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Events in the Persian Gulf demonstrate how strikingly inadequate the Navy’s present state of mine warfare readiness is. The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Surface Warfare stated recently that “no element of our Navy is as deficient in capability against the threat as is the mine countermeasures force.” According to former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, Navy minesweeping “absorbed more effort with less effect” than any other shipbuilding program. A London Times headline succinctly summarized: “U. S. Navy Incompetence Dramatized by Mine Foul-Up.” In the face of such commentary only a masochist would wish to rehash the melancholy detail of the mine warfare program, which in any case has been widely spotlighted in the press. Suffice it to note that an assistant secretary of the Navy estimates that the catch-up program will take five years.
For the future, mine warfare will remain a threat, intensified by the integration of world economies. Soviet mine warfare capability is impressive. The Soviet Union also enjoys the strategic advantages of a central geographic position, and as an autarchic continental power it is less vulnerable to economic blockade than the West. Conversely, to the extent that the Soviet Union must use the sea it is extremely vulnerable to strategic and tactical blockade. NATO strategies have become ever more time sensitive. A repetition of the World War 1 closure of U. S. ports for a week or more will be unacceptable—and the Soviets have significantly greater mining capability than Germany ever possessed, as well as a base less than a hundred miles from our shores. Increased U. S. dependence on imports increases our vulnerability to mine warfare, as does the trend toward fewer and larger merchant ships. Fleet dispersal increases the number of ports we must protect front mining.
As for correctives, national security demands we do no less than restore the mine warfare program to that of a first-class naval power. This is surely no easy task, but if we recognize its importance and ensure strong leadershtp it can be done. While the Navy overhauls the present program, it should devote some time to vigorously examining its plans and policies for mine
A Minestruck Navy Forgets Its History
Mine warfare has been used since the earliest days ot sea power. The primary objective is denial: a belligerent sows mines to deny his foe the use of certain maritime areas. Except in limited cases, destroying the foe’s ships is incidental to denying him that use of the seas.
Alexander the Great’s siege of Tyre in the fourth century B.C. is probably the prototypical example of mine warfare. The Phoenicians frustrated Alexander’s attempts to seize their island port by strewing the surrounding shallows with large boulders. The Greeks swept these obstacles and proceeded to assault and level the city and to slaughter the population.
Alexander’s successors experimented with current-borne Greek fire mines, which were occasionally effective against wooden structures. Mostly, however, fire ships, block ships, booms, and chains satisfied the denial requirements. The advent of explosives added the bomb ship to this inventory, and by the early 17th century naval powers were ordering a variety of crude water-compatible explosive antiship devices.
It fell to Americans David Bushnell and Robert Fulton to apply burgeoning late 18th-century technology to mine warfare. Between them they devised such wonders as workable submarines, operational marine mines (also called torpedoes, the two terms being interchangeable until the end of the 19th century), the screw propeller, and the steamship.
Both men’s schemes required bringing the mine to the target and affixing it thereto—a chancy operation, but one stil used with limpet mines. Bushnell subsequently devised a c011 tact fuze which, fitted to powder-laden beer kegs, produced the first floating mine. His devices did minor damage to the British and induced some panic. The age of mine warfare ha dawned and with it, a seething antipathy to the form among the vested interests of the great naval powers. This reaction was responsible for Fulton’s failure to attract interest in his remarkable (and functional) devices in England and France- Resignedly, he returned to the United States and invented the steamboat. (Entrenched naval bureaucracies didn’t care tor that idea either.)
Although the Americans’ use of mines in 1812 had no great effect on the war, it did keep mine warfare alive. By the 1840s inventors had devised truly effective mechanisms for contact firing and remote electrical firing from shore, transforming mine warfare into what it is today. Forerunners of modern defensive minefields were the Prussians’ defense of Kiel in 1848 and Russia’s heavy use of mines in the BaK* and Sevastopol during the Crimean War.
Admiral David Farragut’s stirring battle cry—“Damn the torpedoes! Full speed ahead!”—commemorates the role ot mines in the Civil War. Tactical daring notwithstanding,
Almost a century ago, Alfred Thayer ahan decried the technological fixa- ns of American naval officers. Long .^ars later Admiral Elmo Zumwalt entified a similar fixation on the ‘Navy’s three “unions”—air, surface, j submarine. He noted that “no un- ns have a vested interest in mines,
'yarfare across the board, including hose for offensive mining. Finally, the Scfutiny should include the status of ^ming and of war reserve assets, and a ^evaluation of NATO plans.
