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For years, the specter of nuclear-armed terrorists has been the stuff of spy novels and techno-thrillers. But the amount of missing and unaccounted-for fissionable material has been quietly growing, along with nongovernment expertise in improvising nuclear devices. Will life follow art?
Why have terrorists never used nuclear weapons? The pal answer to that question has been that there is no advantage in using them. This is no longer (rue— particularly where terrorists have an unarticulated desire to demonstrate their intellectual equality.
Widespread state-sponsored international terrorism has changed the rules drastically from the situation once familiar to many terrorism analysts.
The classic political or national terrorist, who organized and struggled for an obscure cause in the past, has been supplanted by one who acts more as a covert arm to express the hidden agenda of his sponsor. Consequently, this new breed of terrorist has access to more resources than his predecessors. In some areas, the term “terrorist" is almost a misnomer for today's secretive, irregular, but highly organized forces.
Many of the new terrorists are free to operate out of embassies and move truckloads of arms and explosives by diplomatic pouch. These capabilities allow them to undertake much more sophisticated operations, because they are free of the logistical hindrances that have historically limited their options.
These surrogates are not overly concerned with world opinion.
They are concerned with their respective faction’s opinion and revolution. But unlike their predecessors, they do not bargain. They prefer direct attacks to protracted negotiations. While most of the world is concerned about terrorism, the people responsible for terrorist activity suffer few pangs of conscience and seldom realize the effects their actions may have on the rest of the world.
Authorities and scientists disagree in assessing the difficulty of obtaining components and assembling an improvised nuclear device (1ND) or improvised atomic device. Opinions range from those held by physicists such as Theodore FT Taylor, who believes that a device
could be constructed rapidly by a small group or even a single person, to such other authorities as Augustus R. Norton, the co-editor of Studies in Nuclear Terrorism (Boston, MA: G. K. Hall, 1979), who views it as a much more complex and difficult affair, with hidden stumbling blocks that would impede all but the most unusual terrorist organizations.
At any rate, during the past 20 years, building one has clearly become easier. The amount of missing and unaccounted-for fissionable material has grown considerably. Nations in precarious military, political, and geographical positions now have reactors suspected of having nuclear weapon capability. Computers for calculations and design work are readily available, and the number of people with the requisite knowledge has expanded enormously, as has the open literature on the topic.
The obstacles to improvising a nuclear device that seem so daunting to physicists may not be quite as imposing, when viewed from the perspective of a terrorist. The example of Francois Scapula is a case in point. The 13 April 1987 issue of Newsweek reported on a bizarre exchange between defense lawyer Lawrence Dubin and convicted heroin chemist Scapula during the New York trial of a Florida drug ring. Dubin questioned Scapula regarding his attempts to sell arms to Iran.
Dubin: “Well I am interested [in the details]. The idea was to sell weapons to people that needed weapons, is that right?”
Scapula: “Yes. And also about 20 kilos of plutonium that had been stolen from a vessel that originated in South Africa.”
Dubin: “And plutonium is a chemical that is used to make atomic bombs?”
Scapula: “Precisely.”
There is no way to put a good face on this incident. If Scapula actually planned to carry out this scheme, the situation was clearly a crisis. If he were only responding to the desires of the Iranians, it shows that Iranian plans are moving in ominous directions. Even if it is not clear that he intended to sell the plutonium to Iran, he obviously intended to sell it to someone, confirming the existence of a black market in plutonium, something that has only been speculated upon so far. Indeed, some of the speculation establishes that fissionable material is selling for about the same price as cocaine, which seems amazingly low, until one considers the limited number of customers.
