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The recent U. S. decision to withdraw
30.0 U. S. combat troops of the
305.0 now in Europe, plus large numbers of tanks, tactical aircraft, and other war material, will have major implica- Oons for U. S. naval forces. More reductions can be expected to follow: Secretary °f Defense Richard B. Cheney has said that “eventually” the United States can talk about withdrawals on the order of 00,000 or even 120,000 troops.1
In relating these reductions to naval requirements, Secretary of the Navy H. Lawrence Garrett, III, recently observed:
“While negotiated reductions of nuclear and conventional forces stationed on European and Asian soil may reduce the threat of war, our exposed forward allies must continue to be reassured of American resolve to take swift action in our mutual defense.
“That reassurance is conditioned on the perception of our military power and particularly on our sea power. We must never forget that the Soviet Union has the benefit of reaching a European front through internal lines of communication. For us, that front line—should deterrence fail— will forever be an ocean away.”2
While Secretaries Cheney and Garrett ave noted that U. S. defense concerns extend far beyond the European area— Specifically the Middle East, Libya, the orsian Gulf, Central America, and South and East Asia—it is clear that *3- S. political interests will continue to °cus on Europe and, accordingly emphasize the Atlantic.
Troops can be flown to Europe, but ihcir tanks, artillery, support vehicles, ar)d other equipment must come by sea. •he increased warning time gained if u- S. and Soviet forces in Europe were of equal size could radically change U. S. Plans to send ten additional divisions to Western Europe within ten days using considerable prepositioned equipment, he United States now has four and two- birds divisions in Europe plus massive SuPport and tactical air forces. Accord- lngly, Secretary of Defense Cheney has Questioned whether, in view of the additional warning time, more ships should be acquired to carry troops and weapons to Europe.3
A future conflict or crisis in the Atlantic theater would probably include Soviet strike aircraft and submarines attacking merchant and amphibious ships attempting to return U. S. forces to Europe. This post-Cold War situation will present several dilemmas for the U. S. Navy. In general, the three naval warfare communities—submarine, surface, and air—will attempt to keep the ships, aircraft, and other weapons they now have and protect ongoing programs. While the major reductions in U. S. forces caused by budgetary considerations and arms agreements with the Soviets will affect the Army (troops in Europe) and Air Force (intermediate-range missiles, and probably bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBMs] under the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks [START]), the Navy cannot expect to escape from the budget scissors unscathed.
Submarines: The Navy’s 36 strategic- missile submarines (SSBNs) provide about one-half of the nation’s strategic warheads for about one-quarter of the strategic budget. This is highly cost- effective, especially in view of the fact that the SSBNs are the most survivable leg of the U. S. strategic triad.
The START numbers now being considered by the United States and the Soviet Union would reduce the total number of U. S. strategic warheads—both ICBMs and in submarines—to 4,900. Assuming there would be political pressure for an even Air Force-Navy split, the Navy’s 2,450 warheads could be carried by only 13 Trident submarines. Obviously, some other ratio of land- and sea- based strategic missiles must be considered. The 16 Tridents now built and in production could load out 3,072 warheads, and the Navy’s proposed 21- submarine Trident force would have 4,032 warheads.
While the Navy plans force level goals against requirements, and not probable arms agreements, the reality of those agreements coming to fruition within the next few years will probably lead to a truncated Trident program.
Attack submarines (SSNs) should take on added importance in the new defense picture. In readiness for a future campaign against Soviet submarines seeking to interdict U. S. shipping to Europe, a large SSN force would provide the means for rapidly establishing barriers in northern waters and taking other actions to stop Soviet submarines. Modem Soviet submarines are increasingly quieter, which makes them, like modem nonnu-
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•Toceedings / August 1989
clear submarines, extremely difficult to detect by passive acoustics—the principal sensor of U. S. attack submarines. The U. S. SSN, however, can still be expected to make a vital contribution in antisubmarine warfare (ASW). In addition, the availability of submarine- launched antiship and land-attack cruise missiles, over-the-horizon targeting systems, and reliable communications gives the SSN new roles. SSNs are also very valuable in intelligence collection and special operations roles.
The U. S. Navy has 96 SSNs plus two ex-Polaris submarines employed as special operations transports; the force goal is 100. Additional roles for SSNs might lead to a larger force; however, the higher cost of the new Seawolf (SSN-21) class, in series production expected to be at least twice that of an improved Los Angeles (SSN-6S8), will undoubtedly lead to a reduction in the Navy’s attack submarine force.
Surface ships: The successful Aegis cruiser program has been fully approved, with 27 ships of the Ticonderoga (CG- 47) class built and under construction. These will be supplemented by the new Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)-class destroyers plus a large number of relatively modem frigates.
The contribution of surface combatants to convoy defense against aircraft and, especially, submarines is significant. They can operate ASW helicopters, which are effective search and attack vehicles, and can easily communicate with other ASW forces to undertake coordinated operations, an increasingly important factor in fighting submarines. Because they are relatively vulnerable to detection by satellites, aircraft, and acoustic devices, surface ships can employ active sonar without significantly increasing their detectability.
