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The new MIRVed M-4 missiles now entering the French SSBN fleet give France a 4,000-mile nuclear reach. And this is but one improvement to this independent European power’s nuclear forces.
The French government’s loi de programmation (program law) for the modernization of the French nuclear forces is almost as ambitious as the Reagan Administration s nuclear modernization program. The modernization program effected in 1984 is a display of France’s determination to maintain independent nuclear forces into the twenty-first century.
National nuclear forces have occupied a central position in French defense planning and strategy for the past two decades. The French contend that their security can be divorced from that of their European neighbors because of the French “sanctuary” created by these strategic nuclear forces. Although the French Government has never excluded the possibility of its participation in the defense of Western Europe, it refuses to define the circumstances under which France would participate. The tension between the desire for independence and the self-recognition of interdependence has been a constant factor in French military doctrine.
Unlike U. S. doctrine, French doctrine blurs the distinction between strategic and theater nuclear forces. For ease of explanation, however, the following breakdown of French nuclear forces uses the U. S. distinction between strategic and theater or tactical forces.
Strategic Nuclear Forces: The current French strategic nuclear forces consist of a triad of 18 land-based, intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), equipped with single one-megaton warheads; six strategic ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), armed with 16 submarine-launched l ballistic missiles (SLBMs); and 34 Mirage IV-P land- | based strike aircraft, 18 of which will carry the ASMP 9 (French Airsol-Moyenne-Portee) air-to-surface nuclear
missiles. IRBMs and SLBMs contain 98% of the megatonnage and 74% of the warheads in the French strategic forces. The bulk of strategic firepower resides in the six SSBNs, which carry 80% of the megatonnage and 60% of the warheads in the French strategic forces.
The nuclear forces modernization program will update each leg of France’s strategic triad, with the most important aspect being the introduction of the M-4 missile in five of the six SSBNs which began in 1985 and is scheduled to be completed in 1992. The M-4 is a multiple inde- pendently-targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV)-configured missile carrying six 150-kiIoton TN70 warheads to a range greater than 4,000 kilometers (km). France is developing a new warhead, the TN71, with more penetration capability and improved yield-to-weight ratio that will increase the M-4’s range to more than 6,000 km.
With the introduction of MIRVed M-4 missiles and the sixth SSBN, the French SLBM inventory will increase from 80 in 1985 to nearly 500 in 1992—a significant improvement that will introduce new possibilities for force employment.
Finally, the program calls for a seventh SSBN of a new, quieter design equipped with a new missile, the M-5, to enter service in the mid-1990s. It will replace the first French SSBN rather than increase the total force size. The first SSBN, Le Redoutable, will retire from service in 1997, three years after the planned entry into service of the seventh SSBN.
The program updates the air element of France’s strategic triad with the introduction into the operational fleet of the Mirage 2000N in 1988. The 2000Ns will complement the 18 Mirage IV-Ps equipped with ASMPs. France’s strategic aircraft would require refueling from 11 KC-135 tankers to reach targets in the Soviet Union. Therefore, even though the Mirage 2000N is an improvement over the IV-P, it is still not considered a strategic bomber by U. S. definition.
Finally, France’s vulnerable silo-based S-3 IRBMs will be joined in 1996 by the road-mobile, air-transportable SX IRBM. The SX is expected to have a range comparable to the S-3’s 3,500 km. The SX’s mobility will increase the survivability of the third leg of France’s triad, by allowing it to be moved from central operating bases during crises. The program does not specify the number of SXs to be built.
The strategic modernization program will not change France’s strategic force structure. At the end of this century, France will still depend heavily on ballistic missiles, and the bulk of its warheads and destructive power will reside in its strategic submarine force.
Theater and Tactical Nuclear Forces: French theater and tactical nuclear forces consist of 42 Pluton short-range
By the mid-1990s, a seventh, quieter SSBN will replace the first, Le Redoutable, right. Because of the M-4 SLBM’s range, France’s SSBNs now can employ their own “bastion” strategy that better protects them from the Soviet ASW threat.
ballistic missiles (SRBMs); about 75 land-based strike aircraft; and more than 100 carrier-based attack aircraft. Pluton SRBMs, organized in five regiments of three batteries with two launchers, are based in eastern France. The Plu- ton’s range (20-120 km) limits its ability to attack Warsaw Pact forces unless those forces enter West German territory. Thus, whenever France authorizes the use of its Plutons, Warsaw Pact forces will soon be on West German or Belgian soil. Each French nuclear-capable tactical aircraft can carry one or two ANT52 15 kiloton free-fall homhs Tactical aircraft carrv 81% of France’s tactical
nuclear warhead delivery capability and 86% of its tactical megatonnage.
