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Feel like clearing the air, but can’t find anyone to listen? Why don’t you speak to our readers? Send your written comment to us for the “Nobody asked me, but ... ” column. If we publish it, we’ll pay you $60.00. If we don’t, you’ll feel better for having gotten it off your chest. At least you will know that we listened.
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D-5: Don’t give it up .. .
The U. S. Navy’s highly successful Trident II, D-5 development program promises to maintain our Trident ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) as the nation’s preeminent deterrent for many years to come. However, the politics of arms control and Soviet advances in , antiballistic-missile defenses could thwart that promise and make D-5 the beginning of the end for our SSBNs.
Recognizing the growing strategic imbalance between the United States and the Soviet Union, in 1983 the President’s Commission on Strategic Forces, headed by retired U. S. Air Force Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, recommended deployment of D-5. The Soviets had gained the capability to threaten all U. S. land- based strategic forces in a first strike with only a portion of their total intercontinental ballistic-missile (ICBM) force. Following such a strike, the United States would be left with its existing SSBN force, then capable only against soft targets.
Effective deterrence requires that the Soviets be convinced that they could not credibly threaten us or our allies with a limited use of nuclear weapons. To deter such Soviet threats, we must have a survivable capability to attack those targets the Soviets value most: hardened command-and-control centers, reserve ballistic-missile silos, and other
hardened military facilities. D-5 will provide that hard-target-kill capability at sea, where it is survivable.
Since 1983, the D-5 development program has progressed extremely well. The program of flight tests launched from Cape Canaveral has demonstrated that range, accuracy, and reliability goals will be met. The first submarine-launched test flight is less than a year away. D-5 is one of the few programs that can boast of being on schedule and under budget.
Arms Control Politics: President Ronald Reagan envisions a world in which deterrence is maintained with defensive forces. Effective missile defenses can neutralize offensive strategic forces, including D-5, and arms control will be the natural outcome. But until the U. S. strategic defensive forces are viable, we must field the best offensive weapons in our arsenal. D-5 is the best we have because it is capable against the full spectrum of targets, and it is our only fully survivable system.
Following the recently successful negotiation of an intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) treaty, political pressure has grown for an agreement to limit long-range strategic forces. Political pressure is already strong to balance the budget. Weapons that are expected to be “negotiated away” will not draw strong funding support.
The D-5 development flight-test program has already been scrutinized for its possible impact on future arms- control agreements. The number of reentry bodies flight-tested from one missile could be an important parameter in any future agreement limiting the total number of reentry bodies (weapons) for each side. Such scrutiny has not adversely affected the development program yet, but the pressure to restrict the D-5 is likely to mount.
An agreement that limits total numbers of weapons should lead to severe infighting between the Air Force and the Navy, each seeking to show that tts forces are the most effective. While the press is sure to deride it, this controversy is appropriate. Such an import3”1 decision should be made only after advocates of both sides have made the,r arguments. But the Navy predilection has been to leave arms control to the politicians. In this case, the Navy must take an active role by accurately informing our political leaders and the public of the military consequences ot the treaty proposals.
The Navy, alone among the services’ has the advantage of a historical perspective on arms-control treaties. The Naval Arms Limitations Treaties of the 1920s and 1930s provided many lessons that are applicable today. Desp'te Japanese violation of the Washington Treaty provision regarding the territori integrity of China, the United States continued to adhere to the treaty provl" sions for naval-arms limits and attempted to avoid armed conflict by Par ticipating in further negotiations. Not until the Japanese formally withdrew from the London Conference in 1936 and Japanese naval strength became obviously apparent did the United States begin to rebuild its weakened naval forces. By the time of the Pe3r* Harbor attack, the United States had more ships building than were in commission. The recovery from the lethargy induced by reliance on arms lim” tations came in time to save the Unit” States from hopeless inadequacy at the outset of World War II.
