NavAir, Coming of Age in ASW

This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected.  Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies.  Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue.  The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.

The Chief of Naval Operations has es- ^at3Hshed antisubmarine warfare (ASW) ^as the Navy’s highest priority warfare ?^rea- That offers a challenge to every ' avy warfare community, but since the to modem ASW is coordinated oper- ^atl°ns, it offers a special challenge to j!^aval aviation. That’s because the real ®^rce multiplier in coordinated ASW is ^ae aircraft.

It ₈ ,

Aviation is, in fact, the linchpin in modem ASW; it will be that way in the future too. The well-documented expan­sion of the Soviet undersea force with its constantly improving use of technology makes the submarine the most insidious and difficult foe at sea today. Without a modern, well-coordinated, combined arms effort, an effort in which air plays a major role, the U. S. Navy cannot prevail in the ASW war. If it cannot prevail in the ASW war, it cannot prevail at sea.

Naval aviation’s role as the principal force multiplier is true for both area and battle group ASW. In either case, it is the aircraft that provides the speed and range to respond to cueing, the mobility to re­spond to changes in scenario, and the flexibility and sustainability to provide weapons in numbers adequate to fight the ASW war.

Response to Cueing: Modern ASW depends on cueing: some sort of indica­tion that a submarine is in a given area of reasonable dimension. Broad open-ocean search by uncued ASW platforms is inef­ficient and ineffective. Operations at sea have repeatedly proved this point. But cues of any sort become rapidly less use­ful as they age. The speed and range of aircraft, whether launched from ship or shore, can follow up on cues when they are fresh and most useful. This allows for rapid prosecution at long distance, espe­cially when the cues are fragmentary and of short duration. The faster the prosecu­tion platform arrives on station, the greater the probability of localization and the less time, effort, and resources re­quired to develop an attack solution.

The Real Force Multiplier: The ability to respond to cues at range with speed is not, however, the only attribute that makes the aircraft the real force multi­plier. Aviation extends and improves the capacity and effectiveness of the surface ship and the submarine. The aircraft:

► Allows for the rapid sequencing of tar­gets in high-density area operations, par­ticularly in the early stages of a war

►  Facilitates rapid elimination of false contacts without undue expenditure of

A tight, combined ASW effort safe­guards the entire battle group. The LAMPS-III’s breakaway mobility enables the group to prosecute con­tacts quickly and effectively at much less risk to the host platform.

of

m°^st

placeable, redeployable, and, m

the system. It provides its associan tie group the organic capability to P¹

ir°s⁶' at

tion, forcing him to look visually ³ electronically more often. This w* ^

Aviation is the lynchpin in modern ASW, providing the force multipliers that improve the effectiveness of both ships and subs. Clockwise: The car­rier-based S-3 Viking (here dropping a Mk-46 Torpedo) and the new §H-60F Seahawk, and the frigate/ cruiser-based SH-2F Seasprite LAMPS-I.

costly weapons. (The experiences of World War II and, more recently, the Falklands Conflict make this point.)

►  Increases the range from the battle group at which a submarine can be effec­tively prosecuted. This adds an important measure of survivability to high-value units, especially against cruise-missile submarines. This pouncer ability also forces the enemy to change his calcula­tion in developing his targeting solution.

►  Can conduct crucial command, con­trol, and communications simultaneously with ASW while the main battle force remains relatively covert. This is a vital factor in denying the enemy good positioning or targeting information.

►  Is the most survivable and reloadable attack platform. In a war of attrition against a numerically superior submarine force, survivability of U. S. ships and submarines is critical. As the enemy sub­marine becomes quieter, surface and sub­surface engagements will occur at closer range and at higher risk. Aircraft are not only less vulnerable, but they are also more replaceable. Moreover, they are easily reloadable. This is vitally impor­tant in war when weapon expenditure rates will be high and submarine and sur­face ship reloading will become most dif­ficult.

