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Colonel Scharfen sounded out 27 general officers about the most critical events of 1987 (good and bad) for the Corps—and why. In addition to drawing written and telephone responses to the menu at Table 1, he interviewed the directors of operations and plans at Headquarters,
U. S. Marine Corps (HQMC) for insights into directions the Corps is taking. The results were mixed . . .
It was the worst of times . . .
In 1987, a drawing of a Marine in blue dress uniform sporting a black eye appeared on the cover of Time magazine. Cover copy highlighted “Spy Scandals” and “Marine Corps Woes.”1 Inside, an article speculated on the damage incurred in the “Marine spy scandal . . . one of
the most serious sex-for-secrets exchanges in U. S. history.” Old wounds were reopened when former California congressman, former Marine, and Navy Cross recipient Pete McCloskey was quoted, “When I saw 200-plus Marines in Beirut bunched up in violation of every standard precept, I winced a lot. When I saw Ollie North I winced a lot. And Moscow. It just killed us.” Time also judged that “ . . . fairly or not, the Iranian arms Fiasco has been partly associated with the gung-ho ‘Marine mind-set’ of Oliver North and the command-and-control system of former Marines Robert McFarlane and Donald Regan.”
Evidently, articles like Time's have not cost the Marine Corps a single recruit, weapon system, manpower space, strategic commitment, or facility. But harm was done to the Corps’s most valuable asset—its reputation. No matter that the “spy scandal” proved to be something less. No matter that Lieutenant Colonel North won a host of dedicated supporters during the televised proceedings of the congressional hearings. Perceptions of deceit, incompetence, or treachery, once established, are impossible to expunge. Subsequent events sometimes vindicate the maligned, but they seldom repair the damage. Without a doubt, several events of 1987 combined to abuse the reputation of the Corps.
Reportedly, 1987 was a year when the quadrennial politicking that accompan>eS the selection of a new commandant waS
IS
I
more divisive than usual. There 'verj' many highly qualified candidates, £aC
with one or more sponsors. The coin^T dental appointment of a new Secretary 0
the Navy delayed the selection proee*s and extended the period of tension for1.
oli'
is
senior Marines. Few are privy to the p01 t tics of service chief selection, but eVen ™
fewer believe that these choices are m easily. Respondents to the polling that the name of General Alfred M- Gw emerged from a particularly difficU,s process. To quote one, “General Gray assignment—great for the Corps! My heartburn was [over] the way it was don . . . The ultimate selection [was] °u standing and the way he, General Gra)' handled it [was] truly professional, the Corps stood still for a period of ^ prior to the changing of the watch. I! [*.
ade L
k
Marine Corps] wasn’t the institution >t1
and made up of outstanding people*^ submit it may have suffered somewhat' the near term.”
In the words of another corresponding “The appointment [of General Gray] 1 not come easily. It was a result of vig0^ ous debate and political maneuvering
much of which became acrimonious.
Tint
las'
Table 1 Critical 1987 Issues Impacting on the U. S. Marine Corps (An Extract of the Menu Provided to Respondents)
►Naming of Gen. Alfred Gray as Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC)
►Resignation of John Lehman and naming of James Webb as Secretary of the Navy
►Resignation of Secretary Caspar Weinberger and naming of Secretary Frank C. Carlucci as Secretary of Defense
►Legislative/executive agreement to reduce the defense budget
►Involvement of Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North in Iran-Contra affairs, his testimony and related events
►Allegations, trials, and events relative to security at the U. S. Embassy in Moscow
►Creation of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command at Quantico
►Creation of the Marine Corps Research, Development and Acquisition Command at Quantico
►Reorganization of the Installations and Logistics Branch at Headquarters Marine Corps
►Creation of the Schools of Infantry at Camp Pendleton and Camp Lejeune
►Naming of staff NCOs to assume directorship of the three staff noncommissioned officer academies
►Reorientation of recruit training
►Activation of the Marine Security Forces Battalions
Corps became somewhat divided year.”
