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Possible Strategic Defense Initiative weapons such as the railgun could force the Soviets to further develop their wide-ranging, sea-based strategic forces, forcing us, in turn, to increase our ability to find and kill Soviet Typhoons and other submarines armed with nuclear cruise missiles in the open seas, under Arctic ice, and off our coasts.
The United States has committed itself to a multibil' lion dollar program to provide an impenetrate shield against incoming strategic nuclear warheads- While the porosity of the multilayered defense arrange ment envisioned by advocates of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is a matter of continuing debate, it is becoming increasingly clear that the Achilles’ heel of $ publicly proposed efforts is the submarine-launched strategic missile, in both its ballistic and cruise versions. Unless we find suitable methods and technologies to neutral^ the strategic threat posed by Soviet third-generation sub'
brines, the well-intentioned (and so far well-heeled) SDI eftort may go for naught.
Perhaps the most significant strategic event of this dec- was the 1982 launching of the first Soviet Typhoon- lass nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine j~>SBN). Though some may argue that the deployment of ae first U. S. Trident submarine was just as important, £°nsider that Typhoons:
Like the Tridents, are capable of launching (SS-N-20) Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) from their 0vvtl home port
► Like the Tridents, are able to sustain significant shock damage and continue strategic launch
► Like the Tridents, carry sophisticated sonar systems capable of early detection and classification of hostile submarines
► Are as quiet as any submarines produced by the Soviets
Some argue that the Typhoon falls short of U. S. submarine quieting efforts, but there comes a point when the relative importance of source-level decibel reduction is mitigated by the proximity of initial acoustic detections. In fact, in acoustic environments typical of those expected in engagements involving nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) and SSBNs, acoustic parity rather than U. S. acoustic superiority may be the rule rather than the exception.
Much has been made of the fact that the Soviets, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, continued to close the technological gap that the United States had enjoyed and depended on. Thus the Typhoon, because it is comparable to the Trident in some important respects, may signal the end of any significant U. S. technological superiority, at least in submerged strategic assets. Although there are many arguments that contradict this analysis on technical grounds, the fact is that the Typhoon is a sea-based, strategic asset that, like the Trident, is able to place ordnance on target with little or no regard for an opponent’s strategic ASW efforts.
Nearly as important in terms of the superpower strategic balance is the Soviets’ recent deployment of the Akula-, Sierra-, and Mike-class SSNs and the introduction of the SS-NX-21 and SS-NX-24 cruise missiles. While the debate roars on about whether the Tomahawk is a strategic asset, the Soviets, by introducing these long-range nuclear cruise missiles, apparently have rendered the question academic, at least from a U. S. perspective. The range of the SS-NX-21, possibly the low-end mix of the SS-NX-21/-24 cruise missile pair, is advertised to be in excess of 1,600 nautical miles. It is capable of carrying a nuclear warhead that can be targeted with an accuracy comparable to that of the Tomahawk land attack missile (TLAM). The SS-NX- 21’s cruise speed (in excess of Mach 0.7) and its low-altitude capability make it practically invulnerable to current antimissile defenses. Perhaps most important, it is capable of being launched from third-generation SSNs, including Akulas, Sierras, and Mikes. Like the Typhoon, these platforms are very quiet and thus have a good chance of attaining a launch station close to the U. S. Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf coasts. This means that a significant number of countervalue targets may become the responsibility of strategic SSNs, thus freeing the SLBMs for counterforce targeting.
The strategic importance of this shift, in light of the relative vulnerability SDI may bring to the Soviets’ land- based (and heavily counterforce) strategic assets, cannot be overstated. As SDI programs begin to be deployed, we should expect that the Soviets will respond by simply shifting their strategic priorities away from the increasingly vulnerable land-based assets to the relatively unaffected sea-based assets. By making available an increased number of sea-based, covert platforms for countervalue targeting by employing long-range nuclear cruise missiles, the Soviets have already taken the first step toward alleviating a weakness that SDI should expose in the Soviet strategic force posture. Undoubtedly, the Soviets are in the midst of development/deployment of counterforce SLBMs, thus making possible (with the introduction of a sufficient number of Typhoons and follow-on SSBNs) the transition from a predominantly land-based to a predominantly sea-based counterforce capability.
