Naval Instit^u Proceedings, March 1988, p. 36.                                                                  ^

¹⁰No matter how far inland, the navy is always there. When French Army aⁿ⁽¹ Force units deployed in Chad in 1983-84 to help repel the Libyan invasion, . navy contributed its long-range maritime patrol aircraft Atlantics to act as AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) to vector Jaguar and Mirag^e aircraft over the desert. Typical of naval ingenuity, the navy crews discovered by lending sonobuoys to their army friends, they were able to provide the commander with an accurate, real-time position of his units scattered across ^ desert. The Atlantics, sitting on the ground with their powerful radar turned also acted as ground control approach on poorly equipped airfields.

¹¹ Marine, the biannual magazine published by the Association Centrale des ciers de Reserve de l’Armee de Mer (ACORAM), 15, rue de Laborde, BP 12 8eme, 75200 Paris-Naval. Issues numbers 137 (October 1987) and 138 (Jan^u 1988).

the shores of Britanny, causing considerable damage to the environment. ^ French coastal communities, together with those of Belgium, the Netherlands^ West Germany are growing more and more impatient and demand the creation European Coast Guard Service.

Captain Bally graduated from the French Naval Academy in 1944 & served on board an AS W frigate during the last months of World ^ Afterward, he took flight training with the U. S. Navy at Pensacola ^a Corpus Christi and earned his wings in 1952. He held various assL^ ments in French Naval Aviation, especially in test, evaluation, an ceptance activities. As such, he flew most in-service aircraft, in^clu “ helicopters. Captain Bally has had several commands, including coastal patrol boat in Indochina from 1948-50 and the Naval/Air S^ta Noumea in New Caledonia. He retired from the navy in 1976.