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Soviet naval operations worldwide declined significantly in 1986 compared with the operational tempo during 1983— 85, a period which was essentially consistent with overall operating levels since the mid-1970s. (The only exceptions to the pattern were ballistic missile submarines [SSBNs], whose operations were essentially unchanged, and intelligence collection ships [AGIs], whose operations increased significantly in some areas.) In addition, the Soviet Navy conducted its major exercises in waters close to the Soviet mainland—also a departure from exercises of recent years, which have demonstrated the Navy’s growing capabilities to expand its combat operating areas in the Atlantic and Pacific. These changes may reflect, among other things, the following:
- Economic constraints
- Increased emphasis on the Navy’s role in close-in, combined-arms operations
- Conservation of forces in preparation for an ambitious training/operating schedule in coming years
- A possible intention to develop more flexible employment options for naval forces and to increase their combat readiness to counter the U. S. Maritime Strategy’s deployment of forces near Soviet territory and SSBN operating areas at the outset of hostilities.
Submarines
Two ongoing ballistic missile submarine programs reflect the commitment to modernize and strengthen this basic arm of the Soviet Navy. These are the “Typhoon” and “Delta IV” classes. The fifth “Typhoon” hull was launched in 1986, and we expect two or three more to be built. The Soviets designed the class for warfighting endurance and survivability. The “Typhoon” carries 20 SS-N-20 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The SS-N-20 is the Soviets’ first solid-fueled SLBM equipped with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). We expect a follow- on or modification to the SS-N-20, and flight testing of such a missile could begin soon.
The fourth hull of the “Delta IV” class was launched early in 1987. This class represents a significant improvement over the “Delta III.” One of the major improvements is in the missile it carries— the SS-N-23, which became operational in early 1986. With the SS-N-23 the “Delta IV” overcomes a principal weakness of the “Delta IIT7SS-N-18 system: the latter, with shorter-range, less accurate missiles, patrol in waters more accessible to Western antisubmarine forces in order to be in position to hit targets in the continental United States. Since the SS-N-23 has greater range, “Delta IVs” can retire to waters closer to home which the Soviets believe are more secure. The Soviets may back-fit the SS-N-23 into some of their “Delta Ills,” in an attempt to modernize the force and improve its security and survivability.
The Soviets are also expected to continue to seek SLBM force improvements in weapon system reliability, higher ratios of warhead yield to reentry vehicle weight, larger throw weight, more reentry vehicles, and increased accuracy through navigation satellite updating. Follow-on or modified versions of the SS-N-20 and SS-N-23 should be more accurate, and eventually give the Soviet SLBM force a hard target capability.
In addition to modernization of their ballistic missile submarine force, the Soviets have two new long-range, land- attack, submarine-launched cruise missile programs ongoing—the SS-NX-21 and the SS-NX-24. The SS-NX-21 is similar to the U. S. Tomahawk, with a nuclear warhead and a range of 1,600 nautical miles. It should become operational at any time. Possible launch platforms for the SS-NX-21 include several classes of nuclear-powered attack submarines: “Sierra,” “Akula,” “Victor,” and “Yankee.” The Soviets have also developed a larger cruise missile, the SS- NX-24, with a converted “Yankee”- class SSGN as the test bed. It is not clear how the Soviets will add submarine- launched cruise missiles to the strategic equation. Although their program is not yet well developed, it reflects considerably more investment than a simple bargaining chip at Geneva would entail. SLCM platforms could be used against North America to supplement or substitute for the Soviets’ declining inventory of “Yankee”-class SSBNs and perform the role of “analogous response” to
NATO intermediate nuclear force deployments. The SLCMs’ primary role, however, would appear to be for theater employment against Eurasian targets.
The Soviet Navy’s newest nuclear attack submarines are probably intended primarily for antisubmarine warfare. There are currently at least three such SSN programs—“Mike,” “Sierra,” and “Akula”—but only two units of the “Sierra” and “Akula” classes and one of the “Mike” class have been launched. All three submarines are much larger than past Soviet SSNs, indicating further Soviet efforts to incorporate better sound quieting measures. Meanwhile, we believe the older “Victor III” class remains in production as well.