The final interpretation of Scapula’s statement could be that he is an imaginative liar, manipulating the court for his own purposes. If so, he chose an unfortunate avenue to explore, since heroin chemists are precisely the sort of
Swiss authorities brought heroin chemist Francois Scapula to trial in 1987. In the course of his testimony, the self- fancied playboy admitted that he had sold plutonium to Iran. Now serving a 20-year prison term, Scapula may have supplied terrorists with the major component for a nuclear weapon.
individuals who might be capable of bootleg purification of weapons grade plutonium. If he is a liar, his lie is none theless plausible, because the amount mentioned was a significant quantity of special nuclear material, as defme by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Scapula’s testimony presents only one of many situ* tions that have been examined extensively in the literature of nuclear terrorism. In the last two years a number other companies and individuals, such as West German businessman Albert Hempel, have been associated wi the transfer of nuclear technology to radical countries- Some experts believe that terrorist use of nuclear weapon5 is more likely than use by the superpowers. Few are wi ^ ing to rule it out. And most are concerned with when 1 will happen rather than whether it will. Essentially, the) are waiting to see who has both the means and the motiva tion to do it.
Obtaining or producing weapons-grade plutonium one of the most difficult steps in producing a booue- bomb, but terrorists can avoid the entire problem by s*1^ ply buying it. Somebody is always willing to sell his so into a small nuclear inferno for ten million dollars. A cW acter such as Scapula has already accepted the basic noti° of profit at any price by manufacturing heroin. A certa breed of Americans has shown a penchant for this kind 0 activity; as seen in the cases of Edwin P. Wilson and Fran Terpil in Libya. Money is a terrorist weapon, and certa quarters in the Middle East are awash in it. .
Government agencies and security experts involved i”
' «CYST0*
nuclear weapon security generally agree that stolen nu- ear weapons present a threat. But stolen weapons also j'resent tremendous drawbacks to the terrorist. First, °rces mobilized to track down and recover a stolen device 'v°uld obviously be powerful, ruthless, and efficient. And stealing a weapon seems to contradict a basic tenet of terrorism: that all attacks should be made against unsuspect- 'n§ and unprotected targets. Furthermore, terrorists would e forced to overcome a military bomb’s permissive action *nks (PALs), which are designed to prevent unauthorized lr‘ng; they would need a suitable detonator; and they A|°uld require appropriate technical and procedural manu- a s- For security reasons, military weapons are more com- ^ ex than they need to be. Therefore, without the neces- ,arV additional support, they are just conventional, albeit dirty,” explosive devices. Indeed, most manufactured Capons probably would require so much reworking to ^t terrorists’ requirements that they might actually Serve only as sources of raw materials.
The only benefit in using a stolen weapon is that a miliary production warhead is much more likely to work than an improvised one. Nuclear weapons are probabilistic evices. Exact yields and the dependability of new designs Car|not be predicted with certainty until extensive tests are e°mplete. Terrorists are likely to maximize the theoretical pliability of their IND by using the simplest possible de- Sl§m But that reduces the yield far below that of standard Military devices. This essential design-versus-yield ques- l0n has probably become much easier to answer, since the available database has expanded over the years.
. For several reasons, terrorists will probably use pluto- PUrtl before uranium. Separating weapons grade U235 [pm reactor grade U238 is a complex industrial procedure. ‘he entire resources of the Oak Ridge nuclear complex in etmessee went into the manufacture of the U235 used in “Little Boy” and ‘‘Fat Man” bombs during World ar II. The process remains beyond the capacity of most
nations.
Fin the other hand, plutonium has no such disadvan- a§es. When purified, the P23y used or found as a waste Product in reactors is the same material used in weapons. ecause plutonium is so poisonous, the makers of an IND rUn the risk of contaminating people. But they can hardly a f°rd to follow the extreme safety precautions necessary °r Working with plutonium. Obtaining remote handling e9uipment and other sophisticated hardware normally Sed in this work might uncover terrorist plans.
. H we inventory the skills now available to larger terror- lsf and criminal groups in terms of what would be useful in assembling an IND, the list is quite chilling. High on the lst is an abundance of personnel proficient in covertly fansporting material. For a narco-terrorist experienced in Moving tons of illicit drugs around the world, a few P°unds of plutonium are probably child’s play, provided e follows basic safety measures. Equally prominent are he increasingly sophisticated improvised explosive device uilders, who have a strong incentive to adopt more effec- h.Ve> reliable, and untraceable techniques. The bomb that hilled 241 Marines and sailors in Beirut was the largest s'ngle mass of conventional explosive ever successfully detonated. Doing this required an unprecedented level of expertise in detonating large masses of explosive with minimal dispersion. Even so, the Federal Bureau of Investigation post-blast analysis revealed a great deal about the technology and likely source of the explosives and packaging. What would be involved in a post-blast analysis of a nuclear bomb?
