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Th
by ne U. S. Navy believes that Sovi§§r,eSsively attacking the bL.,ets submarine bastions and lcei, ac*‘n8 the Greenland- t'^^'United Kingdom (G-l- it,jne^aP and the Baltic with nnes.S’. ^'3 Orions, and subma- rnarj' 11 can minimize the sub- c0"e *hreat to the sea lines of
“leak1Un!?ation (SL0Cs)- Any be ers” that get through could
b0;Ulc% located and hunted C.The problem is that the 'n, y ls Prepared to deal with iii/.a lew old submarines and tn^ major breakthrough of O Soviet nuclear-powered snd attack submarines (SSNs) s ijjf^fchant surface raiders. If riDes^ uumber of Soviet subma- 'hrt aPPear before hostilities to*.’Jbe U. S. Navy will have the t 3Ve hdlo and goodbye” as tica(iWo navies pass each other, liie /J8 hi opposite directions.
Nayy may have to ^between forcing its way rt]iea§h the G-I-UK Gap and itig § Norway, or abandon- ollth'' ^orward posture to stay Jhe r ,an^ Protect the SLOCs. hven‘ted States does not ?roteen°ugh escort ships to Hry both the carrier groups W erchant shipping at the A||tlme-
^0) planners face a signifi-
litt|eiov>et threat, albeit with l()r,uev’dence of Soviet intent.
a small shift in ori- Hiaj0r°n and planning—without long exPenditures—can go a ’I'K toward dealing with
■Jheat.
Arapaho program, using siVg ner>zed support modules to <leckmerchant ships some flight S readabilities, was a brilliant, V k at'vely expensive idea.
W av’n8 the equivalent ad- VSe °b N. S. carrier air et$ ar- ty,e British and the Sovi- 'W.'s Proceeding with the
a 0 concept. However, the
Vd-
lngs! October 1989
a minor maintenance mode, with the other three rotating through for servicing.
For more than 20 years, the Coast Guard has operated helicopters from cutters on two- month Alaskan patrols without hangar protection. By comparison, keeping LAMPS-IIIs operating during a convoy transit
would be relatively simple. Currently, the Coast Guard also has a need for LAMPS helicopters for its coastal Maritime Defense Zone operations. In wartime, the Navy would not be leaving behind any more antisubmarine warfare assets than it had to, yet coastal shipping, and port approaches would need continuous ASW protection. Coast Guard air stations evenly spaced along our coasts would be logical resources to task with this mission, providing they had LAMPS helicopters and crews. The Coast Guard is purchasing HH-60J Jayhawk search-and- rescue (SAR) helicopters to replace its aging fleet of HH-3F Pelican helicopters for SAR and drug-interdiction operations. It
U. S. Navy does not have the funds to support this program in the lean budget years ahead. A bare-bones alternative would be to create reserve air wings of Coast Guard SH-60 helicopter pilots who would train with their Naval Reserve SH-60B LAMPS-III counterparts. In wartime, if the submarine and merchant raider threat warranted convoy protection, one cutter and four LAMPS-IIIs could offer effective screening for the convoy. Three of the helicopters would operate from suitable merchant ships using existing or portable decks. There would be three crews per helicopter to allow for continuous-screen operations. The fourth helicopter would be staged on the cutter in
replacement. The expense of adding the necessary flight deck extensions and reinforcement and aircraft-handling equipment would be more than offset by the benefit of having a fleet of Coast Guard LAMPS/combat SAR-equipped cutters available for carrier screen, convoy protection, and coastal ASW defense operations.
The SH-2 helicopter requires extensive maintenance after approximately six hours of flight time, making it a poor candidate for the convoy screening operation proposed earlier. The HH- 60, with a LAMPS-III package or the improved LAMPS-I package, would provide excellent off-the-shelf capability for extended convoy screening and SAR operations. The improved LAMPS-I system would easily fit on the HH-60, leaving a large weight and range reserve. Initial training could begin immediately by mixing Coast Guard Reserve flight crews in with their Naval Reserve counterparts at the North Island Naval Air Station, where the
might also consider modifying them to operate as LAMPS-I (or -III) platforms.
Current Coast Guard highland medium-endurance (Hamilton [WHEC-715]- and Bear [WMEC-901] class) cutters are LAMPS-I capable. However, the Coast Guard neither owns nor intends to purchase SH-2 Seasprite LAMPS-I helicopters. These cutters would be used as LAMPS platforms only if Navy LAMPS-I helicopters were deployed on board; this is highly unlikely, except in carrier screening operations. As a result, the cutters will not benefit from the experience of working as part of a helo-ship ASW team. As currently configured, the cutters operate at the outer limits of safety when carrying the HH-3F, so a similar limitation would exist for its HH-60
of
would allow the retention
trainers are located.
