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Royal Australian Naval ship Darwin, fading this force of allied naval ships during Australia’s bicentennial international toaval review, looks a lot like many combatsailing in the U. S. Navy. She does because she serves a country that has a sPecial relationship with the United States.
Australia is reevaluating its national defense strategy in an effort to redefine the structure, roles, and missions of the Royal Australian Defence Forces I^ADF). The effects of this reappraisal will be felt well nto the next century.
^ Australia is a close ally of the United States and will ecome closer as the United States devotes more attention 0 Asia, the Pacific basin, and the Indian Ocean. The im- u°rtance of the area in geopolitical and economic terms ®r°Ws as the United States increases its trade with Japan, , °rea, and Taiwan, as Soviet activity in the Pacific : e'§htens, and as mainland China becomes more modern- Red.
Ij The time is now ripe to examine closely the future of j. ’ S./Australian relations, to project Australia’s luture ^re'gn and defense policies and to consider how they *§ht dovetail with U. S. views on the use of sea power in ttle Pacific.
The Australian Department of Defence underwent a y'ujor reorganization in 1984.' The government since has °ne beyond that by reviewing its overall defense strategy ^ the makeup and missions of the RADF. In early 1985, efence Minister Kim Beazley commissioned a special 'uisterial consultant, Paul Dibb, to prepare a special re- ,°rt- Published in March 1986, as the “Review of Ustralia’s Defense Capabilities,” it highlighted the engths and weaknesses of the country’s armed forces u made sweeping recommendations. The Dibb report
formed the basis for a defense white paper, published in March 1987.2
Today’s RADF consists of 70,000 volunteer professionals and could be expanded in case of emergency. Defense installations are concentrated in the east and southeast areas of the country. Overseas detachments, deployed to Malaysia, Singapore, and Papua New Guinea, are attached to various United Nations peacekeeping forces and are scattered throughout the southern Pacific as part of training and assistance projects. With reserves of 31,000, the standing forces form a core to be built upon in case of an emergency.
The white paper utterly abandons the old Australian concept of forward defense. Because the nation is politically stable and its lands are not densely populated, the paper concludes that the potential military threat is limited to amphibious raids against a few critical areas in the north. The government proposes a strategy of denial for the Commonwealth that trades distance for attrition.
The Dibb report defines an area of principal strategic interest with nearly a 2,000 kilometer (1,100 nautical mile) radius, centered on the northern city of Darwin. It envisions a remodeled defense of strike aircraft, surface combatants, and submarines attacking an approaching force at some distance from the Australian shore. Close-in coastal defenses would impede a landing. Once ashore, an enemy would confront a highly mobile army, focused on defending populated areas and defense installations.3
The paper calls for a small, specialized armed force, tailored for use against a second-rate, unsophisticated foe. It will have no military role, and no capability beyond the area east of the Cocos Islands, south of the Philippines, and west of New Caledonia. Under the new strategy, continued access to detailed intelligence is critical in order to assess a potential threat and engage hostile forces early. Long-range strike forces based on F-111 s and submarines will form the first line. A second line will consist of F/A- 18 and P-3 aircraft and surface combatants about the size of a destroyer or smaller. The army would be tasked with
al-
countering coastal raids and would have six lightly armed, highly mobile, mechanized battalions. There would be the same number of reserve formations, supported by a large helicopter force.
A significant portion of the forces will be moved from their southern bases to northern and western Australia. The RADF will forsake the small all-around force, capable of quick expansion, and will cease some types of warfighting altogether.
As a result of Australia’s close relationship with the United States, the nation will continue to have access to state-of-the-art intelligence, high technology, and a substantial defense logistics base, all of which are essential to Australia’s defense.
A Changing Outlook
The Australian government is presaging a significant role change in order to lead the economy away from the traditionally commodity-based industries and to extend its leadership role in southern Asia and the Pacific.
Australia is beginning to reduce the trade barriers that have traditionally protected domestic producers from foreign competition, hoping this will encourage the nation’s industry to compete overseas and to recognize the growing importance of Australia’s Asian trade. Australia is trying to boost Asian trade as much as possible. The government is also attempting to restructure industry, in order to boost the introduction of modem manufacturing and technological development.4 Australia is concerned about Soviet commercial interests in the South Pacific, and it has its own strong economic interest in the modernization of China.5 Australia’s diplomatic activism of the 1940s and 1950s, coupled with its economic expansionism of the late 1980s, will continue to push the nation to the forefront of Asian and Pacific affairs.
