This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
capability, coupled with the firepo
the 5-in/54-cal Mk-45 and Mk-42 g1
unS’
mis*10
tions, be they raids, assaults, or
“The firepower of the American warships and aircraft makes every landing possible.’’ —Lieutenant General
Tadamichi Kuribayashi, Commander, Japanese forces, Iwo Jima. 19451
The landing craft air cushion (LCAC) and the MV-22 tilt-rotor Osprey mark a new era in amphibious warfare. U. S. naval forces are now developing the capability of launching high-speed, over- the-horizon amphibious assaults. Unfortunately, however, today’s amphibious capabilities are being severely hindered by the Achilles’ heel of our current tactical doctrine—inadequate naval gunfire support. In 1965, Colonel Robert D. Heinl projected that the magazine capacity of the entire U. S. Navy of the 1970s would not be enough to support a single amphibious assault of World War II magnitude.2 It is doubtful that current naval capabilities improve upon this estimate, even with the return of the battleships to the fleet. Ironically, the technology that the Navy needs to remedy this situation is available. Moreover, it is nicely packaged in a series of cost-effective, easily adapted systems that would serve not only the Fleet Marine Forces in their conduct of amphibious operations, but also the surface navy in the close, heated environment that has characterized recent naval operations.
During World War II, on Guam, it took 1.76 tons of steel to inflict one casualty; in Italy, nearly 4 tons.3 In 1990, in a campaign against a well-equipped Soviet beachhead, with highly mobile defenders adhering to the doctrine of landing prevention, the figure likely would rise appreciably. Thus, the advantage in speed
we have gained may be wasted it gunfire support does not improve. a Some would argue that modern a>rC f
- ,wef is sufficient to support effective 0P^[)$
to remove personnel and/or equ'P^f, from hostile territory. In truth. ho'VL ^ aircraft are incapable of supply10? ^ necessary, dedicated force, and they^j, severely hampered by the natural v ronment. In addition, it is not tad1 ^ sound to deploy million-dollar assets may be taken out by inexpen^re. shoulder-launched Stinger missile ,s, and unnecessarily risk personnel in a ^ sion that can be more effectively aCC plished by other means.4 jjji-
Such limitations do not decry ^ portance or the necessity of air sup!
104
Proceedings / Noveni6er
Th
tirne '^erent delay- and slow response
f0 ® op a>r support precludes its sole use ■ he amphibious assault, but these fac-
lr should be reserved for targets of
atiy1 priority which cannot be attacked by ^ other means. Based on past experi-
Ply
*1*10 IO CIO IIUV
full ^ as 11 was *n 1965. For example, in a
......................................... '*
fOrrnenemy’s coastal missile artillery
OfQg - --------- -------------------- J
lrali 3 t lreat that would need to be neu- laUn^d before the assault could be Suitahi 7 ^ava' §unf're would not be e in this role because it would
•ren a i ’ ............................
tions Alarge gap in amphibious opera
by,. ewl it developed after World War II '-ausp — - - -
j.
