The Maritime-Continental Debate Isn’t Over

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The continental versus maritime debate is tangled in the tightly woven threads of the deterrence curtain. The continental school focuses too myopically on the Central Front, while the maritime school is too rash in its insistence on risky,

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early in a war. The ploit this division.

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school argues that control over land area is the organt principle of nation-states and politics. Man lives on

communication. The situation on the land today is on^e

Land strength, manifested by armies and air forces.^s

wage a protracted conventional war in central E^ur°^ A war between the two blocs that orig should be confined to Europe, in the continentalist ■ - ,| Efforts to take the war elsewhere reduce the forces a able for the war in the center, and thus incur high risK

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At all levels, strategic questions that were long ad­dressed only in private or classified forums are being thrown open to renewed examination, and possibilities for change loom large. Several seminal altera­tions have already occurred; four stand out.

► First is the move away from mutual assured destruction (MAD) as the central guiding principle for strategic nu­clear forces. A variety of reasons can be cited for this change, but the most important revolves around the appro­priateness of MAD as a deterrent threat. Although it truly frightened Western decision makers and their constituents, MAD failed to come to grips with either of the fundamen­tal requirements of a deterrent threat. Mutual assured de­struction did not have the capability to attack in retaliation the assets Kremlin holds most dear—the levers of political control; and MAD lacked credibility because the threat to kill large fractions of the Soviet population in response to an attack appeared disproportionate, invited escalation to even more devastating levels of warfare, and was morally troublesome.

► The second change, related to the first, is the long-term strategic goal of emphasizing strategic defenses at the di­rect and lasting expense of strategic offensive forces. The short, ahistoric, and non-strategic but torrid U. S. ro­mance with strategic offensive nuclear forces was cooled by a fresh presidential vision of strategic defenses. Even the prospect of strategic defense, whatever the anticipated level of effectiveness, sparked important strategic debate and breathed new life into arms control talks.

► Third is the embrace of forward-reaching offensive ca­pabilities for European defense. This has been termed “deep strike” or “follow-on forces attack,” which must be seen as a direct attempt to thwart Soviet strategy rather than merely to show a willingness to absorb the adver­sary’s first, and, presumably, best, shot. Like strategic defense and counterforce strategic targeting, attaining these capabilities has provoked firestorms of criticism from those who appear satisfied only when Western mili­tary forces and populations are permitted to be nothing more than potential sponges for enemy weapons.

► The fourth new factor is the U. S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, which has also spawned a lively exchange of views on the best way to implement national policy. This essay will focus on this question—generally termed the maritime/continental debate—while acknowledging that the other three are as vital and related.

What are the causes for these fundamental changes? For one, they represent a belated adjustment to the loss of U. S. strategic superiority. The United States enjoyed undeniable superiority in strategic forces throughout the 1940s and 1950s. Superiority devalues strategy since any strategy is a winning one for the superior force. For more equal military forces, however, strategy, leadership, mo­rale, and luck historically have made the difference.

Another related reason is the new “common wisdom” about war. Widely accepted, this vision maintains that war is neither useful nor profitable for any belligerent, that there can be no victors in war, that the use of nuclear weapons in war is to be avoided at all costs, and that, for all those reasons, war itself should be avoided. Never mind that these premises are contentious. In today world, they are beginning to form the context wiO^l( which debate and decisionmaking take place.

The Debate: The German philosopher Georg Wilhd^ Friedrich Hegel observed that history teaches us that m³ learns nothing from history. Thus, issues often spin ⁰ well-worn axes that are either forgotten or unapprecia^te The ongoing maritime-continental emphasis debate ha^s roots deep in the past, from the time sea-based emp^l<i first came into being. Today, it retains its essence but molded to fit the current context.

The lines of the current debate are fairly easily dra'^vjjj and easily comprehended. They are summarized belo^ : schools of thought without attribution, for they are not t views of any one person, but of a mindset. Some of¹ attributes of the two schools are not ones they claim themselves, but ones projected on them by their oppone¹¹

The Continental School: The so-called confine¹]¹

land, not in the sea, and control of the land far superb ^ in importance control over maritime areas or sea lines

which the Soviet Union enjoys control of the geopoW¹¹' Heartland of British geographer Sir Halford John kinder, fields massive conventional armed forces, maintains a political system and philosophy hostile to Western political structure and values. To resist and ^ the realities of Soviet power requires strength on laⁿ° every possible point of attack.

ficient to provide the counterweight to Soviet migW not be provided by any Western country acting alone; - ~ lition is required. In addition, the credibility of NA 1 strategy, hinging as it does on the threat of the use nuclear weapons to offset conventional weaknesses tive to Soviet and Warsaw Pact strengths, has eroded ⁰ the years and has been devalued, especially by the str3 J gic nuclear parity between the United States and the So^vl Union. Concurrently, the Eastern-bloc countries been improving their conventional capabilities. This H amounts to a large and growing shortfall in Western ^c° ventional strength, which must be redressed if deterre¹¹ is to remain effective..   A