Since the first atomic bomb exploded at Hiroshima, technology has made nuclear weapons more attainable. Who should be watched? It is impossible to monitor and control the activities of everyone capable of building, say, a color-television set from scratch. Highly motivated and well-financed groups are or will soon be able to build an improvised nuclear device that is likely to work with a yield of between . 1 kiloton and 1 kiloton. For security purposes and for ease of construction, the weapon will be of relatively simple design and locally fabricated, using illicitly obtained plutonium. Consequently, it will be larger than “production” models. Preparing an IND is something that terrorists would do only in a benign environment. A supportive local populace, an effective deception plan, or both, could create such conditions. Terrorists are limited to the few military or civilian targets sufficiently concentrated and isolated to merit attack. Such constraints should narrow the probable targets to a relatively small number.
Given this framework, U. S. Navy ships qualify as desirable targets for attack by terrorists. Large, impressive symbols of “imperialism,” they could be attacked in remote locations, to minimize casualties among terrorist allies. There may be some degree of security in classifying ships’ movements to deter this, but the exact name or even type of ship attacked is not likely to be important to the terrorists, as long as it is large, American, and easy to approach. Such an attack would serve as an unsurpassable demonstration of the power and determination of the group and immortalize those who carry it out.
Because of their characteristics and deployments, the U. S. Navy and Marine Corps represent the most appropriate means of dealing with nuclear terrorists. This is not to say that the Navy and Marine Corps are prepared for missions of this nature and that other services and agencies are not. But they are more likely to respond to unanticipated actions on hostile foreign shores, such as those of the Persian Gulf. As usual. Navy elements will probably be closest to the objective when it becomes necessary to respond.
With reliable intelligence, U. S. forces may have sufficient time to plan and coordinate the various facets of their defense into a concerted effort. But since crises never seem to occur in the anticipated order, and personalities overcome even the most professional staff planning, it would be foolish to depend solely upon government agencies, however well-intentioned they are in checking blocks and executing seldom-exercised, vaguely understood operation plans. If this country discovers a ticking warhead, certain surprising assumptions already will have been made in designing a response to the IND threat that directly reduce the ability of an on-scene commander to deal with this problem. In recent conventional operations, such as those executed in Grenada, U. S. forces did not under-
be
necessary. The military situation at the target site, the*0 cation of the weapon, its size or weight, and the sophistl cation of safeguards on the device may call for sU action. Destroying the weapon while it is in the object! area presents substantial difficulties and risks. As vVI conventional improvised explosive devices, disarming
A destruction raid is usually less preferable but may
ded*
stand the appropriate concerted employment of each service and failed to grasp adequately the procedures of sister services. The specialized and compartmented knowledge and action required for responding to a nuclear threat will make proper coordination far more unlikely. This nation has the assets to respond effectively, but putting the pieces together quickly enough will be extremely difficult.
In most circumstances, the short time element rules out anyone but the Navy and deployed Marines from going into action. Simple time, distance, and cross-decking constraints will preclude the availability of tractor trailers filled with exotic equipment and the technicians to operate it. Nevertheless, the on-scene commander should have a prepared course of action. He must have a clearly thought- out plan, which takes into account the characteristics of improvised devices and fissionable material. Even an attempt to eliminate a weapon site with an air strike is unlikely to lead to the degree of destruction or dispersal of special nuclear material required to prevent the builders from recovering the remains and moving to a more secure location. The most important support the commander will need from the chain of command is a clear set of priorities and a realization that their attempts to manage this type of crisis from afar will surely lead to failure. Because of the obvious cataclysmic nature of such a situation, such noninterference would require unprecedented self-restraint and trust.