Modernizing the French theater nuclear forces involves two basic elements: the introduction of the ASMP supersonic air-to-ground, medium-range missile into the French Air Force on the Mirage 2000N and into the French Navy °n the modified Super Etendard aircraft; and the introduction of the Hades SRBM missile into the French Army.
The ASMP began testing on the Mirage 2000N in 1986. The Mach 2.5 missile carries a 100-150 kiloton warhead a range of 100 km at low altitude or 300 km at high altitude. The ASMP gives French tactical aircraft a stand- °ff capability, thus improving their survivability and abil- hy to deliver weapons through Soviet and Warsaw Pact air defenses. Altogether there will be 85 ASMP-capable Mirage 2000N aircraft; 36 to be delivered by 1988, and 49 after 1988. The 2000N aircraft include terrain-following mdar for low-altitude penetration, and will have a range of *,800 km with two 1,700-liter drop tanks. The payload c°nsists of a single ASMP.
% the early 1990s, 53 French Navy Super Etendards MU be ASMP-capable. These ASMP-capable aircraft will e based on France’s two aircraft carriers, to enhance the survivability of the French theater nuclear forces. By bas- m§ the two carriers in Toulon, the French have positioned em to support other French theater forces in Central burope.
The theater modernization program also calls for the ^placement of the French Army’s short-range (maximum 0 km) Pluton missiles with longer range, mobile (maxi- ^am 350 km) Hades missiles, which will give the army a eep-interdiction capability against Soviet and Warsaw act operational maneuver groups for the first time. The jb'ssile’s greater mobility (when compared with the Plu- °n) will improve survivability.
th "^le Trench defense modernization plan supplements .ese strategic and theater force developments with two 'gnificant improvements in the command, control, and ^Ornmunications (C3) area: the strategic communications etwork will be hardened; and, by 1988, France will de- °y an airborne communications relay similar to the U. S. avy s TACAMO (take charge and move out) relay called starte. The C3 elements of the plan will improve commutation reliability with French nuclear forces, j.. The French Government’s nuclear defense posture will .‘kely remain constant, despite qualitative improvements j?n caPability, survivability, and flexibility of their nuclear °rces—all 0f which offer new options to defense planet's. This is because proportional deterrence and auton- y in defense matters—especially nuclear ones—are ic |ely accepted across the full spectrum of France’s polit- s- Parbes. Nevertheless, careful observers can see three *gns that France will rethink questions of both nuclear conventi°nal force employment: ronce has become increasingly concerned about the Q improvements in Soviet theater nuclear capability in Warsaw Pact conventional capability. These im- nu°yementS lBreaten the credibility of NATO’s planned an Car resPonse t0 conventional attacks. The preponder- e of Soviet nuclear forces in Europe could result in nuclear blackmail of the West. And Warsaw Pact conventional forces now may even be able to neutralize NATO’s nuclear capability without resorting to nuclear weapons. Improvements in Soviet firepower and force modernization may make a purely conventional attack the first choice of the Soviet Union. Soviet improvements and delayed allied retaliatory actions are pushing France toward greater involvement in all of Europe’s defense, instead of just its own.
- France exhibits growing concern regarding Soviet theater nuclear capabilities in Europe. Soviet theater nuclear modernization has created a European “strategic” environment in which NATO is definitely outgunned. France’s consistent outspoken support for the 1979 two-track decision and for U. S. Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missile deployments in Europe reflects French concern for the growing nuclear imbalance in Europe.
- The French are greatly improving their strategic systems, concentrating on the SSBN force and the SX missile. These improvements will strengthen the countervalue aspect of French deterrence, and ensure that French forces remain a credible deterrent—excluded from any superpower arms control negotiations—in the face of Soviet nuclear and conventional force modernization. Soviet actions during the debate over the 1979 NATO two-track decision convinced France that the Soviet Union was willing to use its military superiority to achieve political goals. France, therefore, considers its own force modernization as especially important in the maintenance of French military credibility as a deterrent, and as a European counterweight to Soviet attempts to use nuclear forces for political leverage.