Reportedly, the divisiveness of the lection process was limited to the 01 senior echelons of Marines, and m0StJ/ay Washington. Once named, General Gr, quickly gained the unequivocal, enthu astic support of the Corps. l(
The year also brought bad news atn the slashing of the defense budget- Department of Defense (DoD) budget fiscal year 1989 was cut from the quested $322 billion to $292 billion cause of deficit elimination laws." Marine Corps learned from DoD cOI,1|V trailer Robert Helm that the cuts presaged things to come. For the n^s
be- 2 Thc
five years, only slight budget incr# vl> 3 IOVT flits httV
can be expected.1 The 1987 cuts been translated into an end-strength ^
duction of about 3,000 Marines. Genc^ Gray equates this to the loss of a rcn forced infantry regiment.4 In addn
the Corps’s loss of 308 officer
bille'8' |
through congressionally mandated officer reductions, impacts both on staffing and on the morale of the officer corps.
Mar' a bonafide, combat-blooded Nav'ne Was named Secretary of the chan ’ Creat'n8 a propitious climate for nitv "C' The change provided an opportu- eVe0 tum away from some of the sad spQs 1987 to a new agenda. One re- nUmLent Wrote, “To be quite frank, [the Qraer or>e event of 1987] is not A1 has^’ ^6r se hm the fact that the Corps de„a,new leader who will take it into the CDadeofthe 1990s.”
wasCsfhe the ominous portents, 1987 fan/111 a golden year for Marine Corps char ®"~7lhe last year of the funding Lehacter'stic of the Reagan-Weinberger- def„ an rejuvenation of the country’s
^nse structure.
Ued *987, the Marine Corps contin- in ;t attract the highest quality recruits it> ( a'st°ry. As one general officer put he second most important event and as °ur ahihty to continue to recruit hnes retain the proper number of Ma- caijjj’ enhsted and officer, of the highest hie < r' No matter how efficient, capa- WareUrv'Vahle, or maintainable the hard- niat„ 'S’ '* ‘s the Marine or sailor who In lqhe difference.” ship the lead amphibious assault
iaunc5 the Wasp (LHD-1) class was MrUcred’ and a contract was let for con- l0n of the USS Kearsarge (LHD- 3). These were the bright spots in an otherwise dismal picture of impending block obsolescence in the amphibious ship inventory.
It was the year of at least six noteworthy and highly successful exercises in the Fleet Marine Forces (FMF) (among them, Cold Winter—the first time a U. S. Marine Corps general commanded an allied force in Norway). The prepositioning program delivered shiploads of equipment to Norway. The maritime prepositioning ship (MPS) program matured and flourished. The night attack-capable AV-8 Harrier II made its maiden flight. The first F/A-18C came into the Marine inventory. And the Secretary of the Navy approved the refitting of the AV-8B Harrier fleet with an upgraded power plant projected to reduce maintenance costs by almost 33% while giving an additional 3,000 pounds of thrust. Two remotely piloted vehicle (RPV) companies were activated in the Fleet Marine Forces, and the initial deliveries of the air cushion landing craft (LCAC) to the Navy’s operating forces were followed by its immediate deployment with amphibious forces.
On balance, 1987 was not a bad year.
The new Commandant
Almost unanimously, respondents saw General Gray’s commandancy as good fortune for the Marine Corps. However, the opinions expressed about why it was fortunate covered a wide range.
Some voiced unrestrained enthusiasm, viewing General Gray as carrying on in the best traditions of his predecessors. Typical of this category was the comment, “The stewardship of the Marine Corps will obviously represent change. I view this as a refinement of those things that have gone before. Under General P. X. Kelley we experienced a peacetime modernization that had been unprecedented.”
Some supported General Gray without mentioning his predecessors. The most direct comment was “ ... the three greatest impact events in 1987 for the Marine Corps were Gray, Gray, and Gray.” One comment focused on accomplishments: “General Gray has assumed a no-nonsense approach to getting on with the program. Specifically, he has turned ideas which have been talked about for years into his present-day initiatives, and he’s making them happen in his first six months.”
Some implied that the Marine Corps needed General Gray’s fixing. “For the last two or three years the Marine Corps has been mired in a bureaucratic bog. The Marine Corps senior leadership became a group of programmatic thinkers whose acquisition policy appeared to be ‘How much can we get,’ rather than ‘What do we need to accomplish our mission’? We had lost our credibility, and our backing in Congress; we had alienated our senior retired community; and many in the young officer corps doubted our ability to fight. I think we had lost our uniqueness and were rapidly becoming just another military service. At the highest levels we became paranoid. What, at times, was honest criticism of our Corps, became a personal affront, and was treated as such.”
