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Whether standing before the Japanese Parliament or his troops, as commander-in-chief of the Japanese SelfDefense Forces, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone leads a nation determined never to return to militarism.
Proceedings / March
During the four decades since World War II, Japan has long passed the stage of postwar economic recovery. However, Japan’s current prosperity has invited criticism from abroad; some say the Japanese are taking advantage of a “free ride” in defense, and the call for a stepped-up defense effort is heard both inside and outside the country. At the same time, there is a strong opposing view that Japan should never again tread the path of militarism.
Amid the prevailing mood of pacifism in Japan after the devastation of World War II, the new “peace” constitution went into effect on 3 May 1947. It barred the Japanese from having standing armed forces. General Douglas MacArthur and his staff were said to have drafted the highly idealistic constitution.
After the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, General MacArthur addressed a letter to Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida requesting the creation of a 75,000-man National Reserve Force, and the addition of a coast guard unit of
- men to the Maritime Safety Agency. General MacArthur was interested in the rearmament of Japan, at least long enough for it to acquire a self-defense capability.
The Japan-U. S. Security Treaty was signed together with the Peace Treaty in San Francisco in September 1951. On 1 July 1954, with the addition of an air-defense unit, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDFs) were established. Their mission of defending the country against direct and indirect aggression was now clearly defined.
In May 1957, the Japanese Government adopted the Basic Policy for National Defense, thereby establishing Japan’s defense objectives. Under successive buildup plans, the SDFs were continuously expanded and improved. In October 1976, the government issued the National Defense Program Outline, which set forth a peacetime minimum defense requirement to be maintained at all 94 times. The Mid-term Defense Buildup Program was started in September 1985 and is under way now. The current SDFs qualitatively, though not quantitatively- make up one of the best armed forces in the world. They also reflect the world’s eighth largest defense budget on a dollar basis. These forces owe much of what they stand fof today to the assistance of the U. S. Government.
The National Defense Program Outline stated that:
“Should direct aggression occur, Japan will reps' such aggression at the earliest possible stage by taking immediate responsive action and trying to conduct an integrated, systematic operation of its defense capabih ity. Japan will repel limited and small scale aggression, in principle, without external assistance.
“In cases where the unassisted repelling of aggreS' sion is not feasible, due to scale, type or other factors of such aggression, Japan will continue an unyielding resistance by mobilizing all available forces until such time as cooperation from the United States is intro' duced, thus rebuffing such aggression.”
The Japanese Government has repeatedly asserted its policy of denying the right of collective defense, barring the overseas deployment of the SDFs, upholding the Three Nonnuclear Principles—not producing, not possessing, and not introducing nuclear weapons—and prohibiting the export of arms.
The all-volunteer SDFs now maintain 245,000 person' nel, a relatively small number for a country of Japan s economic stature. The Ground Self-Defense Force has
- troops, maintaining 13 infantry divisions, includ' ing an armored division and eight Hawk surface-to-ah missile (SAM) brigades. It also maintains 1,110 main bat' tie tanks, the mainstay being the domestic T-74. Some o’ the U. S.-supplied firearms are obsolescent.
19*7
The Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) is composed
- personnel. Its equipment consists of 51 escort l Ps and 15 submarines for a total of 255,000 tons, and aircraft, including the P-3C Orion. The term “escort . ■J'P” is commonly used instead of “destroyer.” Since the SC)F has concentrated mainly on its ability to conduct jjntisubmarine warfare, it has weak surface-to-air and sur- ace~to-surface capabilities.
The Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) consists of 45,000 ?en> who make up 10 interceptor squadrons, 3 support *8hter squadrons, and 6 Nike SAM groups. It has 322 ^°mbat aircraft, the mainstay being the F-15. The E-2C awkeye has been introduced to complement the base air efense ground environment warning and control system, jhiaircraft weaponry is in short supply at the ASDF bases ®re shelters for aircraft are almost nonexistent.
