The U.S. Navy

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budgeting Antisubmarine Warfare

I ^ Borman Polmar, Editor, The Ships and Aircraft of the U. S. Fleet

The Department of Defense’s decision 5y up 16 Navy frigates became a cause j^elebre for then-Secretary of the Navy ^at>ies Webb. The loss of these 16 ships ^ornpleted from 1964 to 1967) has been ; us preventing the Navy from reach- ⁿ§ the planned 600-ship fleet, hut the decision to drop 16 frigates ui have far more impact than affecting a . ^Ple, in some respects meaningless, aling of certain categories of ships. _c‘^lese frigates (see Table 1) have signifi- i ^.^nt antisubmarine capabilities. All these • Sates possess high-powered sonars and ^ °f them have SH-2F LAMPS-I heli- , P'ur facilities. Their loss will reduce by _n^most 14% the number of frigates in the f^6et’ and by 7% the number of ASW sur- ^Ce combatants in the fleet.¹ According to retired Admiral Isaac

Kidd, a veteran destroyer officer, “num­bers make the difference in antisubmarine warfare."^[1] Kidd’s statement is supported by an analysis of ASW operations in both World Wars. Despite being able to read some German U-boat communications and having organized convoys early in World War II, the Allies could not turn the tide against the German submarines until March 1943 when large numbers of ASW ships and aircraft became avail­able.

The current U. S. Chief of Naval Op­erations, Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost, has declared: “One warfare mission area of vital importance, in which the chal­lenge of the future is particularly intense, is ASW. . . . continued advances in the quality of [the Soviet submarine] force lead me to rank ASW as my central war­fighting concern.”^[2]

The announced loss of the frigates, however, was but the harbinger of a num­ber of DoD budget decisions that will reduce turther the U. S. Navy’s effective­ness in antisubmarine warfare. These DoD budget moves involve program ter­minations, delays in new starts, and de­ferrals.

DoD terminated the naval airship (blimp). While the airship program was intended primarily to provide a fleet air/ missile defense warning, it also had po­tential for ASW. Terminating the blimp project represents only a small amount- $197 million-of the Navy’s $7 billion budget reduction.

The delays in starting new programs center on ASW: the low-cost sonobuoy, the passive-signal monitoring system, the

Table 2 Budget Authority Fiscal Year 1989 (Current Year $ Billions)

Source: Department of Defense

FY 1989 Real Growth Since 1988

Original                                       Revised

FY 1989                                       FY 1989

WEAR

THE

OFFICIAL

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ASW variant of the V-22 Osprey tilt- rotor aircraft, and a new warhead for the Mk-50 torpedo. These moves offer sav­ings of $26 million in research and devel­opment and $67 million in procurement.

All but one of the approved Navy pro­grams that were deferred involve ASW: the Mk-48 advanced capability torpedo, Mk-50 lightweight torpedo, and the ver­tical-launch antisubmarine rocket. These account for $238 million in current pro­curement. (The other program delay in­volved the advanced air-to-air missile, with $57 million planned for future re­search and development.)

Several other Navy ASW-related pro­grams may be at risk because of the prob­able defense spending reductions in the post-Reagan era. For example, the Navy is planning to procure a new, long-range maritime patrol/ASW aircraft beginning in fiscal year 1990. This successor to the P-3 Orion is designated now to be the long-range air ASW-capable aircraft (LRAACA). According to a recent Con­gressional Budget Office report, “A delay of the LRAACA program may prove necessary. Some analysts have ar­gued that the three-year development program is too short and that the Navy has not developed a clear plan for its long-range ASW aircraft needs.”^{[3] 2 * [4]}

Also, based on the current carrier air wing composition—ten fixed-wing ASW aircraft (now S-3 Viking) per ship—the Navy will have a shortfall of at least 44 aircraft by 1994.^[5] There seem to be three solutions:

► The S-3 Viking production line, closed since 1978, could be reopened.

► The V-22 Osprey could be developed and produced in an ASW configuration.

►  A new antisubmarine “vehicle” could be developed for use with U. S. aircraft carriers.

However, the possibility of any of these actions occurring in the near term is doubtful.

Similarly, two major ASW-related ship programs may encounter further dif­ficulties. The Congress has demonstrated a lack of enthusiasm for both the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) and Seawolf (SSN-21) classes. All funding in the fiscal year 1988 budget for the construction of three destroyers was deleted by Congress and construction of the lead ship now is at least 16 months behind schedule.

The SSN-21 project continues to be criticized, with a series production cost of $1.2 billion per submarine now being discussed openly in Washington. The fu­ture of the SSN-21 program is unclear, since the lead ship contract has not been awarded yet, and Congress is funding ^a large submarine technology research e fort by the Defense Advanced Researc Projects Agency.

It is difficult to find solutions to the budget dilemma. As noted in Table 2, the Navy/Marine Corps is taking the larges relative cuts in the fiscal year 1989 bu get. Despite publicity about rebuilding the fleet, according to Admiral Trost, t e Navy has had less real program g^roW' during the 1980-89 Defense recovery than the other services:^[6]

Annual real Change program share of Do growth resources^

Navy/Marine

Corps           3.1%       —3.1%

Army             3.3%       +°-⁶%

Air Force      4.8%       +2-' ^c__

While the Navy is representing U- interests in the Persian Gulf and ^contl” ing major deployments in the Medrte nean, Atlantic, and Pacific areas, operating budgets cannot be reduced eh ily. Rather, the post-Reagan adminis ^ tion probably will continue to cut t^u for research and development, and procurement. Force levels will su also, probably affecting more the tn dane, dedicated-ASW forces, particin¹¹^ the lowly frigates, rather than the ^stra gic or carrier forces. Such a trend co be dangerous, however, especially view of the other reductions in A related programs. While the ten Gat (FF-1040) and six Brooke (FFG-1)'^C _t frigates have limited capabilities ag^a ₍ modem, high-speed, deep-diving ^4>°_vj_et submarines, the majority of the undersea fleet consists of older su ^ rines that these ships probably ^c° counter for many years.