“The Marine Corps needed a ‘shaking up’ and A1 Gray has started that process. ... He is a determined, practical visionary, possessing boundless enthusiasm. With luck he could be the most important impact on the Marine Corps, not only for 1987, but for the next decade.”
Another comment, in the same vein was, “A1 Gray moved quickly to bring all elements, from retired to recruits, back into a cohesive team. I believe he was able to do this more quickly and effectively than . . . any other candidate. Most importantly, he will focus the total resources of the Corps on readiness and warfighting. This also means that in the days ahead he will focus not so much on what we can afford to do but on our mission and how best to accomplish it. We will have top-down leadership rather than management by consensus. But at the same time, A1 Gray will pay very close attention to his staff and particularly to the FMF, the CinCs and the civilian leadership.”
Some viewed the appointment of the new Secretary of the Navy and the Commandant as a single event, not necessarily overturned by Webb’s subsequent abrupt departure from office. Major General Carl Mundy, Director of Operations, HQMC, said, “Gray and Webb [came] as a package; one [complemented] the other. Mr. Webb . . . [envisioned] a lighter Marine Corps . . . lighter as much in philosophy as ... in structure. Webb’s view [was] that we were once the finest light infantry in the world (and maybe we still are) but we have been burdened with a lot of concepts and equipment and habits that tend to make us heavier. Then you bring in a commandant like General Gray who has more operational experience in the Marine Corps than anyone. . . . When you put those two together you [got] a distinct reemergence of an operational orientation to everything the Marine Corps is about to do, or is doing today.” General Mundy was one of those anxious to give credit to General Gray’s predecessor, General
Kelley, whom he characterized as being the architect of “the greatest modernization of the Marine Corps that we have ever experienced.”
Another respondent wrote, “I link these appointments, one following the other closely. And both appointees [were] very different from their predecessors. Any new CMC is important to the Corps. When one arrives declaring that ‘it is broke and I’m going to fix it,’ it has more significance than is normally the case.”
The creation of MCCDC at Quantico
General Gray’s principal legacy to the Corps may turn out to be the creation of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) at Quantico.5 Heralding a major change in the way Marines conceptualize about war, the new command was first proposed during General Kelley’s tenure as Commandant. In the words of one respondent, “ . . .an idea will be able to grow into fruition—from R&D [research and development] to fielding—all under the aegis of one command. Doctrine, tactics, techniques, and lessons learned will all be capitalized upon to bring the best gear possible to Marines on future battlefields.”
MCCDC is one of two commands being activated at Quantico. The second is the Marine Corps Research, Development, and Acquisition Command (MCRDAC). One of the general officers explains that these two new commands are “ . . . companion pieces. The great significance of these events is that the focus of all our activities will be on the MAGTF [Marine Air-Ground Task Force]. Heretofore, various barons represented the ground, air, and service support elements of the Corps. Allocation of resources between the three elements and resolution of differences occurred at the HQMC level. Reorganization will result in balanced MAGTF choices occurring long before they reach HQMC. Reorganization should also enable acquisition to be accelerated by one to three years and structure change to occur much more easily. I see the reorganization as a new emphasis on the integrity of the MAGTF and less emphasis on the separate elements of the divisions, wings, and FSSGs [force service support groups].”6
During his brief tenure as Secretary of the Navy, Marine combat veteran James Webb helped create a climate that reemphasized warrior thinking, with training to back it up—here, firing the squad automatic weapon and M-203 grenade launcher (rear).
Similarly, a general wrote, “It will take Marines (and sailors) who can and will think to develop [and] articulate the warfighting doctrine, tactics, training, concepts . . . necessary to support the Commandant’s goal(s)—MCCDC provides the vehicle and the environment. At the same time, MCRDAC provides the capability to interface material requirements determination, R&D, and acquisition.”
One senior Marine devoted his entire response to a description of MCCDC, as paraphrased here:
MCCDC is a concept to improve force structure, equipment procurement, doctrine and training decisions. It is a concept that has been brewing for years. The idea is to develop operational concepts based upon threat analysis, MAGTF enhancement, technological forecasts, current and evolving Marine Corps missions, and strategy. When the operational concepts are approved, they become part of the long- and mid-range plans. These plans are translated into changes in force structure, material procurement, doctrine and training.