We must be wary of the effects of the arms-control process on the country’s ability to maintain its defenses. Historically, the United States has not deployed all the forces allow'r under arms-control agreements. This was true in the case of the Naval Arm Limitation Treaties and the Antiballistl Missile (ABM) Treaty. Also, we have
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Proceedings / August
flowed our preoccupation with the orces being controlled to blind us to a arming weapons developments by the ‘her side. The Japanese developed hiodern, fast cruisers and the carrier ask force under the Naval Arms Limi- aiion Treaties. The Soviets developed h'assive strategic defenses after signing he ABM Treaty.
Soviet Defenses: The Soviets have hjade a national commitment to defend e Motherland. As a result, they have i hiajor advantage over the United ates in defenses against nuclear- hhssile attack. If their defenses become 'efficiently robust to challenge the ef- ^htiveness of D-5 before our own S. defenses are deployed, the strate- ®!c implications will be profound. So- V|et defenses include deployment of an antiballistic-missile system around Mos- tj°'v (probably the equivalent of our efending the New York-Washington c°>Tidor), hardening of their valued hiilitary facilities, providing mobility and covertness to their military infra- shhcture, and an aggressive program of dvanced research for missile defense *he equivalent of the U. S. Strategic efense Initiative).
if offensive arms are reduced signifi- c3ntly and the Soviets have an effective
defense and we do not, the balance will shift dramatically in their favor.
As a hedge against this shift, we must research and develop ways to maintain D-5 effectiveness in the face of Soviet countermeasures. These will maintain the balance in the near term while we struggle to bring our own defenses on line.
What Should We Do? We cannot predict the outcome of future arms-control negotiations, but history shows us the effect of arms-limitation negotiations on our political process. We must be alert to avoid the mistakes of the past. If arms control is to enhance our security, not undermine it. we must not allow negotiations to take the place of an effective defense or to blind us to developments in other areas that threaten security. The Navy’s leaders must draw on the lessons of the past and speak out.
Captain Nuernberger is the commanding officer of the new Trident Training Facility at Kings Bay, Georgia. His previous assignment was in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations as the Trident Program Coordinator. He commanded the USS Henry Clay (SSBN-625)—Blue Crew—and has served as well in other submarine sea and shore commands.
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ARLEIGH BURKE ESSAY CONTEST
The U.S. Naval Institute is proud to announce its fifth annual Arleigh Burke Essay Contest, which replaces the former annual General Prize Essay Contest.
Three essays will be selected for prizes.
Anyone is eligible to enter and win. First prize earns $2,000, 3 Gold Medal, and a Life Membership in the Naval Institute. Urst Honorable Mention wins $1,000 and a Silver Medal.
The topic of the essay must relate to the objective of the U.S. ■'iaval Institute: “The advancement of professional, literary, and scientific knowledge in the naval and maritime services, and •he advancement of the knowledge of sea power.”
Essays will be judged by the Editorial Board of the U.S. Naval institute.
Entry rules
Essays must be original, must not exceed 4,000 words, and ttust not have been previously published. An exact word count nrust appear on the title page.
2- All entries should be directed to: Publisher, U.S. Naval Insti- 'ute, Annapolis, Maryland 21402.
Essays must be received on or before 1 December 1988 at ‘he U.S. Naval Institute.
4- The name of the author shall not appear on the essay. Each author shall assign a motto in addition to a title to the essay. This motto shall appear (a) on the title page of the essay, with the title, in lieu of the author’s name, and (b) by itself on the outside of an accompanying sealed envelope containing the name and address of the essayist, the title of the
essay, and the motto. This envelope will not be opened until the Editorial Board has made its selections.
5. The awards will be presented to the winning essayists at the 115th Annual Meeting of the membership of the Naval Institute.
Letters notifying
the award winners will be mailed on or about 1 February 1989, and the unsuccessful essays will be returned to their authors on that date.
6. All essays must be typewritten, double-spaced, on paper approximately 8Vi”xll". Submit two complete copies.
7. The winning and honorable mention essays will be published in the Proceedings. Essays not awarded a prize may be selected for publication in the Proceedings. The writers of such essays will be compensated at the rate established for purchase of articles.
8. An essay entered in this contest should be analytical and/or interpretive, not merely an exposition, a personal narrative, or a report.
Deadline: 1 December 1988