Scenario Response and Tactical Flexi­bility. Speed, maneuvering, and decep­tion are important battle group ASW op­tions. The ability to maneuver high-value units away from datum or cues at high speed is crucial to battle group survival. Only the aircraft can reposition its sen­sors in time to cover the constantly changing limiting lines of approach as the battle group maneuvers or varies speed. Other threats or revised missions may also force the battle group to maneuver with little notice. Because force levels rarely allow for full, 360-degree cover­age, the battle group must have ASW platforms that are highly maneuverable and redeployable in order to concentrate forces in areas of greatest vulnerability.

Moreover, modem oceanography is on the verge of being able to provide the fleet accurate, discrete, predictive infor­mation about ocean dynamics. When such information about ocean fronts, streams, and eddies is combined with acoustic models, the battle force com­mander will be able to maneuver his force and position his sensors to maximize their usefulness. That may prove difficult with relatively slow-moving surface and sub­surface platforms, but the inherent mobil­ity and flexibility of aircraft provide the opportunity to take full advantage of such developing concepts.

Area ASW and Campaign Flexibility: In area ASW—particularly in the early days of any war—tracking, trailing, or marking a very high percentage of at-sea enemy submarines is vital, both as a sig­nal to the enemy and as the initial step in winning the first strike. In many areas, the submarine will be the best platform to conduct continuous tracking. The subma­rine, however, is severely limited in the number of units it can track simultane­ously. Unless the targets are conveniently in proximity, tracking more than one is ships in good ASW waters have also demonstrated a substantial tracking capa­bility. But surface ships, unfortunately- are also severely limited in the number o targets they can track simultaneously- Aviation squadrons, on the other han<J

many separately employable units, ³ squadron can be employed simultanO' ously on many targets, sequentially °ⁿ several widely separated targets, or con tinuously on a few targets. In addin⁰’’’ aircraft can often surprise an enemy ^sU marine, a capability not usually avails⁰ to a surface platform. This tactical fie^xl bility provides the fleet commander M a variety of options as he positions to '^vin the first strike or to send a strong dete^f rent message.

In addition, aircraft are rapidly ^re

ASW scenarios, highly survivable. Eve in contested areas, speed, randornn^eS ’ and early warning give the aircraft a ^sur vivability edge. Even if a potential ene ) should develop a counter-ASW aircr weapon of some sort, emerging techn ogy and tactics will likely afford the a craft reasonable safety into the foresee able future.            j_n

Adaptability also counts heavily- ASW the sensor system is generally ¹ more important to keep updated than the platform. As the threat gets q^u’^et® ’ our sensors must keep pace with ene progress. Generally, the aircraft is ^eaS to upgrade than are ships and subman⁰^ Moreover, aircraft can be converted repaired one at a time. This ensures re iness and makes it unnecessary to p^ut. entire tactical unit out of comrm^sS during retrofit or overhaul.  _p. j

Recent Battle Group Experience'- r experience with the LAMPS-III ^{as an} ' j tegral part of the SQQ-89 integ^ra^_g sonar system confirms much °t above. The SQR-19 towed-array ^s)'^st j affords the surface fleet dramatic³^ improved capability in acoustic A but it is the LAMPS aircraft that nj

ated ⁰³¹

£>* ''“P ^v“~ ^ to“***'-                                                                                          ------ J

cute contacts quickly and effective’)^ much less risk to the host platform- introduction of the SH-60F will ^ battle group a greatly improved ^aC.^, acoustic dimension as well. This proved capacity will greatly comp¹¹^ the enemy’s approach and attack ^s ,

ally ^31,0

will i”'

crease the opportunity for non-ae°⁰ . detection. Aviation’s altitude advan makes the aircraft uniquely suite non-acoustic ASW, and its speed ag

ASW capability aircraft), to be selected later this summer. The LRAACA will have improved range, payload, and time on station capabilities.

Such programs have led to the ever- increasing involvement of naval aviation in ASW. By 1990, 40% of all naval avia­tors will be involved with ASW and 38.5% of all naval aircraft will have ASW as a primary mission. This commit­ment is costly and forces hard choices. Naval aviation’s leading priorities have been and will be control of the air and placing ordnance on target. These must remain the primary objectives. Nonethe­less, these roles cannot be fulfilled with­out a serious commitment to ASW. That commitment is important and growing, and will be pervasive throughout U. S. naval aviation.