The sum of Soviet improvements in SSBNs and their newest generation SSNs represents a major effort to improve SSBN combat stability. In addition, the Soviets may believe the combination of greater numbers of more capable, surviv- able SSNs and SSBNs will eventually free greater numbers of older SSNs for forward operations such as:
- Extending the navy’s combat operating areas, especially for anti-SLCM missions
- Anti-SSBN operations
- Open-ocean operations against sea lines of communication
The major submarine program focused on the Soviets’ antisurface warfare mission is the “Oscar”-class SSGN, of which the Soviets now have four. The “Oscar” carries 24 long-range SS-N-19 cruise missiles.
Aircraft Carriers
Fleet air defense for ships operating beyond the range of land-based tactical air is one of the Soviet Navy’s greatest weaknesses. Overcoming this weakness is a high priority, because it affects both the combat stability of the strategic offensive force and the ability to defend the homeland from air and seaborne attack. The answer to the fleet air defense problem—as the U. S. Navy has known for decades—is the large deck carrier and its airwing. The Soviets are attempting to follow suit.
The Soviets’ first large-deck carrier is now fitting out. Shortly after the launching of the first ship, the keel was laid for
Despite the whimsical illustration, the Soviet “Yankee”-class submarine which sank in October 1986 was a victim of a fire which did not affect the nuclear reactor. See Proceedings, December 1986, pages 88 and 122.
the second of the class at the same Nikolayev shipyard on the Black Sea. The design of this class will likely evolve as did the design of the Soviet Navy’s first attempt to take modem fixed wing aviation to sea in the Kiev class. Flight deck and aircraft systems testing continues at Saki airfield in the Crimea. Catapult design, manufacturing, installation, and maintenance are the most difficult steps in building and operating a carrier. There is thus a possibility the first ship may initially appear similar to an enlarged Kiev with a vertical or short takeoff and landing (VSTOL)/helo or short takeoff/arrested landing (STOAL) airwing. Once catapult problems are solved, retrofit and upgrade of the older ship or ships could be accomplished.
The airwing will comprise the bulk of the combat power of the carrier. Even if the first ship goes to sea not quite up to design specifications, it could still carry nearly twice the number of aircraft as the Kiev class, and we expect a much more capable supersonic V/STOL follow-on to the “Forger” to be available in the early 1990s. We still expect the Soviets will find a way to take to sea an even more capable conventional takeoff and landing aircraft similar to, or derived from, their latest generation tactical aircraft such as the Su-27 “Flanker.” Meanwhile, the fourth ship of the Kiev class, the Baku, has begun sea trials.
Surface Combatants
A few common themes run throughout all Soviet surface ship construction programs. These themes reflect the problems the Soviets believe they need to solve in order to fight the war as they think it will evolve:
- Improved survivability
- More potent surface warfare/antiair/ antisubmarine capability
- Greater ship endurance
The two Soviet cruiser programs also reflect Moscow’s major concerns for ships operating in their combat areas— antiair capability plus long-range surface warfare and antisubmarine warfare. First, the nuclear-powered Kirov program continues with the third ship now fitting out and the fourth under construction in the Baltic. The second ship, named Frunze, was transferred to the Pacific Fleet, arriving there in November 1985. The Kirov was the first surface combatant to deploy with the Soviet Navy’s longest range surface-to-air missile system, the SA-N-6, and its newest long-range surface-to- surface missile system, the SS-N-19, as well as a much improved ASW suite, including “Helix” helicopters. The second and later ships of the Kirov class were upgraded to incorporate provision for the SA-NX-9 short-medium range surface- to-air missile for added antiair protection.
The second cruiser program is the conventionally powered Slava optimized for surface warfare. The second ship is operational, the third is fitting out, and the fourth is under construction. The Slava's main battery consists of 16 SS-N-12 surface-to-surface missiles, a weapon which was first deployed on the Kiev-class carrier and “Echo II”-class submarine in 1976. The Slava also incorporates within its weapons suite the new long-range SAN-6 surface-to-air missile, as well as the widely deployed point defense SA-N-4.