Most distressing and frightening is the mounting S<T• „ capability to carry out a “lightning” thrust through NA * defenses, the momentum and impact of which ^c° knock NATO out of the war before it could react, O^-^, before reinforcement plans could take effect). Con^v^_|t tional forces need staying power—not just for days- ₍₍₎ for weeks and months. They need this staying p^ovV®^r _t() deter the blitzkrieg, not because it would be desirab

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failure to defend the principal object of the war,

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that pinpricks on his flanks or rear will dissuade the ₎g^ressor from the undistracted pursuit of his primary ob- ^1Ve is to seriously, perhaps fatally, misunderstand the _a , ^atlon- It is akin to smashing oneself on the foot to cure ₍₎₍, ^ea^^ach^e- Moreover, even if military actions at places ®^r than the point of attack might appear attractive, the _s 5 ⁽i°^es not have sufficient forces—either on land or Ren °^rne7~^t0 pursue multiple actions simultaneously in f'cr ^8raphical|y separate areas. The Kremlin has excess t_eci_i^{es an}d many better options for using this strategic ⁿⁱque. Consequently, proponents of this school con- attack from seaward axes. For example, while no place in the United States is farther than 1,500 kilometers from the ocean, Soviet strategic depth is more than twice that, on the order of 3,300 kilometers. Moreover, 45 important U. S. cities, with a combined population of 75 million people, lie within 850 kilometers of the hundred-fathom curve at sea, while the comparable figure for the Soviet Union is but six important cities with a population of 2.2 million. Thus, vulnerability from the sea is asymmetrical. Economically, the Soviet Union is one of the most self­sufficient countries in the world; it has no severe depen-

To resist and avoid the realities of Soviet power requires strength on land at every possible point of attack.

^hat horizontal escalation would be to NATO’s net , Outage. Sequential, rather than simultaneous, action to v^{St We Can} h⁰P^e ^^or' Thus, the West has no choice *^eeP its attention and effort locked firmly on the if | ^re defeat would mean disaster.

_0n^a. the important countries in the world, the Soviet ^ls perhaps the most, impervious and insensitive to

dencies on international trade, either in imports or exports.

Therefore, by virtue of its geographic gifts—strategic depth and natural resources—the Soviet Union is quite insensitive to the kind of pressure maritime forces can provide. For these reasons, and because the Soviet Union maintains an exceptionally powerful military capability to negate the effect of attacks from the sea, the continentalist

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school argues that power projection from the sea by other than strategic submarines is expensive, excessively risky, and cannot deliver strategically significant blows to the adversary.

Even if the opposing fleet could be decisively defeated, that would not guarantee that the war would not be lost ashore. Therefore, in continentalist logic, a maritime em­phasis to U. S. strategy conveys to its allies a deep-seated desire not to become entangled in a land war on the conti­nent, a retrograde movement toward isolationism, and an implicit unwillingness to bear the burdens of alliance. This is frequently referred to as the “sin of unilateralism.” Those who argue for emphasis on land-based forces in Europe call for a program of increased defense outlays on conventional forces by all allies, better rationalized bur­densharing, closer alliance cooperation, and more host- nation support for allied forces. They also recommend reduced budget priority for maritime forces.

The Maritime School: Proponents of maritime emph^aSls in U. S. and NATO strategy contend that conditions toJ*¹' are significantly different than at the onset of World

II, and that must be taken into account. By the time United States entered the fighting in World War II,

Germany had leapfrogged its geographic strictures

States, moreover, took a long time to obtain the forces strategy necessary to deal with the submarine threat. C⁰”¹,

able to follow defensive courses. Conditions today, °ⁿ ^ other hand, tend to favor strong, early offensive acti°ⁿ j maritime forces; the NATO coalition, led by the V- ■ Navy, can take advantage of the edge it has at sea oiw that edge is exploited.     p

The maritime school says that to deter a Soviet atta^c , Europe one must do more than threaten to defeat the ™

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his t^Sl^ °^{P war}’ Hitler believed that dimension was e_Ven° njodulate; and even though he made blunders that

al₀ ^UallY caused his defeat, at the outset of the war he \v_ar,^{e c}°ntrolled the magnitude of combat. In terms of the w_as ^S §^e°graphic scope, his assessment was that his rear his |'^CtUred by conquest and by treaty with the Soviets, gee/ ^rate§'^c left flank was fortified by a combination of lta|v^raphy’ bis opponents’ weakness, and his alliance with c^nd he took the precaution of invading and gaining

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also h^nter' blbler believed that the time dimension was a_ncj _c ^otb in his favor and under his sway. The swiftness

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the n ^ defense, then, must recognize that weakness on land ^^{ks can} cause collapse in the center. Norway, Ice- pr_eVg ^c Danish straits, and NATO’s Mediterranean states eit(_lerⁿi^^ovi^et forces from outflanking NATO’s center. If abiijty ^{3nk Were} *^ost’ ^{or even} 'b the Soviets acquired the

