Dropping the Baton

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tho^ ^Su^^sPecialists but not yet proven subspecialists, i.e., I_e( ^{Se w}ho have had a single tour in a nuclear-related bil- _Cer ^{n l}he same mid-1984 period, there were 26 such offi- |_n 5 ⁰ⁿ>y eight of whom were not eligible for retirement. rn_e ^e P^ast five years there has been only a slight improve- y in this situation.

h_e ^0se officers who do gain nuclear expertise tend not to sin ^Upwafdly mobile. The passover rate for officers as- ^to the JSTPS in the early 1980s, for example, was Rouble that of the Navy as a whole. No officer as- to the Strategic and Theater Nuclear Warfare Divi-

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ffj *^as twice demonstrated its priorities by assigning to _Vj^{6rs as} vice director of JSTPS who were not promoted j₀ ^e admiral upon assuming the assignment. thi_s ^^lat- The most obvious question is whether any of Pr_0vn^atters- The Navy has risen to a position where it •Hi_cj_e ^es the most important component of the strategic exj_st ^ar forces during a period when all of these trends

Why, therefore, should professional Navy offi- tVhi-ny about changing these cultural factors, most of

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ⁿd budgeting is based on the concept of a platform spon- , ^r- As a result, institutional pressures force trade-offs ^e>Ween strategic submarines and attack submarines rather ^an between strategic forces and tactical forces. One re- ¹ has been that on occasion in recent years the Navy has ■ ^etTIPted to ignore presidential direction and skip a year bie Trident submarine construction program.

^Navy personnel policies also tend—consciously or un- ^nsciously—to devalue strategic nuclear planning and . ^e strategic nuclear mission. For example:

he officers actually involved in strategic nuclear plan- § are designated as proven subspecialists in strategic _s v^ear planning (nuclear). There simply are not enough l ^a °fficers with the requisite expertise, and those who f()^{VC are near}'ⁿ§ the end of their careers. In mid-1984, the ^examP*^e> there were 20 captains and commanders in y_e ^er,tire Navy with this designation: 14 had more than 25 _0fj^ars service and five had more than 20, which left only ^e officer not eligible to retire. The supposed backup for ^Se officers is provided by those who are nuclear plan-

^w oudicgiL aiiu inedier iNuuear wariare ti_c ■ ^»TPS, or the nuclear planning cells in the Atlan- r_an?^nd Pacific commands has ever been selected for flag °^rga  ^advent °f the Goldwater-Nichols JCS re-

Ccnt]^niZation *^e8t^sl^at*^{on ma}y be changing this, until re- ^ *■ ^{Was widel}y perceived outside the service that the ^•aff ^ ^{not ass}*§ⁿ *ts best officers to billets on the Joint la_ri ^0r in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, particu- hi_stQ !^^ose billets associated with nuclear planning. The l_ets ^r'^Cai experience is that officers assigned to such bil- ^Oru ^t'^rC, correctly perceiving that they have no profes- fii_lcj‘ⁱ future. Thus a disproportionate number of officers tlw ^t the tour in which they gain nuclear expertise is i p^r nnal tour.

Na_v,^C^ with a chronic shortage of three-star billets, the

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^c°nt_r | ^3Ve dieir origin either in factors outside the Navy’s loon i°^r '^{n l}^^e imperatives of dealing with preparing for ^{c ear} war? Why not continue on the course that has bureaucratic and budgetary success for 25 years? &n_t ^s^^ou*d not change course simply because the pre- whether the Air Force or the Navy dominates joint billets or strategic spending. The Air Force has chosen to invest, fiscally and intellectually, in a mission the Navy has ig­nored. That is to the Air Force’s credit. At a time when most Navy officers thought of nuclear deterrence—if at all—only in simplistic terms of “mutual suicide,” Air Force strategists and their civilian colleagues recognized that deterrence means threatening destruction of what the Soviets value—the control of the Communist Party over the Soviet empire and the military power that enforces that control. If the technology of the past did not allow holding these targets at risk in an enduring or flexible fashion, that is not the fault of those who did the best they could with the tools they were given. Why then do we need to change when deterrence has obviously worked?

The problem is that the future may not be like the past. Until relatively recently, no matter what the prevailing strategic theory, the fact was that naval forces primarily provided a survivable countervalue capability. Relatively little planning or strategic insight is required for such ca­pability. Thus, the nation could safely turn over its strate­gic nuclear planning to those who did not fully understand maritime capabilities, because it was relatively difficult to misuse those capabilities.

This situation will change dramatically in the coming decade, for several reasons. First, the advent of the Tri­dent II missile’s true hard-target kill capability, coupled with the United States’s chronic failure to solve the ICBM vulnerability problem, may mean that if the nation wants to engage hard targets with ballistic missiles in the 21st century it will have to do so with sea-based systems. This will demand officers who understand both the realities of maritime operations and the concept of strategic counter­force targeting.

Thus far, reports of the ICBM’s imminent demise have proved premature. This may not be true much longer. The MX missile may prove to be the last gasp for the land- based ballistic-missile forces. If so, the Navy may be forced to assume a greater role in the development of stra­tegic targeting in the future, because officers who under­stand maritime capabilities will be required, and because the core of SAC missileers will be much smaller.

Second, and equally important, the trends in strategic theory are toward flexibility and endurance, clearly imply­ing a greater role for sea-based forces. The operation and deployment of an enduring strategic submarine force will require knowledge of both nuclear planning and subma­rine operations.