Cruiser and destroyer numbers will probably decline slightly by the end of the century. There are now 39 active cruisers and 68 destroyers as well as 99 frigates (77 active and 22 in the Naval Reserve Force [NRF]). The Navy’s 31 specialized ASW destroyers of the Spru- ance (DD-963) class are being provided with 61 vertical-launch missile cells. If employed as Tomahawk launch ships, they may be assigned to operating areas that may not be best for ASW operations.
The frigate force has declined with the decommissioning of 16 relatively modem ASW ships of the Brooke (FF-1040) and Garcia (FFG-1) classes last year. By giving up those 16 frigates with little objection, the Navy demonstrated to Congress and others its limited interest in “classic” ASW despite declarations by the
Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost, that ASW is his “central warfighting concern.”4
Assuming there is no construction beyond the Burke class until the end of the century, in the year 2000 the Navy should have perhaps ten fewer cruisers- destroyers than at present, but they will be more capable: 27 Aegis and six older, nuclear-propelled cruisers (CGNs), and perhaps 65 destroyers (DD/DDGs). The frigate picture should look the same except with more ships in the NRF, unless Congress or the Defense Department demands more cutbacks, in which case frigates could be considered expendable.
The battleship picture is less clear. The Iowa (BB-61) turret explosion has focused attention on the viability of these ships. The four active dreadnoughts serve primarily as missile platforms, each having 48 Tomahawk and 16 Harpoon cruise missiles. However, a modified Spruance- class destroyer, which has a full ASW capability, is cheaper to operate, has less than a quarter of a battleship’s crew, and has 61 vertical-launch missile cells plus eight Harpoons.
In this context, the cost of operating battleships will become a major factor in budgetary debates. The Marine Corps, which traditionally enjoys strong congressional support, will argue for the Iowas to fulfill the gunfire support role. But the probability of large-scale opposed assaults is unlikely, while Tomahawk land-attack missiles (TLAMs) with conventional warheads could provide a more flexible strike capability than 16-inch bullets. The only realistic hope for the battleships in the likely budget environment could be as numbered fleet flagships or, perhaps, a more expensive, multimission modification. Otherwise, two dreadnoughts will likely be laid up in the near future.
Aircraft carriers: The subject of intensive controversy in the past, the construction of four new, nuclear-propelled carriers (CVNs) was approved easily during the Reagan administration. The Navy has saved the modernization of the Enterprise (CVN-65), so there'could be six or more conventional and nine nuclear ships— i.e., the current force level goal of 15 carriers. In the short term, the number declines to 13 operational ships plus one undergoing the service life extension program.
The early retirement of some of the remaining Forrestal (CV-59)-class carriers could be caused by severe budget reductions imposed on the Navy, naval arms limitations, or congressional intervention to make the Navy adjust the number of carriers to match the available tactical aircraft. With respect to the arms limitations, the Soviets have great concern for the carriers because of the nuclear strike capability, mission flexibility, and mobility. This concern became abundantly clear in the aftermath of the visit by Marshal of the Soviet Union S. F. Akhromeyev, then Chief of the Soviet General Staff, to the U. S. aircraft carrier Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) in July 1988.
Another complicating factor in the carrier picture could be an increased emphasis on ASW. Less than 20% of the carrier’s aircraft are ASW types—ten S-3 Vikings and six SH-3H Sea Kings or SH- 60F Seahawks. While carriers are invaluable for operations in the Third World, a realistic analysis may demonstrate that a smaller number of large carriers could “cover” the most likely Third World trouble spots.
There may be rationale for the Navy to continue construction of the Wasp (LHD- l)-class amphibious ships beyond the five or so now planned and/or built. With an air group of perhaps 40-50 AV-8B Harriers (or their more-capable future successor), various proposed V-22 Osprey variants, and helicopters, an LHD variant could serve as an effective ASW-sea control ship for one-fourth the cost of a CVN. Smaller carriers for the specialized ASW role or mid-size (CVV) carriers have long been rejected by the Navy s leadership. However, the in-production LHD, especially if modified to carry more aircraft in place of landing cratt. could become an attractive option l°r Navy planners. Again, in this context the LHD variant is a complement, not replacement for the CV/CVN.
It is far from clear as to how the ongoing conventional and strategic arms reductions will affect the U. S. armed forces. However, it is obvious that the Navy will have to rethink both its strategy and procurement programs in view of the changing politico-military environment in Europe, the U. S. budget situation in the post-Reagan era, and the increasing cost of weapon procurement. Within the defense establishment, the debate will involve increasing service partisanship as each strives to save its programs—and possibly even its roles and missions.
‘George C. Wilson and R. Jeffrey Smith, "Cheney Foresees Lighter U. S. Forces Under Bush Arms posals," The Washington Post, 2 June 1989. p. A2 ■ “Secretary of the Navy H. Lawrence Garrett. U*' speech to Naval Submarine League, Alexandria, VA. 8 June 1989. Emphasis in original.
“Wilson, op. cit.
“Adm. C. A. H. Trost, USN, statement to House Appropriations Committee, 1 March 1988, p- * ■
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Proceedings / August 19*®