Technology Transfer: How It Happens

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There are four major mecha­nisms for transferring U. S. ad­vanced technology to other na­tions, and each provides unique opportunities for the Soviets:

► Legal transfer

► Espionage and other illegal activities

► Battlefield exploitation

► Parallel development

Of the four, the legal transfer of technology is the most com­mon. The U. S. Department of Commerce is responsible for overseeing the sale of advanced technology to foreign countries and has the difficult task of bal­ancing the needs of a free enter­prise economy with the require­ments of national security. The Department of Defense has criti­cized the Commerce Department recently for lax oversight, point­ing to the easy access the Sovi­ets have to vast unclassified U. S. computer data bases. Each year, the Soviets obtain nearly half a million unclassified U. S. documents on technical sub­jects.¹ This has enabled them in recent years to narrow the U. S. lead in nearly all key technologi­cal areas, particularly microelec­tronics, and to overtake the West in some other key areas.² The rapid maturing of Soviet com­puter capability and the Soviet semiconductor industry is a case in point: It occurred almost en­tirely through legal sales of Western equipment to third-party countries, which in turn made the technology available to the Soviet Union.

Some of the more highly pub­licized cases of espionage and illegal equipment sales—such as the Walker-Whitworth sale of cryptologic material to the Sovi­ets and the Toshiba-Kongsberg sale of advanced milling ma­chines for making marine pro­pellers-—highlight the problems at hand. They are part of a mas­sive industrial espionage scheme: The Soviets spend $1.4 billion annually on a worldwide effort involving KGB intelligence offi­cers and other espionage agents to obtain military hardware, blueprints, product samples, and test equipment. These efforts have paid fantastic dividends by saving the Soviets immeasurable research and development costs and forcing additional research expenditures by the United States. Further, the Soviets have constructed an elaborate trade diversion program that enhances their own military production capability.³ The United States conducts a major campaign to combat this unlawful channel of technology transfer. Investiga­tions continue to reveal that cor­porations based in friendly c°^un tries are supplying microelectron ics and other advanced technol­ogy to the Soviets at an alarm­ing rate.⁴ For example, allega­tions have appeared of further Toshiba sales to the Soviets of computer chips and nuclear weapon command-and-control communication systems.⁵'

In 1982 the Senate Commit*^ on Governmental Affairs issue a report identifying a global Soviet program to acquire Wes em militarily significant techn ogy. The report noted the SoV ets’ success in supplementing their military research and ma¹¹ ufacturing capabilities and in narrowing the technology g^aP with the West.⁷ However dis­tressing these revelations may be, they are not surprising g^lV the effort the Soviets expend- fact, we should assume that technology transfer will hapP^en' Furthermore, we must guard against the possibility that the Soviets possess detailed techm cal information that supports n only our current weapon sys­tems, but the technological se­crets intended for future U- ²¹' weapons as well.

Battlefield exploitation of U. S. weapon systems is anot serious concern—in peacetim^e as well as in war. The threat

and development community. At best, U. S. research or­ganizations are organized loosely; more often, they are unfocused. We cannot wait for the Soviets to obtain and deploy a U. S. system before we develop a counter-tech­nology. The Red cell must have a deployable counter ready before the United States introduces the technology into its own military systems.

An example of the need for early countermeasure devel­opment is close at hand. In friendlier times, the United States provided Harpoon and Phoenix missiles to the Ira­nian armed forces then under the control of Shah Moham­mad Reza Pahlavi, not foreseeing the fundamentalist revo­lution that ensued. Iran now daily threatens U. S. forces with their own weapons. Had we prepared countermea­sures to these systems early on, our ships, aircraft, and sailors would be much more secure in the Persian Gulf

today.                                                               _s.

Just as the Soviets will field new systems using L- ^ developed technology, they will also field their ⁰ counters once they exploit the scientific basis for a sy^st Therefore, the Red cell must devise countermeasures harden all new systems under development. It makes ■ sense to spend millions of dollars to develop and p^r°^c u advanced systems if Soviet counters acquired thro t> technology transfer render them obsolete at an acceler*

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A final hypothetical example illustrates the imp°^ru _e

of hardening systems to enemy counters at an early ® y

in the technology’s development. The advanced capao¹

(AdCap) torpedo is a major developmental progra'¹³^

U. S. antisubmarine warfare. Suppose a contractor ^

ployee being blackmailed for drug use provides the

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Soviet

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1960

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ity *^S ^^r°^{m an} adversary’s abil- c_at) ? .^exP^°it the technological revp ^l*'^t'^es of a system through iiig ^{Se en}gineering after obtain- ^art °f a system or pieces of ^eaP°ⁿ from a variety of ^i,ttin|^S ^^ur*ⁿ8 wartime, for ex­^e> we would expect an

ALL THE WORLD S AIRCRAFT 1906-1907.

enemy to capture some U. S. equipment and weapons. A de­termined foe who exploited this technological bonanza could rad­ically improve his tactics, de­fenses, and weapon systems. In another instance, some percent­age of the ordnance U. S. forces

expend is bound to malfunction, providing the enemy with equip­ment of immeasurable intelli­gence value. This problem am­plifies in peacetime when actual ordnance expenditures are rela­tively rare but the enemy has plenty of time to exploit his finds.