Five subordinate centers are being activated at MCCDC in this reorganization:
► MAGTF Warfighting Center
► Training and Education Center
► Intelligence Center
► Wargaming Center
► Information Technology Center
The Warfighting Center is tasked to generate an integrated master plan. The responsible branch in the center will be manned by an experienced team of Ma' fines with technical expertise in command, ground combat, aviation combat- and combat service support. The master plan will be a primary source documef1 for developing programs. Service plan ning should also improve substantially-
The Warfighting Center will identity force structure and materiel require^ ments. It will also generate and catalog operational concepts, to improve comb' effectiveness. Concepts will also be go” erated by other agencies, such as the ln telligence Center, now active and grovV
ing- tiThe Wargaming Center, recently act
vated, is expected to develop quickly
over the next two years. In addition
training officers and staffs, it will he P
assess the relative effectiveness of opera
tional concepts produced by the Wat
fighting Center.
The Training and Education Cente was established this year to achieve
lrenchm,
can, ,nen[1] as “a catastrophe because we an buy everything we want, [or] . . . ^opportunity to look at everything to pC d°'n8 and see if it’s the right way pre(j-' General Mundy is upbeat and ^lcts “a leaner and sharper Corps.” optimistic general wrote that the Pact. SC
al
slash
nding
as a consequence of reduced
^csents only 1.5% of the Corps’s au- resPoH stren8th of 199,600. But this
nc^ent Stated his helief that the inpvi-
Pact
stated his belief that the inevi- reduction in manpower will
on
Wen
as
i °rPs'w>de uniformity in instructional orniation and techniques. Coordina- °n with the Warfighting Center will t-ePjl current. The Training and Educa- mj1 Neuter will be staffed with major ele- ^ the Training Department from
Information Technology Center
H0MtW°rk the centers at MCCDC with vMC, the operating forces, and the
prov°nin® establishment. It will also Lit 'de some data processing support. tj0ne |Jje Wargaming Center, the Informa- with , hnolo8y Center is embryonic, not Llrt1'.tec* capabilities at present. It will e fully capable for several years.
'J'l
-^jkclining Defense budget__________
Tk
for ■ department of Defense planned kuj3 W'f~Pcr year growth in the military for P'us funds to cover inflation—-
com ISCal years 1988 and 1989‘ The
n()u/,tl0"er °f the Defense Department j>row Predicts that a 2% annual real The may ad that can be expected, the arrned services, after seven years of (j t|ru’st generous peacetime funding in years hlStory’ are once again facing lean
Th"
Mu''!S, funding decline was General m0s. y. s second choice as the year’s Qra ,slSnificant event. He cited General choi S. v*ew’ that Marines have two Ces; They can see the funding re-
budget will cause a great im- thjnj. now and in the immediate future. I c°rnch'S 's on*y a harbinger of things to to *l ' * foresee reductions in manpower
f 10% ^1 ... ”
the s3Ct’ General Gray was the first of riel i|rVlce chiefs to announce a person3,09]"?.’ wden he revealed plans to cut rePrev. '^6ts 'n f~lscal year 1989. This cut th, closer to the financial and manpower edge than have the other services, we have fewer alternative programs from which to adjust our total dollars. I see difficult times ahead, and very few easy decisions. ...”
Several Marines called for a return to frugality in the Corps: “The Marine Corps is healthy after the budgets of the Reagan era. Modest budget reductions should not be too damaging—but they will be more painful than one might think specifically because the Marine Corps has been (relatively) wealthy so long that it has forgotten how to be frugal. Generations are short in the Marine Corps, and those Marines currently on active duty who remember how to squeeze the maximum out of each dollar are few. With leadership, the habit will return.”
Some respondents even welcomed the budget reductions, anticipating a return to a Marine Corps more devoted to fighting than to modernization and quality of life. “What will the impact be? Certainly a lot of belt-tightening up and down the line. Also, some tough programmatic choices by the leadership. But frankly, I don’t regard this austerity as being catastrophic, nor even cause for hand-wringing. While the Corps has generally made wise investments over the last eight years, let’s face it, we’ve also put on extra pounds around our waistline. These pounds need to come off fast. Also, Marines tend to thrive under adversity and hard times. ... the sooner we get back into fighting trim, the better we’ll feel about ourselves.”