Iargg|°nry> such as missiles, which op ^ replaced the requirement for guns
op, ' 8Unfire support capabilities is not tap, (lQa'ted hut reversed, our ability to
°Ut miles from shore to remain
cu| „uartiUery range. Since the 5-in/54-
for^r mere'y P°'nt out the requirement Effective gunfire. The necessary con-
tors rir» * .*’ *'*“ *“v
He,. n°t eliminate the air strike from
'8 Picture.5 Colonel Heinl stated that air -■
h'gh
*1 . ” r *
’ inere will always be an ample sup- ,oda,<)f SUch targets.”6 This is as true s^ale amphibious assault, the assault the 'Vouid most likely be threatened by
a p()lnate the element of surprise. This is ^Ssible mission for aviation, sup Cnioving air power from the main fire open0rt mission, however, still leaves
U0lSneAs mentioned, the “gun gap” is
of major advances in naval
l95q°ard cruisers and destroyers.8 In the theC(S’ Colonel Heinl exhorted, “Unless lativn,'ni|ing degradation of once super- exiSt °PP°sed landings will cease to Vet k is unfortunate that we have not ^eded Colonel Heinl’s warning. balt|e l ■ e irom recommissioning the ProVeShlps. little has been done to im- at9ph^Unfire suPP°rt capabilities. In an lbe s '°us landing today, assuming that quei,cdr ace-to-surface missile threat is Sid h3t 30 eady poiut, support ships bvc nc required to stand off at least
i " ‘““Sc- omce me j-in/tvf- S, n.|/.as a range of only 12 nautical ’ his leaves a capability of only
'its / November 1988
seven miles of inland support.10 This is severely inadequate; future range requirements could reach 70 nautical miles, assuming a safe distance off shore, the distance from the beach to an inland reconnaissance force, and the distance from that force to the enemy defenses.11
Range requirements reflect the least of the 5-in/54-cal gun’s inadequacies, however. Statistics from the Vietnam and Korean wars show that the gun’s performance is ineffective for most shore bombardment requirements. In Korea, the five-inch gun had little or no effect against coastal defense batteries. Enemy defenses under its fire either continued firing during the attack, or resumed operations shortly after shelling ceased. In contrast, the 8-in/55-cal gun used against such targets succeeded decisively in eliminating enemy activity.12 In Vietnam, the five-inch guns used against reinforced bunkers performed poorly, penetrating only two feet of concrete at short range.13 Applying this record to the major amphibious assaults of World War II places the problem in better perspective; the 5-in/54-cal would not have succeeded in closing down the 25 coastal batteries at Normandy, and, because of its limited range, it certainly would not have prevented the German armored counterattacks that followed.14 Surely, the central Pacific campaign, the key to the defeat of the Japanese, would have been impossible without major caliber naval guns.15
Lessons learned from past conflicts, coupled with modem estimates, indicate a minimum range requirement for most purposes of about 17 miles.16 Theoretically, many enemy defenses would lie within approximately 14.2 miles of the beach. Even with an improved projectile, the 5-in/54-cal is incapable of meeting this requirement.17 If an amphibious assault became necessary tomorrow, it is unlikely that the Navy and Marine Corps would be able to execute it with a fleet of ships that is incapable of effective gunfire support. The problem can no longer be ignored.
A possible solution lies in introducing the 8-in/55-cal Mk-71 Major Caliber Lightweight Gun to the fleet. The Mk-71 has a range of approximately 22.7 miles, a decided improvement over the five-inch gun.18 If the Mk-71 had been fitted to destroyers in Korea, range and power requirements would have been fulfilled, a higher percentage of targets would have been destroyed, and ammunition costs would have been reduced.19 The Mk-71 has twice the maximum range of the five-inch gun, four times the penetration power, six times the fragmentation power, and has a laser-guidance capability.20
Unfortunately, the 17-mile range requirement is a minimum. Infantry reserves, mechanized units, armor, and surface-to-surface missile sites could be located more than 50 miles inland—well beyond the range of even the Mk-71. However, using a sabot-type projectile, the Mk-71 could achieve ranges of nearly 40 miles.21 Although not ideal, this would still be a big improvement over the five-inch gun.
Other considerations also contribute to making the Mk-71 the gun of choice for the fleet. The ability to quickly and effectively suppress artillery fire is crucial in supporting helicopter and LCAC landing forces.2- To accomplish this mission, ballistic projectiles cannot always be relied upon. In order to eliminate enemy counter-batteries, the Navy needs weapons that can provide high volume over a large area.23 The answer to this problem lies in the use of submunitions. Submunitions are lethal against personnel, light armor, and mobile weapons. The five-inch projectile cannot effectively deploy such devices. The Mk-71, however, is perfectly suited for firing submunitions, which, coupled with the increased range of the Mk-71, would quickly, reliably, and effectively suppress enemy counter-batteries.24
A prototype Mk-71 was successfully tested on board the USS Hull (DD-945) in the late 1970s; however the program was cancelled in 1978. The gun commonly used in the U. S. Navy today, the 5-in/54-cal. is a compromise between nothing and something. Since replacing the five-inch gun with the Mk-71 would
105
involve astronomical costs and design obstacles, it may be more prudent to turn to what is available and practical. According to the head of the Warfighting Requirements Branch, Operations Division, at Headquarters, Marine Corps, “New technology must fit into present operational concepts or current equipment must fit into new or emerging operational concepts. In either case interoperability of old and new equipment must be possible.”25 The Mk-71 must be kept in mind in future procurement decisions, but, for now, the Navy has a number of compromises available to it that can narrow the gun gap.