Ado.^{S te}.^c^ⁿ'^cal details to a Soviet KGB agent. Before the c_a ^aP *^s even in the fleet, every Soviet submarine could hony ^{3 srna}^ black box that would spoof the torpedo’s ^ logic. U. S. Navy ASW capability would be fa- ■jUdamaged.

st)₀ ^e Red cell approach to technology development ^r°5dM ^^rCat P^rom'^se’ but it has its drawbacks. One major iHj,, ^0ck is the Congress. Military appropriations com­O- ^^ave been historically shortsighted in dealing with tatio^military ^sy^stems. If the Navy accompanies its presen­ter, °f a technologically advanced system with the sys- c_0n | ^Countermeasure, the Congress could mistakenly f(j_n(j ^Uc*^e that the new technology is flawed and refuse to The Navy must strive to make Congress under- be_fo "*e importance of the Red cell approach. Knowing ^ehand how an enemy may counter a technology is an added benefit. Far from detracting from a system’s effec­tiveness, such foresight enhances it.

For the Future—Run Fast, Anticipate the Enemy. Since the United States would rely heavily on technological su­periority to prevail in a conflict with the Soviets, the Navy should attempt to maintain a technological edge in every possible area. The United States is clearly inferior in such areas as titanium fabrication, high-energy laser applica­tions, manned space surveillance, and armor. The nation should make a strong effort to remedy these deficiencies; should seek to maintain its technological lead over the Soviets in vital design and manufacturing know-how; and should control strictly key dual-use products, including computer-aided design and manufacturing systems and automatic test and inspection equipment.

Consider a hypothetical but entirely plausible example. In the 1986 raid on Libya, the Navy could have used subma­rine-launched conventional Tom­ahawk land-attack cruise missiles (TLAM-C). If it had, and Lib­yan coastal air defenses had shot down a TLAM-C or one failed to function properly, this front­line weapon could have been compromised. The Libyans would have reaped a political and financial bonus by selling the missile to the Soviets, who then could have dissected the missile’s logic and guidance sys­tems and improved their own systems or developed a counter to those of the United States. Even if every missile had ex­ploded as planned, some exploit­able debris could have remained.

The immense, worldwide net­work of foreign military sales also transfers U. S. technology into unfriendly hands. The U. S. government stringently controls transfers of advanced weapon systems abroad, placing exten­sive restrictions on the buyers. Despite all precautions, small but significant portions of these systems are resold on the black market. A recent example is the redirection of U. S.-made Stinger ground-to-air missiles to Iran. The United States had pro­vided these missiles to insur­gency forces in Angola and the mujahideen in Afghanistan.

Strict export restrictions failed to limit their transfer, and some Stinger missiles now threaten U. S. pilots in the Persian Gulf.⁸ That the Soviets will ex­ploit the Stinger eventually is highly likely.

The final method of technol­ogy transfer is parallel develop­ment. The Soviets are unusually adept at absorbing technological ideas from a variety of sources and rapidly applying them to military systems. They find ideas for new technology in open-source Western literature— such as advertisements in de­fense industry journals and ex­hibits at open symposia—and in their observations of operational Western systems. The examples are too numerous to be coinci­dental. The Soviet space shuttle concept looks strikingly like the U. S. version. The development of the Su-27 Flanker, with its all-weather capability and look- down, shoot-down radar is a close cousin to the U. S. F-15 Eagle. Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRVed) submarine-launched ballistic missiles and modern cruise missiles are further exam­ples of how the Soviets have pressed U. S. concepts into ser­vice. Figure 1 shows a partial inventory of similar U. S. and Soviet aircraft and the year each became operational. Clearly, the Soviets have followed U. S. technological leads, intending to keep their systems current by mimicking our own. The relative ease with which the Soviets ac­complish this presents the United States with a serious challenge.

By obtaining technical docu­ments on the U. S. Navy’s F/A-18 fighter radar, the Soviets saved an estimated $55 milli°ⁿ in manpower and development costs. The manpower portion alone probably represents more than 1,000 man-years of scien­tific research. The F/A-18 docu­ments served as the technical basis for the latest generation ° Soviet fighter radars, which in­corporate complex design com­ponents such as fast-Fourier- transform algorithms, terrain mapping, and real-time resolu­tion-enhancement techniques. Undoubtedly, this information will serve as the impetus for ^^ur ther Soviet long-term research projects.⁹

’77s Faster to Copy than to Create: The time it takes for¹ ^ Soviets to acquire a specific nc Western technology varies with the complexity of the applied tion. Figure 2 shows a time hn^c for a typical transfer of techno' ogy during a 25-year period.