Lasting effects will depend on cor- feeting problems of structure and, more lmP°rtant, of attitudes. These attitudes are best described as “fixations.” Professional naval officers under- andably do not like mines. Mines are reacherous; they threaten dominant sea P°Wers and the vested interests within 0se powers. Mine warfare is hard, lrty, tedious, and usually dangerous 0rk. Active-duty naval officers see it as *he province of the reserves, an un- lrriPortant assignment in peacetime that uPposedly offers little potential for Promotion. One way to revise this atti- is to recognize that probably no- nere else can young officers learn °re basic seamanship, face more criti- a leadership problems, and attain f°mmand earlier than in the mine torces.
which have no bridges for captains to pace on.” Being nonunion, mine warfare is not effectively represented in budget deliberations. It is split among the three unions, and because everyone is responsible, no one is.
Two fixations are so similar that we can call them twin dilemmas. The first is that the types of forces required in war and those required in peacekeeping can be competitive. The second is the dilemma planners face in deciding whether to prepare for the most dangerous possibility or the most probable but perhaps less threatening one. It is natural to err on the side of safety—to protect against the most dangerous threat rather than the less dangerous but more probable one, like a householder who obsessively installs lightning rods while termites eat away his house. In the Persian Gulf, we see the consequences of failing to strike the proper allocation of assets.
Military officers are often accused of a fixation upon military solutions. That may or may not be the case, but we should remember that force is not always the wisest expedient. We can and should turn as well to a whole range of international conventions governing mining, terms of blockades, and the rights of belligerents and neutrals. Popular regard for the efficacy of international law may be low, but it might be surprising to see what options Judge Advocate General Corps’ lawyers and Law of the Sea specialists might develop for the Persian Gulf situation. It might even stimulate some international cooperation.
The air-transportable minesweeping helicopter is an example of a final fixation—the search for a “free lunch” in the form of inexpensive security. Any minesweeping sailor who has sweated out that first pass through a suspected minefield considers the minesweeping helo a godsend. It is so good we tend to overlook its drawbacks. The first is that air transport is not always available when needed to lift the helicopters to the operating area, and when it is available an appropriate place to land may not exist. Operationally, helicopters have relatively limited endurance and heavy maintenance requirements, and are vulnerable to many weather conditions and weapons. Crew stress is high. Land- or ship-based support requirements are extensive, irrespective of the helo’s air transportability.
The Navy should use helicopters to the greatest extent possible, but for now they will have to be part of an air-sea team.
These, then, are some of the “fixations” and misperceptions that have
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^federate mines did significant damage at Mobile Bay and °ulq have done more had they not been overaged. The l ath’s mining effort was well planned and directed; its main dlllng was lack of resources. The Confederates employed Verything from simple updates of Bushnell’s kegs to 2,000- ,°Und, steel-bodied, electrically fired giants. Mines sunk or
dam;
War,
aged four Confederate and 33 Union ships during the
d'wo minings of note occurred amidst the considerable ®Val growth of the late 19th century. In 1887, a Russian j lrie sank a Turkish monitor in the Danube. A second inci- sent had much more resounding historical effect, the more so ^nce the mine’s existence is questioned. In 1898, the U. S. satt|eship Maine sank in Havana harbor following an explo- °a attributed to a Spanish mine.
.hat 19th-century developments presaged, the 20th century t1Vered. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 featured ex- ^Hsive minelaying around Port Arthur by both combatants.
' nce this occurred in international waters strong international
def
reaC(
Plo:
ion ensued. In some cases, mining ignited magazine ex-
s>ons in which battleships seemed to vanish in the split- c°nd flash of a massive detonation, stimulating rumors of
aes°me super-weapons. Losses to mines on both sides Counted to three battleships, five cruisers, four destroyers,
Ur lesser craft, and numerous damaged vessels. In fact, a lr|e casualty may have foreordained the outcome of the war. cITI>ral Stepan Osipovich Makarov—who some historians °nsider the most competent Russian naval officer of the pe-
riod—died when his flagship struck a mine during a sortie to engage an attacking Japanese force. Russian naval morale never recovered.
Germany and England heeded the events of the Yellow Sea, and with the outbreak of war in 1914 both undertook strategic and tactical mining on a large scale. Britain used minefields to establish war zones that required most North Atlantic shipping and all sailings to the Baltic to enter British ports for clearance and routing, assuring British control of shipping in the area.
Probably the greatest impact of mines, however, was psychological. The memory of Port Arthur was still fresh in Europe, and the British believed German doctrine relied heavily upon mines, torpedoes, and submarines to counterbalance English numerical superiority. Commander in Chief of the Grand Fleet Admiral Sir John Jellicoe advised his Admiralty superiors of these apprehensions and in a remarkable letter avowed his intention not to be drawn into a tactical trap baited by the apparent retirement of the German fleet;
“The situation is a difficult one. It is quite within the bounds of possibility that half of our battle fleet might be disabled by underwater attack before the guns opened fire at all, if a false step is made, and I feel that I must constantly bear in mind the great probability of such attack and be prepared tactically to prevent its success.”
But the British did not have to wait for a major fleet engagement to taste bitter defeat by mines. In the Dardanelles
brought mine warfare to its current unfortunate estate in the U. S. Navy. That estate will not improve until they
are eradicated. This means recognizing mine warfare as an inseparable element of naval power and acting accordingly.