Two Soviet destroyer programs continue apace—the Sovremennyy, optimized for surface warfare, and the Udaloy, optimized for antisubmarine warfare. The former is the first true multipurpose destroyer the Soviets have built in years. It carries eight supersonic sea- skimming SS-N-22 missiles for surface warfare, two twin rapid-fire 130-millimeter guns for surface warfare and naval gunfire support, the SA-N-7 missile for antiair warfare, and a “Hormone B" helicopter for over-the-horizon targeting. The eighth ship of the Sovremennyy class has been launched and four more are under construction. The Udaloy carries two “Helix A” antisubmarine helicopters. The ninth ship of the class has been launched and two more are being built.
Land-Based Air
The third arm of Soviet strategic defense from seaborne attack is land-based air power. For the anti-surface mission, Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA) possesses a significant portion of the cruise missile combat power in the Soviet inventory. Additionally, SNA will probably be reinforced by Air Force units from Strategic Aviation. The steady modernization of both forces continues through replacement of older “Badger” bombers with the newest variant of the supersonic medium-range bomber, the “Backfire C.”
Soviet Naval Aviation has two fighter bomber units, one each in the Baltic Fleet and Pacific Fleet Air Forces, equipped with older “Fitter C” aircraft. SNA now also has a significant inventory of Su-24/ “Fencer E” reconnaissance fighter- bombers. The “Fencer E” is an important addition, because it can perform both a strike and a reconnaissance mission at nearly twice the range of the “Fitter.” Continued modernization of the SNA reflects, among other things, the Soviets’ respect for the improvements made to the U. S. Navy’s carrier force and concern for distribution of striking power on a variety of Tomahawk-equipped ships. In true Soviet fashion, they intend to address their concerns primarily with massive force, which will require augmentation from Soviet Air Force units assigned to Strategic Aviation.
As noted earlier, Soviet Air Force (SAF) and Naval Aviation modernization of the medium bomber force with “Backfire” continues. The conversion of older SAF Tu-95 “Bear” long-range bombers to the “Bear G” variant also continues. In addition to modernized avionics, the
The Soviet logistic support ship Berezina was damaged by a collision with the Soviet Capitan Soroka on 14 May 1986 while proceeding into the Mediterranean near Istanbul, Turkey.
years, and they appear to have settled on the Orlan class for amphibious operations trials. Both ACVs and WIGs can contribute significantly to the Soviet amphibious forces’ primary mission—rapid assault of key objectives at relatively short ranges from Soviet/Warsaw Pact bases. Northern Norway and the Baltic, Turkish, and Japanese straits all fall into this category.
Other Capabilities ■
conversion enables the “Bear G” to carry either the nuclear or conventional AS^f missiles—the same antiship missile carried by the “Backfire”—rather than the single nuclear-only AS-3 previously carried. Thus, the Soviets have bought themselves more flexibility across the spectrum of conflict. “Bear G” bombers, a Strategic Aviation asset, now routinely operate over water, and have participated in major anticarrier warfare exercises.
Strategic air defense continues to be an area of high investment priority for the Soviets. A new dimension of that capability—SAF’s first truly capable AWACS, the “Mainstay”—is being deployed. Soviet fourth generation fighters such as the Su-27 “Flanker” and MiG-29 “Fulcrum” are now entering the inventory and being operationally deployed. The “Mainstay” and the new fighters, along with their ability to integrate their operations with naval forces, would enable the Soviets to extend their much improved air defenses farther seaward. In anticipation of this improved capability, the Soviets are developing the tactics and procedures necessary to integrate naval and air forces.
The most difficult strategic defense problem facing the Soviets is how to counter Western SSBNs. The first part of this problem is how to find them. Both geography and technological difficulties constrain the Soviets from developing a long-range, open-ocean surveillance capability comparable to our own. But
ASW remains one of the Kremlin’s highest research and development priorities.
Amphibious Forces
The third major task for the Soviet Navy is to provide support to the ground battle. In this regard, the Soviet Navy’s amphibious forces could be especially effective in helping seize key straits such as the Baltic approaches and Turkish Straits. An important adjunct to such amphibious operations is a mine countermeasures capability. To perform these tasks the Soviets are building a specialized amphibious force and maintain the world’s largest mine countermeasures force.
The Soviet Navy is neither the first nor the only navy to use air cushion vehicles (ACVs) for amphibious warfare. It does have the greatest inventoiy of ACVs, including the world’s largest individual craft. In fact, the Soviets topped their own record with the introduction of the 350-ton displacement Pomornik class, first seen in Leningrad in 1985. The Pomornik can carry troops or equipment at high speeds and will probably incorporate improved air defense with Gatling guns and point defense surface-to-air missiles.