The 16-inch gun, using standard shells, is capable of penetrating the 22.7- mile defense zone. Using 13-inch sabot- type projectiles, however, doubles this range.26 By bringing a battleship’s guns
lain
■ con1'
language, allowing quick, effective munication between the forward obse ers and the personnel on board ship s plying the firepower.32 st
The flexibility of the ABRS is its favorable characteristic. In its 0 . mode, it carries an antimaterial/anhP^ sonnel warhead. In addition, like the ^ inch shell, it can carry numerous types > submunitions: antimaterial/antiperso ^ (M77) submunitions, antitank mines, guided antitank submissiles.33 T*6 . ABRS rockets can saturate a 50-acre a
at medium range with 8,000
M77 <
ch
tions. Each munition carries the pul1' ^ a hand grenade, and shaped charges
available for use against armor.
•ctid
Other munitions are being reseat ^ for use in the ABRS, as well.35 f‘0lj j$ ample, a terminal guidance warhe^ under consideration. In this mode, ^ ABRS rocket would carry six. 11 ,j.
U. S. NAVY
The Fix: using submunitions and sabot-type projectiles with the battleships’ 16-inch gun, reintroducing the 8-in/55-cal Major Caliber Lightweight Gun to the fleet, and acquiring the proposed ABRS to meet growing range requirements for amphibious assault.
to bear on enemy defenses during amphibious operations, powerful fire could be placed more than 45 miles inland. In addition, the 16-inch shell is capable of carrying various types of submunitions, including chaff, smoke, and search-and- destroy armor (SADARM) submunitions.27 This capability is not only available, but it is relatively inexpensive.
The most flexible compromise, how
ever, would be the introduction of the assault ballistic rocket system (ABRS) to the fleet. The ABRS is the naval version of the U. S. Army’s multiple launch rocket system. The ABRS is designed to attack area targets as opposed to successive, individual targets, functioning in a similar role as submunitons deployed from the 8-inch or 16-inch shell.28 In the gunfire support role, the ABRS is 25 times more effective than the 5-in/54-cal gun.29 With one 12-rocket load, the ABRS can neutralize most soft targets on the battlefield.30 One launch container carries six rockets, and these containers have a ten-year storage life with no maintenance requirement. Twelve rockets can exit the launcher in less than one minute. The system is completely operational, day or night, in all weather.31 The fire
The UJ
vidual rockets would deploy ft°nl ^
. . . .... . • \XWV
likely SADARM, submissiles, i*"- $
carrier and, using millimetric j length, seek out targets on the grl3 i The ABRS booster could be com11 ^
with a laser-guided system
like
ttic
Pave way III and a shaped charge lik ^s. Hellfire for accurate strikes against ta^ The bottom line is that this system, its effective range of nearly 22.7 n ^ provides the flexibility to strike bot ^ targets and hardened targets with ^
- ‘ -rfy*
unequaled by the Navy’s 5-im ^ guns. Combined with the extended ‘ of the 16-inch guns, ABRS
come a powerful addition to current
phibious warfare tactics. ABRS could be fitted easily to any ship,ineir ing amphibians. It is a relatively >ne sive system that has already been pletely developed for the Army, 111
106
her >'
Proceedings / Novem
'ntegration into naval forces quick, 0st effective, and worthwhile.
Most attractive, however, is that the t\v ^ would require no compromise be- een respective Navy and Marine Corps tssions. Recent Navy operations have
illu
doi
etc.)
may affect the performance of high-
°*>Crati naval as we^ as amphibious
ate
would be invaluable to naval -iU«eerS in the Pers'an Gulf.3S What fu||0vv ^ Stark (FFG-31) had received a sPeed °n attach by a flotilla of high- Pa'rol boats? A salvo of ABRS
its i
Pirated that contemporary warfare ses n°t necessarily turn on the use of Jors and missiles. Commanders are Pcrating in high-tension environments, en within close range of potential f^y forces. In such a politically con- pressure situation, missiles, like ii, harpoon, may not be the most effec- "Ve weapon.