Captain Tarpey, a consultant in management and policy sciences and in national security matters, commanded a minesweeper, a mine division, an destroyer.
Nobody asked me either, but...
By Captain J. R. Avella, U. S. Naval Reserve
the
Reserves: Don't ask, order . . .
When the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to send minesweepers to the Persian Gulf, they tasked the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CinCPac), and the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (CinCLant), with providing three vessels each for the effort. The CinCs knew that the Joint Chiefs were considering such action some time before receiving the actual order.
The Pacific Fleet’s nine minesweepers are all in the Naval Reserve Force (NRF). So when CinCPac issued his deployment orders about five days prior to the sailing date, Commander Naval Surface Force, Pacific, did not even attempt to seek reserve volunteers to man the NRF minesweepers. Instead,
he ordered active ships to provide specific rates to specific minesweepers.
The Atlantic Fleet has 12 minesweepers, three in the active force and the rest in the NRF. Of the three required, only one was available from the active force: the other two had to come from the Naval Reserve. Being closer to the Gulf and thus having more time until the sailing date, the Atlantic Fleet solicited and got 15 drilling reservists to help man the ships.
Subsequent to the ships’ departure, the Pacific Fleet’s Mine Squadron One developed a list of Selected Reserve volunteers who could man the Pacific minesweepers. The Atlantic Fleet also compiled a list of follow-on volunteers to relieve those already on their ships.
Had they asked me, I would have decided differently. Were I the decision-making flag officer, I’d call my chief of staff and say, “Mike, I am going to recommend that the Preside^1 exercise his authority under Title 10, specifically 10 USC 673b, and involuntarily recall the Selected Reserve members of those minesweeper crews.”
Not being a “yes man,” Mike responds, “But sir, isn’t that awfully controversial? Won’t we invite debate by taking that approach?”
To which I reply, “The minesweeps are in the Naval Reserve because we need them relatively infrequently; corn bined active-duty and Selected Reserve crews man the ships; we tell the assigned reservists that they are part of that ship’s crew; if we need the ship we should need her crew; and since
campaign the quick loss of four capital ships in one afternoon taught the Allies the foolhardiness of attempting to force even a small defended minefield without effective countermeasures and support. After trying and failing for a month to pass the Dardanelles, not only did four heavies rest on the bottom, but every ship of the assault force required major repairs. Failure in the Dardanelles led to the disastrous Gallipoli campaign.
German submarines scattered 58 mines in six U. S. ports shortly after American entry into the war. This paltry investment paid off in the sinking of the armored cruiser the USS San Diego (CA-6) and four merchantmen and damage to the battleship the USS Minnesota (BB-22). The closure of several of the mined ports necessitated extensive sweeping with pickup forces. Mines had caught the U. S. Navy’s attention.
German failure to follow up was a significant break for the United States, whose Atlantic coastline is vulnerable to mining. With the German threat in abeyance, Americans trained their major weapon—industrial capacity—on the problem of mine production. The now familiar Mk-6 mines, designed for mass production, soon rolled off U. S. factory lines. The famous North Sea mine barrage—70,117 moored antisubmarine mines in a belt 15 to 35 miles wide and reaching 230 miles from Scotland to Norway—was composed 80% of the Mk-6, laid by the “Yankee Mining Squadron.” Postwar clearance required a year.
The United States had some warning prior to entering World War II, but with a base of not more than two or three desks in Washington, the mine warfare organization had again to be created anew. Ironically in view of this low state of readiness, the first U. S. ship to make a World War II enemy contact report was a minesweeper operating off Pearl Harbor-
From meager beginnings the mine warfare effort became commensurate with all other wartime undertakings— conducted globally and without stint of men or materials. Again, Germany mined North American ports, scattering some 350 or fewer from Trinidad to Halifax. Again, the effort was too little to stop the Allies; but it was sufficient to close several important ports for up to two weeks and to require extensive sweeping and deployment of defensive fields'
Amphibious assault operations reached historically unprece" dented levels in World War II, necessitating assault sweep11'!’ at every beachhead as well as, usually, the setting of defer1" s>ve fields. These operations demonstrated that the mine fofC motto, “Where the fleet goes, we’ve been,” was neither immodest nor inaccurate.
In scope and effect one of the greatest of naval epics is blockade of the Japanese empire. From India, Australia, Hawaii, and hard-won island bases, Allied ships, submarine5’ and aircraft hunted down and attacked Japanese shipping- They sowed mines in the shipping lanes along the Asian coast from Rangoon to Korea and Japan. Not even the interior rivers of China were immune. In the final stage, Opera' tion Starvation, U. S. Air Force B-29s saturated Japanese waters with mines. The Japanese merchant marine nearly ceased to exist, as did the import-dependent Japanese empire'
As in past wars, peacetime brought the need to clear the