We can make some safe predictions about austere defense budgets. Unless a major crisis with the Soviet Union or a hot war with a less dangerous adversary intervene, the cuts in the budget will be deep and painful for all the services. The prediction of a 10% manpower cut in the Marine Corps (nearly seven times more severe than the Corps faces in fiscal year 1988) is sobering. The welcome Marines are extending now to a leaner, more efficient Corps could be short-lived. Officer reductions will likely continue—both as a result of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings inspired budget slices, and the congressionally mandated programs. The cuts could instill a morale-sapping insecurity. General Gray, dedicated to reshaping the Corps, could become frustrated, trying to do much with little. He could run into serious problems while sorting out priorities. Nevertheless, he will have an advantage in the competition for Defense Department dollars, for he will be uniquely effective in making the meritorious case for a combat-ready Marine Corps to a supportive Congress.
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Colo
craven, or breast-beating witness.
even'
broadcasters voted it the top news
on the new Commandant’s agenda- ► The performance of Marine seen1 guards at the U. S. embassy in Mosc1 Some respondents considered the se
fron’
rity breach in Moscow as distinct
_______ _____ , ‘The American
was shocked to see a Marine charged a ,
cer who wrote,
convicted for espionage; a premeditatL,
-act've:
Other events of great significance
► Implications of the evolving national military strategy:
Of the comments identifying other significant events, Major General Michael Sheridan’s were among the most thoughtful. Reflecting his orientation as Director, Plans Division, HQMC, his first choice is the change in the U. S. national military strategy. His second choice, a derivative of the first, is the change in the focus of the Marine Corps’s mission orientation. Number three is the change in the way the Marine Corps plans for the future.
General Sheridan believes national military strategy has evolved through seven years of the Reagan administration from a limited continental strategy to a global one. In his view, it is important that the Congress now insists that the military force structure be consistent with current military strategy.
Several elements of current military strategy are important to the Marine Corps. The first is the shift of focus from the central region of Europe to a global perspective. The report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy explains it this way, “We should emphasize a wider range of contingencies than the two extreme threats that have dominated our alliance policy and force planning: the massive Warsaw Pact attack on Central Europe and an all-out Soviet nuclear attack.’’7
A second development important to the maritime services is the emphasis on power projection by ready forces, “We must diversify and strengthen our ability to bring discriminating, nonnuclear force to bear where needed in time to defeat aggression ... we will need forward deployed forces. . . . ”8 Finally, a major concern for the Marine Corps in the strategy articulated by the Commission is that “ . . .we should, for the near term, accept a greater risk of the unlikely extreme attack [read war with the Warsaw Pact] in order to bring about a reduced risk of the more probable conflicts . . . [read low intensity conflict].”9
General Sheridan says that this global approach equates to a maritime strategy— “Maritime is a code word for global.” Our strengths and weaknesses in the Central Region are no mystery to the Soviets. What keeps them off balance, according to General Sheridan, are uncertainties about what the United States is capable of doing in other parts of the world. This uncertainty encourages deterrence, the bedrock of contemporary U. S. national strategy.
General Sheridan credits former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman with making a major contribution to the articulation of the current strategy, with its emphasis on global-maritime perspectives. He credits former Secretary Webb and General Gray with changing the Marine Corps orientation to better support the national military strategy. He contends that the Marine Corps cannot afford to be an armor-heavy force, structured to fight the war in Europe’s central region, and a light, mobile force in readiness with a global orientation. He does not believe that the nation needs a second land army. Conversely, he challenges the wisdom of the Army’s initiative to create light infantry divisions—a second Marine Corps. He interprets the Commandant’s guidance to mean that the Marine Corps should focus on two principal mis-
The affair of Sergeant Clayton Lonetree and the Marine security guards in Moscow generated a great deal of smoke with relatively little fire. But even smoke damage is hard to clean up.