0j, Gaining for the SDF personnel is hampered by the lack training and exercise areas, limited fuel availability, rnd restricted training hours because of noise abatement frictions, particularly in densely populated areas. How- Ver. their level of skill is still rather high, as demon- _ rated by their excellent performance both at the annual 'ssile-launching exercise held at the McGregor Firing ange |n jqew Mexico, and at the RimPac exercise held in ne Western Pacific.
is '*e ^aPan s defense expenditure for fiscal year 1986 I ^20.9 billion (U. S.—converted at 160 yen = one dol- (Ck 'v^1'c^1 *s 0-993% of the gross national product e the figure certainly does not compare with the Q^ditures by other Western powers (7.4% of the U. S. ^ T, 5.5% of the U. K., 4.2% of the French, and 3.4% of yest German). Despite reports of Prime Minister asuhiro Nakasone’s draft budget for fiscal year 1987 GNp aPProximately $22 billion (U. S.) or 1.004% of rj ’ much more is being made of breaking this 1 % barr than it deserves.
SYGMA (MAT SUMOTO)
In November 1976,. the Japanese Government set a 1% ceiling on defense expenditures for planning purposes for fear of a large increase. Japan’s allies regard this as too low. There is an ongoing argument on increasing this percentage. The Japanese people are well aware that their survival depends on cooperation with other nations of the world, and they are also aware that some think they are on a free ride. Nevertheless, Japan was able to achieve today’s affluence only through total devotion to its economic recovery after the war. The Japanese appreciate the fact that their prosperity would not have been possible if they had chosen to invest a heavier chunk of their resources in the country’s defense.
The SDFs’ logistics capability is inadequate. Former Defense Agency Director General Akagi said he would like to see the SDFs maintain a minimum three-month ammunition stock on a wartime requirement basis. Yet the current stocks are probably adequate for only one month.
Reserves and spare stocks of equipment and repair material are extremely low as the year-by-year procurement is based on the previous year’s consumption rate. This is under the government’s single fiscal year formula.
Despite commercial success, development in military technology is lagging. The budget for research and development accounted for only 1.7% of the total defense budget in fiscal year 1986. There is no joint research program on military technology between the government and academic institutions.
The government views the raison d'etre of the SDFs as being tied in with the country s constitution. The constitution bans the maintenance of war potential but not the maintenance of a minimum force necessary for the exercise of the right of self-defense.
This concept of self-defense forms the basis-of Japan’s national policy. According to the Japan-U. S. Security
Treaty, the forces of Japan and the United States would act to meet a common danger only when an armed attack against either party in the territories under the administration of Japan is recognized as dangerous to Japan’s peace and safety. In addition, Japan will neither act in collective defense permitted under the United Nations Charter nor participate in any international surveillance and police forces dispatched by the United Nations.
In the immediate postwar years, the nation’s opinions were divided between advocates of unarmed neutrality and those calling for armament for self-defense. Even today, scholarly opinions are divided regarding the legal interpretation of Article 9. A schoolboy would not read the article as explicitly providing Japan with the right of selfdefense. As such, Japan should not, as a strict constitutional nation, expand the scope of interpretation of its constitution by creating conditions through a fait accompli, leaving the wording of the relevant article unchanged.
The SDFs do not meet all the requirements normally associated with military forces. The soldiers are not defined as military personnel but are designated as special civil servants. As with other military forces, the SDF soldiers wear uniforms and badges, but in all other respects except medical care they receive equal treatment with other government employees. There are none of the special decorations, premium pension plans, or special welfare systems that are usually provided for military personnel. To change the old image of prewar Imperial Military Forces, the SDF ranks have been given new names, although conventional military ranks are still used in referring to the military personnel of other countries.
There is no system of courts-martial. And there are no laws governing protection of secrets except for the weapons delivered from the United States, although there is a movement to create a new law. Martial law, needed for the maintenance of public order in an extreme emergency, does not exist. There are no detailed regulations regarding the expropriation of material, facilities, or land, nor regarding the control of communications and traffic in times
of an emergency, although there are general outlines.
