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Naval Intelligence wasn't ready in 1941. But despite early weaknesses—and aviators who'd rather carry one more bomb than a camera—the specialists who took the photos, labored over stereo viewers, and formed the rubber terrain models, like the one above, made sure our naval forces were reatfy for the ensuing battles in the Pacific.
Station, Anacostia, and Commander Quackenbush vvaS-
good eyesight and meet the security qualifications f°r
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor accelerated ^,
IF I
sti*
On 10 June 1940, Rear Admiral Ernest J. King, member of the General Board of the Navy, sent a memo to the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) entitled “Are We Ready?—State of Readiness of ONI.” The response to the admiral’s memo painted a bleak picture: The naval intelligence service was sorely lacking in the funds, personnel, material, and training necessary to provide adequate intelligence for naval operations in the event of war.
Later that month, Navy Department bureau representatives gathered for a conference on the subject of photography in the Fleet Training Office. At the time, the Navy enjoyed an excellent relationship with the major motion picture studios in Hollywood. Marion Cooper, a motion picture executive, flier, and former Navyman, suggested that the Navy enlist the help of the film industry to support fleet training. Captain Willis A. Lee, then-assistant director of Fleet Training, was interested and the Navy issued a directive calling for the enrollment of Navy photographic units in fleet training programs and the use of aerial photography for photo interpretation. Studio executives welcomed the officers sent to Hollywood for training, and photographic experts and technicians taught the officers the finer points of cinematography. The Hollywood experts, however, knew little about aerial photography and photo interpretation techniques.
Meanwhile, in London, Rear Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, the U. S. naval attache, witnessed the vital intelligence the British extracted from aerial photos taken over enemy-held territory. With the occupation of the greater part of Europe by the Nazis and the resulting loss of many agents and other sources of intelligence, the British had to resort to aerial photo collection and interpretation methods to derive the day-to-day intelligence information vital to the survival of the United Kingdom.
The main British photo interpretation effort, along with the photo interpretation school, was organized as the Central Interpretation Unit (CIU) and located in Dansfield House, Medmenham, a palatial mansion on the north bank of the Thames between Marlow and Henley. This photo interpretation effort operated around the clock.
Admiral Ghormley obtained permission from the British for an American to attend the photo interpretation school and to observe the photo interpretation effort. The U. S. Navy Bureau of Aeronautics selected Lieutenant Commander Robert S. Quackenbush, Jr., a Naval Academy graduate, naval aviator, and a graduate of the Naval School of Photography at Pensacola, Florida, for the assignment. In the spring of 1941, after being briefed by Admiral Ghormley, Commander Quackenbush reported for the class at CIU. The U. S. representative was the only person actually quartered in the Medmenham mansion—a house supposedly haunted by a lady ghost, who was frequently seen dressed for a formal party or for playing tennis.
Commander Quackenbush attended all the photo interpretation classes and visited the interpretation units
to gather available source materials, anticipating the necessity to establish a similar course and organizatio11 within the U. S. Navy. He also recommended that a ditional U. S. naval officers be assigned to attend the school. Soon, Marine Captains Charles H. Cox and Gooderham L. McCormick were en route to England attend subsequent CIU classes. .
Upon his return to the United States in August 1? ’ Commander Quackenbush met with Chief of Naval or tions (CNO) Admiral Harold R. Stark, and recommended that the Navy establish a school as soon as possible to train officers in the science of photo pretation. After addressing the problems that would encountered in establishing a U. S. Navy photo _
intrepretation school, Commander Quackenbush made , ^
Stark authorized the establishment of a photo interp1 tion school under the Bureau of Aeronautics on 12 “ tember 1941. The school was located at the Naval A
named officer-in-charge. Captains Cox and McCorn1’1 became executive officer and chief instructor, respec' j tively. The first class was scheduled to commence °n January 1942. j.