Generally, SDI is an attempt to bring scientific and engineering resources to bear in defending the United States against nuclear attack. More specifically, it is composed of multilayered, defense-in-depth, antimissile weapon systems, with kill mechanisms ranging from kinetic to thermal to electromagnetic. The first defensive layer consists of elements that are capable, probably by infrared and other heat-sensitive means, of tracking and intercepting ballistic missiles during the boost phase of flight. The second layer relies on intercept before decoy or multiple independent reentry vehicle (MIRV) bus employment. In these first two layers lie the greatest possibilities for advancement. The reason is that although tracking and engagement generally require complex space-based U. S. assets, interception in either of these two phases virtually ensures destruction of actual strategic assets and, depending on the nature of the missile, possibly more than one warhead. Phase one and phase two interceptions are efficient because little effort is wasted (few, if any, decoys) and margined returns (MIRV interceptions) are possible. The third layer consists of assets that attempt to intercept reentry bodies before atmospheric entry, but after MIRV or decoy employment. This phase is perhaps the most difficult because it involves probably the greatest number of potential targets. Though we have sophisticated devices that might allow chaff or decoy discrimination during this phase, such efforts take time, a commodity certainly in short supply by this phase of flight. The final layer of missile defense is made up of land-based point-defense systems. Analogous to shipborne point-defense systems, this layer relies upon deep-atmosphere terminal intercept. Aside from the obvious technological problems associated with “hitting a bullet with a bullet,” this layer must overcome the effects of one or more high-altitude, multimegaton bursts designed to provide offensive electromagnetic pulse (EMP) at the outset of the nuclear sortie. Because the point-defense system must rely upon extremely sophisticated tracking and weapon-control electronics, EMP is certain to play an integral part in any Soviet first strike.
The good news is that it is becoming increasingly apparent that, at least in first- and second-layer defense, real progress is being made. Systems appear ready to move from the laboratory to the field. Porosity and superpower stability arguments aside, the utility of a defensive system that forces an aggressor to question the eventual success of a first strike should not be discounted.
Of perhaps as much importance as the strengths such a system brings to strategic defense are two apparent weaknesses. First, SDI is not equipped to neutralize a nuclear cruise-missile threat. As stated previously, just such a threat exists or will soon exist in the form of Soviet third- generation SSNs stationed off our coasts. While SDI research and development efforts will undoubtedly bring about advances in cruise-missile defense, our national focus is, and will probably remain in the near future, on ballistic-missile defense. A second and perhaps more subtle weakness exists in first- and second-layer defenses. Though potentially the most exploitable area for SDI involvement, these phases suffer because they require an extensive space-based lattice or satellite constellation to continuously monitor and make available assets to track and destroy ballistic missiles. The enormous number of satellites required simply to monitor the Soviet Union appears to be within our national means. Attempts to form space-based constellations capable of monitoring all the potential launch sites for the SS-N-20-equipped Typhoon (and Soviet Yankee- and Delta-class SSBNs) would require assets currently in excess of U. S. budget limitations. Thus we begin to gain an appreciation of just how vital Soviet sea-based strategic assets have become—and made all the more important by SDI.
As SDI begins to elevate the Soviet strategic submarine force (now to include all SSBNs and third-generation SSNs) in terms of nuclear counterforce and countervalue offensive capability, the United States naturally should consider a redoubled effort in strategic ASW, the objectives of which would be to counter:
► The coastal nuclear cruise-missile threat posed by third- generation Soviet SSNs armed with SS-NX-21/-24s
► The threat posed by the Soviet SSBN fleet deployed in the open ocean
► The threat posed by Soviet SSBNs conducting under-ice operations
In the past, the requirement for U. S. ASW coastal protection generally received second billing to forward operations. This state of affairs was the result of the perceived (and probably true) inability of the Soviets to pose any significant sea-based coastal threat. This is no longer the case. Even the most casual observer has noted the increasing number of Soviet surface warships and submarines off our coasts. This disturbing trend is the result of many changes, including the increased strength of the Soviet Navy and its evolution toward a blue-water force, possibly in response to the growing dependency of the Soviet bloc on overseas trade. The increased Soviet naval presence is also the result of increased Soviet awareness, owing the large part to the Walker/Whitworth espionage, of U. S- submarine practices and vulnerabilities. It is also the natural and evolutionary outgrowth of technological advances in submarine quieting, sonar processing, and overall capabilities apparent in Soviet third-generation platforms. The mating of these advanced submarines with long-range land-attack cruise missiles has elevated coastal ASW to a level that has not existed since the early stages of World War II. What will be the U. S. response to this growing threat?