sions: their support of land campaigns associated with naval operations; and their role as an expeditionary force-inreadiness, prepared to engage in low- intensity conflict. The reinvigoration of this second role is evident in the return to the pre-Vietnam designation of Marine Expeditionary Forces (and Brigades and Units): MEFs, MEBs and MEUs— instead of Marine Amphibious Forces: MAFs, MABs and MAUs.10
General Sheridan also contends that Marines needed a more responsive service-planning process to support the contemporary strategy (given the congressional mandate that force structure should reflect national strategy) and the consequent reorientation of the Marine Corps. The old service planning system was outmoded. A new process was first defined by the Marine Corps in 1986 and came of age in 1987." It will support—and be supported by—the newly organic MCCDC at Quantico. The final produc of the new service-planning system v/l be the campaign plan, which is intende to integrate all the elements involved in preparing the Marine Corps to fight- ► The Lieutenant Colonel North Iran Contra affair:
Forget the logic or justice of tn matter—the Marine Corps—as well aS Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North—"aS being judged by the American public dut ing the televised congressional hearing in the summer of 1987. The potential damage to the Corps was great. Imagin the impact if North had been a timorou5.
nel North’s ethical conduct as a staff°^' cer is a different issue—one that will argued as long as we have a public c° science. The nub of the matter is that t ^ Marine Corps survived the potential f°r serious blow to its image because of1 superior performance of Colonel North a witness, under difficult circumstanccsj
After conversations with the §ene^, public, General Mundy believes m®, Ollie North enhanced the public image; ® the Marine Corps. “The impact of 011 North on the public perception of ^ rines has been, by and large, favorab 2 People generally kind of think of 0 * North as a hero. I’m not judging what did—whether or not he served his cod'1 try well—that’s not the point.” . e
It was a surprise to find so few ot1 respondents identifying this event ^ being most significant. It was certainly a important news story. A poll of AsS°C.j ated Press member newspaper editors af
of 1987.12 Perhaps the denigration of' ^ event by the respondents comes frort* perception that, even though Oltv^ North is a Marine, the event was no Marine Corps issue. The event was "^ rooted in the Corps and made small 1 ^ pact upon it. Perhaps the respond^ wanted to forget the issue and get to w°
irity
O^'
the North affair. Others combined ^ two events, viewing them as comtn threats to the reputation of the Mar‘-_ Corps. In the first category was the o breach of security.” Another off* wrote, “Like everyone, Marine—aC*' j reserve or retired, I was disappointed a dismayed with the disclosures that *
Ineptitude
can be overlooked by the pub-
but
sPying and lying are not in the
exter
Ver
vice
^eared in the newspaper and elsewhere ^garding our Marines stationed in Mos- n°W' As these events unfolded, it appears i y t'le situation was not as serious as ofl la|ly believed. The great significance bis, it appears to me, is that ... the J®at majority of the American people 1 not know that the net result was not tuSerious as we initially thought. Unfor- mnate|y, some segments of the news e 'a, both print and electronic, chose to
aH a major requirement to assure among an0Ur Marines that personal integrity is Th^l Part of our professional lives, bott 'S tfUe ^rom very t0P t0 tbe very p 0m our Marine Corps and the im- an ■ance °f personal conduct needs to be . ltlIegral part of all our leadership train® ln years to come.”
Mm'h °n^ respondents who paired the evean<^ tb° Marine security guard (j0ats as a single issue, one wrote, “The barrn^aM slide started with the Beirut 'aent S Probing in which we looked l°ok 7and ln aftermath of which we Crat^ ■ however unfairly, like bureaucovering up. A certain amount of
lie
realm
°f *. 1 acceptable conduct for members
We\ || Corps d' elite that the public (and obSeebeve our Corps to be—and my lieVerVat’on ls t*lat most Americans be- lvin wever unfairly, that spying and happened.”
sine] . er wh° saw the two events as a ''city6 *SSUe wrote’ “Both involved pub- litt|eW^*ch we didn’t need; both put a affaj on our colors. The [Moscow there * believe is working itself out, fire Was some smoke but apparently no should',' ln the [North episode] he the ■ 0 1 ^ave been allowed to remain in his |)SSl®nment so long [that] it went to a\vayea(?' Perhaps ... we have to do with homesteading.” the J|ri.nes cou'c* become paranoid about Cow 6ff 3 reaction to the North and Mos- Setyjaairs- After all, haven’t the other n age Si Proc*uced their share of espio- aligg' ■ Why were there so few media dexfPr.10ns ^at Rear Admiral John Poin- s malfeasance or courage (how- view it) reflected upon his ser- °n th F naVa* Prociivities?14 We all know, is nel°ther band' that the Marine Corps tinfaj,. S ^*arines often complain about s°niet' treatment by the press—
rineslm<-eS Wlt*1 justification. But if Ma- sufler from the pens of the press,
the suffering is, more often than not, self- inflicted. Great institutions commit suicide more frequently than they are slain by their adversaries.