Criteria for the selection of candidates were demal1 ing. Each candidate had to have a “sound, thorough educational background,” possess a college degree- have a specialized knowledge of architecture, geol°rj engineering, “or a similar closely related field,” ani be 21 to 29 years old. The candidates also had to h*1' handling classified photography. It was determined 150 photo interpreters would be trained plan for the school and increased the quota of intefP ers to be trained to 500. The initial class of 19 Nav?
and eight Marine Corps officers reported to Anaco5’ for the eight-week course on 5 January 1942. Ensig11 Clifton K. Mulinaux, a student in the first class, te' j members that the curriculum included using stereoscopes and technical aids to photo interpretation, d£ mining scale from aerial photography, plotting
— Th •
the ;nne admiral wanted photo intelligence to support Scligj asi°n of Guadalcanal in the Solomons Island recaiie ,e^ 50r * August. Commander Quackenbush later 'Verg ’ Hell, I didn’t know where the Solomons less Guadalcanal.” When Commander did not h Us^ complained to Admiral Ghormley that he such a .Ve aircraft, cameras, or equipment for 'v'th „ .rTUss'°n, the admiral replied, “Don’t bother me If thln0r details.”
'vas thg 111051 striking feature of the war in the Pacific frighten'Vastness of the theater of operations, the most lng aspect was the. United States’s unfamiliarity
Uljp j^rt|Phic sorties, making mosaics, map reading, t°gra^'ng. learning the elementary principles of pho- instali metry’ ar*d recognizing military and industrial defenatl0ns’ aircraft, shipping, camouflage activity, Caaier.eS’ ant* electronics. The course also covered the instri|c(S etnPl°yed in reconnaissance, along with basic Miijjn l0n 0n constructing three-dimensional models. C°uld kUX n°teS l^at ^e required interpretation tools In j e carried in an attache case.
OrdersUtle 1942, Commander Quackenbush received li°n u0 set UP the Navy’s first field photo interpreta- ates of",'0 t*le South Pacific. He took 13 recent gradu- ■bg jn J.ae Photo interpretation school with him. Arriv- Ghormi CW Zealand on 16 July, he reported to Admiral Ka now Commander-in-Chief, South Pacific with the geography and topography of the ocean and land areas where its forces would later fight. What little information existed came from United Kingdom colonial administrators, copra planters, sailors, or people involved in the copra trade. Available charts and tide tables were old and often unreliable. Sources frequently disagreed on tide conditions and water depths. To most Americans, the Pacific islands were all the same, with pristine waters, white sand beaches, colorful coral reefs, swaying palm trees, and populated by Dorothy Lamour look-alikes in sarongs.
The Japanese had pushed the Allies back to India and Burma, to Australia and New Guinea, to Hawaii, and Alaska. Unlike the war in Europe, the enemy’s bases of operation in the Pacific were often beyond the bombing range of Army, Navy, and Marine Corps aircraft, and there was little precise and reliable information on the disposition of the Japanese fleet. Placing aerial cameras in carrier strike aircraft met with stiff resistance from those in command. One admiral, who was approached at the start of the Battle of the Coral Sea with the suggestion that an aerial camera be used to photograph the enemy fleet, replied, “Hell, I am not going to put a 100-pound camera in one of my aircraft just to take pictures when I can carry one more 100- pound bomb instead.” Throughout 1942, many enthusiastic photo interpreters assigned to the fleet or forward areas, anxious to demonstrate the value of photo interpretation, found their superiors indifferent, aerial photographs scarce, and themselves assigned to duties not associated with their training.
As part of their flight training program, Navy and Marine Corps aviators were given a short ship and aircraft identification course. The usual method was to flash silhouettes on the screen for diminishing periods with the students attempting to identify the ship or aircraft. Later, placards with a number of silhouettes of
ana'
communication centers, etc. Detailed studies also
et
Without much practice, photo interpreters at JICPOA soon replaced inadequate information, collected from less-than-reliable sources, with detailed target maps like Moen, below, developed from reconnaissance photos like the one of Maloelap Island in the Marshalls, right. This island base was later reduced to a pile of coral rubble.