(e|^s mentioned, any number of factors JMrornagnetic pulse, sensor damage,
'ech
her survival? Unfortunately, the Cal gun has proved its inadequacy
j ns- Can the Navy afford to oper- ^ility *^e ^ersian Gulf without the capa- diq . 0 suppress coastal batteries, as it ofCouUring the Korean War?36 Missiles, ^ are capable of silencing enemy acc0 Positions, but naval gunfire can sion, y lsh the same interdiction mis- half the cost.37
'he value °f area munitions, in light of W1*"' °Perational environment, is V'vah|eaPParenl- A low-cost, highly sur- Jam^c | rocket system that cannot be
SSa
rockets packed with submunitions would have reduced such an attack force to shreds, without expending high-tech, high-cost weaponry. Even a severely damaged ship could be effective with such a system.
Consider one recent U. S. Navy mission in the Persian Gulf. The Washington Post reported on 19 April 1988 that during the 18 April attack on two Iranian oil platforms, a small force of Marines reduced one platform to “a smoking mound of twisted metal.” The attack against a second rig, however, required more than 1,000 rounds of 5-in/54-cal gunfire to accomplish the same task.19 Was this target practice, or did the mission truly require 1,000 rounds? If so, the waste of such an operation is appalling. By applying a salvo of ABRS rockets, any question of enemy defense would be eliminated, and the mission could be accomplished quickly and effectively. On a small scale, the effectiveness of this type of submunition application has been demonstrated by the Rockeye. Applied by air, the Rockeye has effectively subdued attacks by small combatants. Expanding this concept to a larger scale, the possibilities for the ABRS are great.
The problem that has plagued the development of efficient, modem naval gunfire support has been one of necessary compromise. The Marine Corps must meet its requirements to support an amphibious landing in the contemporary warfare environment, and the Navy must meet its requirements to accomplish its mission at sea. In order to support the maritime strategy, neither branch can sacrifice operational ability to support secondary missions. Although the U. S. Navy’s current gunfire capability is sorely inadequate to support successful amphibious operations, the problem can be solved. The program proposed here is simple, inexpensive, flexible, and would benefit both the Marine Corps in conducting amphibious operations and the Navy in its current missions in world “hot spots. ”4() Since the systems are flexible, they can be easily upgraded to accommodate new technologies, and will never be subject to the criticism that plagues the 5-in/54-cal gun.
'Col. Robert D. Heinl, USMC (Ret.), “The Gun Gap and How to Close It,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1965, p. 28.
2Ibid., p. 33.
3Ibid., pp. 28-29.
4Col. M. B. Darling, USMC, Head. War-fighting Requirements Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps, personal interview, 6 April 1988.
5Heinl, p. 30.
6Ibid.
7David H. Smith, “New Speed for the Spearhead,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1987, p. 43.
“Wallace M. Greene, “Navy Gun Gap Worries Marines." U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 1964, p. 146.
’’Heinl, p. 35.
'“Smith, p. 48.
'9. M. Parkinson, personal interview, 6 April 1988. '“Donald M. Weller, “Naval Gunfire Support of Amphibious Operations: Past, Present, and Future,” Dahlgren, Virginia: Naval Surface Weapons Center 1977, p. 5.
'"Ibid.
,4Ibid., p. 8.
'"Ibid.
'“■Ibid., p. 7.
17Ibid., p. 9.
'“Ibid., p. 7.
'“Ibid., p. 8.
20Ibid., p. 41.
"'Ibid., p. 9.
“M. B. Darling, “Future Technology." Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, date uncertain, p. 3. "’ibid.
"■‘Weller, p. 7.
"'Darling. “Future Technology,” p. 2.
"““Multiple Launch Rocket System," Jane’s Weapon Systems 1987-88 (New York: Jane's Publishing Co., 1987), p. 538.
""Ibid.
"“Ibid., p. 128.
"Tbid., p. 129.
“Ibid., p. 128.
"'Ibid.
“Ibid., p. 129.
“Ibid.
34Ibid., p. 128.
“Ibid., p. 129.
“Weller, p. 8.
’"Heinl, p. 30.
’“Darling interview.
39“U. S. Sinks or Cripples Six Iranian Warships,” The Washington Post, 19 April 1988, p. A22. “Darling interview.
Lieutenant Herrmann graduated from the U. S. Naval Academy in May and is now attending the Basic School, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia.
vdi
in8s / November 1988
107