One distinctive characteristic of coastal ASW is a relatively limited search area that is best accessed by land- based and coastal or “brown water” assets. Thus we might expect that localization and targeting of Soviet sub-
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marines off the U. S. coasts might best be conducted by shore-based air or even quick-response, ASW-capable hydrofoil patrol combatants (PHMs). In this arena, the efficient integration of Navy and Coast Guard efforts and assets is essential.
The problem of coastal search is confounded by at least tw° factors. First, Soviet quieting efforts have been sucCessful enough to make efforts at conventional, long-range Passive detections a questionable endeavor. Complicating detection are difficult acoustic conditions laden with surf, dipping, and other interfering noise sources. Successful Search techniques probably will rely heavily on methods °ther than conventional passive sonar systems.
decent efforts in bi-static sonar employment are a good Sample. A powerful active source—airborne, shipbome, °r moored—is used in conjunction with passive sensor helds to detect possibly hostile submarine contacts. The °hvious advantage of such systems is that no amount of platform quieting will reduce the submarine’s vulnerabil- *'y- While it is true that hull coatings employed by the Soviets reduce the active signature of these platforms, it is als« true that such coatings are generally tuned to attenuate a specific sonar frequency. The application of frequency agility, not unlike the capability resident in more advanced radar systems, to bi-static active sonar transponders tion and attack assets. The problem remains of handling those strategic cruise missiles that leak through these frontline coastal defenses. This calls for a direct application of terminal, fourth-layer SDI systems, which should handle the high-trajectory ballistic missiles and be equipped to combat low-altitude, land-attack cruise missiles. Clearly, then, we need a concurrent, SDI-like effort in ASW coastal defense and a maritime strategy that adequately reflects this strategic threat.
Open-ocean prosecution of Soviet SSBNs bears the greatest likeness to what we have in the past called strategic ASW. However, as in any discussion involving the Soviets’ third-generation submarines, decreasing acoustic source levels may render conventional passive sonar search techniques untenable. To compound the problem, the dramatic increase in potential open-ocean SSBN operating areas, brought about by the introduction of long- range SS-N-18, SS-N-20, and SS-N-23 SLBMs, preclude search methods similar to those proposed for the area- constrained coastal ASW defense problem. In addition, the quick-response assets available in the coastal scenario will, by the more distant nature of the problem, either not be available at all (as is the case for the brown water ASW assets) or be late in arriving. In fact, of the three strategic ASW scenarios outlined, this open-ocean case may pre-
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sh°uld alleviate the problems posed by anechoic subma- 11,16 coatings.
Other coastal search methods might exploit the requirement that cruise missile-equipped submarines communi- Ca,e frequently with command-and-control stations. This c°nimunication requirement implies that at least a passive atltenna be made available by the platform. The develop- ^nt of systems capable of detecting these antennas, pos- ■bly by radar or even visual means, would go a long way °ward solving our coastal ASW problem.
These ASW defenses rely in large part on non-passive arch techniques, and airborne and brown water localiza-
sent the most difficult problems of search, localization, and attack.
Indications are that, for a variety of reasons, the U. S. submarine force is moving away from the traditional carrier battle group direct-support role and toward a more loosely structured integrated-operations role. In this new role, the submarine(s) will act in consort with individual air and/or surface assets to accomplish vital ASW missions. These submarine-air-surface triads are now receiving serious consideration as potential ASW force multipliers. Whether by coincidence or design, these integrated operations may provide the solution for open-ocean strategic ASW.
