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In 1975, the guided-missile cruiser USS Belknap (CG-26) sustained near-fatal damage in a collision with the aircraft carrier USS John F. Kennedy (CV-67). In 1982, six British ships were sunk and more than a dozen others were damaged by Exocet antiship missiles and aerial bombs in the Falklands Conflict. In 1987, the guided-missile frigate USS Stark (FFG-31) received major damage when she was struck by two Exocet missiles in the Persian Gulf. Each of these events stimulated a spate of public criticism in the United States of the survivability and vulnerability of the U. S. Navy’s modern surface combatants. Each time, the critics, including veteran naval prpfession- als, military commentators and analysts, and members of Congress, concluded that these ships are not very survivable/and that large numbers of them will sustain catastrophic damage^n future combat. Implicit in this criticism is the conclusion tljat this is a new phenomenon in'naval warfare, attributable to the nature of the current threat and limitations inherent in modern ship design dnd construction.
Are modern combatants—for this discussion: guided-missile cruisers, destroyers, and frigates—truly less survivable than their predecessors?
In 1987, naval analyst Norman Pol mar stated that these
combatants are becoming more vulnerable because they face smart antiship missiles with less armor and their defensive systems rely on vulnerable electronics. But he also said that even though post-World War II ships are probably less survivable, they are far more powerful than their predecessors. “The Navy faced a choice between firepower and defensive power, and it rightly chose firepower.”1 In his book United States Destroyer Operations in World War 11, Theodore Roscoe wrote:
“Smaller than some private yachts, the destroyer bristles with armament. Every superfluous item of gear is eliminated; every available foot of deck space that can be so devoted is utilized for gun mounts, fire-control apparatus, depth-charge gear, torpedo tubes and munitions storage. . . . Armor is sacrificed for speed, the cruising range is sacrificed for speed. Fastest ship afloat, the destroyer depends for protection chiefly on speed, maneuverability, the use of smoke screens, and, of course, firepower.”2
Clearly, today’s combatant has much in common with those serving during World War II: speed, firepower, and a lack of armor. Without armor, these
combatants are inherently more at hazard than capital ships to most threats. Unable to absorb a heavy blow and survive, they must avoid the blow; they must rely on firepower and maneuverability.
Survivability is not exclusively a combat concern. Naval ships are exposed to a variety of hazards in both peace and war. For example, critics cite the damage sustained by the Belknap in the collision with the John F. Kennedy as evidence of modern combatants’ vulnerability to fire. The Belknap lost her superstructure, but she did not sink. She survived, was repaired (a major undertaking), and returned to the fleet.
During World War II, three destroyers were lost in collisions; one with a troopship, one with a fleet oiler, and one with a merchantman. In 1952, the USS Hobson (DD-464), a World War II-vintage destroyer-minesweeper, sank after a collision with the aircraft carrier USS Wasp (CV-18). In 1968, the World War II-type destroyer USS Frank E. Evans (DD-754) sank after a collision with the Australian aircraft carrier Melbourne. None of the five ships that collided with these older destroyers was as large as the John F. Kennedy. Although size is not the sole determinant of collision damage, it is certainly a major factor. Given the John F. Kennedy's size, it could be argued that the Belknap is tougher and more survivable than previous generations of destroyers. Certainly there is no compelling evidence that she is less survivable. It is axiomatic that combatants rarely fare well in collisions with large ships, bombs, or torpedoes.
The common criticism that modern destroyers are “far mot£ susceptible to catastrophic damage in an actual battle” presum' ably means more susceptible than such ships used to be. But just how susceptible were yestef' day’s combatants to yesterday’s
warfare magazine
threats? The naval war in the ;.ac,f'c theater during World War Was fought by two sea powers> thus there was a balance or ^ymmetry in the number of • S. destroyers lost to air, sur- ace, and submarine actions. For e United States, the European eater was, on the other hand, Pnrnarily a conflict between a nea Power and a continental Power. The European naval arT>paign is best characterized gS a hi- S. effort to supply its ropean allies by sea, opposed tl| a German effort to interdict e sea lines of communication •1 f1 hs submarines. Not surpris- w8-v’ fewer U. S. destroyers t,Cre jost in the Atlantic theater an 'n the Pacific theater, and Marines were responsible for ore losses than all other coma causes combined. Table 1 is st summary of combined de- r°7er losses in the two theaters, in u C ta^'e clearly shows that e World War II U. S. destroys Were victims of virtually ^ erY type of available antiship aPon: bombs; gun projectiles;
I ~’ ship-, and submarine- ^ belied torpedoes; and mines. l()n heavy destroyer combat wSes did not originate in World war 11 • Losses in World War I twCre also severe. In less than
ish° dayS’ for examPIe’ 17 Brit- jj and German destroyers and
su i! ■Unarniored) cruisers were •j,,n in the Battle of Jutland. ne difference in World War II was the scale and ferocity of air attacks launched against these ships, particularly at Okinawa.