The time estimates would appo to fielding a new weapon sys­tem, deploying a new sensor °^r communication system, or de^v oping specific systems to use ⁱⁿ constructing a ship, submarine’ or aircraft. While it is extreru¹

No action can completely eliminate technology transfer to a determined adversary. But some things can be done to delay the inevitable transfer and to limit its effects. Retired Navy Admiral Bobby R. Inman, a strong propo­nent of advanced technology de­velopment, describes a frame of mind he terms “running fast.” Seeing the U. S. technological edge eroding and recognizing that technology transfer is unavoida­ble, he urges the United States to pursue advanced technology at the fastest rate possible, applying new Admiral Bobby Inman developments to a wide range of

weapon systems, and trying to shorten the cycle in material becomes available.² This fast-paced pursuit advanced-technology solutions would widen the g^aP ^D- tween U. S. and Soviet capabilities, apply the most p°^s‘ j ble pressure on the Soviet defense establishment. ^Jl1 maximize the leverage of U. S. defense investments-

The United States can also stall technology transf^ef the Soviets by expanding the use of special-access P^T grams. While retaining the means for sufficient oversig ^ congressional leaders must understand the vital nature critical technological programs and take steps to p^rt) them.³

Finally, the government must do more to plug classified information. In a recent statement, CIA Dire^ William H. Webster reiterated his concern that a sift

Soviet recognition

Soviet espionage begins

Introduce into Third World

□

Mass produced by foreign governments

Soviet Union

Third World

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difficult for the United States to reduce its system-development times, a determined adversary can shorten the time it takes to field a copied system.

The development of new tech­nology begins with basic re­search efforts in universities, industrial laboratories, and Navy or national research centers. In time, successful research may evolve into a technology that the Navy recognizes for its potential application to a naval system. This period is four years for the sample technology shown in Figure 2, but it could be 10-15 years or more in some cases. Well-structured Navy research and development efforts then begin; complete development of a concept normally takes at least five years.

Once researchers successfully demonstrate the technology’s capability, a program manager has sufficient confidence to in­corporate the technology into the ■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■

□

Navy’s system-acquisition proc­ess. The development process includes constructing a usable prototype of the demonstrated technology and follow-on devel­opment into a deployable system with a manufacturing rate suffi­cient to support its introduction into the fleet at IOC. Typically, the Navy can complete the de­velopment in seven to ten years beyond the basic research pe­riod.

Well before the U. S. Navy begins system development, the Soviets recognize American re­searchers have hit upon a new technology with military poten­tial. Except for a few highly classified projects, most new U. S. technologies are discussed openly in academic journals and military advertising. Many arti­cles in the Soviet naval journal Morskoy sbornik confirm the Soviets’ intense interest in U. S. advanced-technology projects. The Soviets quickly launch a

⁵Willis Witter, “Toshiba Allegedly G^ave " ets Nuclear Push,” Washington Times, * March 1988.              .

⁶Stuart Auerbach, “CIA Says Toshiba S°^ More to Soviet Bloc,” Washington Post* March 1988.

¹ Soviet Acquisition of Western Technology• April 1982. Report on hearings before the ^ manent Subcommittee on Investigations ⁰ Committee on Governmental Affairs, U^nl* States Senate, Ninety-Seventh Congress, ond Session, 4, 5, 6, 11, and 12 May ^ ^{P 8}Smith Hempstone, “Where the Stingers Proved their Worth,” Washington Times, February 1988.

⁹Soviet Acquisition of Military Significant Western Technology. An Update, Septet 1985, p. 8.                  '                       .₀

M. Goldb*^

, So^yl'

1988.

concerted espionage effort to acquire the technology for ulti­mate inclusion in Soviet systems After the United States has deployed the new technology ⁱⁿ a military system, the Soviets begin their development. They apparently rely heavily on pr°^t0 typing to prove the capability >° themselves, as evidenced by numerous one-of-a-kind plat­forms, and then proceed on the own path toward deploying the system. The Soviets can move their copied technologies from development to IOC much fa^ste than the United States can re­search, develop, and field an original system—about ten y^ear faster.                             

'Kathryn Jones. “CIA Official Expects S<nV to Step up Industrial Spying,” Dallas M°^r News, 17 February 1988.

²Soviet Acquisition of Military Significant Western Technology. An Update, Septet 1985, p. 1. (See Note 7.)

³K. Jones, Ibid.

⁴Willis Witter, “CIA Aide Tells of Toshiba Deliveries,” Washington Times, 9 March