Civilian control is thoroughly enforced. The prime minister is the commander-in-chief of the SDFs. Within the Defense Agency, civilian personnel enjoy superiority over their uniformed counterparts in status and in authority in such matters as planning, budget, and personnel affairs- Senior uniformed members of the SDFs have few occasions to present reports to the Prime Minister on the SDF’s status.
Former Prime Minister Yoshida said that the SDFs are military forces short of war potential. When Prime Minister Nakasone was director general, he was known to have stressed that the “SDFs are not military forces; SDFs are SDFs.’’
For all the rhetoric, however, the SDFs are, both in appearance and in substance, an armed mass of men capable of fighting an enemy. Since the establishment of the SDFs, the leftist parties have lost no opportunity in the Diet in expressing their doubts about the constitutionality of their existence. In fact, a lower court has ruled the forces unconstitutional.
Today, the circumstances have changed somewhat- According to an opinion poll conducted by the Prime Minister’s office in 1984, 83% of the respondents said they thought it was better to have SDFs; and 63% considered “maintenance of the security of the country” as the SDFs^ role, while 17% chose “maintenance of public order, and 14% “disaster relief operations.” When asked about the role in which they thought the SDFs had proven most useful, 81% singled out “disaster relief operations- These surveys suggest that the Japanese people recognize the need for the SDFs.
The plan to move the airfield for night landing practice for the U. S. Seventh Fleet aircraft from Atsugi to Miyake Island has almost no possibility of succeeding, because o the island residents’ opposition to the noise problem. Un' like many other countries, Japan is still some distance from reaching the stage where national defense is accepted without controversy.
Japan’s unhappy experience as the only victim of the atomic bomb in the world brought about the strong aversion the Japanese have for nuclear weapons. Today, their sense of civil defense is extremely low, and there are virtually no nuclear shelters in the country.
Japan has not only ratified the Treaty on Non-Prolitera' tion of Nuclear Weapons, but maintains the policy of the Three Nonnuclear Principles. These principles make Japan’s situation considerably different from that of West
Germany, which permits the presence of U. S. nuclear weapons.
Regarding the nuclear umbrella, Japan is totally dependent on the United States. There have been charges that U. S. ships equipped with nuclear weapons may have called at Japanese ports. The government maintains that it did not believe the ships were carrying nuclear weapons because their introduction would have required prior consultation between the two governments and no such consultations have been made.
When the battleship New Jersey (BB-62) arrived at the port of Sasebo on 24 August 1986 equipped with cruise missiles, there were demonstrations expressing suspicions of the presence of nuclear weapons.
This situation, however, seems to elude many foreign observers, who still believe that Japan may go nuclear. In a survey of American intellectuals conducted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in January 1983, 50% responded that they believed that Japan would have nuclear weapons in the future.
In my opinion, the people will continue to have an intense aversion to going nuclear. And the government is unlikely to change its position for many years to come.
Japan’s financial deficits will continue to restrain the growth of defense expenditures. Increases in oil prices have had an enormous impact on the Japanese economy as well. Inflated during the period of high economic growth, the government’s budget has been chronically in a deficit since the national economy entered a period of so-called low economic growth. In compiling the budget for fiscal year 1987, the government directed the ministries and agencies to observe an across-the-board strict ceiling of less than the amount of the previous year in their request for allocations. This has been done for the past five consecutive years. Even so, among the few exceptions was the request for defense expenditures.
Japan occupied countries in Southeast Asia during World War II. Despite well-intended political management in some areas, Japan’s ventures left scars in these countries. Their animosity toward Japan makes them apprehensive about the possibility of a resurgence of Japanese militarism.
Considering this situation, Japan should not, and need not, expand defensive capabilities that would add the slightest degree of anxiety or become a threat to the people of Asia.
Japan’s experience of external control of its domestic affairs is limited to the period of lenient U. S. occupation in the postwar years. The Japanese perception, therefore, of an external threat is less immediate than even the Americans’ against the Soviets.
On the one hand, Japan is highly dependent on the
Ocean Air Defense Japanese Style
By Kensuke Ebata
Japan’s ocean air defense may be unique, since Japan does not have any conventional aircraft carriers. In addition, Japan has no forward strategy, because the Japanese islands themselves are the forward edge of the Free World.