The Okinawa campaign introduced—en masse—the original antiship guided missile, the Kamikaze, or Divine Wind. These suicide attack aircraft—sometimes attacking singly, but more frequently in coordinated waves —did more damage in less time than any other type of threat in any theater. Of the 148 destroyer/destroyer escorts participating in this campaign, 58 were put out of action by Kamikazes in less than 90 days. Fifteen Pacific Fleet destroyer/ destroyer escorts were sunk and 43 sustained such major damage that they were removed from action for vital repairs—at a critical time in the war. In today’s terminology, all 43 of these ships were “mission- killed” by the Kamikazes. Fourteen other destroyers were hit by Kamikazes in the Okinawa campaign, but were able to continue the fight.
How vulnerable were the
U. S. destroyers to the Kami- hazel More precisely, how many Kamikazes were required to saturate and penetrate a destroyer’s defenses? Some ships were hit by a lone attack. Rarely could ships withstand multiple wave attacks without sustaining a single hit; destroyers receiving multi-plane attacks usually sustained one or more hits. During a 90-minute mass attack on 11 May 1945, two destroyers occupying Okinawa’s radar picket station 15 shot down a combined total of 46 Kamikazes while sustaining three and four Kamikaze hits, respectively. Both ships were mission-killed, but neither was sunk.
An examination of battle damage sustained by destroyers off Okinawa shows that the survivability of these ships against the Kamikaze was unpredictable. Some sank immediately after a single Kamikaze hit; others sank only after being hit by as many as four. Still other destroyers, although mission-killed, survived multiple Kamikaze hits. Overall damage to destroyers struck by Kamikazes was determined, at least in part, by chance, i.e., where the hit(s) occurred, how many hits occurred and at what interval, and whether the weapon—bomb or torpedo— carried by each Kamikaze ex-
Table 1 Combined V. Cause |
S. Destroyer Losses PacFlt |
in World War II LantFlt |
Total |
Air attack |
22 |
4 |
26 |
Surface action |
18 |
l |
19 |
Submarine action |
9 |
10 |
19 |
Mines |
2 |
5 |
7 |
Other |
6 |
5 |
11 |
HMS Sheffield (opposite) was no more vulnerable to Exocets in 1982 than the USS Hazelwood (DD-S31) was to Kamikazes off Okinawa in 1945 (right). Surface combatants will always be lost in combat, but improved defenses can reduce these losses.
ploded and contributed to the damage.
Certainly, the 40% destroyed fatality rate inflicted by Kamikazes off Okinawa would be intolerable over the long haul. According to Theodore Roscoe:
“Kamikaze crashes caused all manner of ship-wounds. Topside damage was, of course, predominant. But the fire which inevitably followed the explosive smash usually endangered the ship more than the initial blast- damage. And casualties were often progressive, working their way below decks until ... the vessel was paralyzed.”3
The Okinawa campaign demonstrated that existing shipboard air defenses were inadequate against the Kamikaze. Unless the Japanese ran out of aircraft, pilots, or fuel before the planned U. S. invasion of Japan, the attack would be catastrophic for the United States Fleet. Thus, the Navy quickly began to develop a shipboard antiaircraft weapon capable of detecting and killing aerial targets at much longer ranges and with much greater initial accuracy than existing shipboard systems. Japan surrendered before the invasion could be mounted, and before any significant improvement in shipboard air defense was achieved.
Both world wars demonstrated that destroyers were vulnerable to virtually every threat encountered. Not without reason were destroyers called “tin cans” and “small boys.” These nicknames reflected as much gallows humor as affection, ironically acknowledging that not all of these ships entering battle would emerge intact, if at all.
So what’s new today? Com
pare the threats—the Kamikaze, a manned antiship missile, and today’s unmanned version. The modem missile is certainly smaller and much faster. It flies much higher and perhaps a bit lower as well, and cannot be intimidated by hostile action into aborting the attack. (There is precious little evidence that Japanese pilots could be intimidated either.) But though the Kamikaze was larger and slower than today’s antiship missiles, it was very difficult for contemporary defenses to defeat it. Because it was manned, the Kamikaze was particularly difficult to deflect from its attack. Many Kamikazes had their wings, control surfaces, or major portions of their fuselage shot away, but pressed their attack all the way to target impact. There is no evidence that any unmanned missile is that tenacious.
In addition, because they were manned, the Kamikaze attack was easy to coordinate compared to today’s missile. In-flight changes to the planned attack— necessitated by conditions encountered—were easily effected, usually to the detriment of the defenses. To further complicate the defense’s problems, the Kamikaze could execute radical maneuvers—bobbing and weav-
U. S. N*"
ing, and accelerating and decelerating, as they closed their targets. Modem weapons are not yet capable of such terminal maneuvers. Moreover, because the modem antiship missile is far more complex than the Kamikaze, the latter was undoubtedly more reliable. If it were not shot down, it would almost certainly hit its target.