► Basic infantry training:
One would suspect that if senior Marine staff NCOs had been included in the formal request for comments in this poll that General Gray’s 1987 initiatives on a “return to the future”—making every Marine a basic infantryman again— would have ranked higher. Throughout the Marine Corps, staffs and commanders are working to implement the Commandant’s basic warrior training (BWT) program. The agenda calls for modifying recruit training to emphasize weapon familiarization and field operations. The plan is to send all recruit graduates to an infantry school before entering specialization training. The essential subjects tests are being revised to reflect this emphasis on infantry skills. Enlisted weapon familiarization will run across the board, including all weapons found in the infantry battalion. The emphasis is on combat skills rather than fixed-range firing. Women will be included in all phases of BWT.
General Gray described the Marine of the future as a “commando—by anybody’s definition.”15 The commando Marine will be skilled in all the combat arts.
One respondent wrote that BWT "includes not only the reorientation of recruit training, but the follow-on training at the School of Infantry, plus unit training. . . . There are a lot of ancillary parts to this that will also have a dramatic effect not only on our new Marines but the current crop of NCOs, SNCOs, and officers. I was one of those . . . that never was happy with our drift away from the basic premise that every Marine is a rifleman. . . . Boot camp . . . has always been tough and demanding both physically and mentally, and I am convinced over the years has turned out a good basic Marine. It was after boot camp that we
Despite severe budgetary pressures, the MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft (here, prototype under construction) survived; Marines envision it replacing today’s helicopters on tomorrow’s expanded battlefield.
appeared to lose the bubble. Now the Commandant has opened the opportunity to . . . make our good Marine a better Marine. We have always said we could march farther, shoot straighter, and fight better than anyone else. Now we are going to add action to words.”
► The V-22 Osprey aircraft:
The survival of the tilt-rotor Osprey aircraft as the replacement for the medium helicopter won a few votes as being the year’s most significant event. “The second major . . . impact in 1987 was our ability to keep the MV-22 program alive. ... I believe the sophistication of the modern battlefield will be such that helicopters forward of the FEBA [forward edge of the battle area] will be a testy matter. Further, helicopters, all with relatively short ranges, will not perform well on tomorrow’s expanded battlefield. These shortcomings, combined with today’s major problem of getting Marine aircraft to the battle, cry for a worldwide, self-deployable aircraft that fits the MPF [Maritime Prepositioning Force] concept. An aircraft that possesses the ‘legs’ to maneuver on the wider and deeper battlefield. An aircraft, if you consider speed alone, that will survive longer than the helicopter. I believe the MV-22 type aircraft is a major technological step that will be a necessity in the next few years, and will someday be ranked with radar and the helicopter as a change that altered warfare.”
► The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986;
Two respondents named the 1987 implementation of the Defense Reorganization Act as their nominee for most significant event. The Act, which is to
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“ . . . reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen civilian authority”16 dramatically changes the relationships and lines of authority between the Chairman and the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense and the President. Title IV (Joint Personnel Policy) of the Act particularly concerns the respondents for its creates and insulates a new career pattern for professional officers, the “joint specialty.”
Title IV could be one of the most debilitating legislative mandates ever to affect the United States professional officer corps. It was passed into law without benefit of an in-depth analysis of the impact that it could have on overall officer requirements and assignment patterns of the services. Only now are some of the services able to project the effect that it will have on officer personnel management and it isn’t good. The General Accounting Office has made an initial study of what can be expected of the provisions of Title IV and reported to the House Armed Services investigations subcommittee that implementing the provisions of Title IV “would significantly alter the consecutive time officers spend away from war-fighting assignments.”17 Title IV has the potential for emasculating the services by siphoning off the best years of the best officers to joint staff duties at the expense of the operating forces. The legislation requires the management of assignment patterns for officers to accommodate joint service at the expense of other priorities.