Japanese aircraft or naval vessels were hung in briefing rooms and training areas. Unfortunately, by the time the aviators reached the combat theaters, most of this information had been forgotten. Aircrew debriefings following combat operations often provided conflicting information. It was soon realized that in the excitement of combat, dodging flak, and fighting off interceptors, aviators made poor observers. The often-quoted statement of a returning aviator was, “I sighted an unidentified destroyer or a possible aircraft carrier.”
Intelligence officers, noting the variety and discrepancy of reporting, recommended using cameras before, during, and after combat flight operations. It was not long before the larger aircraft carriers had a complement of four aircraft and six pilots assigned to photo missions, while light and escort carriers had two photo planes and three pilots. Photographic units became part of the carrier air groups and flew most missions. The aerial cameras soon provided vital information on the movement and disposition of the Japanese naval and merchant fleets. The photography also captured activity in harbors and shipbuilding and repair facilities, ship concentrations, and the outfitting of fleets for action.
As the specialists’ experience increased, aerial photography provided definitive information on new classes of naval and merchant ships.
Commander Quackenbush had established the South Pacific Photographic Interpretation Unit on Espiritu Santo Island in the New Hebrides archipelago. The early Pacific operations were characterized by harsh experiences, resource improvisation, and ad hoc per' sonal initiatives. To obtain aerial photos of Guadak^. nal, cameras were removed from Marine Corps ait** and installed in an Army Air Corps B-17. Comma111 Quackenbush operated the cameras for this mission- After being attacked by a number of float-equipped Japanese Zeros, and shooting several down, the B-1 returned and the film was processed and interpreted- Despite these efforts, a number of snafus allowed d1® t 1st Marines to go ashore on Guadalcanal without aefl. photos or up-to-date maps of the island. Although 11 ‘ and aerial photos were later dropped to the assault troops, criticism of the photo interpretation process abounded.
The need for up-to-date information for future aS' saults on Japanese-held islands was clear. The ‘‘UIlC trolled mosaic” proved invaluable in these endeavofS, A reconnaissance plane assigned to photograph an a’|( flew a predetermined track at a given altitude. The was developed, prints made, assembled, and the c°n' pleted mosaic quickly dispatched to the military p'al1[f: ning organizations. This could be done within days ^ one case, it was done within 34 hours. Once the enc territory had been photographed, the photo interpret, would painstakingly study and extract information 1 . the photos on coastal defenses, airfields, supply da11 lyzed beaches and their defenses, approaches, and egresses in preparation for amphibious landings. . e While secrecy had to be maintained in the plann|a- stage, once a military operation was approved, the naval and ground commanders and the airmen had t0 be thoroughly briefed. The three-dimensional terrain model, based on information derived from aerial j, photos, was new to personnel in the Pacific theater- gave aviators an invaluable bird’s-eye view of targr objectives such as harbors, coves, airfields, and . (jt beaches. The model also gave ground troops a real11, concept of potential battle problems and helped amphibious troops devise routes of access to avoid oh cles. In the beginning, photo interpreters were told use “local” materials to create the models. This as ally meant raiding the medics for plaster of paris,
which Thi
was then molded onto a piece of plywood.
la(ese m°dels were heavy and did not transport well. plaer Models were cast in rubber, synthetic rubber, and CaS'(js’ which made them not only lightweight but |;l a e °f being rolled up or folded and thrown about 7 fugs.