It can be argued that the Kamikaze was a more lethal threat- It carried either a torpedo or a bomb payload. The torpedo was to be released in time to hit the target simultaneously with the aircraft; the bomb might be released just before impact or be carried to impact. This combination of ordnance, aircraft, and fuel had devastating results.
The modem combatant, equipped with surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, should be inherently more capable of defeating the unmanned missile threat than was the World War II destroyer in defeating the Kamikaze. If this is the case, the modern destroyer is less vulnerable than its predecessor—as long as its systems are functioning properly. However, modern SAM systems are more comple* and less reliable than the antiair gun defenses used by World Waf II combatants, and hence are
JP°re apt to fail. Moreover,
AMs are relatively “soft” tar- 8ets: Because their radar anten-
ltutes sunk in the Falklands
nas cannot be armored and they must be located in exposed posi- l0ns> high-velocity fragments mm an explosive air burst close a °ard can destroy them. Losing a system in combat to a reliabil- 1 y failure or a “cheap kill” of 1 s radar antenna has the same result-—inCreased vulnerability to antiship missiles.
. A related matter in ship de- Sl?ri and construction is the use c aluminum in place of steel in e superstructures of modern
MANN NEWSPHOTOS (BRITISH MINISTRY OF DEFEf
e’ which contains many ele s ^nts °f the ship’s combat ss em> may reduce the missii ^-ability of these ships in su*bat. But returning to steel il ^erstructures will not necess Provide any substantive im fri?,V?ment' The British Type-'
£ —............................................... * U.U.U..UL
tu°n^'Ct ^ac* steel superstruc- as did the destroyers al mawa. The latter’s weapoi systems were distributed throughout the length and breadth of the ship, and these systems were simple, tough, and reliable. However, the range and accuracy of these ships’ antiair defenses were limited against the Kamikaze. The inherent passive strengths built into these ships appear to have been offset by the weaknesses of their weapons, which accounts for the 40% loss rate to Kamikazes. More to the point, 80% of the destroyers struck by Kamikazes were sunk or mission-killed.
The lesson to be learned from Okinawa is that destroyers under attack must kill or be killed. Once their defenses have been penetrated, their survival depends upon effective damage control and chance. Is that lesson still valid?
On 17 May 1987, the guided-missile frigate Stark was struck—in less than one minute—by two Exocet missiles fired by an Iraqi F-l Mirage aircraft. Neither Exocet was detected by the Stark until they were visually spotted just before impact, but the launch aircraft was being tracked by the Stark's air-search radar well before missile impact. In addition, her electronic warfare system had detected evidence of the aircraft’s hostile intent, but the ship did not attempt to engage the aircraft or the missiles.
Thus, the vulnerability of the Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)- class frigates to attacks of this nature remains to be determined.
Survivability is another matter. Despite the explosive impact and resultant extremely hot fires from the dual Exocet hits; despite the loss of primary fire mains needed to fight these fires; despite the shock and surprise of this sudden attack; and despite the loss of 37 of her crew—the Stark survived. She survived primarily because of the courage, damage-control skills, and tenacity of her crew.
Luck—good and bad— influenced her survival. The warhead of the lead Exocet failed to detonate; the unbumed propellant of the second Exocet detonated (ignited) after missile penetration, amplifying the intensity of the fire. Fires ignited throughout the ship because of severe thermal radiation through the hull, decks, and bulkheads. Because they had been preparing for an inspection, the Stark's crew had almost twice as many oxygen breathing apparatus can- nisters and cans of firefighting foam on board as was normally the case. This gave the crew more time to fight the fires without outside assistance.
Are destroyers more vulnerable and less survivable today? Probably not; only trial by combat can provide the final verdict. Whether better or worse than earlier ships, small combatants will continue to be lost in combat. The task is to keep these losses at an operationally acceptable level, by making those improvements in combatants’ passive defense capabilities that make sense, and are affordable and consonant with combatant missions. And never forget that it is better to give than to receive. Or as Admiral David Far- ragut said; “The best defense is a well-directed fire from your own guns.” 'Interview with Nomian Polmar in Military Logistics, March 1987.
•Theodore Roscoe, United States Destroyer Operations in World War II (Annapolis, MD: U. S. Naval Institute, 1953), p. 12.
3Ibid., p. 490.
Rear Admiral Carter retired from active duty in 1985 and is a senior visiting fellow at the Center for Naval Analyses.
He enlisted in 1945 and received a fleet appointment to the Naval Academy. He served in eight surface combatants and commanded: the Towers (DDG-9); Biddle (CG-34); Cruiser-Destroyer Group Three; Surface Combatant Force, Third Fleet; Surface Combatant Force, Seventh Fleet; and the OpTEvFor. He also served in the Office of the CNO, Naval Ordnance and Naval Sea systems commands, and as the Naval Inspector General. He has an M.S. from MIT.