If the intelligence preceding the discovery of an IND under construction is detailed and of a long-range nature, a commander should be able to implement a controlled response. Carrying out such plans is not the normal role of
the Navy or Marines. But if the intelligence is poor superficial, the Navy and Marine Corps are likely to involved. Time will be short. Though strategic intel i gence is essential to discovering an improvised nuclei threat, it is outside the scope of the Navy and this article Conversely, the success of the on-scene commander >n executing his action will depend to a great extent on tn responsiveness of tactical intelligence and the ability t0 link up with the sources that first detect the terrorist pi"ePa rations. ,
The sensitivity of present and proposed operation methods of dealing with INDs does not permit discussion of specific aspects, but some general statements can made. Preparation of a device can be stopped either ) recovery or destruction raids. A recovery raid is prefer3 ble, because it permits detailed analysis of the device* which in turn is likely to reveal the source of the nucle material and indicate the proficiency of the builders. Ob'3 ously, this option denies the hostile group any possible; of recovering the material and avoids the risk of radioac tive contamination caused when a nuclear weapon is fra? mented by explosives. When sufficient time is availab • this option may be the simplest.
nuclear device through disassembly should be avoi
• • •
Nobody asked me, but
of
If you threaten to kill me, I will kill you . . .
None of us out here wants to kill anyone, despite whatever words of bravado we might mutter in the wardroom and on the mess decks. From the beginning of our consciousness as individuals, our families, our churches, and our culture have burned into us an abhorrence for killing.
Maybe that is what stings us when we see one of our fellows hanging from a ceiling in some godforsaken land. Everything Colonel William Higgins stood for was noble and upright: He risked his life every day, and paid the ultimate price. A man like that should not be executed as a criminal.
But that feeling of abhorrence indicates the paralysis that we, as a nation and as a Judeo-Christian people, feel when we are victimized by terrorism.
We are stunned by the savagery of the act, stunned into a stupor. We cannot comprehend how people who really are not that much different from ourselves can bring their hearts and their minds to commit such acts.
But our thinking and our assumptions are flawed. To understand the savagery, we must escape our world for a minute. We must disembody ourselves from the cars and homes and televisions that frame our existence and our thoughts. To understand the savagery, we must take ourselves to the desert. It is a little easier to do out here off those desert coasts, but all who wish to understand the terrorist must try.
The morality and philosophy of the people we must understand—those who compose the different factions involved in Mideast terrorist activity, whether living in a refugee camp, a small village like Jibchit, or a once flourishing metropolis like Beirut—are bom of in desert. Their roots are in a sweltering* barren, hostile place where existence |S scratched out from the sand through competition with other peoples for scarce resources. These individuals operate under assumptions that have remained as unchanged through the millenia as the sands; basic instincts familial and tribal survival in the remorseless desert run deep in their veins. Indeed, the conflict at the very heart of the Mideast problems—the fight between the Israelis and the P®*" estinians for the lands between the Mediterranean and the Jordan—dates from the time when the tribes of Isr®e conquered the lands of the CanaaniteS’ This same conflict has repeated itself for four thousand years. The waters o* Western civilization never flowed to these deserts. These people were un-
Specially when time constraints exist. The conventional Method of neutralizing bombs through disruptive explo- SlVe or non-explosive means is the most straightforward ecnnique. But it must be accomplished in a manner that e'ther allows the nuclear material to be recovered and removed, or that pulverizes and scatters the material enough ?° that it cannot be recovered. Clearly, many of these ISsues may become secondary to a commander faced with Setting as many men as possible back safely from the op- cation.
. The discovery of partially constructed weapons or sites ln countries with normal relations with the United States Cay present a less critical scenario. In such cases more echnological expertise becomes available, and the Navy °r Marine Corps will probably be involved only in a sup- P°1 role, if at all. Unfortunately, the more unanticipated and the more immediate the problem is, the more likely ce Navy or Marines are to get involved.