This year we may see the introduction of a unique capability into the Soviet inventory. Series production of amphibious warfare wing-in-ground (WIG) vehicles could begin soon. The Soviets have tested a variety of WIGs for over 20
Three other areas which cut across mission areas and which impact on Soviet warfighting ability deserve brief discussion. These are command, control, communication, and intelligence (C3I) programs; people, and technology transfer.
In addition to land-based space control facilities, a fleet of 12 heavily instrumented ships is maintained to control and monitor spacecraft outside the control of ground sites in the Soviet Union and to provide continuous worldwide coverage of Soviet manned space flights. This fleet is being expanded with the deployment of the Marshal Nedelin experimental auxiliary (AGE) and the construction of two new ships, a sister ship to the Marshal Nedelin and another, possibly nuclear- powered ship. Unlike other ships supporting manned space operations, the Marshal Nedelin is, and her companion probably will be, manned and operated by the Soviet Navy. This heavy investment reflects the Soviets’ commitment to the military use of space.
Intelligence upgrades which benefit the Soviet Navy can be seen close to the United States. The Soviet signals intelligence (Siglnt) collection facility at Lourdes, Cuba—the largest intelligence collection facility outside of the Soviet Union—plays a key role in Soviet intercept operations. The Soviets also continue to rely upon intelligence collection ships (AGIs) for their collection requirements. The Balzam class is the Soviets’ largest, most capable AGI, and was the first designed from the keel up for the intelligence collection role. Balzam-class deployments to date have been primarily off the U. S. East and West coasts.
Over 70% of the Soviet space program is military related. The Soviets use at least two satellite systems to provide their ships and submarines with an over-the- horizon (OTH) location and targeting capability: the electronic intelligence ocean reconnaissance satellite (EOR- SAT) and the radar ocean reconnaissance satellite (RORSAT).
The Soviets are pressing hard to solve their technical and hardware problems, and they are making good progress. People problems, however, are another mat-
ter. The “raw material” for the Soviet Navy often lacks fundamental background and skills required as a basis for rapidly learning to operate and maintain hi-tech weapons or electronic equipment. Since the Soviet sailor is a conscript and more than 75% of the force serves only two or three years, there is not much time for advanced technical training. While compulsory preinduction training and other programs are designed in part to overcome these shortfalls, officers, warrant officers, and the few senior career enlisted must take up the slack and perform many tasks performed by sailors in our Navy. For day-to-day peacetime operations and even in a short war, these personnel deficiencies may not loom as a large problem for the Soviets. In a more protracted war, however, the demands increase dramatically, and any personnel casualties among their officers, warrants, or sailors—even those with limited, narrow training—would be costly. The breadth and depth of personnel reserves available for operating or repair of equipment which would be increasingly prone to casualty are absent in the Soviet Navy. If the war does not go according to the Soviets’ plan, their readiness can be expected to suffer as hostilities drag on.
The last area which cuts across all wartime areas is technological transfer. The
Soviets’ Military Industrial Commission (VPK) coordinates efforts to acquire Western technology for the development and production of Soviet military systems. The VPK annually supplied over 1,000 Soviet military requirements during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Soviet strategic missiles, air defense, tactical forces, and weapons manufacturing capabilities benefited the most from the VPK program. For example, the Soviets gained five years in developing fire- control radars for their fourth generation fighters. Documentation on the F/A-18 fire control radar served as the technical basis for new lookdown/shootdown engagement radars.
When the Soviets acquire Western technology they streamline their procurement process, sometimes by two to three years. They save on time for research and development, and obtain improved manufacturing processes. They not only get equipment outright, but also redirect their technical approaches to ongoing programs. And the acquired information has significantly raised their technical expertise.
Operations in 1986
Turning to “peacetime” issues, the Soviet Navy serves an important role as an instrument of Kremlin foreign policy by showing the flag and demonstrating support for client states. Today, Soviet naval forces maintain a presence in the Mediterranean Sea, Indian Ocean, the South China Sea, and in the Atlantic off West Africa.