Congress has the priorities wrong. Joint service needs should not drive the system—command of operational units should. The legislation may not generate a new breed of “lounge lizard” (a fear attributed to former Secretary of the Navy Lehman), but it will make it much more difficult to give the men and women in the operating forces the quality of leadership they deserve.
Reflections
The results of this poll tell more about the current state of the Marine Corps than they do about the future—or even the past. Whether or not the respondents got it right in selecting the most significant events of 1987 doesn’t matter; only future generations will be able to sort that out. What emerges as important are the respondents’ reactions to recent events. Tomorrow’s historians will probably find many of these choices well off target and ask, “How could those professionals of 1987 possibly miss the significance of the remotely piloted vehicle, robotics, or the performance of the infantryman’s surface-to-air missile against helicopters in Angola, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan- Couldn’t they foresee the impact of directed energy weapons on the battlefield- How could they have possibly overlooked the explosive situation in Latin America?”
And, patient reader, how could these officers fail to adequately apprecia^ some of those momentous events you or may have identified? Whatever y°ur choice and evaluation of events, the year 1987 was a big one for the Marine Corps- It was turbulent. It brought despair an hope. It brought shame and gM' Mostly, however, 1987 was a year of ^ surgence and rededication to what tn American public expects from Marines^" a professional corps of warriors.
'Time, 20 April, 1987, p 14.
2Jone’s Defence Weekly, 16 January 1988, p 4 2New York Times, 20 January 1988, p 20 4Washington Times, 20 January 1988, p A-4 ^
5For a good description of the creation of Me see: Gen A.M. Gray, ‘‘Establishment of the Ma^ Corps Combat Development Command,” ^arl Corps Gazette, December, 1987, p 8. .q
6For a good description of the creation of MCRU see: BGen Robert J. Winglass, ‘‘The Corps’ New Command, MCRDAC, Activated,” Marine Con Gazette, January, 1988, p 10.
7Fred C. Ikle and Albert Wohlstetter, et al., criminate Deterrence, Report of The Commissi°n Integrated Long-Term Strategy,” January 1988. 8Ibid, p 2.
9Ibid, p 3.
10Ibid, pp 68-69. i of
"See Weeks and Pelli, ‘‘A More Purple Shade ^ Green” Proceedings, November 1987, p- 33 °r good, detailed description of this new planning Pr ess and its evolution.
12Washington Times, 29 December 1984, p A3- "The Army’s Sergeant Daniel Richardson and ^ Navy’s Walker family ring come immediately mind. ,g
"One of the few analyses of Admiral Poindex1^ conduct that equated it to propensities character1 of the sailor by retired Army Colonel Harry G* mers, Jr., see; ‘‘An Army Man Won’t Be The ^ Cannon’ Poindexter Was,” Los Angeles Tinted November 1987, Metro Section, Part 2, p 7*
15 Washington Post, 20 January 1988, p A-21- l6Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Re°r. ,f nization Act of 1986, Public Law 99-433—1 Octo 1986, Title IV—Joint Officer Personnel Policy-^ ^ "Rick Maze, ‘‘Officer Career Paths May HaVl|ie Change,” Navy Times, 15 February 1988, p 13- testimony before the subcommittee is credite ^ Louis J. Rodrigues, GAO’s associate director f°r tional security. Subcommittee aide Archie ^ Q\\ challenged the results of the GAO analysis sinc ^ was based on a sample of career paths of °n ^ officers.
____________________________ ; deg1
from Stanford University and a master’s degree international relations from Georgetown Univer* He was a member of the Secretary of the Navy s cial study panel on progress of the war in Sout Asia; a lecturer on Pacific strategy; general war P ncr for Europe on the staff of U. S. Comman Chief, Europe; and a lecturer at the U. S. Joint ^ College. He is a senior scientist at TITAN Syst^. ^ Inc. in Vienna, Virginia, and sits on the Board o Marine Corps Historical Foundation.
[1] foxhole strength of the FMF ||iari(j" as slow down some of the Com- chani>ant s innovative, and needed there .at Quant'co and HQMC. Though $Dbs[.Wl11 be a fight, dollar cuts mean of qu 'nability reductions and a decrease Marina lty °f life improvements for the ductie ar|d his family. These budget re- e()rps>r^ WH1 be particularly hard on the ecause we have always worked