&leak as this picture may seem, it will be incomparably w°rse if a terrorist group ever succeeds in detonating an lmProvised nuclear device. Such action will demonstrate to all that INDs are within the reach of anyone. The world Mil seem vastly more hostile than ever. Concern about . s threat, which surfaces only occasionally in intema- l0nal literature on terrorism, shows that a theoretical dan- §er, no matter how severe, is submerged in the daily flood jTreal-time clear and present dangers. This may not be all b;i(T because the first evidence of terrorist nuclear capabil- “y could quickly establish impetus for the repeated use of ^clear weapons by other groups. The resulting climate of ear could cause a major slowdown in international and regional trade, travel, and cultural exchange. Following the Abu Nidal organization’s Rome and Vienna suicide attacks in 1988, the entire Mediterranean region and much of Europe experienced diminished tourism and economic disruption. The corresponding scare in the wake of a nuclear attack will likely be much worse.
The fact that the United States is hated by some peoples with such breathtaking (and to most Americans, inexplicable and unwarranted) vigor, should satisfy anyone that the motivation for such attacks is there. In the past, if anyone had the means, apparently no one had the desire. Now the situation is reversed. Some antagonists have proclaimed a desire and are relentlessly acquiring the means.
Although the United States may have had no part in the origins of an international dispute, it must get involved whenever the actors in that dispute appear to be contemplating covert nuclear actions. We need to develop a worldwide detection and deterrence capability, in concert with allies, to ensure that first improvised nuclear device never goes off.
Captain Barth is the intelligence officer for 3rd Battalion, 8th Marines, 2nd Marine Division, at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. He returned recently from six months in the Mediterranean Sea, where he was part of the ground combat element of Landing Force, 6th Fleet. Among other assignments, Captain Barth has served as Terrorism Counteraction Officer in II Marine Expeditionary Force, Special Operations Training Group. He graduated in 1981 with bachelor’s degrees in business administration and German from Purdue University.
By Lieutenant (junior grade) Jeffrey W. Cottle, U. S. Naval Reserve
bott,
Th
nc competition for resources has been M'n by the most powerful. Death has .ays been the final criteria of value !? the desert. It matters not how . 8°od,” or how “civilized” you are;
11 matters only that you remain alive.
To deal effectively with the terrorist, 'Vc must inhabit the desert. We must
°m line has always been survival.
°uched by the embrace of Hellenistic aiN Roman thought; concepts of serialization through freedom are foreign 0 them. Theirs is a creed of harsh pictures and obedience. The desert emands, it does not nurture like the *hs of Athens and Rome, p The paradoxical notions of Judeo- hristianity that form the basis of our ’h'nd-set as Western peoples have been jMected—indeed, combated—by the esert peoples for more than two thou- ,Sand years. The desert has no tolerance 0r our kind of morality. There, the
take on for ourselves his law—the Law of the Desert (not the Law of the Jungle; jungles are too fertile for this notion). The Law of the Desert repulses us Westerners, but it must become ours if we are to deal with the terrorist on his grounds. The Law of the Desert, simply stated, is that “If you threaten to kill me or those I protect, I will kill you.”
Let us not regard the terrorist with the hubristic ethnocentricism that has so often been our undoing in previous conflicts. We should never assume that our civilization and its values have more inherent merit than his. Indeed, in its own way, the desert civilization is just as rich and complex as our own.
Some argue that by assuming the Law of the Desert we would somehow reduce our civilization to the level of those who perpetrate these evils upon us. This illustrates perfectly the flaw in our initial mind-set: In our smugness we think our civilization is more virtuous than theirs. But terrorists do not respond to Westem/Christian notions of virtue, only to desert rules of survival. That is why the terrorist has been so successful in dealing with us: He adheres to a law we have never known, the Law of the Desert. The Israelis, because of their proximity to the desert and to the terrorist, understand the law and continue to respond effectively.
The terrorist threatens to kill us, so we must kill him. We must not feel better about our persecution because we are virtuous. We must live by his law.
It is a law, thank God, that we abhor, but it is the law we must follow if we are to meet and defeat the terrorist.
Lieutenant Cottle is the intelligence officer with VFA-82, a Navy F/A-18 squadron deployed on board the USS America (CV-66) off the coast of Iran.