U. S. Forces in the Pacific and Indian Oceans
The U. S. assessment of possible threats in the Pacific and South Asian areas and the increased assets available to the United States have resulted in a different approach to defense. Since World War II, the focus of U. S. trade overseas has shifted from east to west, and the Pacific has assumed greater importance.
Asia has made consistent gains in trade with the United States, at Europe’s expense. In 1970, Asia held 20% of total imports and exports, while Europe accounted for less than 33%. By 1983, Asia held more than 34% of the United States’ trade, and Europe’s share had shrunk to less than 21%. At the same time, U. S. demographic and political centers shifted westward. In 1970, the Northeast states boasted 24% of the population, while the West held 17%. By the year 2000, these statistics should be reversed.6
The U. S. Seventh Fleet, the forward deployed of the two Pacific fleets, is tasked with the following:
“ . . . Control of the sea in order to defend the United States against attack through the western Pacific and Indian Oceans, to maintain the security of the Pacific command and to support the operations of adjacent lied and national commanders.”7
This translates into four separate areas of responsibil'ty- a) countering Soviet Pacific and Indian Ocean nava forces; b) supporting the defense of South Korea, princ1' pally with tactical air power; c) assisting in the maritir>ie defense of Japan; d) defending allied shipping proximate to the Asian mainland.8
These missions are couched in terms of war, yet Pacific fleets are playing active roles in peacetime: pr° tecting American economic interests, securing region^ political stability, supporting U. S. allies, and attempt'11.- to limit the expansion of Soviet influence in the Pad'1 and Indian oceans.
The peacetime mission traditionally has been accom plished by the constant presence of carrier battle groUps and amphibious ready groups, that carry out reguU schedules of port visits and exercises with local forces >" the Pacific. Until recently, no other significant fore'g11 presence existed as a counterweight. Today, the Soviet are upgrading their large Pacific Fleet. The Soviets have established a forward base at Cam Ranh Bay, ^'ct nam, and are courting favor with many nations in the PJ cific Basin.
The depth and complexity of the U. S. strategic pr0 lem in the Pacific have been compounded. In response the United States has upgraded its own Pacific Fleet. T'1 United States has increased deployments and exercises '" the northern Pacific and is demonstrating its willingness t°
Steam ever closer to the Soviet mainland. More is needed ln the allied Pacific counteroffensive, however. The U. S. t’ti'ategy in Asia and the Pacific must be given depth. Also, e diplomatic, defense, and political problems presented y the Soviets must receive more consideration.
for Increased Cooperation
The principal objectives in Australia’s long-term eco- J?mic offensive, in southern and eastern Asia, lie outside «s “area of strategic interest.” Micronesia, Papua New ainea, and the southern Pacific and Indian oceans gener- j. y have been ignored in U. S. strategic policy. It is uni ■ ,e y that Australia’s armed forces will be given the capa- l lly to operate effectively beyond the area immediately ^rrounding the continent, just as it is unlikely that the n'ted States will consider increasing its military or ecostake in the southwest Pacific.
’here is a strong case here for a closer bilateral relationship between these friends. As a counterforce to Soviet commercial and political incursions, Australia can use its diplomatic prestige and influence among its regional neighbors, who are wary of the superpowers. On the other hand, the United States must anticipate that someday Australia may find its overseas economic and political stake threatened. And at some point, the United States should expect to be asked to intervene—diplomatically or militarily—in Australia’s behalf.
Australia is working toward defending itself within its own region. It will thus become more dependent on its alliance with the United States for strategic intelligence, high-technology defense equipment, and logistic support. The advantages for the United States are enhanced security for defense-related installations on Australian soil and possibly increased diplomatic influence in Third World nations now being so avidly courted by the Soviets. In addition, if a low-level military presence is required, Australian ships or aircraft could be deployed without arous
ing the trepidation caused by a deployment of Seventh Fleet ships. Canberra has already demonstrated strength as an arbiter between the United States and smaller nations by its actions in the recent crisis about the collective security pact among Australia, New Zealand and the United States (ANZUS). Australia emerged with an enhanced reputation and reinforced bilateral ties to both antagonists. The United States must rethink its policies in the southern hemisphere, taking into account Australian policies and strengths.