The problems associated with submarine-air-surface triad search and localization might be handled best by a combination of surface and submarine towed arrays. While suffering from Soviet efforts to decrease acoustic source levels, such extremely long passive sonars are able to exploit the very-low-frequency regime of acoustic propagation. In the environmental conditions normally associated with open-ocean conditions, these very-low- frequency signals travel with little attenuation over great distances. Thus, through a combination of very-loW- frequency signal processing, multiplatform triangulation, and Navy tactical data system-like command and control (using airborne or satellite relay stations), the problem of open-ocean search and localization should be solvable- Though many requisite hardware components exist, a significant and dedicated effort in the area of submarine-air- surface triad command and control and integrated operating tactics is required to solve the problem of open-ocean strategic ASW.
Once open-ocean target detection and localization are completed, the submarine, by way of her extraordinary staying power, is in essence able to maintain track f°r periods limited only by her ability to hold contact by either passive or active means. The benefits of continual target track are clear. For example, the impact of U. S. SSNs in effect holding Soviet strategic assets hostage by overt tracking could help deter any aggressive Soviet actions, nuclear or conventional, during periods of heightened international tensions.
Examining the SSBN under-ice scenario presents what may prove to be one of the great ironies of U. S./Soviet strategic planning. In exploiting the ice cover to form bastions for their strategic assets, the Soviets have helped solve a vexing U. S. ASW issue. While great strides have been made in rectifying the more technical aspects of under-ice attack, perhaps even greater benefits result from the fact that bastion SSBNs are SDI-vulnerable, owing t0 the relatively high density of submarines that results from this strategic grouping. Much like land-based mobile assets, the location limits of bastion SSBNs are well known at the outset of hostilities. Thus no significant burden is Placed on the satellite constellations required for the productive first and second layers of SDI defense.
Still, neutralizing the platform is far superior to efforts directed at neutralizing individual missiles or warheads. This is the stand-alone SSN’s metier. The combination of ^accessibility, generally good acoustic conditions, and the advanced state of under-ice readiness found in our SSN fleet today makes this a desirable engagement arena from the U. S. perspective. Though certain to be fraught with hazards, including Soviet SSNs riding shotgun and otined barriers, there the U. S. SSN, equipped with advanced capability (AdCap) Mk-48 torpedoes, should Prove most valuable.
There is, then, a direct relationship among SDI, Soviet Sea-based strategic assets, and strategic ASW. Continuing advances in SDI should lead to a shift in Soviet strategic deployment from a predominantly land-based and SDI- vulnerable posture to a more sea-based approach, with increased emphasis on strategic sea-launched cruise- rnissile assets. This cruise-missile threat demands that we rethink our coastal ASW defenses and place greater importance on quick-reaction, land-based air ASW and c°astal or brown water ASW. In this arena, the synergistic effect that might be realized by increased Navy-Coast Guard cooperation could prove invaluable. The solution to tomorrow’s open-ocean strategic ASW issue may be found in today’s advances in command and control. By freeing the SSN from the direct support role and developing the integrated-operations ASW capability of properly equipped submarine-air-surface triads, the SSN should prove more capable in both strategic and tactical (carrier battle group) ASW. Serious consideration of the under-ice SSBN threat reveals weaknesses that both existing SSNs and developing SDI projects should be able to exploit.
We should continue our efforts to defend the United States from strategic attack. We must not, however, do so myopically—looking to the heavens when the real threat may come from below. The Strategic Defense Initiative should encompass all phases of the strategic threat. To ignore the developing Soviet sea-based nuclear first-strike capability is to weaken a link in an otherwise strong chain of strategic defenses. The importance strategic ASW will play in tomorrow’s superpower confrontations cannot be overstated, especially when one considers the rational Soviet response to SDI employment. The need to formalize the Navy’s intentions in the nuclear arena, as we have done in the conventional arena through the maritime strategy, is clearly the key to getting on with the business of national defense.
Author of “Acoustic Showdown for the SSNs” in the July 1987 Proceedings, Lieutenant Commander Peppe has been the engineering officer on board the USS La Jolla (SSN-701) since June 1987.
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