In the near term, the major expansion in French strategic forces will occur in the SLBM force. The number of warheads will increase from 80 to 496 in the SLBM force; equivalent megatonnage (EMT) will increase from 80 to 270, which meets earlier criteria for destroying 20-25% of the Soviet population and 50-66% of Soviet industrial capacity in a second strike.
While this growth does not necessarily presage a change in French countervalue targeting policy, it will give the French increased flexibility. Since 1983, France has maintained 60% of its SSBNs at sea, where they are least vulnerable. Thus, in 1992 France will be capable of maintaining about 290 warheads and 160 EMT at sea, compared to 48 warheads and 48 EMT today.
The greater number of warheads makes a multiple- strike strategy possible. The French have not discussed this strategy much, perhaps because it resembles the U. S. doctrine of flexible response, which France has traditionally rejected. Instead, the French appear to have expanded their countervalue targeting criteria and goals.
Through official statements and other authoritative announcements, the French have established their strategic targeting criteria to cause greater damage to the adversary s population and economic potential than France would suffer in a nuclear exchange. The SLBM force resulting from the modernization program will easily exceed these criteria, and will give France the capability of damaging and possibly crippling the Soviet Union’s civil and
In the air: The ASMP gives French Air Force Mirage 2000Ns a stand-off capability, enabling them to penetrate hostile air defenses more effectively; French Navy Super Etendards will carry ASMPs by the early 1990s. In the ground: Encased in steel and reinforced concrete, the French strategic S-3 IRBM is considered vulnerable and will be replaced by the SX IRBM in the mid-1990s.
economic infrastructure, and thus its ability to recover from war. This raises the deterrent value of the French strategic forces, because the Soviet Union must now consider war termination and postwar domination on the terms of an undamaged United States.
Moreover, the greater number of survivable warheads in the SLBM force counterbalances the ongoing upgrading of Moscow’s anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system. They cannot, however, offer protection against a nationwide Soviet ABM system that would force France to restrict its attack to a limited number of targets.
The increased range of the M-4 missile (potentially more than 6,000 km with the TN71 warhead), compared with that of the M-20 (3,000 km), will provide two significant advantages for France’s SSBN force. The SSBNs’ missiles will be within range of their targets a greater percentage of the time. Today, an SSBN equipped with M-20 missiles and based at lie Longue must move into the Norwegian Sea to be within range of Soviet targets. The M-4 missile will enable French SSBNs at sea near their home port to threaten Soviet targets.
The M-4’s increased range also increases submarine survivability, allowing the submarine to patrol a larger area and still be within range of Soviet targets. The larger operating area for the SSBN complicates antisubmarine warfare (ASW) efforts to detect, localize, and track it. It also eliminates the need for noisy transits at high speeds to and from patrol areas, a time when submarines are more susceptible to detection. Finally, it allows the submarine to operate in a bastion off the French coasts or farther out to sea. There are five factors that make the bastion option attractive:
► In many conventional war scenarios, the North Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea are expected to be the scene of aggressive allied and Soviet ASW efforts. Obviously, French SSBNs would be more secure from attack if they
were removed from the areas of ASW efforts of friends and foes alike.
- Soviet ASW capability, although inferior to NATO’s, is improving. In anticipation of further Soviet improvements, France should consider operating its submarine force farther from Soviet ASW efforts.
- The French Navy can deploy ASW-capable aircraft and
ability
ships in support of its SSBNs more effectively in areas close to France, which would in turn protect France’s mar- hime approaches.
' Concentrating pro-SSBN forces close to France would Permit more effective countering of the anti-SSBN mining threat.
^ Operating the SSBNs close to France would simplify communications with them in a stressed environment. The Astarte element of the modernization program would also help improve communications.