*n fanui
tiodei
fourse
ary 1943, a two-week postgraduate course in making was added to the photo interpretation
lal . at Anacostia. As the quality and quantity of aer- holograph
Photography increased, selected graduates of the
interpretation course were sent to the Land-
,ng W,
mique School (later named the Terrain Model-
orkshop) located at the Museum of Natural His- 1>iak'ln ^£W City for a six-week course in model /\n 'n§- Still later, the course would be moved to As$C°St'a’ where, under the leadership of Arthur .. > many new innovations to model making were
toi
cjfjcUt^ated and unreliable charts and tide tables of Pa- on g's!ands proved tragically inadequate in the assault as jq2?0 ^s*and in the Tarawa Atoll. Sources disagreed \vereae erratic tide conditions and U. S. planners arHnh KrCed to use consensus estimates in drawing up lan^nl0Us landing procedures. Many of the heavier thUs ® craft ran aground on the surrounding coral reef, dead,exP°s'ng riflemen and pack-howitzer crews to to tr/lenerny fire as they desperately tried to transfer Sutr 6C^ amPh'hious landing craft or wade ashore, ply . Seciuently, the Navy pressed Washington to sup- Water .ai*ec^ intelligence on beach conditions, tides, and °ther ■ ePl^s over the reefs that fringed the atolls of agelsiand archipelagos. Frequent photographic cover- tiitt’ed °n® 'mProved interpretation techniques, per- staC|e .rtl0re accurate determination of underwater ob- Phot()S anc* tides. Interpreters employed stereo deten“raPhy, preferably using Sonne strip cameras, to c0ulci 'ne water depths. In waters where the bottom rpineti e seen, depths down to 20 feet could be deter- an jnWlth confidence from aerial photographs using Hot tr, runient called a stereocomparagraph. In waters WaVe ,nsParent, wave refraction, wave length, and tionio ^ e,ghts were measured and by using separate he obfraPhs, a depth profile of the landing area could
newly organized U. S. Navy Underwater nature'1100 ^eams to determine the depths of water and facjjit fee^ °hstacles, and to provide information to Wiree the removal of mines, tetrahedrons, posts, a variety of other enemy-placed obstacles In ., to impede beachhead landings.
Pteters2 ear,y stages of the Pacific War, photo inter- jtttowi ^ere seriously handicapped by their lack of 'Ustaii -^e JaPanese culture, military and industrial
mined.
°to interpretation centers also worked in concert
itaiiat -. -
er$ ^ ons, equipment, and practices. Photo interpret- lhjs ^to recently captured Japanese islands addressed ^tl sif.1Clency. They made notes, took photographs,
‘Jap through captured materials. The report, photosCSe Installations at Attu and Kiska, Aerial
ar|d Ground Reconnaissance,” is a classic study
containing the best of aerial photography and ground reconnaissance. Arthur C. Lundahl, who served as a Navy photo interpreter at Adak, Alaska, and later became the director of the National Photographic Interpretation Center, recalls:
“Constant feedback of experience was the secret of the Navy’s success. Lessons were studied and rigorously applied. Information uncovered in the field was immediately incorporated into the photo interpretation course. A constant stream of information kept the photo interpreters in the field aware of the latest techniques and findings.”
In the spring of 1943, the Navy began sending experienced photo interpreters from the Pacific to Anacostia to revise the curriculum. Meanwhile, as the quantity and quality of ground and aerial reconnaissance increased, interpreters in the field and at Anacostia created a profusion of photo interpretation reports on such subjects as Japanese supply depots, searchlights, pillboxes, camouflage, barricades, radio-radar, military buildings, mechanized equipment, aircraft, small craft, field artillery, and naval vessels.
Not only were the photo interpreters getting better, but the reconnaissance aircraft aerial cameras were improving. New developments included continuous strip cameras, trimetrogon cameras, night-flash photography, and radar scope photography. The trimet camera was hailed as one of the greatest accomplishments for mapping purposes during the war. This system comprised three wide-angle cameras arranged so that the center one shot straight down and those to the left and right shot at angles. The three cameras provided horizon-to- horizon coverage. A single aircraft equipped with a trimet camera system could photograph some 20.000 square miles in three hours.
The U. S. Navy established the Northern Pacific Interpretation Unit at Adak, Alaska, while the Southern Pacific Interpretation Unit was moved from Espiritu Santo to Guadalcanal. Interpretation Squadron Two on Guam supplied intelligence to carrier task forces and surface fleet vessels, along with the amphibious and ground forces under Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Area. Interpretation Squadron Two was also responsible for interpreting the photography taken by the Navy photographic detachments assigned to carrier forces. Interpretation units on board carriers and on the command ships of the amphibious forces provided immediate intelligence support. The Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas (JICPOA), at Pearl Harbor, and the Photo Interpretation Center at Anacostia provided valuable backup and support services. JICPOA collated pertinent data derived from aerial photos into comprehensive intelligence reports and also prepared a variety of special targeting reports. One of the most significant contributions of JICPOA was the quality reproduction of target briefing charts of enemy installations. These illustrated simply and completely information that no amount of written material could have conveyed as well. The effectiveness of Allied air.