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₀ ^{armies on} g^round 'ⁿ West Germany. Rather, (W ^{aas t0} threaten Soviet core values. Offering a stout e]_e^{enSe at} point of attack constitutes only one of the _erap^ents °f the deterrent fabric. The whole cloth has sev- the ^IT1°^re breads, namely, the prospect that the conflict Plan^attaC^^Cr Unites might not turn out to be what he l_e ^nec* for in terms of intensity, geographic scope, or stre ^ deterrence depends not only on maintaining alte_r ^w*^lere attacks might occur, but on threatening to °_{r (}.^ne war in its various dimensions: intensity, breadth,

g_r^°lph Hitler was not deterred in 1940 by the Allied W_er ^{na an(}l air forces on the continent, even though they t),_r ^{6 ar}§^uably superior to his own. What then of the ^{a s} in the fabric of deterrence? With regard to the

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^I'°th'^{UCCeSS 0p attac}b^s right to the English Channel did thr_e."J^ ^to disabuse him of that conviction; thus, the time Was also absent from the deterrent fabric.

On _t,^aril'rne strategists suggest that about all allied forces ^c°ni r ^^round and in the air over Central Europe can ac- attack^1S^ *^{S t0 meet} f°^{rce w}ifh like force at the point of Hi_arjj.’ ^be other strategic dimensions are the province of ^re_nc_c"'^lc forces, and they are no less important to deter- it j_s jv Unlike Hitler, Soviet leaders should not believe that ^0r the ^W^° ^contro' 'b^e intensity, the geographic spread, jgj_c^{6 ea}gth of a war they might initiate. And, since stra- %at_e^Parity ^{has er}°ded the credibility of U. S. action at the in g_u^^lc *^eve* 0-e., a strategic response to a ground attack ^Cern$^rtu^)e^ deterrent leverage lies in Soviet planners’ con- (W.„. ^taat they could control neither the course nor the _M^lt_A^,0n Of ;

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operate more freely in the Atlantic, then NATO

iD_e|^{Vc ear}ly reinforcement and resupply from the North dey^^^{11 c}°ntinent. Accordingly, the flanks must not be

tio_re^tke *'^na^ ^analysis, continental defense should rest !?«fcTS.^ly on the shoulders of the allies who, after all, ^cha_n ^In Europe. Not only has the strategic situation ^abe_r5? • ^markedly, but the economic situation has also b)r_ni |ⁿ ways not fully understood. When NATO was V" 1949, the U. S. gross national product equalled fbe rest of the world combined. Today, not count­ⁱⁿ®^s! June 1987 ing the United States, the other 15 NATO countries have a greater gross national product than the entire Warsaw Pact, including the Soviet Union. The United States spends more than 7% of its gross national product on de­fense; its NATO allies average less than half of that. This means that more than 300,000 U. S. servicemen and women in Europe provide more than a token of U. S. involvement and commitment. The allies should contrib­ute marginal dollars for conventional land and tactical air forces, and the United States should concentrate on and emphasize the area in which it has a survival interest and a current and inherent advantage—sea power.

The maritime school’s argument that has the ring of finality is that certainly the United States intends to assist and provide forces for a stout defense in Central Europe, for to lose in Europe would be a calamity. But for the United States, as the past has demonstrated, losing on the continent need not be the end of the war. If, however, the United States were to lose at sea as the allies were losing ashore, that would be the ultimate disaster short of a stra­tegic nuclear exchange.

Where Is the Truth? An anecdote appeared in the Pro­ceedings several decades ago about a destroyer unit flag­ship whose officer of the deck (OOD) was unaware that the division commander had executed a turn signal from the flag bridge. When the frustrated commodore ap­proached the unwitting OOD with the question: “Why isn’t the flagship turning?” the OOD responded, “Be­cause the rudder’s amidships, sir.” Perhaps, like the com­modore’s, the wrong questions are being asked in the maritime-continental debate.

The two sides are much too starkly drawn. Frequently, in the rush to score debating points, the schools—or those who attribute certain positions to the two schools— approach caricature. Thus, the continental school appears to devalue Soviet strategy, to ignore the essential elements of deterrence, to focus myopically on NATO’s center, and thus appears to be unwilling to provide adequately for flank or at-sea dimensions of defense of the continent. The maritime persuasion would seem almost willing to lose on the ground, rash in its insistence on risky, low-payoff for­ward operations early in a war, and reliant on strategic maritime depth as a cushion for U. S. security, narrowly defined.

In fact, each should acknowledge that maritime and continental forces are complementary. The question at issue addresses the proper mix of conventional forces at the margin. Indeed, the maritime school acknowledges that maritime power is necessary but not sufficient for victory, which must be earned on the ground. At the same time, the continental school recognizes the importance of controlling the seas to success on the continental European battlefield.

To be sure, the arguments are never open and shut. While both recognize that the preponderance of strength on the ground lies with the Warsaw Pact forces, there is genuine disagreement among reasonable men as to whether NATO’s conventional capability is or is not cur­rently adequate. There is ample room for debate on how

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