. |n French strategic thought, theater nuclear weapons are 'ntimately linked to strategic nuclear weapons. Theater nuclear weapons have no warfighting role in French doc- h'tne, because using them would demonstrate France’s determination to use strategic weapons against an aggresSor- This reasoning fits with the French contention that Possession of nuclear weapons makes France a sanctuary, and, therefore, it is unnecessary to commit French forces to the defense of Europe in advance. However, for the first hote under the nuclear force modernization program, fance will have the forces to intervene effectively outside th ^rance- The Hades missiles stationed in France will .hreaten targets in the Warsaw Pact countries, thus remove's the political liabilities of moving Pluton missiles onto v’est German territory.
The ASMP will introduce standoff supersonic missile CaPability into French tactical aircraft, improving their l'urvivability and ability to penetrate Warsaw Pact de- enses. The Super Etendard, operating from carriers based 'n the western Mediterranean, will create an entirely dif- erent attack axis than that of the Mirage aircraft operating r°m France, thus complicating Warsaw Pact defense P anning. And although considered a strategic weapon, e rnobile SX IRBM can also play a theater role. With a 00-km range, it threatens key targets throughout the arsaw Pact countries and western Soviet Union. This to attack rear echelon targets and follow-on forces in the gray area between theater and strategic missions complements the shorter range French missile and aircraft systems, and threatens the Warsaw Pact’s operational maneuvering group strategy.
Today’s French tactical nuclear forces have limited capabilities, but the modernized nuclear forces will permit the adoption of tactical counterforce targeting against the Warsaw Pact. Such targets could include military transportation nodes, airfields, command bunkers, other C3 facilities, and concentrations of troops and armor. The mobility of the ASMP-carrying aircraft, the Hades, and the SX missile makes these systems less vulnerable, particularly against Soviet conventional attack options.
Even though these tactical nuclear force developments appear to be pushing the French into closer cooperation with NATO, France has not made an automatic commitment to fight side-by-side with NATO. In fact, the French Government took two steps in the past few years that seem to deliberately underline this point: it created its own centralized army tactical nuclear command directly under the army chief of staff; and it replaced the NATO phrase armes nucleates tacticqaes (tactical nuclear weapons) with armes pre-strategiques (pre-strategic weapons). The French are determined to remain outwardly independent of NATO and to maintain that the use of theater nuclear weapons demonstrates a willingness to escalate to strategic nuclear weapons. For essentially domestic political reasons, the French will maintain a constancy in declaratory policy, while continuing to mask the evolution in their strategic and theater force employment capabilities.
Commissioned in 1962, Captain Hyland served six sea tours in nuclear submarines, including command of Abraham Lincoln (SSBN-602) and Sam Houston (SSN-609). His shore duty included tours as an Olmsted Scholar, as a Federal Executive Fellow, and in the Strategic and Theater Nuclear Warfare Division of the Navy staff. He is now the U. S. Naval Attache in Paris.
--------------------------------------------------------- Is Pilot’s Job_____________ _ _______ __
One day in a Brazilian harbor, a ferryboat changed course and headed toward our ship. The officer-of-the-deck (OOD) picked up the bridge-to-bridge radio to warn off the ferry, but our Brazilian habor pilot spoke up. “No, please," he protested in English, “Is pilot’s job to talk with ferry. Portuguese is difficult language. We do not want mistakes.” The OOD handed the radio to him, admitting that he did not even know the Portuguese word for ferryboat. And we all felt secure about our pilot’s translating skills—until he picked up the radio and began, “Ferryboata . . . Ferry- boata ...”
Lieutenant Kevin J. Delaney, U. S. Navy ----- Sky Pilot on the Wheel________________________________
One good way for a chaplain to gain recognition on board a new ship is to take a turn acting as helmsman. I took one turn on the wheel of the destroyer HMCS Iroquois that had an unexpected ending. We were approaching San Juan, Puerto Rico. All was uneventful until the pipe for “special sea dutymen to close up” was made, and I was relieved by a rather surprised coxswain. As I approached the bridge, 1 noticed that HMCS Huron had, as befits a junior ship, taken station astern of us. When I reached the bridge, the Iroquois's Captain beckoned to me. With a twinkle in his eye, he told me that he had messaged the Huron: “Pardon my steering, but my sky pilot is at the helm.”
Very quickly, he added, a return message had been received: “We hope he does better with your souls.”
Dr. H. Irvine Hare, Canadian Navy (Retired)