^<ti
ill8s! June 1987
49
tational assignment and distribution of photo interp1
ret'
ers, which allowed the Navy to keep abreast of the
instructors; others became subject specialists, provi^
iptef'
prefers were often asked for more than the dimensi1
of the objects shown. The increasing sophistication l’ weapon systems demanded increasing precision in |lV
photogrammetry course as part of the photo interpf^
sea, and ground attacks can be attributed in part to these charts.
Most Navy and Marine Corps aviators remember the JICPOA target packet they carried. It consisted of: (1) a general map showing magnetic headings and mileage in increments of 200 miles; (2) a target map showing the islands of an atoll; (3) a target detail map showing the results of photo interpretation; (4) a target approach (aerial oblique) photo; and (5) a target detail photo identifying the principal targets on a specific island. In the case of a small target, the packet would consist of six pages. With a more complex target, such as Truk, the package consisted of 17 pages.
Photo interpreters became so adept at locating and identifying enemy antiaircraft weapons that they were often called upon to help determine the safest target approach and departure routes for strike aircraft. The science became so advanced that photo interpreters aided in the creation of a new planning tool: flak charts, which showed the location, number, and caliber of weapons and provided the mechanical limitations of such weapons, as well as the best altitude and speed for the attacking aircraft.
An important function performed by the photo interpreter was the preparation of BDA (bomb damage assessment) reports. These determined how many bombs actually hit their targets, along with their effectiveness. By carefully analyzing photos taken before, during, and after an attack, the photo interpreter could determine whether all objectives were met or further bombing missions were necessary. Often, the photo interpreter could determine how long it would be before a target installation could be operational again.
There were several areas, however, where the photo interpreters had trouble providing the intelligence required. The greatest deficiency was in locating the many tunnels and caves the Japanese used in defensive operations. Aerial photos provided few or no indications as to the entrances of the tunnels or caves, their lengths, or their functions. The Japanese were masters at using natural materials for intensive camouflage, concealment, and deception, and these tactics were often effective in concealing weapons from the photo interpreter. In addition, the Japanese use of dummies and decoys created further difficulties for photo interpreters. The dummies which had been carefully copied in detail were frequently misinterpreted as real.
As the Allies gained control of the skies, and photo reconnaissance became increasingly sophisticated, the Japanese moved troops and supplies at night. While daytime photography showed little or no activity, night photography employing powerful “flash bombs” often revealed just the opposite. During the early days of the New Guinea campaign, U. S. commanders were puzzled by the continuing Japanese ability to supply their advanced forces. Although supplies had to be transported over the Owen Stanley Mountains, daytime photography showed no signs of transportation activities. Night photography, however, revealed the location and routes of the mule-powered supply trains.
The Navy had no organized plan for managing the assignment of qualified photo interpreters and no cefl‘ tral file listing the billets to which the officers were assigned. Often training school graduates discharged duties having no relation to their specialties. Late m 1943, however, the Navy took steps to establish active establish such a system. One of the unheralded ind'vl uals in this effort was Lieutenant Natalie Hoyt, who has been described as “a human dynamo and a me111 ory bank.” It was her job to keep track of all Navy and Marine Corps interpreters and their training, sPe cialties, and duty stations. The result improved the r° transient and changing requirements of prosecuting ^ Pacific War. Some of the officers on rotation served
special reports for the fleet; some worked at develop^ and testing newer reconnaissance systems such as c° photography, infrared, and side-looking radar; and 1 rest attended the advanced interpretation courses i° Anacostia. v.