The Japanese ocean air defense encompasses general and integrated air defense activities to protect the so-called 1,000-nautical mile sea-lanes. Geographically and geopolitically, Japan should be the front line in protecting the Pacific Ocean for free use by the Western world. Japan itself has to import about 600 million tons of materials and food a year. In a crisis situation, Japan would need a minimum of 200 million tons, which requires tens of thousands of 20,000-ton cargo ships a year or about 30 20,000-ton cargo ships a day. The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF), finding it almost impossible to escort convoys effectively in a war situation, has developed a sea-lanes defense concept.
Japanese sea-lane defense is similar to NATO’s—keep a few sea-lanes open for the free transit of merchant ships by deploying several antisubmarine warfare/ antiair warfare (ASW/AAW) forces along both sides of the sea-lanes.
Two imaginary ocean roads are established as vital sea-lanes. The southwestern sea-lane runs along the southwestern islands, including the Ryukyu islands from the southern tip of Kyushu Island and stretching to the eastern side of Taiwan. The southeastern sea-lane begins in the mouth of Tokyo Bay and connects the Izu islands and Iwo Jima. The former is the main sea route carrying raw materials and crude oil from Southeast Asia and the
Middle East. The latter stretches to Guam, which is the western end of the major logistic sea-lane from the West Coast of the United States, covering Hawaii and Wake Island.
The JMSDF shifted its warfare priority from ASW to AAW in the mid-1970s. Although the service’s main task is still to protect merchant ships from enemy submarines, AAW capability has been emphasized since the Soviets began deploying Tu-22M Backfire bombers to the Far East in the mid-1970s. Today, more than 85 Backfires are deployed in the Far East.1
With this threat of attack by antiship missiles from the air, the JMSDF decided to modify the composition of its new flotillas. Originally, each flotilla was to include two helicopter-carrying destroyers (DDHs), each carrying three large HSS-2 ASW helicopters; one guided missile destroyer (DDG) for the air defense role; and five multipurpose destroyers (DDs). However, the new flotilla organization calls for each fleet to consist of one DDH, two DDGs, and five DDs—and each DD will carry one large ASW helicopter. This new composition will have eight ships and eight large ASW helicopters, three on the DDH and five on the five DDs. The JMSDF has four escort flotillas today.
This change emphasizes an antiaircraft capability, especially against a multiple threat from antiship missiles (ASMs). At least two DDGs would be required to cope with the multiple air threat for area air defense, and each ship, except the DDGs, is equipped with a NATO Sea Sparrow point defense missile system.
Later, 20-mm. Mk-15 Vulcan/PhalanX close-in weapon systems were added to augment the ships’ self-defense capability, mainly to counter sea-skimming antiship missiles.
The building program for these new destroyers has been slow but steady, and the last of the planned four DDHs (two Haruna class and two Shirane class) was commissioned in 1981. Twelve of the 20 required DDGs (12 Hatsuyuki-dass and 8 Asagiri class) have been completed or are fitting out, and the first ship of the Asagiri class was launched in the fall of 1986. However, the construction of the DDGs has been delayed, mainly because of budget restrictions. Only five of the required DDGs were in service by the end of 1986. (These were three ships of the Tachikaze class, the single ship of the Amatsukaze class, and the first Hatakaze class). Three of the remaining four required DDGs were completed by 1986; the remaining five, including the one to replace the aging Amatsukaze, the firs* JMSDF DDG commissioned in 1965, are awaiting authorization for construction-
In the early 1980s, the JMSDF took an aggressive attitude toward ocean air defense. They began to consider the possibility of introducing the U. S. Aegis aif defense system. An Aegis destroyer- centered system had been discussed in the early 1980s, but a more integrated ocean air defense concept has emerged.
This new concept not only includes JMSDF air defense systems (mainly ships) but also Japanese Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) and ground-based^ airborne early warning systems.
Early warning, which is the key to ef-
98
Proceedings / March 19^