The dramatic show of support for Libya in January 1986 vividly demonstrates how the Soviet Navy can be used to support state interests. Terrorist attacks which had taken place at the Rome and Vienna airports in late December 1985 were followed quickly by accusations of Libyan support and/or involvement. Libyan fears of possible U. S. retaliation immediately began to grow, and tensions in the area swiftly reached crisis proportions. During the resulting crisis, the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron flagship remained in Tripoli and probably relayed locating data on Sixth Fleet units to the Libyans from Soviet ships monitoring our operations. This activity supplemented deliveries to Libya during 1985 of the Soviets’ longest range SAM system, the SA-5. Libya is only the second country outside the Warsaw Pact—after Syria— to receive the SA-5.
The Soviets also provided support for Libya during the U. S. Sixth Fleet’s March 1986 operations in the Gulf of Sidra. A Soviet ship remained in port in
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Tripoli in order to relay information to the Libyans and other Soviet ships shadowing each U. S. carrier. The Soviets were cautious, however, and kept their submarines well distanced from these operations. During the 15 April U. S. bombing raid, the Soviets were also extremely careful to avoid any confrontation with L. S. forces, and made obvious moves to show they were keeping their submarines and intelligence collectors out of the way.
In addition to the show of support to Libya early in the year, throughout 1986 we saw a small but notable increase in Soviet naval air deployments to Libya and Syria. The Soviets deployed 11-38/ “May” maritime patrol aircraft to Libya six times for an average stay of 37 days. “Mays” also deployed to Syria twice. “Badger” reconnaissance variant deployments to Syria have continued. These deployments are becoming almost routine—with three deployments in 1986—and fill a major gap in Soviet fleet ocean surveillance capability in the Mediterranean lacking since the Soviets left Egypt ignominiously in 1972.
Cuban ports and airfields continue to support Soviet naval task force and long- range aircraft deployments to the Caribbean. Since 1969, 26 task groups have visited Cuba—the latest during October- November 1986. This group consisted of a Kara-class guided missile cruiser, a “Kashin”-class guided missile destroyer, a “Foxtrot” diesel submarine, and an oiler. As in previous years, the task group conducted joint exercises with the Cuban Navy in the Caribbean. Soviet “Bear D” reconnaissance and “Bear F” ASW aircraft also deploy to Cuba on a regular basis.
In the Pacific, the Soviets continue to upgrade their naval base at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, and extend their area of operations and influence. They typically maintain a presence of two to three submarines (SS/SSN/SSGN) and four to five surface combatants at Cam Ranh Bay. They also continue to maintain a composite squadron of 16 Tu-16 “Badger” strike, four “Bear D” reconnaissance, and four “Bear F” antisubmarine aircraft at the airfield there. They are building storage and support facilities, perhaps to insure that all their “Badgers” which arrived in Cam Ranh three years ago have enough antiship missiles. Some of the squadron of Soviet MiG-23 “Floggers” which arrived in Cam Ranh in January 1985 began flying intercepts of U. S. reconnaissance aircraft in the South China Sea last summer. Cam Ranh Bay is the first fully developed Soviet overseas operating base and it seems the Soviets are intent on keeping it. Farther to the north, a new agreement has been reached by the Soviets with North Korea allowing overflight by Soviet military aircraft of the North Korean landmass. Both Soviet Naval Aviation and Soviet Air Force reconnaissance and strike aircraft are now making periodic overflights into the Yellow and East China Seas.
In the Indian Ocean, the Soviets have retained their considerable influence in South Yemen and their access to air and naval facilities and anchorages, despite initial appearances of a setback following the January 1986 coup in Aden. The South Yemeni political situation has by no means stabilized, however, and the threat of further internal turmoil and/or conflict with an unstable North Yemen could upset the Soviet position there. Until May 1984 the Soviets had been able to fly “Mays” out of Johannes IV airfield in Ethiopia as well as Aden. After the loss of a “May” to rebel attack in Ethiopia, they restricted their Indian Ocean operations to Aden. A new airfield may, however, be under construction in Ethiopia which will give the Soviets the kind of increased security from rebel ground attack they lacked at Johannes IV. In addition, this airfield will provide the Soviets flexibility and redundancy for antisubmarine warfare and reconnaissance missions in the Indian Ocean.
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