Photogrammetry always had been the exclusive Pr. ( ince of the mapmaker but, during World War II, 'n course of presenting data to their superiors, photo
suration. The Navy recognized the need to formally train photogrammetrists and incorporated an advance tion curriculum. Lieutenant Stephen Johnson, who 1 returned to Anacostia from the Aleutians, was sum' moned by Lieutenant Commander Richard O. “Retl Greene, the officer-in-charge. Johnson recalled, “o , I told me when the first class should start and how 1° " j the program should be. The subject matter was left me.” Johnson selected two associates, lieutenants . H. L. Gustafson and Robert Johnson, and together visited the military and civilian organizations enga?e
interpretation efforts were launched to sup- 'nvasions of the Philippines, Okinawa, and
Port
the
^aPping and photogrammetric activities. Drawing , he best of Washington expertise and incorporates combat
experience and field conditions, Johnson I944 °Ped a ten-week course which began in February teretj' Officers returning to the center on rotation en- fr()rt) ;'e course, as well as selected officers graduating pi he photo interpretation course, the pnn'n£ an amphibious landing on a small atoll in largep11?1^0 Was one thing, but planning the invasion of anc^ masses defended by forces of greater mag- Ptobl Un^ soPhistication presented extremely complex hist0^- The greatest photo interpretation effort in l0rdrj, Was applied to preparations for Operation Over- tetp’ e Normandy landings of 6 June 1944. Photo in- dayse ers Poured over thousands of aerial photos for •ions’ ^'HPomting enemy beach defenses, troop disposi- tati0r^ rac*ars’ and lines of communication and transporter*0 beaches. It was the interpreters who se- andanalyzed, and constantly monitored the beaches f°rceIr orne landing areas to be assaulted by Allied 'v°nie 1'^ore than 1,700 officers and enlisted men and of 0vn w°rking around the clock studied a daily take took I"' 85 >000 negatives and prints. This task alone
sivp 0re lhan a half million man-hours. Other mas- e Photo
Southern France.
In May 1945, with the war in Europe over, many interpreters were transferred to the Pacific, where the massive preparation for the invasion of the Japanese homeland was under way. The urban and industrial analysis of the Japanese mainland, along with the beach intelligence program, was well advanced when the Japanese surrendered on 14 August 1945.
After the war, President Harry S Truman authorized the United States Strategic Bombing Survey to conduct an evaluation of photographic intelligence in the Pacific. Its conclusion:
“Although viewed with indifference and skepticism at the beginning of World War II, aerial photography ultimately became one of the most important single sources of intelligence in the Pacific War. They played an important part in more phases of military and naval operations than any other source.’’
Moreover, the contributions made by the 831 Anacostia graduates set the stage and provided the impetus for subsequent decades of achievement in the science of military and civilian photo interpretation.
Mr. Brugioni is a former senior official and a reconnaissance and photo interpretation expert for the Central Intelligence Agency. During World War II, he flew in 66 bombardment and a number of reconnaissance missions over North Africa, Italy, France, Germany, and Yugoslavia, for which he was decorated. Mr. Brugioni writes extensively on the application of aerial photography to intelligence and other fields and is a past contributor to Proceedings.
My Dad Made Models
By Commander Peter Mersky, U. S. Naval Reserve
lllRs 1 June 1987
connaissance effort. Every type of aircraft was used, from singleengine fighters modified to carry cameras, to four-engine B-24 Liberator bombers with more sophisticated equipment.
Photos, as well as other intelligence, were funneled into Washington, D. C., but advanced area centers were soon necessary to analyze and get the information out more rapidly to the operational commanders. Intelligence ser
The m. .
an<j sany islands of the central hits aWest Pacific were little •he ear|"e°TraPhic mystery until tilted ^TOs, when war dic- he obtat a great many hard facts ttated .lnec^ and quickly dissemination? °Perati°nal commands. Opuses ^ aSainst Japan’s far-flung 'east inU.?^ on best-guesswork, at ^Hied , e ear*y stages of the ?P°nseC?untero^ensive- re_ 4l*ncheH 6 United States
a vast photographic reV* vice activities were thus centralized at Makalapa, Pearl Harbor, in the Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas (ICPOA) building, in July 1942. The nucleus of the center was the Combat Intelligence Unit, which included most of the people assigned to the center, roughly 35 officers and 91 enlisted men. Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, one of the most illustrious figures in U. S. Navy intelligence during the war, was
51