Third, the advent of nuclear-armed, sea-launched cruise missiles such as Tomahawk requires a new approach to nuclear planning. Such missiles are hybrids: nonstrategic nuclear weapons with an important strategic role as part of the nuclear reserve. With recognition of Tomahawk’s ca­pability and the size of the deployed force both growing, there is an urgent requirement for those who understand both national and nuclear policy, and the fundamentals of maritime operations.

The ideal future: The prevailing strategic culture—the theoretical, organizational, and personnel practices of the past—may not be good enough for the demands of the

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'ⁿR^s 1 June 1989

35

not merely in their physical aspects, but also in our ab> [1] to employ them to deter war. Ignoring the issue will ° longer work. No one knows for certain what really d^ete^ but the penalties for a failure are so apocalyptic that have an obligation to the nation and the future to do ⁰ utmost to ensure that deterrence succeeds. That fl¹® ending our comfortable habit of letting someone ^e worry about strategic issues.                                                                         ₍

The cultural change will be immense, perhaps n¹ . than any of us realize. Our traditions are exclusively *^a _|(j cal. No one ever sat around the officers’ club bar and *°‘_a sea stories of maintaining alert coverage or design’⁰-j_s better target package. Thinking about nuclear deterrent^ not much fun and does not seem related to our day-*⁰' j

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21st century. We need a new strategic culture—new the­ory and practice to meet the challenge about to be thrust upon us. What should the ideal 21st-century culture in­clude?

First and foremost, we need an evolving strategic nu­clear theory that looks at nuclear deterrence through a maritime lens. Ideally, we want articles by the seminal strategic thinkers of the 21st century to sound like they were written in a submarine, not on a SAC base. Such a strategic theory should stress endurance, the inevitability of retaliation (but not its immediacy), and flexibility. It should be a far more dynamic theory, owing more to a continued attempt to understand what deters the existing Soviet leadership than to the Strategic Bombing Survey of World War II.

Second, we need a series of civilian defense officials who view strategic nuclear deterrence through a maritime lens. When the director of Defense Research and Engi­neering is as likely to have served on a Navy strategic advisory body as he is on the SAC Scientific Advisory Board, the culture will begin to change. When officials who enter government after a career developing nuclear weapons at Los Alamos or Livermore National Laborato­ries are as familiar with the benefits of sea-based forces as with ICBMs, the change will be complete.

Third, we need a restructured JSTPS, independent of SAC and moved from Omaha, that serves as a true joint body, probably with command rotated between the Air Force and Navy. To complement this, we need a Joint Staff in which the billets associated with strategic nuclear planning are held by naval officers competitive for promo­tion—not because we have established such a policy by fiat, but because the expertise resides in the Navy and gaining that expertise is one of several recognized paths to advancement for our top performers.

Fourth, we need institutional change within the Navy that provides for a three-star officer who views his primary responsibilities as strategic nuclear matters, and a revital­ized nuclear planning subspecialty community to aid this officer and his counterparts in the unified commands. This revitalized subspecialty community must not become a core of pure specialists. The most important strength of the Navy is that those who do its planning and shape its future understand going to sea because they have been there. The Navy has historically rejected the concept of a “wet” and “dry” Navy for the excellent reason that it will not work. It will not work in the nuclear area either. In the 21st century we need a large number of operation­ally competent officers who also understand nuclear plan­ning, just as today we have a large number who under­stand communications, or electronic warfare, or antisubmarine warfare.

Fifth, we need advisory boards (analogous to the De­fense Science Board or the SAC Scientific Advisory Board) that advise Navy senior leadership on strategic nu­clear matters. The existence of such advisory boards will be important because of the dominant role of naval forces and because such boards will serve to disseminate a mari- time-oriented view of nuclear deterrence into the civilian professional community.

The nation’s strategic direction will soon have the flavor of those who have viewed the world from SSBNs. The Navy must begin now to develop these people and the thinking necessary to carry the strategic baton in the 2ls* century.

Sixth, we need to do in fact what we have long claimed to do in theory: look at strategic deterrence from a nations perspective. This will require an altered planning, P^r0' gramming, and budgeting system that, after a quarter ce” tury of trying, finally implements a strategic budget. Tltf trade-offs should be between sea-based and land-base nuclear forces; they should not be between ballistic missile and attack submarines. A national perspective W’ require officers who understand and appreciate land-base systems, perhaps because they have had exchange toub early in their careers. We may even need to take a ft®* look at a unified strategic command. Historically- ¹ Navy has feared such a command would involve Air Fore domination of Navy systems. The strategic realities of* 21st century may require Navy domination of Air For systems.  -_s

Grasping the Baton: The issue before the Navy whether any of these changes are desirable—or even ^eS sential—and, if so, what should be done now to ^ensU that the strategic forces of the 21st century are adeq^ua concerns. But if we fail to do the needed thinking ^a planning, it will be done by those lacking understanding maritime forces and the nature of going to sea. Or, worse, it will not be done at all.

Navy contributions to deterrence are immeasura The Polaris, Poseidon, and Trident programs have ^ hailed as the best managed, most successful weapon velopments in modern times. The operational comp^e*° _v of the ballistic-missile submarine force is legendary- ^ we need to apply those standards of excellence *° ■: equally important, and equally difficult, world of str[2] thinking, and help the nation to understand how best to these incredible tools to deter war.     _to

Ready or not, the baton is passing to us. It is our du; be ready.    >-