__________ Royal Australian Army__________
Trained for counterinsurgency operations
32,0 men 1 infantry division 1 armored regiment 1 reconnaissance regiment 1 armored personnel carrier regiment 3 artillery regiments 3 support units
__________ Royal Australian Navy__________
Trained for surface and subsurface ASW 14,700 active personnel (including about 1,000 women)
1,200 reserve
6 Oxley-class (British Oberon) submarines 6 Kockum Type 471 replacement submarines under construction
3 Perth-class guided-missile destroyers (U. S. Charles F. Adams [DDG-2] type)
9 frigates: 4 Adelaide class
(U. S. Oliver Hazard Perry [FFG-7 type])
5 “River” class
22 patrol craft, including 2 mine warfare ships 1 amphibious war ship and other landing craft 5 Sea King Mk-50 helicopters
________ Royal Australian Air Force---------------- —■
Trained for ASW and maritime P-3 patrol, ground attack, strike, reconnaissance, and defense.
23.0 active personnel
2.0 reserves
8 Sikorsky S-70B2 (equivalent to SH-60B LAMPS-III)
75 F/A-18As to replace Dassault Mirage lll-0s by 1990.
20 P-3C
Credit: USNI Military Database, October 1988; A. D. Baker, III, Combat Fleets of the World (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press), pp. 12-21; and Robert O’Neill, The Military Balance: 1985-1986 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1985), pp. 119— 120-
years following World War II, this trade has become more focused on Asian nations, particularly Japan. The Australian economy is recovering from oil price increases, the collapse of commodities, and the weak agricultural markets of the mid-1970s. The government hopes to expand foreign markets for traditional products, as well as modern manufactured products, and new technologies. At the same time, Australia is projecting itself as a leader among South Asian and Pacific nations. This political activism shows no sign of abating.
The United States is also very dependent on Pacific trade. The bulk of U. S. foreign trade is shifting from its traditional markets in Europe to new ones in the Far East. The forward deployment of sea power plays a major role in sustaining this trade and supporting and protecting U. S. allies. The majority of the U. S. Pacific force is maritime, bringing a U. S. presence very close to the Asian mainland. Such a presence affords military and political strength, flexibility, and a measure of safety in pursuing U. S. goals.
Both nations regard the security of South Asia and the Pacific as critical. Both actively encourage political stability throughout the region, and are very concerned with aggressive Soviet designs in the area.
U. S. economic and military strength in the Pacific and Asia is obvious and has sometimes not worked in its favor. Australian diplomatic strength there is long established and its economic strength is growing. The Australian military presence is minimal and is expected to diminish. As a result, there are manifest advantages to strengthening the ties between the United States and Australia.
The United States and Australia should discuss strengthening their bilateral defense relationship. Perhaps a plan should include provisions for the use of U. S. military force, not only in case of attack (as provided under t ^ ANZUS treaty), but also in certain instances when Austro lian economic or political circumstances might require ^ In return, the United States could expect active supp°rt achieving its own goals with the nonaligned nationswiu* Australia’s sphere of influence. Any agreement will based on U. S. sea power in the Pacific and Indian ocean* Regardless of whether such provisions are establishe ' Australia is beginning to realize its political and econon1 potential. The United States must also recognize this P0^ tential if it plans to capitalize on its relationship wifi1 very special ally.
‘R. W. Cole and P. H. Bennett, Defense Report 1984-85, (Canberra, Ant'd11 Australian Government Printing Service, 1985). ^
2Dibb was a Senior Research Fellow at the Australian National University’s Strj.,in gic and Defence Studies Centre and soon will become Director of the Aust^a Joint Intelligence Organization, the most senior military intelligence position ,l* country, upon the completion of the Defence White Paper. (Jane's Defense ^et 18 October 1986. p. 848).
3Paul Dibb, Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities: A Report to the for Defence (Canberra, Australia: Australian Government Printing Service, •
page 49 ‘ . os S&
4Larry Klinger, “Thinking the Unthinkable,” Financial Times, London,
tember 1985, p. VII. ^g
5Larry Klinger discusses Australia’s trade with China in “Trade Links with Strengthened,” Financial Times, 25 September 1985, p. VIII.
'Trade figures are taken from Dibb Report. jlUte
7Norman Polmar, “The U. S. Navy: The Seventh Fleet,” U. S. Naval Ins Proceedings, August 1985, p. 81.
*lbid.
Commander Else currently is assigned to the Armed Forces ^eapjia> Training Facility, Puerto Rico. He is a radar intercept officer wh° completed operational tours in F-4 Phantom and F-14 Tomcat squadt He served on the NATO staff of Commander-in-Chief, Allied F° ^ Southern Europe, and studied at the Royal Air Force Staff College >n ^ United Kingdom. Commander Else was commissioned throug NROTC unit at the University of Illinois in January 1974.