Establishing Coast Guard serve LAMPS/combat SAR un '
some of the most highly quJ 1 Tied ocean flight crews in the world. Currently, there is no Coast Guard Reserve prograrng let these trained crews contma to fly after they retire or leav the service. Such a program would prove less expensive 1 trying to build guided-missi e frigate-type escorts, and w°u support Navy missions with0 extensive investments in man power and training. An alter tive to Coast Guard Reserve ^ ASW/SAR flight crews niigm to simply bring them into the Navy. This overlooks the a tage to the Navy of having a potentially large number °\. u\e ASW/SAR flight crews aval'3 without having to pay for 0f them—following the rationa counting on Coast Guard A equipped cutters for screen a coastal patrol duties, withou ^ paying for their construction routine operations. ,{
Another option might be the Marine Corps and the L° Guard to procure the V-22 _ ^ Osprey tilt-rotor together. a Marine Corps is facing stiff position to purchasing this highly versatile vertical take off/hover aircraft in the leaI1® (S Department of Defense budg that lie ahead. But if a join1,^ could be arranged, both seC’ would recognize significant P curement savings. The Coa Guard’s mid-range HU-25A Guardian was a “low-bid ^
placement for the ancient H Albatross. A combination 0 political and fiscal constrain forced the purchase of an a * quate but less than ideal airC for the Coast Guard’s naulb sion peace and wartime role ■
A stripped-down Osprey e.
equipped with SAR/law °n ® j.
ment/ASW interchangeable
ules would provide a versat!tead mission-capable aircraft. ms of HH-60s on the convoy n* chant flight decks, an Ospre'
130
Proceedings
I Octi>ber
jS(sWe(l by Coast Guard reserved provide over-the-hori- A ""borne early warning, surf Sonar dipping, and air-to- or defenses for the convoy ."diWdual fast merchant ships faceracbon of the cost of sur- Hj c°nvoy protection. Again, a$sw°uld be almost a no-cost C0 '0r the Navy, since the st Guard would procure and
°Perate
the aircraft for its peace-
titoe . > .
|Sfav Astons. However, the liav ^ and Marine Corps would initj6 to ass'st ar*d subsidize the since ,Foast ^uard purchase,
entireiy
the start-up costs for an
Un*que
i
GU;
new and radically
are 5eaircraft like the Osprey
&ut
the small Coast . . acquisition, construction,
'Improvement budget level.
the
out-year savings to the
>rv^ ln having this asset in re- lith^ould more than justify jn" start-up subsidies.
dav" a future war, the first 30
^ATfv°Uld cruc'ak a°d
Out U s only chance of holding Wc ■ ■ -
St
diiteri ,'"jup
termu States. Like mine counts ^asures» SLOC protection Wa£en a forgotten and unit, ar'ed stepchild of the U. S. caselrrie strategy. And as in the loSe °f mine warfare, we can $0„s" War if we ignore the les- hnc bistory on the impor- Tjie" °f Protecting the SLOCs. shin SSt’ independent merchant the ^ may be a partial solution if S °V‘ets fail to deploy their cha-.attack submarines and mer-
chanF°Uld be to receive mer- shipping resupply from the
"ant "and, fisk; .
traj g Slng the land war in Cen- at)(j • Ur°pe by losing essential g^rreplaceable supplies at sea. dijjae ff- S. Navy should coor- ’he$ee vv’bh the Coast Guard on it) 0 defensive responsibilities the 0r,Cr to be free to perform So ^ fensive missions they do Pt0 *■ A conservative ap- Ptote °n t*le Davy’s part to tVeg^bng the SLOCs in the first UntjjS °f the war is required Cou (be threat is either dis- ed or controlled. This is
raiders. On the other the West cannot afford to
e"in:
Ss I October 1989
the proper response to the commander-in-chiefs’ mandate to prepare for an enemy’s capabilities, and not his intentions. Under the MDZ concept, the Navy should capitalize on Coast Guard operational capabilities as a low-cost means to protect Western SLOCs.
San Diego, California. Prior assignments include service as the weapons and operations officer on the USCGC Boutwell (WHEC-719) on Alaskan and eastern Pacific patrols. He was port security officer, a marine safety inspector, and boat station officer at the Marine Safety Office in Long Beach, California. Commander Golden was the planning and supervising officer for the 1984 Olympic port security operations. He was also the deputy director and intelligence division chief for the Vice President’s National Narcotics Border Interdiction System, Pacific region.
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